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The thesis is concerned primarily with the objective 
credibility or realism of the official Soviet account of Peaceful 
Coexistence, detente and related issues. This question of credibility 
is regarded as methodologically prior to the question of the 
reliability or otherwise of Soviet doctrine as an index of Soviet 
intentions. But the concern of the current American debate on 
Soviet doctrine has been overwhelmingly with the second question, 
reflecting an apparent consensus among otherwise opposed groups that 
Soviet doctrine does not provide a realistic perspective on the 
problems of the contemporary great power relationship. The 
epistemological and substantive assumptions implied in such a 
consensus are considered and rejected; and it is argued that the 
'schizophrenic' Soviet account, with its combination of a limited 
commitment to stable great power coexistence and a continuing 
expectation of revolutionary ferment in the Third World, does 
provide a generally realistic perspective on the problems in question. 
It is further argued that the process of adaptation to the unique 
features of international relations is continuing in Soviet doctrine} 
and that arguments which seek to demonstrate on doctrinal grounds 
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1.
INTRODUCTION
This thesis is addressed to the contemporary American debate over 
the significance of official Soviet doctrine on Peaceful Coexistence, 
detente, nuclear deterrence and related issues for the interpretation 
of Soviet behaviour and intentions in these areas. In particular, 
it opposes the hostile 'reading' of Soviet doctrine advanced by the 
influential group of American analysts designated here as the 'hawk' 
group (in the sense that they ascribe hawkish intentions to the 
Soviet Union, not that they necessarily prescribe hawkish policies for 
the United States).1 But, more generally, it also seeks to open out 
the polemical confrontation between Soviet and American perspectives 
by locating this in a wider debate over the adequacy of contemporary 
Western international theory - a debate which calls in question 
several of the basic criteria against which Soviet doctrine is 
implicitly assessed in much American discussion. Indeed, this dual 
focus of the thesis constitutes its chief claim to originality in an 
otherwise well-trodden field. For the argument is that Soviet doctrine 
is most usefully considered not as an isolated body of ideological 
formulae, whose truth content is to be assessed by reference to a 
genuinely 'theoretical' Western standpoint, but as a contribution in 
its own right to the evolving body of contemporary international theory; 
and that the confrontation of Soviet and mainstream American 
assumptions raises serious questions for both sides of the debate.
The broad implications for the thesis of defining it as a study 
of international theory rather than as a study merely of Soviet 
doctrine will be explored below. However, this definition also has 
important specific implications for the internal structure of the 
argument, in respect both of the type of material presented and of 
the order of its presentation, and it may be best to approach the wider 
theoretical issues through a brief consideration of these questions 
of structure.
Part I (Chapter 1 only) surveys the postwar American literature 
on the Soviet approach to interstate coexistence and detente, relating 
developments in that literature to more general trends in American 
political thinking, on the one hand, and to the changing context of
* The term doctrine is used here in a general sense. The thesis does not 
follow the sharp distinction between doctrinal and other elements of Soviet 
discourse sometimes proposed in the American debate.
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Soviet-American relations, on the other. In particular, it attempts 
to account for the re-emergence, in the era of formal detente, of 
intense debate about the significance of Soviet doctrine as an index 
of Soviet intentions, and for the victory in this context of the hawk 
image of a settled Soviet rejection, allegedly confirmed from the 
'horse's mouth', of the essential prerequisites of stable great power 
coexistence - a victory capped by the movement of leading hawk analysts 
into important posts in the defence and foreign policy apparatus of the 
Reagan administration. The argument here is that this victory was 
greatly facilitated by the pervasiveness in the American debate of 
ethnocentric assumptions about international 'stability', which 
retained their power even in the decade or so before 1972 - when concern 
about Soviet doctrine temporarily gave way to a focus upon 'objective' 
constraints on Soviet behaviour - and which in turn allowed the hawk 
group to reconstitute the debate about doctrine around a very 
narrowly defined set of questions.
In this sense, Part I also attempts to reconstruct the basic 
American 'problematic' of coexistence and detente: the shared 
constellation of questions which defines for most American analysts what
ois, and is not, a thing-to-be-explained in this regard. In turn, the 
major discrepancies between this and the apparent Soviet problematic 
provide the point of departure for Part II (Chapters 2-4), which 
attempts to situate the problem of Soviet-American coexistence against 
a rudimentary model of contemporary world politics fashioned around 
two sharply-counterposed 'spheres' of social interaction - the 'states- 
system' and 'transitional development' - characterized respectively by 
exceptional continuity and exceptional change. This Part constitutes 
the most obvious excursion into formal 'international theory' in the 
thesis, and much of the detailed argument takes the form of an immanent 
critique of the relevant segments of Western theory, both classical and 
behavioural. But the positive model developed here is consciously 
derived from a fundamental tension in the Soviet account - what William 
Zimmerman once described as an 'intellectual schizophrenia' regarding 
the relative conceptual claims of two competing 'scenarios' :4'international relations' and the 'world historical process'. It would 
seem to be precisely this persistence of an attenuated doctrine of 
world revolution alongside the insistent Soviet advocacy of Peaceful 
Coexistence (and the associated predilection for a strictly limited,
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'compartmentalized' view of detente) which accounts for much of the 
suspicion with which the coexistence doctrine is viewed in the American 
debate.5 However, I will be arguing that this 'schizophrenic' Soviet 
perspective, by effectively grounding the political continuities of the 
states-system in a wider historical context of fundamental socio-economic 
transformation, actually provides a more realistic depiction of the 
contradictory parameters of Soviet-American coexistence than does the 
general 'equilibrium' model which evidently informs most American 
analyses.
Although Part II thus involves an extended, if indirect, exploration 
of the basic categories of Soviet doctrine, the detailed exposition and 
critique of that doctrine is left to Part III (Chapters 5-7). The 
emphasis here is on the ongoing adaptation in the official Soviet 
account to those crucial structural features of interstate relations 
not accommodated in the original Leninist doctrine of world revolution. 
This adaptation, moreover, is depicted as continuing within the basic 
categories established by the Khrushchevian 'Peaceful Coexistence 
synthesis', adding significantly to the 'states-system' component of 
the Soviet perspective, though still falling far short of the convergence 
upon Western/American assumptions apparently anticipated by some 
American analysts in the 1960s.
Three points snould be noted about this discussion of Soviet 
doctrine. First, it is limited in extent (comprising less than half 
of the total thesis) and very selective in regard to the themes explored. 
There seems little point in adding to the already exhaustive exegesis 
of Soviet doctrine produced by the detente-era debate, which has itself 
largely reproduced the results of earlier endeavours predating the 
relative loss of American interest in doctrinal issues in the 1960s. 
However, the selection of themes here directly reflects both my reading 
of the American debate and my own judgement about the essential conditions 
of Soviet-American coexistence. Thus a full chapter has been allotted 
to Soviet military doctrine, because its implications stand at the very 
centre of the hawk argument, and because some measure of agreement on 
nuclear issues in particular is clearly essential to any form of stable 
coexistence at the great power level. By contrast, the important area 
of Soviet international law is touched on only incidentally here. This 
is in part because the already well-charted contradictions of the Soviet
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legal position have not emerged as a serious new issue in the contemporary 
debate.6 But it also reflects the judgement - the grounds for which are 
explored in Part II - that a large measure of Soviet-American disagreement 
over issues such as non-intervention is virtually inevitable in the 
present environment of world politics, and that such disagreement 
need not in itself preclude a condition of stable coexistence and 
limited detente between the two powers.
Second, the chief concern here is to elucidate the basic categories
of Soviet doctrine, and to trace the evolution of the basic Soviet line
on the issues under discussion. There is little attempt to examine in
detail particular doctrinal nuances (with the partial exception of the
chapter on Soviet military doctrine) and still less to distinguish
between 'genuine* and 'propagandists' elements - or, to borrow a
distinction popular in American strategic discourse, between 'action'
and 'declaratory' doctrine. Thus the approach largely by-passes a
central preoccupation of the American debate, which has been dominated
by the hawk tendency to dismiss 'detentist' Soviet pronouncements as
propaganda, while attributing special significance to formulations
suggesting an intractable hostility to Western 'imperialism'. I do
attempt to demonstrate that the hawk case rests upon the arbitrary
selection of the most unchanging elements of Soviet doctrine, as opposed
to the growing evidence of innovative developments of the theme of
coexistence. But more generally I would argue that the influence
of ethnocentric assumptions in the American debate has obscured the
objective basis of the contradictions in official Soviet doctrine, and
the fact that the consistency of its basic categories actually
facilitates substantial flexibility in the prescriptions - ranging from
detente to militant struggle - advanced in respect of particular
7'concrete' political situations.
Third, the endeavour here is to present a consciously historical 
treatment of Soviet doctrine, which places its evolution against the 
evolving context of contemporary world politics and the changing Soviet 
role therein. This is a dimension which is, in general, very inadequately 
handled in the American debate - by the hawk group as much as their 
opponents, despite the former's own emphatic claims to be redressing the 
a-historical treatment of the Soviet Union in the strategic debate of 
the 1960s. Indeed, I would argue that the continuing a-historical
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character of dominant American conceptions like deterrence provides the 
most obvious reason for the exaggerated American emphasis upon the 
distinction between genuine and propagandistic elements in Soviet 
doctrine. This is not to ignore the obvious aspect of manipulation 
of Soviet doctrine from above, in accordance with the changing tactical 
interests of the Soviet regime. But it is to suggest that a concentration 
upon this aspect alone, which ignores the ongoing engagement with 
reality of a crude but genuine scheme of historical explanation, is 
likely to miss the most important dimension of the problem.
This last point leads back to the central theoretical thrust of 
the thesis as a whole. It is explicitly envisaged as an exercise in 
'taking Soviet doctrine seriously' - a designation which the hawk 
analysts have attempted with considerable success to reserve to their 
own endeavours. But it construes this task in quite different terms 
from those w7hich have typically characterized the issue in the 
American debate. There the chief concern has been with the hawk 
contention that Soviet doctrine (or more precisely its most threatening 
components) is taken seriously by the Soviet leaders themselves, and 
hence provides an important guide to their intentions and possible 
behaviour. At the same time, there has been little direct attention 
to the question of whether Soviet descriptive and analytical claims 
warrant serious attention in their own right - though it is possible 
to detect an implicit consensus between the hawk group and many of 
their opponents that the Soviet world view, by virtue of its foundation 
in the Leninist theory of world revolution, is dangerously at variance
•7with the complex realities of an inescapably pluralist world.
This thesis, by contrast, focusses above all upon the issue of 
the credibility of the Soviet picture of world politics, arguing that its 
dualistic perspective offers a genuine theoretical contribution 
to our understanding of this complex area. And though it seems 
reasonable to assume that the Soviet leadership does subscribe in 
broad terms to the main elements of its doctrine as set out in this 
thesis, the issue of leadership beliefs is dealt with only incidentally 
here.
There are several important reasons for placing the issue of 
analytical credibility in the foreground of this general debate. To 
begin with, the question of whether the Soviet leadership still believes 
its own analytical claims assumes a quite different aspect if one
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accepts that these claims are, in general, believable rather than 
unbelievable. Such a judgement is not in itself incompatible with 
the emphasis on the legitimating function of ideology common among 
those American critics who accept the continuing importance of Soviet 
claims about world revolution and the anti-imperialist struggle.8 But 
it does provide a more obvious and straightforward reason for assuming 
that the Soviet leaders take their own doctrine seriously: namely that, 
like any set of policy makers, they require a conceptual framework in 
terms of which to impose some intellectual order on the international 
environment, and that the framework which they claim to espouse is, in 
general, an objectively plausible one.
Similarly, the question of adaptation, as well as continuity, in 
Soviet doctrine becomes less problematic when that doctrine is regarded 
as providing a reasonably credible account of the world. If no 'fit' 
between doctrine and reality is acknowledged, it is logical to expect 
that the doctrine will either be retained in toto (because of its 
legitimating or other functions) or jettisoned in toto, when its 
barrenness finally becomes inescapably plain. If, however, the 
doctrine is believed to combine major incoherencies with genuine 
explanatory power (a judgement which might be made of several national 
’world-views’), then one might reasonably look for an ongoing interplay 
of theory and practice, with continuity predominant in some periods 
and change predominant in others, but with the two elements closely 
interwoven in a complex historical dialectic.
Judgements on these issues may also do much to shape one's basic 
expectations about the Soviet Union as an international actor. If the 
regime's assertions about an unfolding world revolution are regarded 
as both analytically ridiculous and illustrative of a continuing deep 
alienation from the prevailing international order, one might expect 
to see myths about the objective course of history deployed as 
sanctions for subjective Soviet actions of a crudely imperialist kind 
- with the recent dramatic extension of Soviet military power offering 
special temptations to give the historical process a push. If, 
however, it is accepted that there is in some significant sense, a 
'world revolutionary process' (even if its impetus is primarily anti- 
Western, rather than directly pro-Soviet) the question becomes more 
complex. A degree of 'voluntarist' Soviet activity aimed at enforcing 
incremental change in the international status quo might still seem
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likely. But overall, one might expect the Soviets to be readier to 
wait on the course of history, less inclined to force square pegs into 
round holes, less disposed to imperil projected long term gains by the 
short term exploitation of raw military force. Of course, this 
distinction might appear irrelevant from a standpoint concerned primarily 
with the defence of 'American values'. But it is a crucial one for any 
discussion concerned with the general prospects for reasonably stable 
coexistence in a world of heterogeneous value systems.
Finally, I would argue that the question of credibility of Soviet 
doctrine is a more manageable question than those which have, in 
effect, dominated the American debate. It may initially seem much 
more modest to skirt the credibility issue - with its apparent implications 
of prior ontological judgements on the totality of world politics - and 
to confine oneself merely to setting out the most important elements 
of what the Soviets actually say. However, I will be attempting to 
show that far-reaching ontological judgements are already implied in the 
selection of 'important' elements of Soviet doctrine in the American 
debate; and since what the Soviets say must often appear blatantly 
contradictory m  terms of these assumptions, the question of importance 
inevitably merges with the question of who believes what within the 
Soviet policy making elite. It is difficult to see how such a question 
could be usefully answered in regard to, say, Carter administration 
pronouncements on 'human rights' or Reagan administration pronouncements 
on 'international terrorism'. In the Soviet context, it involves an 
excursion into the most speculative of all areas of Kremlinology.
By contrast, judgements on the credibility of Soviet doctrine do 
not require a complete ontology of contemporary world politics, but 
merely the identification of its most basic structural parameters - 
the underlying skeleton to which both great powers must adapt in a 
world in which power is dispersed and values heterogeneous. Thus 
delimited, the question of coexistence is a staple question - perhaps 
the staple question - of political theory. If there is any validity 
to the enterprise of social science in general, and Western international 
theory in particular, useful answers to it should be possible.
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For these various reasons, I believe that an important area of 
inquiry still remains in the heavily ploughed domain of 'taking Soviet 
doctrine seriously', and that the key to the enterprise lies in the 
recognition of that doctrine as a significant contribution to the 
general body of contemporary international theory. Admittedly, the 
Soviet theory identified here is far cruder and more impressionistic 
than its apologists could admit - the fruit, in Martin Wight's words, 
of 'a theory of domestic politics ... cut and tugged about to cover a
qmuch wider range of circumstances than it was originally designed for'. 
However, the argument here is that a.11 political theory is constructed 
in large part by analogous processes of ad hoG ’bricolage ' with such 
intellectual materials as lie to hand;10 and, more particularly, that 
theoretical perspectives on international politics must inevitably draw 
heavily upon the rationalization of particular domestic experiences.
The argument thus entails the rejection of any positivistic 
distinction between 'value-free' scientific theories and value-laden, 
action-oriented ideologies, identifying instead a single theoretical 
process of reflection upon previous practice and prescription for 
future practice. It is in this sense that the thesis as a whole may 
be characterized as a study in international theory, for the distinction 
between the overtly theoretical inquiry of Part II and the more polemical 
materials considered in the other two parts is one of degree rather 
than kind - between levels of abstraction within the one mode of discourse 
rather than between different modes of discourse.11
The only type of theory/ideology distinction acknowledged here is 
a practical one: between relatively 'open' problematics, in which the 
scope of a 'theoretical practice' is relatively free of constraints 
generated by a corresponding 'political practice', and relatively 
'closed' problematics, in which the theoretical practice is largely 
circumscribed in this sense.12 All social theory must be substantially 
influenced by such practical closure, which is a much more pervasive 
feature of mainstream American international theory than the 
characteristic self-definition of American 'pluralism' would suggest. 
Nonetheless, it is essential to emphasize the special intensity of the 
closure effected in the Soviet case by the political practices of 
Stalinism, and the enduring legacy of this for Soviet international
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theory.13 Thus contemporary Soviet bricolage on the coexistence issue 
is heavily circumscribed not just by the inevitable restrictions on 
the range of historical practice 'available' to theoretical reflection 
at a given moment, but also by specific political prohibitions on the 
range of concepts which may be borrowed from 'bourgeois' (and indeed 
other Marxist) sources; and an important goal of this thesis will 
be to explore the theoretical potential of the basic Soviet categories 
when these political inhibitions on ideological 'boundary crossing' 
are removed.
This rejection of any true/false, theory/ideology correlation may 
seem to undermine from the outset the prospect of a principled verdict 
on the objective credibility of Soviet doctrine. However, this hinges 
on the meaning attached to 'objectivity'; and the key consideration 
here is the above-mentioned notion of objective social structures. I 
will be rejecting the logical-empiricist identification of science with 
the piecemeal testing of discrete propositions against a realm of 
objective (in the sense of theory-neutral) facts, identifying it 
rather with the intersubg ective validation of truth claims through the 
hermeneutic mediation of competing 'frames of meaning' (problematics, 
'paradigms', 'conceptual worlds', etc.).14 However, since frames of 
meaning remain effectively 'incommensurable' if treated as irreducible 
wholes, the notion of such a scientific mediation process also implies 
the belief that their core truth claims are comparable in terms of 
reductionist assertions about basic structures which they explicitly 
or implicitly endorse. Thus, insofar as this thesis proposes its own 
composite 'conceptual world', the credibility of Soviet doctrine is 
assessed by reference to basic structural factors which,in this 
conceptual World3 are said to have an objective (i.e. real) existence.
It is also important to recognize two different kinds of 
structural factor implied in a given theoretical perspective on social 
life: other frames of meaning, which are said to have a real existence 
because of their reality for the actors concerned; and material 
structures, which are said to have a real existence irrespective of the 
perceptions of the actors concerned. From the 'third party' perspective 
of this thesis, therefore, an understanding of Soviet and American 
'strategic cultures' is seen as essential to an understanding of Soviet 
and American perceptions of the geopolitical, developmental or other 
parameters of specific international situations. But beyond the
hermeneutic task of elucidating such culturally specific determinants 
of action, there is also the structuralist problem of identifying 
those most basic parameters of action whose inherent logic any national 
acton would have to recognize; and it is, once again, this conception 
of inherent structural logic which provides the yardstick for the 
evaluation of Soviet doctrine in this thesis.
The most important point about all this is that the argument 
proceeds upon two inter-related levels more or less simultaneously.
On the one hand, it attempts to 'decodify' or 'round out' the Soviet 
and American problematics of great power coexistence by identifying 
the most important 'absences' or 'silences' in each case: those 
assumptions which seem crucial to the positions actually articulated 
on the coexistence issue, but which are not themselves directly 
articulated in this context, and may even be directly suppressed by 
the kind of ideological closure discussed above.15 On the other hand, 
it attempts to formulate an 'independent' perspective on the basic 
parameters of Soviet-American coexistence which is itself derived, in 
large part, precisely from an immanent critique of Soviet and 
American perspectives and the mediation of them one against the other.
In this latter endeavour, I have of course resorted to already 
established independent perspectives where these seemed appropriate.
In particular, Part II draws heavily upon the 'classical paradigm' 
of the European states-system, which reflects the practical experience 
of some three centuries of relatively ordered relations among the 
major European powers, and whose central themes are inadequately 
represented not merely in the Soviet account but in the 'Realist'/ 
'geopolitical' rubric under which they have characteristically appeared 
in the American debate.* But while the classical paradigm does 
indicate with relative precision the extent and the limits of agreement 
which might be expected between the great powers on distinctively state- 
to-state issues, it has little cf value to say about the international
* 'Classical' seems to me a much better term for this approach than 
'traditional' (the term commonly used in the American debate), since it 
is useful to be able to speak also of a 'behavioural tradition', and 
indeed pluralist and Marxist traditions, in international theory.
implications of revolutionary change within states, nor about the general 
phenomenon of a multi-level inter-penetration of 'states-system' and 
'world-economy' issues in the contemporary era. In addressing these 
questions, one must desert the relative elegance and coherence of 
the classical paradigm for the complications raised by pluralist 
development theory and the transnationalist/interdependence perspective 
in the American case, and by the 'Leninist' theory of imperialism and 
the General Crisis of Capitalism in the Soviet case.
I will be suggesting that Marxist approaches are, in general, 
superior to pluralist ones in this regard; and though the argument 
will at times rely upon 'neo-Marxist' analyses of the contemporary 
world-economy, the primary emphasis will be upon the adaptation of 
the Soviet account itself. The most important such adaptation will be 
the abandonment of the concept of a single, 'unfolding' world historical 
process for an emphasis upon the manner in which a massive transformation 
process (initiated in Europe by a complex of factors which need not be 
directly considered here) was extended over the whole globe by the 
rapid expansion of European economic and military power in the late 
19th century - creating what might be called a 'contingent but given' 
framework for contemporary world politics.16 This adaptation, of course, 
could hardly be accepted by the Soviets themselves; but I would argue 
that the basic Soviet claims become much less vulnerable to the 
standard pluralist critique when expressed in this historically specific 
fashion. For the Soviet international perspective, though obviously 
influenced by a broader Russian inheritance, refers above all to this 
global transformation process of the past century; and it is therefore 
pointless to denigrate Soviet doctrine merely on the grounds that it 
acknowledges no prospect of open-ended, stable equilibrium, based on 
a condition of multiple balance, in international affairs. The 
international practice to which such a theory would be relevant forms no 
part of the Soviet historical experience, nor does it seem likely to 
re-emerge before the end of this century at least.
This point emerges still more clearly if the current Soviet- 
American polemics over the meaning and content of detente and the 'rules' 
of nuclear deterrence are referred to in their immediate temporal and 
spatial context. Temporally, the central concerns of the American 
debate may be situated roughly in a period stretching from the late
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1960s to the early 1990s. On the one hand, true global parity between 
the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., on both the nuclear and conventional level, 
did not arrive until the late 1960s, and it is the implications of 
this phenomenon, coupled with the coincidence of increased Soviet 
military activism in the Third World and post-Vietnam American 
retrenchment there, which have preoccupied the contemporary American 
debate. On the other, not even the strongest American critics of 
Soviet 'expansionism' have been prepared to concede that the Soviet 
Union enjoys a permanent advantage in the global contest for power and 
influence. Rather, the common line is that the Soviet Union remains 
much the weaker power in a number of crucial respects, but that, through 
a combination of its own ruthlessness and American indecision, the 
Soviet regime will be presented during the 1980s with a transient 
'window of opportunity', the predictable brevity of which may actually . 
encourage Soviet risk-taking of a hitherto unprecedented kind. Given 
this rough delineation of the period at issue, any prescriptions for 
great power co-existence which assume a kind of natural equilibrium 
must be regarded as seriously misleading. Rather, it seems possible to 
identify several crucial factors making for tension between the great 
powers, each roughly traceable to the end of the 1960s and likely to 
intensify for at least a further decade to come: the qualitative 
strategic arms race; the process of radical socio-economic change in 
the Third World, intersecting with the vestiges of the anti-colonial 
revolution in Southern Africa and elsewhere; and the dependence of the 
advanced industrial economies on Third World sources of certain raw 
materials, especially in the field of energy.
Spatially3 the focus of the contemporary debate is primarily 
determined by the perceived nexus between the great power military 
relationship and the practice of great power intervention in Third 
World development. The essence of the hawk case is that the Soviets 
openly treat nuclear war as a viable instrument of policy; but no 
arguments worthy of consideration have been advanced that this alleged 
perception would lead the Soviet authorities to launch 'out of the 
blue' a nuclear attack on the United States, or even a massive nuclear 
or conventional attack on Western Europe, merely because they enjoyed 
a temporarily favourable correlation of military forces. The real 
concern is with the dangers of escalation resulting from great power
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involvement in a lesser conflict; and though the possibility of Soviet 
action against China or against dissident East European states has 
attracted much speculation, it seems fair to say that the issue presented 
as the greatest source of uncertainty and danger has been that of Soviet 
intervention in the Third World. Moreover, the American concern has 
been not so much with the Third World as a whole as with certain crucial 
Afro-Asian regions - and above all with the challenge to American 
interests posed by Soviet 'geopolitical momentum' in the so-called 'arc 
of instability' in West Asia and Africa.18 Aside from its relative 
proximity to the Soviet Union, this region is distinguished by the 
prevalence within its constituent states of problems of radical socio­
economic change, massive ethnic barriers to the process of 'state- 
making', and residual anti-colonial conflicts - and more generally by 
its acute strategic and resource significance to the advanced 
industrial powers.
All these issues will be discussed in detail in Part II. But, even 
in outline, they suggest that the process of 'rounding out' the 
problematic of great power coexistence involves situating the states- 
system within a wider context of massive and ongoing socio-economic 
transformation, and that, to be adequate to contemporary realities, a 
theory of relations between states must be compatible with an explicitly 
historical theory of the state in 'transitional' situations. Moreover, 
the task of formulating an adequate theory of the state is not advanced 
by the recent ascendancy of interdependence themes in the American 
debate, where the emphasis on the interpenetration of domestic and 
international politics has rather helped to obscure the crucial role 
of the state as the nexus between these spheres of interaction, and to 
reconstitute a disguised equilibrium model embracing each. By contrast, 
it seems desirable to preserve a clear conceptual distinction between 
these two spheres, to recognize that the relative stability of the 
states-system is attributable mainly to the special structural 
characteristics of international relations, and to acknowledge, 
in turn, the existence of forces making for radical change in Third 
World societies which are substantially independent of the actions of 
the great powers.
The suggestion, therefore, is that while it is no doubt politically 
expedient for the Soviet leadership to adopt a compartmentalized approach 
to the issue of great power detente, this position also constitutes a
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reasonable response to the genuinely contradictory character of 
contemporary world politics. Moreover, I would argue that Soviet 
international theory/doctrine reflects these contradictions because 
it rests upon an experience of international relations which is move 
inclusive than that of the United States, in the sense that it 
incorporates not merely the problems of acting as a fully fledged 
great power, but also those of transforming the position of a weak 
power within a turbulent and hostile international environment.
This suggestion challenges the conventional post-1945 American 
wisdom that the United States, as the most powerful legatee of the 
European (and especially British) tradition of balance in international 
relations, had a special responsibility to educate the Soviet authorities, 
by persuasion and constraint, in the basic rules of the international 
system. Even at the level purely of great power relations, this notion 
seems debatable; for both the Russian/Soviet and the American experiences 
of international relations have been highly idiosyncratic, and it is 
arguable that, of the two, the former reflects a good deal more of the 
complex history of the modern states-system than the latter. As 
regards the second issue of Third World development, it seems clear 
that the Soviet historical experience is more representative of the 
problems confronting 'transitional' Third World states than is that of 
the United States.
This is certainly not to suggest that Soviet policy reflects any 
special altruistic concern for the weak and disadvantaged in contemporary 
world politics. Soviet development theory and practice remains to a 
large extent Stalinist, and Soviet policies towards specific Third 
World states have often been characterized by a brutal veal'pol'lt'ik.
The Soviets have been powerful, and they have been weak, and Soviet 
doctrine itself clearly implies that, all things considered, powerful 
is better. However, this much granted, the central point about the 
unique vange of Soviet experience remains valid. Given the relationship 
between theory and practice sketched above, it would be logical to 
expect the Soviet perspective to offer a valuable contribution to a 
debate of the problem of contemporary great power coexistence, precisely 
because it reflects aspects of contemporary world politics which have 
been notably absent from the historical experience of the opposing great 
power - the United States.
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It remains to sketch the relationship between this approach to 
Soviet doctrine and the wider reappraisal of Western international 
theory mentioned at the outset. Epistemologically and methodologically, 
this thesis rejects positivistic approaches - whether of the 'historicist' 
Soviet variety or of the a-historical, 'systemic' variety characteristic 
of American behaviouralism - pursuing instead a mode of analysis which 
is envisaged as both hermeneutic and structuralist. It seems fair to 
say that these latter approaches have still received little direct 
acknowledgement in the mainstream American debate, where positivistic 
assumptions have retained much of their sway despite 'the pseudo-drama 
of the "post-behavioural revolution"' - above all in the narrowly 
defined area of strategic studies. 19 However, if there has been relatively 
little rethinking of American perspectives within the dominant behavioural 
tradition, a more systematic development of theoretical alternatives has 
occurred within the classical tradition - whose defenders had earlier 
been content merely with the negative task of repudiating the behavioural 
conception of international theory - and in the broad neo-Marxist school 
of 'structural dependence'/'world-systems' theory, which remains outside 
the American mainstream but which, in the era of 'interdependence', has 
become increasingly difficult to ignore outright.
The classical approach has both a structuralist and hermeneutic 
component. On the first count, there has been a sophisticated reassertion, 
most notably by Hedley Bull, Kenneth Waltz and Robert W. Tucker, of the 
structural considerations which always lay behind the Realist perspective 
on the states-system.20 The work of these theorists - with which one might 
loosely associate the reformulation of a 'statist'/'mercantilist' perspective 
on international economic issues by writers such as Stephen Krasner and 
Robert Gilpin - has an ambivalent aspect. They may reasonably be classified,
following Ralph Pettman, as pluralists in respect of their general
22substantive bias. But their practical achievement is to highlight 
the importance of the distinction (enunciated explicitly by Bull) between 
znternational order3 and world order, to expose the theoretical 
imprecision of those transnationalist/interdependence perspectives 
which imply the normality of a pluralist world order, and to demonstrate 
that the persistence of a pluralist international order is most readily 
accounted for by reference to the overall structure - both anarchical and 
hierarchical — of international military power.
Though American writers have figured prominently in the above 
developments, the upsurge of an essentially hermeneutic approach has 
been largely the work of classically-oriented British theorists. The 
most notable development here has been the fuller publication of the
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highly influential work of Martin Wight; but other important contributions 
have been made by Bull, and by the collective authors of a work entitled 
The Reason of States, which represents perhaps the most sustained effort 
to date to explore the epistemological underpinnings of the classical 
paradigm. Several contributors to this work appear to share Wight's 
equation of international theory with 'the kind of rumination about human 
destiny to which we give the unsatisfactory name "philosophy of history"';24 
and, in addition to more proximate influences such as Wight himself,
C.A.W.Manning and Michael Oakeshott, the volume reflects a strong interest 
in the potential of Hegelian philosophical perspectives for the
2 5establishment of a coherent 'framework for choice' in international affairs.
The implications of the classical approach are ambivalent here also.
On the one hand, these works generally reflect a substantive bias
towards pluralism; and insofar as they do invoke a wider historical
perspective, that perspective is essentially an idealist one, in which
bodies of ideas - such as Wight's three great 'paradigms' or 'traditions'
of Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism - are represented in historical
conversation with one another, but not with an identifiable material
environment.26 Particularly significant in the context of this thesis
is Wight's characterization of Marxism and Marxism-Leninism as merely
the latest manifestations of an age-old Revolutionist impulse, without
reference to the massive historical transformation which Marxist-derived
doctrines themselves profess to interpret. On the other hand, there is
no intrinsic reason why an acknowledgement of the striking persistence
of certain broad frames of meaning in international affairs should
preclude an acknowledgement of changes at the level of material structures:
indeed, the fruitfulness of such a contrast has long been evident in the
work of E.H.Carr and F.H.Hinsley, though it has received remarkably little
development in classical theory in general.27 The real problem in
Wight's case (as also with Rheinhold Niebuhr and Hans Morgenthau, the
doyens of American Realism) appears to be in an independent attachment
to a religious or quasi-religious philosophy of history, which sanctions
high-level conservative assumptions about social life in general, and
thus obscures the real significance of that unique repetitiveness of
international relations which is, on the surface, one of the most
2 8insistent themes of the classical approach.
The problems posed by the structural dependence/world-systems
approach are almost the exact opposite of those involved in the classical 
approach. Though in many respects a highly diverse group, theorists 
of this persuasion are unified in two respects crucial to this argument: 
in their sensitivity to the question of the structural/material determinants 
of contemporary world politics; and in their identification of the 
world-wide extension of modern capitalism as the central structural 
transformation of modern history. But they can be convicted in turn 
of seriously under-rating the autonomous structural dimension of 
the states-system, just as classical theorists largely ignore the 
autonomous structural dimension of the world-economy; and except for 
the postulate of the emergence of a 'global bourgeoisie' with 
substantially shared values, the structural dependence literature shows 
little interest in the possibilities of a hermeneutic analysis of 
international and world society. Thus, although this approach figures 
in Pettman's classification as the structuralist approach to world 
politics, counterposed in all essential respects to the pluralist 
approach (both classical and behavioural),29 I would argue that its 
full analytical potential can be realized only in association with an 
avowedly structuralist restatement of the core classical themes of 
geopolitics and the balance of power, and with an emphasis upon the 
crucial structuring role of broad political traditions in international 
affairs.
This thesis will attempt to demonstrate that a serious consideration 
of the analytical merits of Soviet international theory can contribute 
to the kind of theoretical reappraisal discussed here, and actually help 
to bridge the gaps identified in the various positions considered. This 
claim, it must be reiterated, rests on a more rudimentary conception of 
social theory than that advanced in both Soviet and American behavioural 
literature - as an inherently metaphorical attempt to gain a crude and 
temporary 'fix' upon an ever-changing historical process. Indeed, I will 
consciously be approaching the various materials considered in this thesis 
in the spirit of the Leavisite injunction to the aspiring literary critic 
to 'scrutinize the imagery'; and assuming that the more sophisticated 
the rhetorical defences established against the analysis of social life 
as structured human activity, the less the perspective in question 
warrants serious consideration as social theory. Thus the increasing 
flirtation with 'cybernetic' and 'general systems' themes in Soviet
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doctrine - its most obvious area of rhetorical 'convergence' upon 
American approaches - will be treated here as an ideological strategy 
calculated to shroud the contradictions in the Soviets' own domestic 
and international situation, while the analytical strengths of Soviet 
doctrine will be located in precisely the area often regarded as pre- 
scientific by Western critics: in the crude, 19th century images of 
the great 'transition' to which contemporary Soviet analysts are still
3 0linked through the conceptual language of the Marxist-Leninist 'classics'.
Finally, it is also important to reiterate the fluidity of the 
relationship between social theory and polemical controversy, and the 
commitment here to evaluating Soviet doctrine not merely in terms of 
a consistent and widely 'avaiable' rhetoric of argument, but also by 
reference to a delimited and historically specific constellation of 
problems. The further definition of these problems, primarily through * 
their reflection in the American debate, will be the task of Chapter 1.
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PART I
Footfalls echo in the memory 
Down the passage which we did not take 
Towards the door we never opened 





WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
This chapter is intended primarily as a 'survey of the literature'.
It attempts to provide, first, a brief outline of the basic Soviet account 
of interstate coexistence and detente; and second, at much greater 
length, a discussion of the context and pattern of the debate over Soviet 
ideology and Soviet intentions which preoccupied the American 'strategic 
community' after the signature of the SALT I agreements and the Basic 
Principles of US-USSR Relations in 1972. Finally, certain persistent 
anomalies in the treatment of the Soviet Union in the American strategic 
debate are identified, and elaborated on in the further definition of the 
approach to be employed in this thesis.
The discussion of Soviet doctrine inevitably anticipates, in 
extremely truncated form, many points which will be dealt with at length 
in Chapters 5 - 7, and is intended merely as a basic reference point for 
the first two parts of the thesis. The concentration here is on themes 
which have attracted particular attention in the American debate. But 
the mode of presentation of these themes reflects the assumption, which 
is central to the whole thesis but has not normally been evident in the 
preoccupations of the American debate, that Soviet international theory 
should be regarded as explicitly historical in character.
The distinction between 'context' and 'pattern' in the treatment of 
the American debate is a somewhat arbitrary one. The two relevant sections 
in fact present a broadly chronological account of the development of 
American perspectives on the Soviet Union and its international role 
throughout the post-1945 period; and at one level, the earlier developments 
are treated as the context of the latter in the simple sense that they 
came before. I would also distinguish three, rather than merely two, 
broad phases in the entire post-1945 debate. 1945-62 may be regarded 
generally as a period of Cold War orthodoxy. 1962-72 was a decade of 
transition, in which developments in several areas, including that of 
social science methodology, came together in the late 1960s to produce 
an intellectual atmosphere supportive of detente - though its direct 
contribution to American detente policies was probably limited. The post- 
1972 period - the period of the more narrowly defined 'American debate' 
normally discussed in this thesis - initially seemed likely to produce a 
further strengthening of pro-detente sentiments. But, virtually from
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the time of the 1972 Nixon-Brezhnev summit and the conclusion of SALT I, 
an analytical counter-attack emerged, based on disturbing estimates of 
Soviet capabilities and Soviet intentions, and by the end of the decade 
it had effectively established itself as the new orthodoxy.
In addition, both sections attempt to place the apparent perspectives 
of American policy makers in a wider intellectual and material context.
Thus I have attempted to relate trends at government and quasi-government 
level to developments in the academic and quasi-academic study of the 
Soviet Union. Without any sense suggesting a one-to-one correspondence 
of ideas between the two domains, it does seem clear that governmental 
attitudes were substantially influenced by - and in their turn exerted 
an influence upon - the analysis of academic specialists in this period. 
Indeed, in regard to the linked areas of 'national security' policy and 
policy towards the Soviet Union, there appears throughout to have been 
a. particularly close government-academic interdependence, including the 
rotation of key personnel from one sector to the other. Similarly, I 
have emphasized the interplay between international political developments 
and the shifting 'correlation of forces', changing theoretical perspectives 
on international security issues, and assessments of the Soviet international 
role. 'Perceptions' have clearly been of great significance in this 
regard, and often they seem to have operated at several removes from the 
most obvious evidence. For the most part, the evaluation of Soviet 
behaviour has been heavily dependent upon prior assumptions about the 
nature of the Soviet system. Conversely, Daniel Tarschys points out that 
specialist analyses of the Soviet system in these years have been 'strongly 
influenced by the international political atmosphere', as also by 
conceptual shifts deriving from 'the internal development of the social 
sciences'.1
However, having noted the broadly chronological nature of the 
discussion in these two sections, I also wish to suggest that pre-1972 
developments provided the context for the later debate in a more specific 
sense: that they established the basic parameters within which the battle 
over American approaches to the great power detente of the 1970s was 
fought out. There was, I would argue, little that was new in the detente- 
era debate: it was marked not by the further evolution of American 
perspectives on the Soviet Union and its international role but by the 
replay of earlier themes. This was true above all of the analysts
26.
referred to here as the 'hawk' school, who resurrected, in near 
identical terms, orthodoxies established in the immediate post-war 
years. But it was also true of the majority of their opponents, who 
took their stand primarily on assumptions derived from the 1962-72 
period; and one reason for the success of the hawk campaign, I would 
argue, was that the shift in mainstream American perspectives in the 
1960s itself derived less from a direct reappraisal of the Soviet role 
than from a general shift in American preoccupations, which temporarily 
downgraded the importance of Soviet policies and Soviet perceptions in 
the American scheme of things.
Moreover, I would argue (in broad agreement with the Soviet regime's 
own claims about a decisive shift in the correlation of forces) that 
the basic material context of Soviet-American relations during the 1970s 
was established at the outset of the decade - above all with the 
achievement of a rough 'parity1 in nuclear forces and global projection 
capability, and the beginning of the post-Vietnam retrenchment of 
American power in Asia. The Soviet Union's new 'great power' assertiveness 
in West Asia and Africa and its readiness to exploit the opportunities 
provided by revolutionary turmoil in those regions should not have been 
especially surprising in the light of this altered power structure, nor 
in the light of the dualistic perspective on detente consistently 
advanced in Soviet statements from the 1971 Twenty-Fourth Congress onward. 
The invasion of Afghanistan, admittedly, was a qualitative extension 
of Soviet activities in this regard: but the watershed in American 
attitudes to the detente seems to have occurred before that invasion.
Once again, the point to emphasize is the continuing influence of pre-1972 
practices and concepts, which evidently established strong inhibitions 
on American acceptance, not so much of Soviet-American parity in the 
abstract, as of the political 'implications of parity in the turbulent 
environment of contemporary world politics.
Finally, there is a contrast to be drawn between Soviet and American 
perspectives, and between the underlying assumptions which seem to have 
shaped their development, over this period. The argument of this thesis 
is that official Soviet perspectives on the great power relationship have 
not remained frozen in essentially Stalinist stereotypes, but have 
evolved quite substantially within the basic categories of Khrushchev's 
Peaceful Coexistence synthesis. Thus I am suggesting that, in some
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respects, the 'ideological' Soviet approach has actually been more 
conducive to the marriage of continuity and flexibility than the 
'pragmatic' American one. Admittedly, differences in power position 
are extremely important here. Because of the exceptional power of 
the United States, its leaders could attempt to deal with the Soviet 
Union first by containment and later by accommodation, and then 
seriously contemplate a return to the former when disillusioned with 
the results of the latter. By contrast, Soviet global power grew 
much more slowly and remains more fragile, and this factor has established 
more clearly defined 'objective' limits within which Soviet policies 
have evolved. However, there remains an important difference in 
conceptual approach. The official Soviet perspective incorporates 
fairly clear distinctions between short and long term, between tactics 
and strategy, and (though this is not directly articulated) between 
international and world order. These distinctions are not systematically 
addressed on the American side, and this difference in approach, I would 
argue, has substantially excerbated the problems deriving from the 
competing world order values of the two powers.
The Basic Soviet Account
To repeat the point made in the Introduction, the subject of concern 
here is not merely the Soviet doctrine of Peaceful Coexistence (with 
capitalist powers), but the Soviet account of interstate coexistence and 
detente in general. Of course, the particular focus of the thesis is on 
the conditions of SoV'iet-Amev'Lcan coexistence, not on the state of the 
'international system' as a whole. But by virtue of their size and their 
global 'reach', the two great powers inevitably interact in some measure 
in all the major arenas of their foreign policy activity; and, as is 
argued at length in Part II, the complex structures of contemporary world 
politics ensure that their interactions have an important world order, 
as well as international order dimension. Moreover, as the following 
pronouncement in the 1977 constitution indicates, Peaceful Coexistence by 
no means exhausts the officially proclaimed major goals of Soviet foreign 
policy:
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The foreign policy of the USSR shall be aimed 
at ensuring favourable international conditions 
for the building of communism in the USSR, at 
strengthening the positions of world socialism, 
supporting the struggle of the peoples for national 
liberation and social progress, preventing wars of 
aggression, and consistently implementing the 
principle of peaceful coexistence of states with 
different social systems.2
The order in which the policy goals appear in this statement is 
also significant. In the Khrushchev era, Peaceful Coexistence was 
typically presented as the 'fundamental line' of Soviet foreign policy.
In the major pronouncements of the present regime it has typically been 
ranked, as here, in fourth position after the objectives of building 
Communism in the USSR, strengthening the world socialist system, and 
supporting the national liberation movement. The importance of this
qchange should not be overstated. Peaceful Coexistence remains unequivocally 
the professed Soviet posture towards the eapttatist powers; and, conversely, 
Khrushchev at no stage repudiated the Soviet commitment to the national 
liberation struggle. But the present regime has nonetheless displayed a 
conscious determination in its major pronouncements to emphasize the 
inextricable linkage of co-operation and struggle in East-West relations.
The tensions inherent in this concept of coexistence are very clearly 
exemplified in Brezhnev's formulation at the Twenty-Third Party Congress 
in 1966 (the first Congress since the fall of Khrushchev, and an event 
held in the shadow of the widening American involvement in Vietnam):
In exposing the aggressive policy of imperialism, 
we at the same time consistently and unswervingly 
pursue a policy of peaceful coexistence of states 
with different social systems. This means that 
the Soviet Union, while it regards the coexistence 
of states with different social systems as a form 
of the class struggle between capitalism and 
socialism, at the same time consistently advocates 
normal, peaceful relations with capitalist countries 
and the settlement of controversial issues between 
states by negotiation and not by war ... Naturally, 
there can be no peaceful coexistence when it comes 
to internal processes of the class and national- 
liberation struggle in the capitalist countries 
or in the colonies. The principle of peaceful 
coexistence is not applicable to the relations 
between the oppressors and the oppressed, between 
the colonialists and the victims of colonial 
oppression.4
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These tensions may be approached on three levels. One approach 
might treat the question as an issue in international law, and 
emphasize the undoubted contradiction between the state-to-state 
obligations which the Soviets claim to recognize under the 'state' 
principle of Peaceful Coexistence, and the rights to set aside such 
obligations which they claim under the 'class' principles of Proletarian 
and Socialist Internationalism. In one sense, this focus is invited by 
the Soviets' own predilection for the legalistic expression of international 
relationships, as evidenced by the inclusion of a special chapter on 
foreign policy in the 1977 constitution, the pressure for a statement 
on Peaceful Coexistence in the 1972 Basic Principles of US-USSR Relations, 
and the long campaign for a conference on European Security to codify 
the territorial status quo in Europe. Thus they can hardly object when 
their behaviour is judged against the sweeping criteria for state-to-state 
relations (in general, not just with capitalist states) set out in the 
constitution:
Mutual renunciation of the use or threat of force, 
and the principles of sovereign equality, inviolability 
of frontiers, territorial integrity of states, peaceful 
settlement of disputes, non-interference in internal 
affairs, respect for human rights and basic freedoms, 
equality and the right of peoples to decide their own 
destiny, co-operation between states, scrupulous 
fulfillment of principles emanating from universally 
recognized principles and norms of international law 
and the international treaties signed by the USSR.
5
The modification of these principles in relations among the states 
of the Socialist Commonwealth inevitably follows, on the Soviet account, 
from the existence of a number of states which express by their internal 
political and economic structure the common interests of the working 
class. The basic theoretical position here was established by the 1957 
Moscow Congress of 12 Communist Parties, which presented Socialist 
Internationalism as incorporating all the commitments to sovereign 
equality, non interference and the rest, plus 'close fraternal co-operation 
and mutual assistance'. This, in itself, seems innocuous enough. But 
the declaration was, of course, issued after the Soviet suppression of 
the 1956 Hungarian uprising; and in the wake of the 1968 invasion of 
Czechoslovakia, statements by Brezhnev and leading Soviet theorists 
elaborated a doctrine of collective responsibility for the defence of
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socialism which effectively over-rode the legal sovereignty of 
individual socialist states. This notion was expressed with particular 
clarity by the Soviet international lawyer S.Kovalev:
There is no doubt that the peoples of the socialist 
countries and the Communist parties have and must 
have freedom to determine their country's path of 
development. However, any decisions of theirs must 
damage neither socialism in their own country nor the 
fundamental interests of other socialist countries 
nor the world-wide worker's movement, which is waging 
a struggle for socialism. This means that every 
Communist party is responsible not only to its own 
people but also to all the socialist countries and 
to the entire Communist movement ... The class approach 
to the matter cannot be discarded in the name of 
legalistic considerations. Whoever does so and forfeits 
the only correct, class-oriented criterion for 
evaluating legal norms, begins to measure events with the 
yardsticks of bourgeois law.
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The Soviet authorities have never retreated from the position 
expressed here, though they have consistently repudiated Western talk 
of a 'Brezhnev doctrine' of ' limited sovereignity' for socialist states.
The generality of the language, moreover, raises the question whether 
the notion of collective responsibility applies only to Warsaw Pact 
nations, or to any states which the Soviet Union chooses to regard as 
socialist. The question remains unsettled. But it should be noted that 
the Soviet regime has not to date invoked such a justification for the 
intervention in Afghanistan; and that, since 1972, it has consistently 
indicated a willingness to settle relationships with china on the basis of 
Peaceful Coexistence, even though Soviet commentary has never formally 
indicated that China is no longer regarded as a socialist country.
Soviet relations with progressive forces in the non-socialist world 
come under the venerable principle of Proletarian Internationalism. Since 
the time of Lenin, this principle has been extended to embrace the 'national 
liberation movement'; and there is little doubt that, in the Peaceful 
Coexistence era, this movement has assumed greater significance than the 
proletariat of the advanced capitalist countries in Soviet expectations 
regarding the struggle with imperialism. There are two points to be made 
about this. First, Soviet statements insist upon 'the sacred right of all
8oppressed peoples' to employ armed struggle in the cause of their liberation,
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and commit the Soviet state to provide assistance to this struggle - 
including military assistance where appropriate. Thus it is often 
claimed that, while excluding war from East-West dealings, the Soviets 
have reintroduced the idea of the ‘just war' in regard to the Third 
World. Second, 'national liberation' in the Soviet definition has an 
economic as well as a political dimension, and no definite commitment is 
acknowledged to the integrity of established regimes in post-colonial 
situations. In practice, Soviet policy towards established Third World 
regimes has proved very flexible: but in principle, Proletarian 
Internationalism provides a potential sanction not merely for military 
assistance to established 'progressive' regimes (which can also be 
rationalized on traditional grounds as assistance against foreign 
intervention), but also for assistance to insurgencies struggling 
against 'reactionary' established governments.
The application of separate 'class' and 'state' principles to the 
various major areas of international politics, if interpreted in essentially 
synchronic terms, can make for a very complex 'model' of international 
relations. Kubalkova and Cruickshank, who attempt to construct 
such an abstract model of the Soviet account - in terms of a 'participant 
determined typology of international relations' - argue that Soviet 
assumptions logically require nine different types of international 
relations, and claim to identify 'six or seven' such types in actual 
Soviet commentary.9 On a more general level, the Soviet claim to apply 
different principles to different types of relations has been strongly 
criticized by American analysts in the past; and the argument that the 
Soviets insist upon a 'compartmentalized' detente, or seek to establish 
rules for Peaceful Coexistence designed to place the West under 'unilateral 
constraints', remains a subordinate but still important part of the hawk 
case today.10
These criticisms seem to me to be overstated. There is no doubt that 
the Soviet position on non-intervention and related issues involves 
blatant contradictions. However, non-intervention cannot be regarded as 
an undisputed master principle of international behaviour. Rather, it is 
an extremely important prudential rule which is sometimes over-ridden, in 
great power interaction, by other prudential considerations such as the 
reciprocal acknowledgement of 'spheres of influence', or competitive 
intervention in areas of uncertain power relationships. Furthermore, 
there are obvious structural reasons why the degree of consensus between
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the great powers on the rules of 'within-system' competition should be 
much lower today than in the mid 19th century - the high point of 
positivist international law. One could certainly argue, from a position 
which openly valued the positivist legal tradition, that Soviet doctrines 
have helped to ensure a general devaluation of the language of international 
legal discourse in this century: but it is essential to acknowledge the 
other factors - including the comparable gap between theory and practice 
on the part of the United States - which have also contributed to this 
result.
A second approach to Soviet doctrine - and one which will receive more 
attention in this thesis - would be concerned with the evidence, or lack 
of evidence, for an evolving Soviet recognition of prudential rules of great 
power coexistence in the contemporary international environment. At the 
grand level, of course, the doctrine of Peaceful Coexistence is itself a 
declaration of the need to direct the socialist-capitalist conflict into 
channels which do not involve the prospect of central war. At the lower 
level, however, the investigation of the question of prudential rules 
involves one in the 'decoding' process mentioned in the Introduction, 
since in many instances - such as the delineation of spheres of influence 
- there are powerful ideological barriers to the discussion of the issue 
in 'neutral' language.
The indirect character of this decoding operation makes it very 
difficult to cite examples of Soviet recognition of prudential rules in 
this brief introductory outline. But the basic argument - advanced 
primarily in Chapters 6 and 7 - is that the Soviet literature evinces in 
general a growing interest in great power management without abandoning 
the long-term commitment to a fundamental 'restructuring' of international 
relations; and that it recognizes more specifically the need for reciprocal 
arms race restraint in order to preserve the existing deterrent 
relationship, without accepting either 'stable deterrence' or the 'balance 
of power* as a desirable end in itself.
One problem with this second approach is a certain predilection among 
American analysts to associate the realistic acceptance of rules of 
interstate coexistence with the articulation of a basically 'systemic' 
approach to international politics. Thus considerable attention has been 
paid over the last two decades to the emergence of more 'systemic' language 
in Soviet quasi-academic literature, and questions about the influence of
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this strand of analysis have formed one part of the debate over whether 
Soviet elite attitudes are becoming less ideological. This does not 
seem to me a very fruitful line of inquiry, since the point at issue is 
not the idea of 'system' as such, but the pluralistic assumptions which 
typically underlie this motif in American political theory. Soviet 
theorists could not endorse these assumptions without abandoning their 
entire epistemology; and as the following notably 'modernist' Soviet 
formulation indicates, the shift in terminology does not represent a 
major shift in substance:
... one must not think that [long term] trends and 
processes manifest themselves in the same way in 
every case. Actually, they develop in highly 
diversified conditions. Any international situation 
within the framework of one and the same system of 
international relations, even within the same period 
of time, or in a locally limited territory, will 
always be practically unique. No matter how favourably 
the main trends of world development may be appraised 
from the point of view of socialism, it is clear that 
their embodiment in international relations is becoming, 
at the same time, a direct and highly sensitive 
mechanism in the struggle between the two systems in the 
world revolutionary process. This calls for the careful 
analysis of every concrete international situation, 
taking into account nonidentical, external and internal 
conditions of its development.
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This is certainly a highly developed instance of the 'intellectual 
schizophrenia' - between 'international system' and 'world historical 
process' - mentioned in the Introduction. But it clearly does not 
constitute a surrender of the basic assumption of an underlying capitalist- 
socialist polarization of world politics; and its most interesting feature 
- the emphasis upon the uniqueness of specific international situations - 
is replicated in many pronouncements relying more obviously upon the 
history-oriented doctrine of the correlation of forces. Moreover, unless 
one assumes a static world, there is no reason to suppose that the 
wholesale conversion of the Soviets from one determinist model - of 
revolutionary change - to another determinist model - of systemic 
equilibrium - would encourage more realistic judgements on their part 
regarding appropriate rules for contemporary great power coexistence.
The third approach, and the one most relevant to the basic theoretical 
concerns of this thesis, involves placing both the legalistic and prudential
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aspects of Soviet doctrine bearing on coexistence within the wider Soviet 
account of trends in contemporary world history. I would argue that the 
inadequate recognition in the American debate of this dimension - and 
of the related question of the international order/world order dichotomy 
- accounts for a good deal of the incredulity, and even incomprehension, 
which Soviet doctrine evokes in that context.
The first point here, and one point which Is repeatedly emphasized 
in the American debate, is that the historic struggle between capitalism 
and socialism is destined, on the Soviet account, to end in the world wide 
victory of socialism. Thus, by definition, Peaceful Coexistence between 
states with different social systems is a temporary historical phenomenon, 
relevant only to the present 'period of transition'. On the other hand, 
the practical significance of this premise seems very limited. The present 
regime has quietly retreated from Khrushchev's optimism about early 
Soviet victories in the contest with capitalism; and Soviet pronouncements 
on the ending of the transition period are now both infrequent and so 
vague as to place the goal well outside the range in which one might 
usefully speculate about 'long term' trends in world politics.
For instance, Brezhnev's 1S77 speech on the 60th anniversary of the 
October Revolution - an occasion on which an emphasis on this theme 
might have been expected - did indeed conclude with an assurance that 
'we are advancing towards the epoch when socialism, in some specific, 
historically determined form or other, will be the prevailing social system 
on earth ...'. But Brezhnev also stressed that 'our world today is 
socially heterogeneous - it is made up of states with different social 
systems. This is an objective fact'. And - pointing to a series of 'very 
real and serious problems' of a world order variety - population pressures, 
food and energy shortages, economic inequalities, environmental degradation 
- he warned that 'with every decade they will become more acute, unless a 
rational, collective solution is found for them through systematic 
international co-operation ... In this [co-operation] - if one looks
deeper - lies the essence of the foreign policy course that we refer to
1 2as the policy of peaceful coexistence'.
However, neither Soviet vagueness regarding the positive dimension 
of the transition to socialism nor the intermittent emphasis on broad 
cooperation in the discussion of Peaceful Coexistence should obscure the 
more substantial theoretical analysis of the negative aspect of the
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transition period - the deterioration of world capitalism. Indeed, as 
Robert C. Tucker has observed, the doctrine of the General Crisis of 
Capitalism may fairly be characterized as the Soviet 'working theory of 
contemporary world history'. Together with that other highly 
characteristic feature of Soviet analysis - the notion of a moving 
correlation of forces in the long term struggle between capitalism and 
socialism - this concept has played a central role in the theoretical 
rationalization of Peaceful Coexistence and detente with the West. Under 
Khrushchev, the onset of the Third Stage of the General Crisis was 
retrospectively identified in the middle or late 1950s, resulting from 
such phenomena as the ending of the effective American nuclear monopoly, 
the economic and military consolidation of the socialist camp, and the 
breakup of the colonial empires;14 and a further qualitative deepening 
of this Third Stage was clearly associated, in Soviet statements, with 
the renewed detente offensive launched by the 1971 Twenty-Fourth Congress.
Two points may be made here. On the one hand, although the strategy 
of Peaceful Coexistence is overtly predicated on the assumption of a 
continuing shift in the correlation of forces in favour of socialism, this 
does not logically entail a commitment to Soviet 'superiority' in the 
military sphere. Khrushchev's late 1950s 'rocket rattling' notwithstanding, 
Soviet military superiority has become a serious issue only in the 1970s; 
and since the 1972 SALT I Agreement, the Soviet leaders have become 
increasingly specific in their denials that this constitutes a Soviet 
goal. If Soviet intentions are to be inferred from Soviet statements, 
it must be accepted that victory in the struggle with capitalism is 
supposed to emerge from broad socio-economic trends in world politics, 
not from the direct great power military contest.
On the other hand, one central feature of the broad coexistence 
strategy has always been a vigorous campaign to undermine Western power 
and influence in the Third World. The General Crisis of Capitalism is 
seen, after all, as a crisis of capitalism in its 'highest stage' of 
imperialism. The goal of undermining the imperialist edifice through its 
colonial outreaches was an integral part of Lenin's long term strategic 
conception; it was enthusiastically reawakened by Khrushchev to meet the 
conditions of the nuclear age; and the present regime, able for the first 
time to challenge Western military hegemony in Asia and Africa, has 
added a new emphasis upon the 'internationalist' dimension of Soviet
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military power. But it must be noted that, although the Soviet 
authorities point to an intensification of the national liberation 
struggle in the era of detente, they have abandoned the optimism about 
rapid, unilinear advance towards socialism in the Third World exhibited 
in the Khrushchev era doctrine of ’national democracy'. Despite the 
proliferation of self styled Marxist-Leninist regimes in the 1970s, 
the general Soviet expectation appears to be one of prolonged struggle, 
with ample scope for retrogressive developments, and with the Soviet 
working goal the essentially negative one of encouraging more and more 
Third World nations to pursue anti-imperialist political and economic 
strategies.
The over-riding issue is that Soviet analysis presents international 
relations merely as one particular, more or less insulated aspect of the 
wider world historical process. This perspective is nicely expressed by 
the leading Soviet 'Americanist' G.A.Arbatov in a formulation which 
offers a more useful insight into the substantive content of Soviet 
'schizophrenia' on international issues than does the overtly systemic 
formulation quoted earlier :
What is involved here is essentially different 
spheres of political life in our time (though 
they may influence one another in various ways).
One of them is the sphere of social development, 
which steadily makes headway in any international 
conditions - whether detente, 'cold war', or even 
'hot' war ... The other is the sphere of inter­
state relations, in which other extremely important 
questions are resolved - questions of war and 
peace, methods of resolving controversial foreign- 
policy questions, and possibilities for mutually 
advantageous international cooperation. The 
drawing of a clear line between these two spheres 
is one of the basic premises of the Leninist foreign 
policy of peaceful coexistence of states with different 
social systems.
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This distinction, which may be related to the international order/ 
world order distinction mentioned earlier, is of great significance for 
the American critique examined in the remainder of this chapter. There 
is clearly a major world order conflict between Soviet aspirations for 
the national liberation movement and the deepseated American preference 
for an 'open' or 'pluralist' world order, involving the free movement of 
capital, persons and ideas across state boundaries. But although it seems
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natural for American observers to assume a connection between such a 
pluralist world order and an international order based upon a plurality 
of sovereign states, no such connection necessarily obtains. There is 
no reason, from a purely international order perspective, why a state 
should not employ its resources of external and internal sovereignity 
in the promotion of a collectivist and solidarist domestic order. More 
specifically, there are strong reasons why certain nationalist regimes 
in the Third World may wish to severely curtail the scope of private 
economic activity within their countries. It could well be argued that, 
to date, the primary impact of Soviet economic and military policies upon 
Third World development has been to increase, rather than decrease, the 
diversity among new states, by allowing greater scope for the emergence 
of collectivist social orders than would have been possible under the 
continuing hegemony of powers devoted to a pluralist world order.
The Context of the American Debate
There is a considerable paradox in the pattern of American responses 
to the Soviet Union since 1945. Except, perhaps, for the middle and late 
1960s, the Soviet Union has provided the central focus of American foreign and 
defence policies; and this focus has done much to define the way in which 
other international issues, especially in regard to the Third World, were 
approached. But American perceptions have shown only a limited 
responsiveness to the development of the Soviets’ own self-account.
From the time of Stalin's death, the Soviet authorities pursued a 
major, though undeniably erratic campaign for a relaxation of tensions 
in relations with the West. From 1956 onward, Khrushchev vigorously 
promoted the notion of Peaceful Coexistence as the 'fundamental line' of 
Soviet foreign policy - a drastic revision of doctrine which might have 
been interpreted as a serious attempt to articulate criteria for a 
minimalist international order, within the context of which the long term 
capitalist-socialist struggle for a preferred world order could be 
carried on. But the basic Cold War orthodoxies, codified and entrenched 
by the time of the Korean War, maintained a largely unchallenged 
domination of the American debate until the Cuban Missile Crisis. There 
were, of course, several variations on the central theme of 'containment',
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and an intermittent descant regarding 'liberation' and other 'forward' 
strategies. But the fundamental notion that the Soviet international 
posture demanded a resolute and far reaching policy of military containment 
was virtually unaffected by the Soviet change of line.
Moreover, when serious questioning of this approach did develop 
in the mid 1960s, it took its primary point of departure not from the 
Soviets' own well established doctrinal revisions, but rather from the 
identification of 'objective' forces related to the Soviet Union's 
maturation both as an industrial society and as a nuclear great power - 
forces allegedly impelling the Soviet leadership towards more realistic 
international policies for which the Peaceful Coexistence doctrine merely 
provided an ideological rationalization. And, conversely, when the hawk 
school successfully reawakened the debate over the relation between 
doctrine and intentions in the 1970s, they felt able to dismiss the 
Peaceful Coexistence component of Soviet doctrine virtually out of hand 
as propaganda, concentrating their main attention on the far more esoteric 
question of the compatibility of Soviet military doctrine with the rules 
of stable deterrence.
The key to the paradox, I would argue, is that the Soviet-American 
conflict is at bottom a world order one, and that for much of the postwar 
period the preponderant power of the United States made possible an 
essentially instrumental approach to the management of the conflict. As 
a result, in Walter Lafeber's words, 'the debate over the nature of the 
Communist threat usually lagged behind the debate over which weapons to 
use against that threat'.16 This has been true for the most part, of the 
American strategic debate in the 1970s just as it was in the later 1950s, 
the other occasion on which an apparent trend towards great power parity 
produced an extensive detente offensive from the Soviet side. However, 
there is one major difference. In the 1950s, the specialist study of the 
Soviet Union and Soviet foreign policy was still relatively underdeveloped, 
and its conclusions generally reinforced the perspectives of those who 
were primarily concerned with the technical problems of containing a 
taken-for-granted Soviet threat. Today, the specialist 'Soviet studies' 
literature presents a far more complex and differentiated picture; but 
the assumptions about Soviet policy which dominate the mainstream 
strategic debate still largely reflect the judgements of the 1950s, when 
its basic intellectual structures were still being established. In the
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remainder of this section, I will attempt to indicate how these 
judgements were formulated, 'encapsulated' in American thinking on 
issues such as deterrence and limited war, and 'carried over' into the 
1970s despite all the changes of the intervening period.
To begin with, it is quite inadequate to approach the long-standing 
Soviet-American world order conflict in terms of any facile distinction 
between rhetorical, 'ideological' issues, on the one hand, and power 
political, 'national interest' realities on the other. Such distinctions, 
deriving from the venerable Realist-Idealist controversy in American 
international theory, have become less simplistic with the passage of 
time. But they remain influential in American discussions of Soviet 
policy; and are, moreover, characteristically given a differential 
application in this context. The powerful tradition of 'Wilsonian' 
idealism, it is suggested, has consistently hampered the United States' 
ability to respond adequately to international aggression, while the 
Soviet Union is often credited with an instrumental realism of the most 
vulgar-Machiavellian kind, however unrealistic its announced ideological 
goals may be judged to be.
This approach is misleading on both counts. As Geoffrey Barraclough
emphasizes, the immediate aftermath of the Russian revolution produced,
theon both the Soviet and^American side, a clear repudiation of the special
traditions of the European balance of power and of the imperialist world
order which it had nurtured. Both Lenin and Wilson set forth rival
doctrines of national self-determination; and both must be judged (on
any other than narrowly Euro-centric criteria) to have evinced a perfectly
realistic perception of the changing structures of world power and of the
1 7strategies best tailored to their respective national assets. Moreover, 
both the Soviet and American approaches must be regarded as deeply 
revolutionary in respect of the established world order, though this was 
substantially obscured in the American case by the fact that Wilson's 
self-determination campaign, and Truman's later Open Door policies, were 
each emmeshed in the wider process of post-war reconstruction.
40 .
The question of reconstruction after World War II - when the old
international structure had finally been brought down in ruins - leads,
of course, into the fiercely contested area of the origins of the Cold
War. There are substantial grounds for arguing that the more immediate
issues of this period need not have become so closely emmeshed with the
wider world order conflict as in fact occurred. The Soviet Union was
in most respects on the ideological defensive against the United States,
which, in addition to the prestige of its enormous material achievements,
also possessed a distinct 'leftish aura' deriving from the social and
political vision of the 'New Deal'; and Stalin's conduct at this time
is arguably best explained in terms of a rather brutal veallpolitik in
1 8the service of the Soviet state. On the American side, as Daniel Yergin 
has recently emphasized, Roosevelt's concern with power realities inclined 
him strongly towards a settlement which would accommodate the USSR's 
'legitimate' interests - including its interest in a sphere of influence 
in Eastern Europe - while Cordell Hull and the State Department, the 
chief bureaucratic standard-bearers of the Wilsonian faith in the 
wartime years, had much less direct influence than some revisionist 
historians have implied.19
However, this argument should not be pushed too far. As Yergin 
himself puts it, Roosevelt was compelled to pursue both a 'foreign foreign 
policy', in his dealings with Stalin, and a 'domestic foreign policy', to 
accommodate the 'fervent rebirth of Wilsonianism' which gripped the 
United States from 1943 onward;20 and the concern for Soviet legitimate 
interests was swiftly eroded under his successors. Still more important, 
the fate of Eastern Europe was merely one element of a far reaching 
American world view, and if one looks at post-war American policies in the 
global context, interpretations which emphasize the commitment to an 
'open' world order, secured against the challenge of political and social 
revolution along Communist lines, acquire more cogency. On the Soviet 
side, Stalin's pessimism about the national liberation movement seems 
to have been deeply ingrained. But tradition, ideology and the 'logic of 
the situation' would have drawn his successors into the attempt to exploit 
the anti-colonial revolution, whether or not they had previously been 
'contained' in Europe. This is not to deny that a Soviet-American diplomatic 
accommodation, if achieved, might have turned the later global struggle 
in a far less militaristic direction. But an active 'world order' dispute
over the future of the Third World was virtually guaranteed by the 
rival historical traditions of the two great powers and the changing 
structures of world politics.
If this argument is accepted, the intellectual shift involved in 
the postwar American acceptance of a wholehearted peacetime involvement 
in the European 'balance' appears less radical than is usually suggested.
The developments of this period are often described, in accordance 
with the self-interpretation of leading protagonists, in terms of a 
campaign on the part of the dominant section of the American foreign 
policy elite to imbue the nation with a realistic appreciation of the 
central role of military power in structuring the anarchical international 
environment. It is certainly true that the 'legalistic-moralistic' 
component of the Wilsonian tradition - the assumption that a viable 
framework of political order could be sustained in the international, as 
in the domestic domain primarily by legal means - was decisively 
overthrown by the Realist critique of the early postwar years.22 But 
the notion that a rival great power might 'legitimately' expect not 
merely to order its own society as it saw fit, but also to exert an 
influence upon the wider system commensurate with its power - a notion 
which a thorough-going Realist analysis might logically have supported
2 3- found few serious advocates at either government or academic level. 
Rather, the basic American world order expectations remained unchallenged, 
but were now married to a preoccupation with the military, rather than 
the legal instrument as the prime means of contesting the determined 
challenge to international order presumed to derive from the USSR.
There were various reasons for this. First, the foreign policy 
elite was in good part the prisoner of a volatile public opinion. American 
leaders, recalling the 'isolationist' trend after World War I, oversold 
the Soviet threat in their efforts to secure a national consensus behind 
an openended commitment to Europe - most notably in the 1947 Truman 
doctrine. On this occasion, as the 'internationalist' Republican senator 
Vandenberg approvingly noted, the President 'scared hell out of the 
American people'. But the public mood was already shifting rapidly 
towards complete disillusionment with Soviet policy; and within a few 
years the Truman administration was badly on the defensive against the 
McCarthyite onslaught characterized by Secretary of State Acheson as
o c'the attack of the primitives'.
Second, the Realist orientation of the elite itself was essentially 
an instrumental one. As far as the limited question of power management 
was concerned, Realism was readily accepted as a 'sharp instrument of 
criticism', and a 'convenient crib of European wisdom’ for an 'American 
audience in need of a crash course in statecraft'. But with almost 
all of the other major powers economically and/or physically prostrate - 
mendicants for reconstruction assistance to a United States of unparalleled 
wealth and power - American policy makers had no reason to question their 
belief in the value of an open world order, to which the one great 
obstacle - once the residual problems of European colonialism were cleared 
away - seemed likely to be the ideological intransigence of the Soviet 
Union.
Third, there was a crucial ambiguity in the European balance of 
power tradition which was greatly amplified when mediated through the 
dominant pluralist assumptions of American political theory. The latter, 
after all, commonly associated domestic political coexistence with the 
operation of a flexible balance of power among many competing 'interest 
groups', buttressed by a general consensus on the 'legitimacy' of incremental, 
as opposed to fundamental change. The power of these conceptions can be 
seen in the work even of those Realists commonly regarded as the most 
European in orientation. Thus Henry Kissinger placed the idea of 'a 
"legitimate" general consensus' at the centre of his conception of 
international order. And Hans Morgenthau, accepting at face value 
the 'checks and balances' principle of the Federalist papers as the 
principle underlying the 'relative stability and peaceful conflict' of 
the American political system, argued that 'if the factors that have 
given rise to these conditions can be duplicated on the international
scene, similar conditions of peace and stability will then prevail there,
2 8as they have over long periods of history and among certain nations'.
Fourth, American policy makers, with the spectre of appeasement in 
the 1930s constantly before them, were inevitably preoccupied by the 
fear that the democratic nations, through their desire for a quiet life, 
might again make only a belated challenge to the aggressive aims of an 
expansionist dictatorship. Once again, a thorough-going Realist analysis 
might have concentrated merely on the actual and potential structure of 
power, and refused to shape its policy on the assumption that certain 
international actors were special.29 But, again, this assumption received
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strong support at academic as well as government level : for example, in 
the status quo/imperialist and legitimist/ revolutionary dichotomies 
proposed respectively by Morgenthau and Kissinger, and in the special 
category of 'natural aggressors' invoked, in support of candidly anti- 
Soviet policy prescriptions, by Robert Strausz-Hupe and Stefan Possony.30
Finally, there were the more specific intellectual factors which 
encouraged the classification of the Soviet Union as a 'natural aggressor'.
The notion of 'totalitarianism' - as a quality inherent in the goals 
and political structures of the Soviet, as much as the Nazi state - was 
already being formulated; and it appeared to enhance the intellectual 
coherence of the links instinctively drawn between totalitarian domestic 
policies and 'totalitarian' (i.e. militantly expansionist) foreign policies 
on the basis of the 1930s experience. But still more important, in terms 
of the trends in the American debate in the 1970s, was the extent to which 
analagous notions about the impact of Russian historical development had 
been absorbed into the American intellectual framework through the impact 
of liberal (and other) emigres from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
Such emigres were directly influential in the original formation of a 
Soviet studies community in the United States. But their most intense 
influence, Yergin argues, was upon the intellectual 'set' of the small, 
closely knit group of State Department analysts who observed the Soviet 
Union from Riga during the 1920s. Indeed, Yergin argues, the effect of 
this period of immersion in the concerns of the large emigre community 
at Riga, reinforced by diplomatic service in Moscow itself at the height 
of the Stalinist purges, was so powerful for this group that the 'Riga 
Axioms' - which supplanted Roosevelt's 'Yalta axioms' immediately after 
the war - had been codified in full, in the writings of men like George 
Kennan, even before World War II broke out.32
Even more clearly than the formal totalitarian model, the 'Riga 
Axioms' identified the Soviet Union as a special threat to international 
stability, while at the same time flatly denying the Soviet regime's own 
pretensions to political and social radicalism. Their triumph within 
the Washington bureaucracy was sealed by Kennan's 1946 Long Telegram from 
the embassy in Moscow; and they were given an elegant public restatement, 
along with the policy prescription of 'containment', in the famous 'X' 
article by Kennan - now head of the new Policy Planning Staff - in the 
July 1947 edition of Foreign Affairs. Because of their original significance,
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and their uncanny resemblance to themes which re-emerged in the 1970s, 
Kennan's arguments of this time warrant quotation at some length.
The Long Telegram insisted that Soviet attitudes and policies were 
shaped by 'basic inner-Russian realities', and not by an 'objective 
analysis of the situation beyond Russia's borders'. 'At bottom of 
Kremlin's neurotic view of world affairs is traditional and instinctive 
Russian sense of insecurity', Kennan argued. But that in turn impelled 
Moscow to be permanently on the attack, 'in patient but deadly struggle 
for total destruction of rival power, never in compacts and compromises
o owith it'. The 'X' article added to this theme an emphasis upon the 
internal structure of the Soviet political system, and the need for Stalin 
to exploit the doctrine of 'capitalist encirclement' to regiment the 
cowed Soviet population.34 Conspiciously absent from both statements 
was any suggestion that Soviet conduct reflected serious historical or 
political analysis. The revolutionary goals of Marxism-Leninism received 
considerable emphasis, especially in the 'X' article. But Kennan 
treated Marxism-Leninism as a kind of perverted theology, for which 
'truth is not a constant but is actually created for all intents and 
purposes, by the Soviet leaders themselves. It varies from week to
O ITweek, from month to month'. In keeping with this basic premise, Kennan 
felt no need to spell out identifiable Soviet goals, other than the 
long term one of world domination, which was pursued with a tactical 
flexibility so great as to be almost non-directional:
Thus the Kremlin has no compunction about retreating 
in the face of superior force. And being under the 
compulsion of no timetable, it does not get panicky 
under the necessity for such retreat. Its political 
action is a fluid stream which moves constantly, 
wherever it is permitted to move, towards a given 
goal. Its main concern is to make sure that it has 
filled every nook and cranny available to it in the 
basin of world power.
36
This notion of Soviet tactical flexibility, linked to the view that 
the survival of the Soviet system was ultimately dependent upon the 
possibility of limitless expansion, provided the basis for Kennan's 
prescription for a 'policy of firm containment designed to confront the 
Russians with unalterable counterforce at every point where they show 
signs of encroaching upon the interest of a peaceful and stable world'.
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Pointing to the enormous toll already exacted on Soviet society by 
industrialization, the purges and the war, Kennan drew the moral for 
American policy:
The United States has it in its power to increase 
enormously the strains under which Soviet policy 
must operate, to force upon the Kremlin a far 
greater degree of moderation and circumspection 
than it has had to observe in recent years, and 
in this way to promote tendencies which must 
eventually find their outlet in either the breakup 
or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power.
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Despite the strength of his language, Kennan seems to have envisaged 
'containment' as an essentially political operation. He had been 
disturbed by the military overtones of the Truman Doctrine, and over the 
next couple of years increasingly moved to a dissident position within
• • 3 8the Truman administration. But the trend towards a military, and 
increasingly global conception of 'containment' was strengthened in 
1949-50 by the 'loss' of China, the successful Soviet atomic test, and 
the outbreak of the Korean War. A key expression of administration thinking 
was provided by NSC-68, an overall review of defence and foreign policies 
which Truman commissioned in the wake of the soviet atomic test, and
whose major budgetary recommendations he pushed through Congress in the 
atmosphere created by the Korean War. Drafted under the general 
supervision of Paul Nitze (who was to become a major figure in the 
American defence community and a leader of the hawk school in the 1970s), 
NSC-68 recommended a 'bold and massive program' to rebuild the degree 
of superiority which would allow the West to meet 'each fresh challenge 
promptly and unequivocally'; and it explicitly distinguished the USSR 
from 'previous aspirants to hegemony' by reference to its 'fanatic new 
faith, antithetical to our own'. In sum, it argued:
The Kremlin is inescapably militant. It is 
inescapably militant because it possesses and 
is possessed by a world wide revolutionary 
movement, because it is the inheritor of Russian 
imperialism, and because it is a totalitarian 
dictatorship. Persistent crisis, conflict 
and expansion are the essence of the Kremlin's 
militancy ... It is quite clear from Soviet 
theory and practice that the Kremlin seeks to 
bring the free world under its domination by 
the methods of the cold war.
39
The Korean War saw the final consolidation of the notion of extended 
military containment, linked with the insistence that the United States
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would negotiate only 'from positions of strength';40 and this provided 
the dominant theme of American approaches to the Soviet Union throughout 
the next decade. Admittedly, the Eisenhower administration proved 
fairly flexible in its direct dealings with the Soviet Union, despite 
its initial promise to replace the 'negative' and 'immoral' policy of 
containment by a policy of 'liberation'. 'Liberation' was tacitly 
abandoned when the Soviets suppressed uprisings in Eastern Europe in 
1953 and 1956; and in 1956 Eisenhower, who in the previous year had 
participated with Khrushchev in the first post war 'summit', was 
re-elected on a peace platform.41 More tangibly, he was evidently 
strongly concerned to limit military spending, both from a general 
fiscal conservatism and from a fear of the development of a 'garrison 
state ' mentality in the United States.42 He therefore initiated major 
cuts in American conventional forces, substantially greater than those 
projected by Truman in the aftermath of the Korean war - rationalizing 
these, under the 1954 New Look defence posture, by a much greater overt 
reliance on nuclear weapons. And in the mid 1950s, in response to the 
developing Soviet capability for intercontinental nuclear strikes, the 
administration proposed a doctrine of 'adequacy' or 'sufficiency', which 
affectively accepted that American security from nuclear attack should rest 
on the possession of a secure second strike.43
As against this however, the diplomatic conception of the anti­
communist struggle was becoming increasingly global in scope. An attack 
on Truman's 'Asia last' policy had been a central feature of the Republican 
campaign in 1952; and although the stalemate in Korea relieved fears of 
a major campaign of direct Communist aggression, the war also encouraged 
the belief in the 'monolithic' unity of the Sino-Soviet bloc, and 
intensified the expectation of a far reaching campaign of subversion in 
Asia and the Middle East. This perception, together with a sense of the 
rapid crumbling of European imperial control in these areas, encouraged 
the bout of 'pactomania' which characterised Dulles's period at the State 
Department. The United States' vital interests were very liberally defined. 
In Congressional hearings on SEATO, Dulles characterized the American 
position as a declaration, along the lines of the Monroe Doctrine, 'that 
an intrusion [in the treaty area] would be dangerous to our peace and 
security'; and the 1957 Eisenhower Doctrine, as Lafeber observes, 
effectively made the same claim in respect of the Middle East.44
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Such pronouncements, of course, could be dismissed as largely rhetoric. 
But even in the closed forum of the 1955 and 1956 meetings of NATO 
foreign ministers, Dulles emphasized the perils of Communist economic 
and political penetration of the developing nations. If the Communist 
indirect tactics succeeded, he argued 'the world ratio as between 
Communist dominated peoples and free peoples'would change from 1 a ratio 
of two-to-one in favour of freedom to a ratio of one-to-three against 
freedom. That would be an almost intolerable ratio given the 
industrialized nature of the Atlantic Community and its dependence upon 
broad markets and access to raw materials'.45
Thus there was a basic discrepancy between the United States' 
military capabilities and its greatly expanded diplomatic commitments.
At first, Dulles attempted to cover the gap by his manipulation of the 
'massive retaliation' doctrine, which was ostensibly intended to do duty 
for a wide range of diplomatic objectives, in addition to the direct 
deterrence of Soviet offensives against NATO.46 But the emergence of a 
direct Soviet threat to the United States undermined the credibility 
of this position; and the Administration's defence policies came under 
increasingly strong attack on two related counts.
On the one hand, 'massive retaliation' was attacked by academics 
like Bernard Brodie and Henry Kissinger on the grounds of its inflexibility 
and lack of credibility as a response to anything other than a similarly 
massive Soviet challenge; while Generals Maxwell Taylor and Matthew 
Ridgeway resigned from the army in 1955 on broadly similar grounds.47 
On the other, the prospect of a direct Soviet threat prompted growing 
attention to the problems of mutual deterrence, and in particular, to the 
distinction between 'first strike' and 'second strike'. Studies conducted 
by the RAND Corporation from 1954 onward produced the conclusion that 
American nuclear forces overseas, and increasingly nuclear forces stationed 
in the United States itself, would become 'inviting' targets for Soviet 
first strike, precisely because they were themselves organised only with 
a view to a first nuclear strike, in retaliation for a major conventional 
challenge from the Soviet Union. Deeply alarming projections about the 
security of the American 'deterrent' were publicised by the leaking of 
the top secret 'Gaither Report' in January 1957 r one month after the 
Soviet Sputnik success, and the publication in January 1959 of Albert 
Wohlstetter's Foreign Affairs article on the 'Delicate Balance of Terror'.48
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The ending of American nuclear invulnerability was presumably one of 
the major reasons why a long term Peaceful Coexistence strategy could 
be considered on the Soviet side; and under the administration's 'adequacy' 
criteria, an American acceptance of this fact might have been possible.
But in the context of these new controversies, linked to the 'missile 
gap' scare of the late 1950s, there were extremely strong inhibitions 
against acknowledging the 'nuclear stalemate' as one of the preconditions 
of stable coexistence.
These developments illustrate one crucial aspect of the emergence of 
a civilian 'strategic community' which has again assumed great importance 
in the 1970s; namely, that 'worst case scenarios' for a Soviet-American 
nuclear exchange, which might otherwise be confined primarily to intra­
military and intra-government discussions, were established as an integral 
part of the general political debate over relations with the Soviet Union.
A second, closely related point is that the psychologistic approach of 
the American civilian strategists inevitably encouraged a preoccupation 
with Soviet intentions - with the question of Soviet propensities towards 
a first nuclear strike (or the military 'superiority' which might make 
one possible) becoming intertwined, in practice, with that of the long 
term Soviet commitment to the overthrow of capitalism.
As regards the latter point, the academic Soviet studies literature 
of this period showed relatively little concern to place the Soviet 
account in its broad historical context, concentrating instead on the 
special inner dynamic which allegedly underlay the Soviet threat. The 
totalitarian model of Soviet politics received its fullest academic 
exposition at precisely the time when,by virtue of the post-Stalin thaw, 
it was most likely to obscure the very real changes occurring in the Soviet 
Union. For the most part, the totalitarian concept encouraged very 
simplistic analyses of Soviet politics; and this was particularly true 
of most studies of Soviet foreign policy, which, in William Welch's term, 
presented an 'Ultra-Hard image' of intense and unyielding opposition to 
the Western powers.50 In particular, the literature of this time relied 
upon three ill examined propositions which remain an important component 
of the hawk case today: that there was a direct connection between the 
Soviet regime's totalitarian inability to accept 'peaceful coexistence' 
with its own population and its inability to accept stable coexistence 
with the West; that the regime was capable of holding to its basic goal
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of world hegemony through an indefinite number of reverses and zig-zags; 
and that it was capable of orchestrating a vast campaign of subversion and 
aggression by its 'proxy' forces (at this stage including China) 
throughout the Third World.51 Even the two substantial studies of 
Soviet doctvine in this period, by Wladyslaw Kulski and Eliot Goodman, 
clearly reflected the prior assumption of an infinitely expansionist Soviet 
foreign policy - with Goodman in particular relying upon an extremely 
one-sided interpretation of its allegedly 'Aesopian' terminology to 
substantiate his case that Soviet policy had been consistently directed
5 2towards the single goal of a centralized, Russian dominated 'World State'.
Prescriptions for American/Western conduct in this 'universal, 
unitary, unending war to the finish' were quite common in the literature.53 
Even Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, in a work devoted primarily 
to the domestic face of totalitarianism, insisted that:
The possibility for peaceful coexistence of 
nations peopling this world presupposes the 
disappearance of the totalitarian dictatorships.
Since according to their own loudly proclaimed 
professions, their systems must be made world­
wide, those who reject the system have no 
alternative but to strive for its destruction. 54
But the most self consciously 'policy oriented' of all these studies 
were those produced by Strausz-Hupe and his associates at the Foreign 
Policy Research Institute. Conceiving themselves to be prescribing for 
a democracy hampered by its pluralistic policy making process, and its 
idealistic, all or nothing approach to the use of force in international 
politics, the Strausz-Hupe group counselled an agressive 'Forward Strategy' 
which - while eschewing direct support for 'wars of national liberation' 
within the Communist bloc - would in other respects carry the fight to the 
enemy both in his own camp and in the Third World. In particular, they 
rejected outright any notion of detente:
The argument that the captive peoples or the 
Free World would benefit from a relaxation of 
international tensions is contradicted by 
incontrovertible facts ... The Soviet and 
satellite rulers seek relaxation of tensions 
- a term of Communist coinage - as a means of 
relaxing Western pressures. Relaxation of 
tensions - the flagging of Western will and 
viligance - demoralizes all peoples opposed to 
communism.
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As suggested earlier, this basic image was effectively encapsulated 
in the general 'strategic studies' literature of this period, whose 
authors tended to take over, largely unexamined, the most conservative 
prevailing assessments of Soviet motives and conduct as background 
assumptions to their own more technical, instrumental concern with 
appropriate American foreign and defence postures. The 
Strausz-Hupe works were particularly relevant in this connection.
Presented as a synthesis of the result of an extensive program of 
debate and analysis on the part of numerous academic and bureaucratic 
members of the national security community, they occupied something 
of a middle ground between Soviet studies as such, and the influential 
group of 'limited war' analysts whose work is commonly regarded as 
having inaugurated the 'golden age' of post-war American strategic 
thinking.56
These latter writers, who included figures of great importance in
future American foreign and defence policy, adopted several of the
/basic assumptions of the Strausz-Hupe group, albeit in less extreme 
formulations. On the one hand, they plainly regarded the Soviet/Communist 
mastery of the indirect approach, linked to the emergence of an apparent 
nuclear stalemate, as the great problem confronting American strategy. 
Soviet expansionism was taken as given, with Kissinger - in perhaps the 
single most influential work of this school - again resorting to his 
basic legitimist/revolutionary dichotomy. On the other hand, these 
analysts also assiduously cultivated the central 'myths' about traditional 
American strategy handed down to them by the Realist critique of the 
immediate post-war years.57 Relying on a selective reading of the 
American international record in general, and of the Eisenhower years in 
particular, they portrayed American strategy as seriously defective in 
precisely that area in which the Soviets were allegedly supremely 
effective - in establishing a coherent, instrumental relationship between 
military force and political objectives in both peace and war.58
Their central task they saw as the restoration of an essentially 
Clausewitzian perspective for the nuclear age, which would equip the 
United States with the doctrine and forces to enable it to conduct a 
protracted struggle without any single, decisive military clash. From 
1956 to 1962 three variants on the limited war theme were extensively 
canvassed: tactical nuclear war, limited strategic nuclear war, and
limited conventional war (which later found its institutional expression 
in the doctrine of 'flexible response'). But the central theme in all 
cases was that the United States could circumvent the multi-faceted 
Communist threat only by creating what Kissinger called a 'spectrum of 
capabilities with which to resist Soviet challenges'.59
Finally, suprisingly little consideration was given, in the search 
for Soviet intentions, to the Soviets' own military doctrine. The 
stereotyped and highly politicized style of the Soviet literature failed 
to impress most American analysts. But in fact, Raymond Garthoff and 
Herbert Dinerstein, the two RAND analysts who did address this literature, 
produced several interesting conclusions, and anticipated most of the 
major themes of the 1970s debate.
By tracing the 'revolution' in Soviet strategy following on the 
death of Stalin and the advent of thermo-nuclear weapons, they 
demonstrated that the doctrinal shifts involved represented a rational 
military response to fundamental problems of the kind which American 
theorists had themselves been confronting.60 In particular, they 
showed that the Soviet strategists - who, unlike their American counterparts, 
had been faced from the outset with the threat of an enemy 'first strike' 
against their vulnerable nuclear forces - were acutely aware of the 
enhanced significance of surprise in the nuclear era - although they did 
not of course approach this as an abstract problem of mutual deterrence.
They also indicated that the Soviet military were inclined, logically 
enough, to respond to this problem of vulnerability with a doctrine of 
'pre-emptive' strike in a situation of intense crisis.61
The evidence in the literature surveyed by Garthoff and Dinerstein 
for an operational Soviet goal of military superiority was ambiguous at 
best - especially in the context of the substantial reductions in 
conventional forces undertaken by Khrushchev.62 And conversely, their 
analysis might logically have suggested to American planners that a 
determined American drive for nuclear superiority would increase the 
Soviet sense of vulnerability and inclinations towards a pre-emptive 
strategy, thus decreasing the prospects of a stable 'balance of terror'. 
Moreover the nuclear policies of the second Eisenhower administration - 
in particular the development of the Polaris SLBM system - had largely 
removed the spectre of the vulnerability of the American 'second strike' 
deterrent.
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But the incoming President Kennedy had campaigned strongly on the 
'missile gap' issue; and both he and Defence Secretary McNamara were
G 3evidently strongly impressed by the arguments of the limited war school.
In the context of a general worsening of the East-West climate in 1960-61, 
the new administration undertook an expansion of the strategic nuclear 
forces far in excess of that initiated in Eisenhower's last years, with 
the result that, by late 1961, administration spokesmen were able to 
insist that the United States possessed a second strike capability at 
least equal to the first strike capability of the Soviet Union. In 1962 
McNamara formally advanced a doctrine of limited strategic nuclear war 
(the so called 'No Cities' or 'counterforce' doctrine). But by the 
end of 1963, a range of international and domestic considerations - 
including the fact that the Soviet Union showed no inclination to accept 
rules of warfare so obviously biased against it - had compelled an 
official retreat from counterforce in the direction of massive retaliation 
(though now in the ostensibly quantifiable formula of 'Assured Destruction').64
A major expansion also occurred in American conventional forces, 
with the army alone temporarily exceeding one million; and the doctrine 
of the 'flexible response' was strongly promoted in NATO, being finally 
accepted as alliance policy in 1967. The new administration also turned 
its attention to the problem of 'sub-limited', or counterinsurgency 
warfare, with McNamara characterizing Khrushchev's famous January 1961 
speech in support of 'wars of national liberation' as potentially 'one 
of the most important statements by a world leader in the decade of the 
sixties'.65 An early test of the new doctrines, and of the forces 
developed to meet them, was provided by the deteriorating situation in 
Vietnam, where there were already 23,000 American advisors by the time of 
Kennedy's death. In conclusion, then, the Kennedy administration, like 
most academic commentators, tended to respond to the nuclear stalemate 
- and the Soviet shift to a more dynamic indirect strategy in the Third 
World - not by an attempt to rethink the political categories of the Cold 
War, but by a further immersion in the technical problems of adapting the 
basic containment strategy to a more amorphous, protracted, and, above all, 
global East-West struggle.
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The period 1962-72 produced major changes, at both academic and 
governmental levels, on the question of coexistence with the Soviet 
Union. The reasons for this are obviously very complex and inter-related, 
but three broad issues stand out: the changes in the United States' 
own strategic preoccupations; the increasingly obvious changes in the 
position of the Soviet Union and of 'World Communism'; and the impact 
of changing preoccupations in American social science upon the way 
in which Soviet domestic and external policies (and world politics in 
general) were interpreted. The first two issues are broadly similar 
in character and will be considered together here. But the third is 
concerned not so much with specific substantive changes and perceptions 
of those changes, as with the contribution of the specialized 
conceptual language of behaviouralism to the process by which already 
established 'images' and 'axioms' were encapsulated and carried over 
to future stages of the debate. The key argument will be that the advance of 
behavioural methodologies militated against a genuinely historical 
understanding of the major changes of this period; and this argument 
will be developed separately in the concluding part of the section.
As regards the first issue, American thinking in this decade about 
international relations (and inferentially about relations with the 
Soviet Union) appears to have been strongly influenced by the 'lessons' 
of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Vietnam War. The Kennedy administration's 
conduct of the Missile Crisis was widely regarded at the time as an 
exemplary exercise in 'crisis management' through skilful bargaining 
based on the manipulation of the threat of force. But it was also argued, 
in retrospect, that incautious generalization from this very special 
confrontation had encouraged the rush into Vietnam, a quagmire which in 
turn severely challenged American assumptions about the efficacy of 
military force in achieving political objectives. The symmetry of these 
interconnections should perhaps not be overdrawn. But the extent of the 
1960s transition from expansionist hubris to disillusion and retrenchment 
was none the less extraordinary, and its very rapidity contributed to a 
striking inconsistency in the criteria by which the international position 
of the Soviet Union was assessed in the earlier and later parts of the 
decade.
Thus the early years of the Vietnam involvement now appear as the 
high point of a de facto marriage between the 'Wilsonian' vision of a
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preferred world order and the neo-Realist, 'limited war' conception 
of the role of force in the management of international order. Even 
in the Johnson administration's public pronouncements, the Vietnam 
involvement often assumed a clearly instrumental dimension, as 'the 
war to end all wars of national liberation'.66 In the administration's 
internal debate on the issue, as the editor of the New York Times edition 
of the Pentagon Papers observes, this instrumental approach is even 
more clearly discernible:
... Behind the foreign policy axioms about 
domino effect, wars of liberation and 
containment, the study reveals a deeper 
perception among the president and his 
advisers that the United States was now 
the most powerful nation in the world, 
and that the outcome in South Vietnam 
would demonstrate the will and ability 
of the United States to have its way in 
world affairs.
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In this context, the Soviet Union - temporarily eclipsed in both 
strategic and long range conventional capabilities, and smarting under 
a series of major reverses in the Third World in 1965-66 - appeared for 
a few critical years to be largely irrelevant to the United States' 
preoccupations in Asia. This view was reinforced by the continuing lack 
of proportion in American assessments of the threat from Communist China, 
which was in turn exacerbated by a misreading of Chinese pronouncements 
on 'Peoples’War'. As late as October 1967, at a time when the USSR was 
acknowledged as Hanoi's leading military supplier , Secretary of State 
Rusk brushed aside a reporter's challenge to his emphasis on Chinese 
expansionism:
Well, I believe that the Soviet Union is supporting 
Hanoi, at least with respect to any action which 
we ourselves are taking against North Vietnam. I 
think that is, perhaps, not so clear about what 
is happening in South Vietnam. But ... I pointed 
the finger at what I called Asian Communism because 
the doctrine of Communism as announced and declared 
in Peking has a special quality of militancy within 
the Communist world, quite apart from the problems 
it has created with many other countries. So, I 
would suppose that if Asian Communism, that is 
Hanoi-Peking, were prepared to move this Viet-Nam 
problem towards a peaceful settlement it could in 
fact move towards a peaceful settlement very 
quickly ...
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By the advent of the Nixon administration, of course, it was 
abundantly clear that the Soviet Union was very relevant indeed to 
developments in Indochina, and increasingly in the Afro-Asian region 
in general. But now Nixon, and to a lesser extent his National 
Security Adviser Kissinger, had become convinced that Soviet co-operation 
was crucial to the goal of successful American disengagement from 
Vietnam, as also to that of stability in the Middle East. Therefore, 
when the problem of Soviet power once again became a central focus of 
American attention, it was in the context of a conscious effort to 
establish 'linkages' between SALT and detente, on the one hand, and
r Qissues like Vietnam and the Middle East, on the other. The basic goal 
of containment was essentially reformulated in terms of a new task of 
establishing a strong Soviet stake in a stable 'structure' of 
international order, even as the United States itself increasingly withdrew 
from its former role as 'global gendarme'.
Roughly comparable trends could be observed in American attitudes to 
the strategic balance in this decade. In the late Khrushchev years, 
there was actually speculation from McNamara and some academic commentators 
that the Soviet Union - faced with an enormous American strategic lead 
and many competing demands on its resources - might be prepared to accept 
an indefinite position of strategic inferiority, rationalized by a 
Soviet version of a 'minimum deterrence' doctrine. There was even some 
initial uncertainty on this score in the early stages of the succession 
to the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime, though by 1967-8 it had become clear 
that the Soviets would strongly contest American strategic superiority 
(and American superiority in long-range conventional power as well).70
However, by this stage the Johnson administration was also attempting 
to balance expenditure on strategic arms against other pressing claims 
on its resources: the ever growing drain of Vietnam, and the 'Great 
Society' programs. And McNamara, in particular, moved towards the 
view that - without the acceptance of sensible political limits - the 
Soviet-American strategic competition could become an openended 'race' 
with its own inbuilt 'action-reaction' dynamic. This view was clearly 
expressed in a speech in San Francisco on September 18, 1967:
What is essential to understand here is that 
the Soviet Union and the United States mutually 
influence one another's strategic plans. Whatever 
be their intentions, whatever be our intentions, 
actions ... on either side relating to the buildup 
of nuclear forces ... necessarily trigger reactions
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on the other side. ... it is precisely this 
action-reaction phenomenon that fuels an 
arms race.
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In addition, the Vietnam experience was challenging earlier 
assumptions about the value of strategic superiority. Thermo-nuclear 
power, McNamara declared in the speech quoted above, had 'proven to be 
a limited diplomatic instrument'; and the United States' existing 
superiority did 'not effectively translate into political or diplomatic 
leverage'. To this judgement should be linked McNamara's concern
- strong since the retreat from the counterforce doctrine in 1963 - that 
an operational goal of superiority would present an open cheque to 
military interest groups for the promotion of favoured projects. This 
concern was strongly in evidence in McNamara's attempts to defuse 
proposals for an American ABM system. Not only would ABM procurement, 
on the Defense Secretary's analysis, greatly exacerbate the cost of the 
strategic competition with the USSR, without adding anything to United 
States security. In addition, the links between the ABM proposals and 
those for the 'MIRVing' of the offensive forces appeared to fit the 
arguments of those who claimed that the United States, as the leader in 
the strategic competition, was actually engaged in a 'race' with itself
- or more precisely between the competing potentials of its own evolving 
offensive and defensive systems.74
There seems little doubt that this concern with the inner dynamics 
of the arms race and their implications for 'stable deterrence' was an 
important factor of restraint upon United States strategic policies in 
the middle and late 1960s. But it clearly was not - as some writers of 
the hawk persuasion have implied - the sole, or even the dominant influence. 
Even McNamara did not formally abandon the goal of superiority, and it 
was pushed with much greater vigour both by his immediate successor Clark 
Clifford and by the incoming Nixon administration, at a time in which the 
Soviet Union was passing the United States in crude ICBM totals.
Throughout 1969, the new administration gradually evolved a new, and 
appropriately vague, goal of strategic 'sufficiency'; and on November 17 
1969, the long delayed SALT talks finally commenced. But by this time 
testing of United States MIRV systems - potentially as 'destabilizing' 
as ABM in terms of strict Assured Destruction criteria - had virtually
been completed, and they began to be deployed on both the ICBM and SLBM 
forces in mid 1970.75
Whatever might be said of McNamara's last years, the Nixon administratior 
approach to the strategic contest was from the first a pre-eminently 
political one. But initially it seems to have been shaped by the belief 
that the Soviet authorities could be required, through linkage, to pay 
a substantial 'po'l'it'lca'L price for an arms agreement which, along with 
generally enhanced economic co-operation under detente, would release 
some of the pressures on their seriously strained economy. Only as the 
prospect of a successful Soviet MIRV program became imminent were the 
SALT talks viewed increasingly as a crucial venue for the restraint of 
potential Soviet gains in the area of offensive weapons. Thus in the 
strategic field, as in the wider political domain of the Soviet-American 
contest, the Nixon administration policies capped a gradual evolution 
away from the posture of negotiation only 'from strength' towards an 
endeavour to use negotiations to secure Soviet restraint even as the 
distribution of power moved markedly against the former American 
preponderance.
It is significant that this process was consummated under the aegis 
of Nixon, a quintessential Cold Warrior in American politics, and of 
Kissinger, whose published assessment of both the Soviet Union and of 
world politics had changed remarkably little in the preceeding fifteen 
years. This fact reflects the substantial core of truth in the insistent 
Soviet propaganda claims that the change in American policy was an 
enforced adjustment to 'objective' circumstances. But there is also 
little doubt - to turn to the second of the considerations outlined earlier 
- that a changing perception of the Soviet Union and its international 
role had helped to generate in the United States a general intellectual 
atmosphere supportive of the idea of detente.
There were two features, in particular, which encouraged a reappraisal 
of the Soviet international role in the decade after the Cuban Missile 
Crisis. The first was the evidence of a more extensive and intensive 
Soviet participation in the network of state-to-state relations. Though the 
SALT negotiations themselves did not become a serious prospect till late 
in the decade (not surprisingly, given the extent of Soviet inferiority 
before this time), the USSR participated in the Partial Test Ban Treaty
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and 'hot line' agreement of 1963, the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 and 
the Non Proliferation Treaty of 1968. In addition, the Soviet attitude 
to the United Nations became noticeably more positive as the swelling 
of the Afro-Asian bloc increasingly placed the West on the defensive 
in the world body. More generally, with the dissolution of the greater 
part of the European colonial empires, the Soviet Union's campaign 
for influence in the Third World seemed increasingly focussed on 
established national governments rather than insurgent liberation movements 
(in regard to which it seemed likely to be outflanked by the greater 
militancy of Chinese Communism); while, in their promotion of the 
Tashkent agreement between India and Pakistan in 1965, the Soviet 
authorities appeared to be demonstrating a classic great power concern 
with the stability of their general region.
The second feature was the now unmistakable dissolution of the 
always implausible Communist 'monolith'. The long running dispute with 
China finally erupted into a substantial military clash on the countries' 
joint border in 1969, while the Moscow World Conference of Communist 
parties in the same year demonstrated the substantial limits upon the 
Soviet ability to marshal the rest of the movement for a condemnation 
of the Chinese line, even in the most general terms. And if it seemed 
outflanked by China on the left, the Soviet regime was also plagued by 
'revisionist' stirrings in Eastern Europe and on the part of the powerful 
Italian Communist party. Of course, the East European reform movement 
received a major setback with the military suppression of the 'Prague 
Spring' in 1968; but even this development, which was followed soon after 
by an intensified Soviet campaign for the normalization of relations 
with Western Europe, may have contributed something to the general image 
of an essentially conservative great power, concerned above all to hold 
its established positions in an increasingly complex international 
environment, and faced with very severe constraints in any attempt to 
fundamentally restructure that environment, even if its leaders should 
still desire to do so.
These developments were reflected in the academic Soviet studies 
literature. This period produced several important studies bearing 
wholly or partly on Soviet foreign policy, ranging from Adam Ulam's 
account of its evolution throughout the entire period since 1917, to the 
more detailed studies of late-Stalin and post-Stalin policy by Marshall
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7 6Shulman and Michael Gehlen respectively. There were also studies
by Thomas Wolfe and Roman Kolkowicz of developments in Soviet military 
7 7doctrine, and by Zimmerman of the new body of theoretical and 
analytical literature on international relations produced, primarily, 
by the Soviet Institute of World Economy and International Relations 
(IMEMO).78 Collectively, these studies elaborated certain basic themes: 
that the Soviet Union should generally be viewed as a 'normal1 - if 
difficult - great power concerned to defend an extended conception of 
its own national interests, rather than as a revolutionary power out to 
overthrow the entire system; that the Soviet regime's conduct was 
substantially modified not just by the general experience of protracted 
state-to-state relations with the capitalist powers, but also by the 
far-reaching implications of the new military technology and the problems 
of managing a modern (or near-modern) industrial society; and that the 
indefinite elongation of the regime's perspective on world revolution, 
together with the elevation of Peaceful Coexistence from a tactical 
expedient to a general strategic 'line' of Soviet policy^ reflected a 
qualitative shift in the basic Soviet approach to world politics.
Welch actually distinguishes two different 'images' among the 
major works on Soviet foreign policy in this period: the 'Neurotic Bear' 
image, which pictured the Soviet Union generally as cautious and 
defensive rather than militant and aggressive, with its major challenge 
to international order deriving primarily from an excessive preoccupation 
with security rather than from an ideologically motivated drive towards 
world hegemony; and the 'Mellowing Tiger' image, which did indeed credit 
the Soviet Union with aggressive intentions and militant methods throughout 
all or most of the first 35 years of its existence, but which saw its 
policy as secularly moderating since the early 1950s under the impact 
of international and/or domestic constraints such as those mentioned
7 9above. Of the two images, however, it seems clear that the latter
was much the more significant in regard to the development of official 
American attitudes, and amongst its proponents those who addressed 
themselves most directly to the basic concerns of the strategic debate 
were Kennan and Shulman (who, in addition to his more detailed study 
of late-Stalin policy, produced a short book and several important 
articles on the 'limited adversary relationship' emerging between the 
U. S. and the USSR) .8°
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Perhaps the most important point about Kennan's and Shulman's 
arguments was that they were grounded in a moderate reatpolitik which 
assumed no necessary connection between international posture and 
domestic social order. To employ Kennan's original terminology, they 
sought the prime cause of the 'mellowing' of Soviet foreign policy not 
in the internal 'breakup' of the Soviet order (which Shulman described 
as 'passing into some mature form of totalitarianism')8Jbut in 'the 
process of adaptation to the external environment, which is often 
overlooked in the study of Soviet policy'.82 A subordinate aspect of 
this approach was that they took a generally positive view of the early 
American measures to contain the Soviet Union in Europe and in East and 
West Asia, while at the same time arguing that the progressive shift 
towards a global and highly militarized approach to containment had 
been a mistake based upon an over-simplistic reading of Soviet revolutionary 
goals, and that even in the European theatre - in regard to which Kennan 
had begun to advocate a 'disengagement' strategy as early as 1957 - the 
altered alignment of military, political and social forces made
o ocontainment an inadequate basis for future American policy.
Shulman specifically addressed the question of mutual nuclear 
deterrence, arguing that the 'dominant characteristic' of the decade 
1955-65 had been 'a tendency toward the acceptance of a certain strategic 
stabilization as beween the United States and the Soviet Union', in which 
each side had 'slowly begun to accept the realization that more military 
power does not always produce more security, that there is an interacting 
process at work between the adversaries, and that in an ultimate sense 
the security of each is interlocked with that of the other'. He also 
emphasized that the trend towards strategic stabilization had itself 
allowed more room for manoeuvre to the lesser members of the two great 
alliance systems, so that except in the narrowly strategic sense 'international 
politics is not bilateral but polygonal'; that the nationalist ferment 
in the Third World was a crucial new factor which neither great power 
could really shape to its own ends; and that technological and other 
factors were creating an increasingly interdependent world in which local 
problems could seldom be insulated from world politics and traditional 
geopolitical concepts were 'losing some of their significance'.85 Finally, 
while he certainly did not present the Soviet Union as a status-quo 
power, Shulman did argue that the 'transitional development in Soviet
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foreign policy over the past decade or more has been increasingly 
towards traditional nation-state diplomacy', and that, within this 
general context ' the dominant trend ... has been towards an atmosphere 
of detente'.8 6
Shulman showed less sceptisism about the analytical significance of 
Marxism-Leninism for Soviet policy than was evident even in Kennan's 
immediate postwar statements, arguing that the broad theoretical analysis 
of capitalism/imperialism remained important even though 'the goal of 
world revolution' had become 'operationally irrelevant'. But he did 
emphasize the need to distinguish the 'operational principles' and 
'realities of Soviet behaviour' from the 'shadow play of verbal symbols' 
couched in the 'symbolic language of Marxist proletarianism'; and 
Zimmerman, who also took the position that the Soviet international 
posture was being very substantially modified by the constraints of the 
external environment, attempted to demonstrate in detail the emergence 
of a 'modernist' strand in the official Soviet literature in which such 
environmental realities were addressed with relative freedom from the 
rigid ideological categories of the Stalin years. 89 He devoted most 
attention to the more obviously substantive questions: the indefinite 
elongation of the transition period; the doctrine of a new Third Stage 
of the General Crisis of Capitalism; and the growing focus on the state 
as the primary international actor, with the associated notion of the 
relative autonomy of the political sphere in the major Western societies. 
But he also emphasized the development of a more neutral 'systems' 
language for the discussion of international issues, and the emergence of 
the embryonic notion of a 'world political system' embracing both the 
capitalist and socialist camps and the Third World. 90
Moreover, though Zimmerman carefully avoided overtly ethnocentric 
judgements and warned that the Soviet acknowledgement of a world political 
system did not imply an acceptance of the normality of social and political 
equilibrium, his overall message was that the conflict between 'ideology' 
and 'reality' was pushing Soviet analysts towards a world view more 
acceptable to the West. 91 In the earlier-mentioned schizophrenia between 
'international system' and 'world historical process', the former was 
winning out. The specialist Soviet analysts were developing a concept of 
'post-imperial' international relations which no longer fitted any simple 
'two person, zero sum' schema, and a 'view of the contemporary system
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[which] differed radically from the conspiratorial Bolshevik view and 
conformed instead with reality, or with Western notions of reality'.92
If the expectation that Soviet international perspectives would 
'converge' upon their Western/American counterparts received a rather 
guarded expression from Zimmerman, it was stated more forthrightly by 
Roman Kolkowicz in regard to the narrower question of military doctrine.
In 1964, Thomas Wolfe had written of a 'crossroads' for Soviet strategy, 
involving a choice between the acceptance of military inferiority and 
a 'minimum deterrence' doctrine or a costly attempt to match the intensive 
and extensive expansion of American capabilities under the Kennedy 
administration.93 By the end of the decade, the Soviets had more or 
less closed this gap. But Kolkowicz argued that, having once caught up, 
'the Soviet Union strongly desiretd] to maintain the stability of [the] 
deterrence relationship', and that the new situation, which for the first 
time saw a 'rough symmetry' in the 'capabilities, postures and doctrines' 
of the two powers, provided a generally favourable basis for significant
q  narms control. One of his major concerns was with the shifting balance 
between 'conservatives' (including particularly the military) and 
'pragmatists' (whose pronouncements on the arms race were 'strikingly 
similar' to the position of McNamara in his last years of office) within 
the Soviet establishment. Here he argued specifically that whereas the 
Brezhnev-Kosygin regime (like that of Khrushchev), had been constrained 
to conciliate the conservatives while establishing its authority, it 
was (like that of Khrushchev) now being impelled towards 'a gradual 
reversal of attitudes and priorities from the conservative to the more 
pragmatic approach, in order to retain a workable internal and external 
balance of resources and allocations'.95 But he also offered a double 
barrelled argument about the external determinants of Soviet doctrine and 
capabilities, which he saw as typically following those of the United 
States with a general five year lag:
First, modern defense technology determines to a 
large extent the kind of strategic doctrines 
and policies that will be adopted by the super­
powers. Thus technology seems to have a levelling 
effect which subsumes political, ideological and 
social differences in various political systems.
Second, Western strategic doctrines have had an 
'educative' effect on Soviet political and military 
leaders, persuading them to exchange their own 




In addition to this question of convergence of world views3 there 
was also that of the convergence of domestic social orders. This second 
notion was either not addressed or treated with some scepticism in most 
leading studies of Soviet foreign policy in general (though Gehlen, who 
also produced a functionalist analysis of the role of the CPSU in the 
maintenance of the Soviet system, did attribute what he saw as the
foreign policy caution of the post-Stalin leadership substantially to
9 7the complex demands of managing an increasingly pluralist society).
However, the notion of convergence, linked to the wider concept of 
'industrial society', was very much the air' at this time; and it 
had obvious affinities with the sort of assumptions implied in Kolkowicz' 
argument for the emergence of a 'pragmatist' strand in the debate over 
Soviet military doctrine and policy. Moreover, there were two important 
factors which were calculated to make this issue a 'salient' one for 
the American strategic community: on the one hand, the powerful belief, 
encapsulated in the assumptions of mainstream strategic thinking in the 
1950s, that Soviet 'militarism' and 'expansionism' were directly rooted 
in the political structure and ideology of the Soviet state; and on the 
other, the ideological impact of McNamara's drive to rationalize 
American strategic planning by the large scale application of systems 
theory, especially in the form of the Planning-Programming-Budgeting 
System (PPBS). Within the narrowly technocratic horizons of the strategic 
debate proper, where the historical perspective of Kennan and Shulman (or 
even the much more instrumental concern with history exemplified by 
Kissinger) was the exception rather than the rule, it seems likely that 
convergence assumptions formed an important part of a general ethos 
supporting the expectation that, on nuclear matters at least, the Soviets 
would in time be compelled to abandon their ideological preconceptions for 
a rational (i.e. American) view of the international situation.
In fact, there were at least two major versions of the convergence 
thesis in the wider Soviet studies literature: the one that the Soviet 
Union and the United States would each converge upon a third model of 
the industrial society of the future (more or less planned, more or less 
pluralist, but certainly highly bureaucratized); and the other that 
the Soviet Union, as the less advanced society, was destined to converge 
upon the more advanced social order of the United States, the leading 
historical exemplar of that pluralistic democracy which Talcott Parsons 
depicted as one of the 'evolutionary universals' of societal development.
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Similarly, there were two alternative models applied to the Soviet 
Union itself as the totalitarian model fell into disfavour in the 
middle and late 1960s. The first was the bureaucratic model, which 
could be traced back through leftist critics such as Barrington Moore and 
Herbert Marcuse (himself an advocate of the first convergence thesis) at 
least as far as Trotsky, but which was pioneered in the mainstream 
American debate by the work of Albert Meyer in the 1960s.100 The second 
was the interest group/pluralism model, pioneered by Gordon Skilling 
and Franklyn Griffiths, who in 1969 co-edited a landmark volume on this 
theme, with contributions from specialists (such as Kolkowicz) on 
different aspects of the modern Soviet social order.101
While the full pluralism thesis appears to have been wholly premature, 
a much stronger case could be made for the emergence of a 'bureaucratic' 
or 'institutional' or 'controlled' pluralism, deriving from the interplay 
between the specialized advice on context and policy execution emanating 
'from below', and the broad political goals laid down 'from above' in 
at least general conformity with the dictates of Marxism-Leninism. Such 
arguments have been developed, with varying degrees of emphasis on the 
two sides of the equation, by several Soviet studies specialists in 
the 1970s. However, there were two major factors militating against
a serious consideration of their implications within the narrower 
strategic debate. First, Marxism-Leninism was simply not regarded as 
a plausible foundation for rational foreign and domestic policies for a 
modern industrial/nuclear power. Second, the idea of bureaucracy as 
either an efficient instrument of policy execution or as an unbiased 
source of information on policy options had been severely battered by 
the manifest failures of the 'systems' approach to American foreign and 
defence policy in the 1960s; and the newly fashionable 'bureaucratic 
politics paradigm' strongly emphasized the constraints imposed by 
bureaucratic routine and inter-bureau bargaining upon the prospects 
for any overall rationality in policy formation. Therefore, as the 
pluralist thesis receded in the 1970s, and the attention of the American 
strategic community was increasingly focussed on the practical problem 
of the significance of the formidable Soviet military arsenal, the debate 
tended to polarize around arguments attributing it to a more or less 
aimless process of bureaucratic drift, on the one hand, and to the 
totalitarian rationality of a Soviet regime still dedicated to the goal
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of world hegemony, on the other, with the prospects for political success 
weighted heavily on the latter side.
Finally, it should be emphasized that the above trends by no means 
represent the full scope of the developments in Soviet studies in the 1960s, 
to say nothing of the 1970s. Because of the nature of its subject, this 
field has always retained a strong nucleus of historically-oriented 
scholars (especially outside the United States, where the general impetus 
towards a 'behavioural' science of politics was always less overwhelming); 
and it has produced many works which recognized the historical specificity 
of the Soviet Union without necessarily portraying it as a totalitarian 
anomaly among modern industrial societies. Of particular importance 
here has been the re-evaluation of the 1920s, most notably by E.H.Carr 
(whose massive 14 volume History of Soviet Russia had reached the most 
crucial questions of economic decisionmaking by the middle and late 1960s),104 
but also by Alec Nove, Alexander Erlich, Moshe Lewin, Robert C. Tucker, 
and Stephen Cohen.105 These studies had three important implications 
for the topic of this thesis. First, they seriously undermined the 
view that Stalinism represented the 'inevitable' outcome of the attempt 
to bend a recalcitrant social reality to Marxist/Leninist specifications. 
Second, they indicated that the conceptual changes enshrined in the 
Khrushchevian Peaceful Coexistence synthesis represented not merely an 
enforced adjustment to the realities of containment, nuclear deterrence, 
and the like, but also the recovery of a more flexible Leninist perspective 
abandoned during the Stalin era. Third, they suggested that the Soviet 
historical experience might provide an insight into the problems of 
developing countries superior in several respects to that provided by 
theories of 'modernization' derived from the more privileged Anglo- 
American experience. Moreover, this last point (which received an early 
general acknowledgement from Tucker and Meyer) was developed in detail 
from the mid 1960s onwards by scholars who addressed themselves to the 
growing volume of specialist Soviet literature on the Third World, showing 
that, while the Soviets certainly presented their own historical 
experience as an important reference point for developing countries, they 
were far from seeking to impose a simple Stalinist development model upon 
them.106
All these issues (which are considered at length in Chapters 5 and 6) 
have been further explored in the last decade, while scholars such as
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Jerry Hough have devoted much attention to reformulating the 1960s models 
of post-Stalin change in less ethnocentric and empirically more 
satisfactory terms.107 But it seems fair to say that that growing 
complexity of the wider Soviet studies debate (in the United States and 
elsewhere) has had very little impact upon the way in which Soviet- 
related issues have been discussed in the narrower context of the American 
strategic debate. Indeed, the impressively successful hawk campaign of 
the 1970s to re-establish an essentially totalitarian model of Soviet 
policy-making was conducted almost as if there had been no significant 
developments in Soviet studies since the 1950s - or even the late 1940s.
To account for this development, I would argue, one must look to the 
earlier-mentioned process of encapsulation, and particularly to the 
process by which the search for a comparative/behavioural approach to 
Soviet politics helped to carry over certain basic images from the early 
to the later period. Moreover, this is a question with implications for 
the related questions of American perspectives on the Third World and on 
international relations in general; and it will be considered here as a 
final aspect of the context of the 1970s debate.
The study of the Soviet Union, of the Third World, and of international 
relations constituted three linked areas of academic inquiry of obvious 
significance for the general world order preoccupations of American policy­
makers after 1945; and it seems fruitful to think of all three as examples 
of 'area' studies which became fully subject to the impulse towards 
'comparative' analysis only in the 1960s, at the high tide of the 'behavioural 
revolution' in American political science. In one sense, admittedly,
Soviet studies and international relations had always been comparative.
The totalitarian approach entailed an explicit comparison of the Soviet 
Union with the Fascist regimes of the 1930s, and an implicit contrast 
with the pluralist model of the Western democracies. Similarly, Realist 
international theories were comparative in the sense that they sought to 
demonstrate that international politics was not like domestic politics. 
However, the advance of the more formal comparative approach was delayed
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in both fields by the strength of analytical traditions (partly 
European-based) which emphasized the special character of the object 
of study, while Third World studies as a general enterprise did not 
really get under way until the great burst of decolonization in the 
1950s. In all three areas, therefore, the comparative movement was 
dominated by a behavioural approach which had already been exhaustively 
articulated in regard to the domestic American social order; and, in 
several respects, the result was not to widen the scope of historical 
and cultural comparison but to further entrench ethnocentric assumptions 
about social and political 'normality', which were rendered less open 
to criticism precisely because they were now less visible.
To appreciate this paradox it is necessary to consider both the 
methodological and substantive assumptions behind the behavioural approach, 
though these were closely linked in practice. At the former level it 
seems fair to speak of a mainstream consensus, at least until the late 
1960s, on a positivistic approach to social and political theory - 
an approach based upon the marriage, or rather illicit cohabitation, of 
the logical-empiricist/hypothetico-deductive philosophy of explanation 
with the synchronic analysis of social systems.108 There were,of course, 
substantial differences in the formal claims of structural-functionalism 
and the various forms of 'systems' theory; but the validity of 'system' 
as a basic tool of analysis was hardly questioned. 'The concept of 
system is so fundamental to science', Talcott Parsons insisted, 'that, 
at levels of high theoretical generality, there can be no science without 
it. If there are no uniformities involved in the interdependence of 
components there is no scientific theory'.109
This positivistic consensus, moreover, was just as important for 
what it excluded as for what it endorsed. The hermeneutic approach 
survived primarily in a 'thoroughly purged' conception of verstehen as 
an auxiliary process useful only for the generation of hypotheses which 
must then be tested in accordance with rigorous deductive criteria.110 
And the Marxist analysis of class struggle and modes of production could 
now be firmly dismissed as 'ideological' (in the sense of non-scientific), 
a view buttressed by the prestige of Karl Popper's critique of 'historicism' 
(from an explicitly hypothetico-deductive position) for its alleged 
reliance upon unfalsifiable assumptions about social 'essences'.111 In 
related fashion, the formal definition of the systems approach reflected
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Weber's criticism of the 'pernicious' Marxist tendency to invest modes 
of production with material reality, and the notions of 'ideal type' and 
selection through 'value relevance' which he emphasized instead. 112 
Thus David Easton, perhaps the leading theorist of political systems, 
insisted that all systems (short of the totality of the universe) were 
constructs of the mind, and that the relevant distinction was not between 
'natural' and 'constructive' systems, but between 'interesting' and
i I o'trivial' systems within the latter category.
However, there were basic problems with this broad systems approach 
(to say nothing of the logical-empiricist account of explanation, even 
in Popper's falsificationist reformulation). Once one rejects the 
validity of synchronic analysis for social phenomena (and I will be 
arguing in the next chapter that it is untenable), the notion of a 
functioning social system can be seen as one more grand 'historicist' 
generalization, with its own implied teleology of continuity or 'stability' . 114 
More specifically, a synchronic perspective provides no adequate framework 
for the systematic discussion of structural contradiction, uneven development 
and the coexistence of diverse social forms within a given social order, 
since comparison of the system with itself must be handled in terms 
of a series of synchronic 'snapshots' of its progress from 'tradition' to 
'modernity', 'totalitarianism' to 'industrial society', or whatever.11J 
Similarly, the 'ideal type' mode of analysis becomes highly questionable 
when it is employed, as it was employed in much comparative analysis, 
for the construction of typologies within which to locate a variety of 
distinct social systems. The most plausible rationale of the ideal 
type is that, precisely because it does not have to conform to any 
concrete reality, it can provide a rigorously defined criterion against 
which specific aspects of concrete social orders can be discriminatingly 
compared. But where two or more ideal types are used to classify a range 
of social systems, the temptation to appeal to privileged knowledge of 
social 'essences' is given an unusually free rein. This procedure does 
nothing to obviate the necessity to make impressionistic judgements 
about concrete social systems, which must still be summed up en bloc as 
more or less totalitarian or pluralist, traditional or modern, and shifted 
en bloc to the appropriate end of the ideal type spectrum. But it does 
provide a rationale for substituting rigour in the definition of the 
ideal type for sensitivity to the empirical complexity of concrete
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social forms, and on such ideologically charged questions as the classification 
of the Soviet order the potential for analytical distortion is further 
enhanced.11b
As regards more directly substantive questions, it is possible to 
distinguish three important intellectual influences which predisposed 
American comparative theorists to emphasize the normality of evolutionary, 
relatively harmonious social change emanating from below. First, there 
was the 'unfolding' model of change inherited from 19th century social 
theory. As Krishan Kumar points out, all the great 19th century social 
theorists, including Marx, were deeply influenced by a particular, and 
in many respects unrepresentative, 'image of industrialism' derived from 
the experience of early Victorian England; and the non-Marxist strand 
of this tradition, shorn of the notion that massive discontinuities and 
revolutionary leaps might be a normal part of the unfolding process, was 
absorbed into the synthesis of 20th century American functionalism, 
above all through the work of Parsons.117 Parsons' particular achievement 
- aside from highlighting the conservative concern with normative solutions 
to the problem of social order - was to translate the 19th century concern 
with a specific historical transformation (though one characteristically 
endowed with world-historical significance) into a set of abstract 
analytical categories of ostensibly universal import. But in practice,
Kumar suggests, no serious revision was ever made to the classic 
evolutionary conception:
All that happened was that the topic of social 
change was put in cold storage for a time. In 
fact the prevailing functionalist approach of 
the first half of this century was itself heavily 
permeated by evolutionist assumptions ... only 
now in relation to persistence rather than to 
change ... When stimulated by the rise of the 
new post-colonial states after 1945, the theory 
of social change (in the guise of the 'sociology 
of development') picked up again the evolutionary 
form of the nineteenth century.
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Second, there was the indigenous pluralist tradition, looking back 
to Tocqueville and the Federalist papers, which emphasized the American 
achievement in combining order and progress within a framework of checks 
and balances among competing social groups. Third, there was the
tradition of liberal political economy, with the strictly delimited 
role prescribed for the state. In the context of the new concern with 
Third World development, this perspective received a further endorsement 
in Walt Rostow's influential 1 non-Communist manifesto', The Stages of 
Economise Growth3 which presented a theory of self-generated industrial 
'takeoff' heavily influenced by the Anglo-American experience, and in 
which Communism appeared as an unfortunate and avoidable 'disease of 
the transition'. 11y But more generally, the moral judgement of liberalism/ 
pluralism that the state should keep out of the substantive organization 
of civil society was effectively encapsulated in the analytical categories 
of systems theory, and specifically in its 'insistence upon the need 
to define the boundaries between the political system and other social 
systems'.lz0 Ostensibly, the boundaries so conceived were between 
complexes of votes', and each man in his life plays many roles, constantly 
crossing and recrossing boundaries in his manifold exits and entrances.
But 'in practice', Hough points out, 'it is extremely difficult to 
restrict analysis consistently to the level of abstract roles [and] social 
systems tend to become associated with more concrete institutions... Thus 
in examining a society such as the Soviet Union, the comparative systems 
theorist must see the political system (read state) invading the whole 
of society in a totalitarian fashion; and this must remain the case 
so long as the state undertakes to organize the social division of labour 
in the pursuit of centralized goals, irrespective of the means -  police 
terror, ideological exhortation, material incentives, or whatever - 
employed for this purpose.12z
This complex of methodological and substantive assumptions, I would 
argue, produced a situation in which the Soviet Union, Third World societies 
and even, in a curious sense, the contemporary states-system, were each 
compared to a model of political and social order derived, in large part, 
from an idealization of the Anglo-American historical experience. As 
regards the Soviet Union, the major point of the argument has already 
been foreshadowed. The totalitarian model of the Soviet social order 
was in practice the obverse side of the coin from the pluralist model 
of the American social order; and the hidden assumptions of leading 
comparative theorists ensured that their work (which presumably was more 
accessible to the a-historical mainstream of the American strategic 
community than the specialist Soviet studies literature) carried forward
a simplistic image of the Soviet reality which was being abandoned 
in the latter field. But it is also important to note that the 
comparativist penchant for typologies, involving the impressionistic 
location of entire social systems at different points on an ideal type 
spectrum, involved an interest in sequential as well as lateval 
classification in the Soviet case. The concern, which was explicitly 
manifested in the convergence thesis, was not merely to contrast pluralist 
and totalitarian systems as they currently existed, but to establish 
whether the Soviet Union, as a partly developed country which had taken 
an initial wrong turning during the 'transition' period, could find its 
way back to the developmental high road marked out by the pluralist 
democracies as it acquired the objective material prerequisites of 
advanced industrial society.
The notion of 'modernization', that is to say, tended to be 
encapsulated in that of pluralism; and if the empirical evidence of 
change in the post-Stalin era could not be assimilated to a broadly 
pluralist schema, it must be suspected that the increasing complexity 
of the socio-economic 'base' was not being matched by developments in the 
political 'superstructure' - a situation calculated to produce severe 
internal 'strains' which might, as in the Stalin era, be directed outwards 
in a campaign of intense ideological hostility against alleged foreign 
enemies. Moreover, while the notion of 'bureaucratic politics' was 
often invoked to account for the defence procurement policies of both 
the United States and the Soviet Union, the differential master images 
of the two societies promoted a different mainstream appreciation of the 
role of bureaucracy in either case. As regards the United States, the 
bureaucracy was viewed primarily through the pluralist filter, as a 
channel which cawied up the interplay of private interests into the 
realm of government itself, making the formation of coherent national 
security policies a particularly difficult affair. But even where 
bureaucratic politics arguments weve accepted about Soviet policies, 
they tended (once the brief flirtation with a general image of incipient 
Soviet pluralism had been abandoned) to be assimilated to a residual 
totalitarian/'directed society' approach, with the bureaucracy being 
seen as the mature institutional expression of the regime's centralizing 
preoccupations, which carried down its largely unchanged socio-economic
1 2 3priorities into the general reaches of Soviet society.
There were, admittedly, important differences among American theorists
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about the efficiency with which this was done; and in the late 1960s, 
some conservative American theorists - such as Samuel Huntington ~ 
displayed an open interest in Leninism (the organizational Leninism of 
What is to be done?) as a possible solution to the institutional problems 
of mass society and rapid social change.124 Huntington was unusual in 
his candid acknowledgement that the Soviet political order had certain 
advantages, even from a domestic viewpoint, over its 'antique' American 
counterpart (though the idea that the United States was in many ways 
hampered by its pluralist/democratic organization in the foreign policy 
contest has been a recurring one in the strategic literature, from NSC68 
through to the arguments of the hawk school today). The more common 
position on the comparative efficacy of the two social systems was that 
charted by Brzezinski, when he began to distance himself from his original 
advocacy of the totalitarian model. In their 1963 comparative study, 
Political Power: USA/USSR. 3 he and his co-author Huntington rejected the 
notion of convergence, but spoke of the further evolution of a Soviet 
system which had 'in its own way ... been highly successful',125 and an 
evolution in which the aspirations of the 'young technocrats' seemed 
likely to be a significant factor. But Brzezinski described Khrushchev's 
fall the following year as a 'victory for the clerks' and a triumph for
T O C'bureaucratic conservatism'; and in 1966 he suggested two alternative 
futures for the system: either its 'transformation', in a more or less 
pluralist direction, or its bureaucratic 'degeneration'.127 The latter 
image required only the addition of a renewed emphasis on the weight of 
traditional Russian political culture (which Brzezinski, among others, 
supplied in due course) to produce the assessment of the Soviet Union which 
has come to dominate the American strategic debate in the late 1970s.
As regards the question of Third World development3 the teleogical 
character of much mainstream comparative analysis was even more obvious.
The question at issue was the movement from a 'traditional' to a 'modern' 
social order, and as Donal Cruise O'Brien points out, the early American 
modernization theorists, led by Gabriel Almond, had little doubt about 
the empirical character of this process:
Political modernity is representative democracy, 
and the practical achievement of the democratic 
ideal has reached its highest point in the United 
States of America. The process of modernization,
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in less advanced areas of the world, is 
therefore very simply to be understood as 
one of 'transition' in which backward 
polities will grow increasingly to resemble 
the American model.
12 8
Almond and his associates drew primarily upon established political 
and sociological concepts: in particular, upon Easton's input-output 
model of the political system (with the inbuilt assumptions about the 
proper scope of political action mentioned above); and upon the Parsonian 
'pattern variables' which were taken as defining the contrast between 
tradition and modernity (and behind which lay Dürkheim's preoccupation 
with the problem of establishing, in a modernizing society, a viable 
'organic solidarity' based upon the awareness of interdependence and a 
common fate dictated by the complex division of labour, to replace the 
'mechanical solidarity' disrupted by the undermining of the traditional 
social order) . But another important influence on the general pattern
of American thinking on development issues was the emphasis of economists 
such as Rostow on the 'trickle down' effect of modern industrial sectors 
and transport networks on the rest of a developing economy. Moreover, 
since Rostow emphasized that 'the existence or quick emergence' of an 
appropriate 'political, social and institutional framework' was 
essential for the effective exploitation of the economic impact of leading 
sectors, the two sides of the analysis were mutually reinforcing.130
In practice, the record of Third World development in the 1960s 
conspicuously failed to conform to this original pluralist scenario; and 
especially in the Vietnam era, American comparative theorists became 
increasingly concerned with the social and political dislocation 
occasioned by rapid economic development and the opportunities this created 
for political revolution. However, though their focus of interest shifted 
and their political optimism sharply declined, the underlying assumptions 
which shaped their analyses remained largely unchanged. As Charles Tilly 
points out, American theories of revolution now drew on that aspect 
of the Durkheimian perspective which emphasized the problematic character 
of the 'transition' from mechanical to organic solidarity and the danger 
that the dislocation engendered by rapid industrialization and urbanization 
could produce massive anomie or normlessness, which might find its outlet 
in revolutionary action. A subsidiary influence, he argues, was the
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Weberian notion of the role of 'charismatic' leadership in the creation 
of alternative definitions of reality and on the founding of new social 
movements. But the common strand was the perception of revolution not 
as rational collective action by groups and classes subjected to 
objectively definable exploitation - as Marxist theories would have it - 
but as an unnatural and essentially irrational activity - a reflection of 
the 'breakdown* of the normal functioning of the social system as a 
whole. 131 Thus the bias of such analyses was strongly away from questions 
of socio-economic structure and strongly towards speculation about the 
psychological states of revolutionary actors - whether directly, as in
• 1 3Ted Gurr's elaborate investigation of the concept of 'relative deprivation',
or indirectly, as in Chalmers Johnson's preoccupation with 'deviant'
political responses to the phenomena of the 'disequilibrated social
system'. Indeed, Johnson explicitly maintained that revolution
constituted the 'morbid' condition of society, whose 'healthy' condition
is equilibrium, and implied that the 'macro' analyst of strain in the
system as a whole should look to his 'micro' colleague 'to know what
psychological needs may be met by subversive political activities for
13 3outcasts, declasses, undesirables, and the "maladjusted"...'
Once again, Huntington constituted a substantial exception to this 
pattern, advancing a strongly political concept of revolution which had 
significant affinities with the Marxist-oriented theories generally 
followed in this thesis, and taking a favourable view of 'Leninist'
Communism as a force capable of re-establishing viable political order in 
circumstances where an acien regime had irretrievably broken down.However,
Huntington discounted the core Marxist emphasis on the socio-economic 
foundation for revolution; and his central notion - that political 
instability resulted when social mobilization outran political 
institutionalization - lay within the basic Durkheimian tradition.134 
Moreover, while Huntington himself recommended both measures to slow the 
rate of social mobilization and the utilization of the Leninist theory 
of the vanguard by non-Communist Third World regimes, the general tenor 
of the argument also provided a rationale for support for apparently 
cohesive military juntas and 'modernizing autocrats' such as the Shah, and 
it was for an ad hoc reliance upon such clients that American Third World 
policy was chiefly remarkable in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
Finally, there is the question of the impact of comparative/behavioural
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preoccupations in carrying over pluralist assumptions about domestic 
politics into perspectives on international relations as such in the 
mainstream American debate. The argument that there was such an impact 
must be more speculative than in the two earlier cases, given the 
apparent strength in the 1950s and the 1960s of a Realist tradition 
implying a radical discontinuity between domestic and international 
politics. However, I have already suggested that American Realism 
itself tended to be filtered through indigenous pluralist assumptions 
about politics in general, and there were two more specific aspects of 
the indigenous tradition which retained their vitality throughout the 
period of apparent Realist hegemony. First, there was the venerable 
Anglo-American attachment to 'commercial functionalism': the belief, in 
its 19th century variant, that the mutual benefits of free trade would 
render war obsolete, or, in mid-20th century American parlance, that the 
'positive sum' dimension of economic relations between states would
135come to outweigh the 'zero sum' dimension of their military relations.
Second, there was the international strand of pluralist political theory
developed under Charles Merriam at Chicago in the 1930s, which, with
its pragmatist, 'problem solving' approach, and its explicit attempt to
draw a comparison between world politics and urban politics as two
different examples of 'politics in the absence of central authority',
anticipated many of the 'transnationalist' themes which became so136prominent in American international theory in the 1970s. This approach 
was carried on in the 1960s by those writers who sought to replace the 
'state-centric paradigm' with the concept of a far more inclusive world 
political system. But it also received a more specific and substantial 
referent in studies of the prospects for integration in Western
137Europe - notably in the neo-functionalist approach of Ernst Haas,
and the cybernetic approach of Karl Deutsch, who coined the term
'pluralistic security community' to describe a social group divided
into separate political units but linked by a single set of transactional
boundaries, and marked by a degree of community feeling which 'eliminated
138war and the expectation of war1 within those boundaries.
These different components appear to have come together into a 
'global interdependence' perspective in the early 1970s, when the oil 
crisis and the NIEO debate added an urgent North-South dimension to the 
already established preoccupation with the interdependence of the
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advanced industrial societies and with the prospects for converting 
economic interdependencies into political 'linkages' in dealing with 
the Soviet bloc. This global interdependence perspective, I believe, 
might fairly be characterized as general systems theory under another 
name. Like the bureaucratic politics perspective which flowered at 
the same time, it was a characteristic product of the misnamed 'post- 
behavioural revolution' in American international theory, in that it 
involved a more candid emphasis upon normative and 'policy-relevant' 
concerns, without any serious reconsideration of the normative bias 
built into its essentially unchanged methodology (a problem which 
could now be finessed by abandoning the rigorous Popperian aspirations 
for a pseudo-Kuhnian image of a hundred paradigms ranged in creative 
contention).
If this argument is correct, the ingrained positivistic conception
of a functioning social system encouraged a diffused but powerful
sense of an imminent 'transformation' of world politics, in which the
growing complexity and intensity of international interdependence was
in itself helping to generate a new world order whose essential
features were misrepresented by the classical 'state-centric paradigm'.
However, this expectation also received crucial support from the
similarly entrenched translation of the commonsense notion of mutual
deterrence into the abstract, mathematical formulae of Mutual Assured
Destruction, especially since the Soviet acceptance of an ABM ban in
SALT I was often interpreted as an acceptance of the core MAD doctrine.
Insofar as the innate logic of nuclear technology was itself expected
to 'eliminate war and threat of war' among the major powers, it became
the more attractive to identify the growth of 'interdependence' with
the prospect of an embryonic 'security community' over the world as a
whole. Indeed, this vision received at least rhetorical support from
the erstwhile Realist Kissinger, who had also taken up McNamara's theme
of the meaninglessness of nuclear superiority in his defence of the SALT 
139I agreements. As John Vincent points out, Kissinger's last years
in office involved an increasing diversion from the carefully
articulated 'minimalist' programme of international order towards
'globalist' world order concerns, in regard to which he fell back on a
pluralist 'one worldism' of a characteristically American kind, and an
'extraordinary belief in a new harmony of interests', allegedly
140demonstrated in unmistakeable fashion in the field of energy.
77.
To say only so much would be to endorse the hawk contention that
an a-political MAD 'theology', which catered more generally to 'the
traditional American dream of a non-strategic world order', had
promoted a dangerous abdication of American military responsibilities
141in the face of the continuing harsh realities of power politics.
But this would be to quite ignore the role of the corresponding
'theologies' of limited nuclear war and extended deterrence in shaping
the general intellectual climate of the American strategic debate.
The adherents of these two closely related approaches were just as
committed as the advocates of MAD to the pursuit of technical solutions
to intractable political problems, whether through the manipulation of
the threat of nuclear force in 'brinkmanship' crisis strategies, or
through the escalatory use of nuclear force in post-crisis limited war.
They were just as prone to misleading suggestions that such solutions
could be determined with some kind of 'scientific' precision (indeed,
the wide popularity of 'second wave' deterrence theorists such as
Thomas Schelling and Herman Kahn, in contrast to 'first wave'
predecessors such as Brodie, would seem to be attributable in roughly
equal measure to their emphasis on extended deterrence issues and their
pretensions to a systematic 'game theoretical' approach to these
issues). And behind a positivistic screen of value-freedom, they
appealed to an essentially pluralist vision of a political universe
without highly structured objective interests, and to a bargaining
culture in which the most intensely held national values could be
modified or negated by the astute manipulation of a wider calculus of
costs and benefits. The crucial difference was that the MAD approach
at least started from a strictly limited area - namely, the avoidance
of central war - about which it Was genuinely plausible to postulate a
common interest over-riding the geopolitical, developmental and other
conflicts among the great powers; whereas the extended deterrence
approach sought to stretch the common interest in war avoidance so far
as virtually to deny these other conflicting interests a politically
142significant reality.
It seems clear that limited war strategies remained an operational 
component of American nuclear policy throughout the 1960's despite the 
retreat from a declaratory commitment to them, while the extended 
deterrence theme maintained a consistent, if temporarily muted, presence
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143in the public debate. Both themes flowered again in the mid 1970s,
along with the growing concern over a Soviet first strike threat to
the Minuteman ICBM force. Indeed, as Lawrence Freedman points out, it
was only by virtue of the increasing emphasis in this period on the
preservation of a credible limited war capability (as opposed to a
simple Assured Destruction capability, which would be much less
susceptible to erosion by Soviet technological advance) that the furore
144over Minuteman vulnerability made any real sense.
The hawk group were in the forefront of the campaign to establish
a limited war capability as the true criterion of a viable deterrent
posture, invoking scenarios for graduated Soviet-American nuclear
exchange which were both 'astonishingly abstract in nature' and totally
at variance with the kind of nuclear warfighting suggested in the
145Soviet military literature. These arguments thus had very little to
do with the introduction of more genuinely political criteria into
American strategic policy: but they did have important political
implications for American posture vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. From the
time of the first successful Soviet MIRV test in 1973, Defense Secretary
Schlesinger campaigned for improved American 'limited options' to 'shore
up deterrence across the whole spectrum of risks' - without which, he
argued, a future United States leadership might be 'self-deterred' in 
146a nuclear crisis. From this point onward, the issue remained a
focal point of the public debate, and though the formal promulgation of 
an American limited war strategy occurred only in 1980 - with the Carter 
administration's Presidential Directive 59 - Schlesinger could then
147claim that the relevant policies had been '80% in place' since 1973.
Finally, it should be noted that these developments occurred
against the background of a 'third wave' critique in mainstream
American deterrence theory - a critique which, though in many respects
most notable for the continuing ethnocentricity of its underlying
assumptions, at least acknowledged the enduring reality of substantive
_ . , 14«and intrinsic conflicts of interest even in the nuclear era. Similarly,
the later 1970s produced a renewed emphasis on economic and
geopolitical conflicts in the wider foreign policy debate, with the
pacific connotations of interdependence being downplayed even by the
concept's leading defenders, and Kissinger (now out of office) leading
the call for a 'geopolitical' perspective to replace the 'idealistic',
'legalistic' and 'pragmatic' approaches which had allegedly dominated
149the history of American foreign policy. Thus the pluralistic model
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could be convicted of a basic failure to predict trends in international 
politics, just as in Soviet and Third World politics; and given this 
comprehensive failure, one might have expected a broad reappraisal of 
the model itself, and a new readiness to credit the analytical claims 
of perspectives emphasizing structural contradiction rather than 
functional harmony as the key to social analysis. In practice, 
however, the American strategic debate remained to a striking extent 
confined within the framework of traditional pluralist assumptions; and 
if the harmony of interests motif receded once again in discussions of 
Third World affairs and international relations in general, the most 
popular explanation of its inappropriateness was once again, as in the 
Cold War era, the atavistic intransigence of the Soviet Union, 
expressed precisely in the official Soviet insistence on the inherent 
dimension of contradiction and conflict in the established world order. 
Moreover, this general perception of a special Soviet inability to 
adapt to the changing international environment meshed neatly with the 
specific hawk thesis of a Soviet doctrinal commitment to military 
superiority and to the preservation of nuclear war as a potential 
instrument of policy. The implications of this pattern in the post-1972 
debate will be considered in the final section.
The Pattern of the American Debate
As suggested above, the detente-era debate proceeded along two 
central axes: the one broadly concerned with the overall 'correlation 
of forces' in contemporary world politics, the other focussed more 
narrowly upon trends in the Soviet-American strategic balance. But the 
two axes were linked by an over-riding concern with the nature of the 
Soviet Union as an international actor, judgements about which were 
crucial to the significance accorded to developments in either context. 
And the most important factor here was the growing influence of the hawk 
argument - expounded most insistently and with the greatest show of 
authority by Richard Pipes - for a refurbished totalitarian model of 
the Soviet order in which traditional Russian, rather than Marxist, 
influences were now clearly accorded explanatory pride of place.
The major divisions in the debate over broad international trends
are usefully summed up in Ole Holsti's distinction between Cold War
Internationalists - for whom the hallowed verities of the East-West
confrontation still hold good despite the illusory slogans of detente -
and Post-Cold War Internationalists - for whom the importance of this
confrontation is now eclipsed by North-South problems and the imperatives
150of the 'management of interdependence'. The categories by no means
provide a cut-and-dried home for all leading figures in the debate
(Kissinger, for instance, has apparently moved from the first to the
second category and back again over the past decade or so, while
Brzezinski has contrived to straddle both throughout); and Holsti's
(1979) argument would appear to understate the strength of the general
trend back to a neo-Cold War perspective. However, the scheme does
provide a useful starting point for locating the hawk group - as the
most extreme of the Cold War Internationalists - in relation to other
major participants in the debate.
The hawk group themselves have presented this relationship rather
differently, generally laying claim to the mantle of Realism (to the
extent of solemnly invoking the wisdom of Kennan the late -1940s
advocate of containment to refute Kennan the late -1970s advocate of a
151fundamental reappraisal of American perceptions of the Soviet Union). 
This approach was evidently very successful as a rhetorical strategy: 
but it was also nothing more than a rhetorical strategy. For all the 
emphasis in the hawk literature upon the obstacles which a 'pragmatic'
or 'mercantile' or 'bargaining' political culture places in the way of
~ 152a genuine comprehension of a state such as the Soviet Union, there
was remarkably little acknowledgement that this basic perspective 
(designated earlier as 'commercial functionalism') might be inapprop­
riate to contemporary world politics iwespective of the Soviet vole. 
Indeed, the issues of the 'North-South conflict' and of the autonomous 
sources of 'instability' in Third World states were not explained away 
but simply ignored in the hawk literature, with the current malaise of 
the American international position being effectively attributed to two 




However, although the hawk group showed much less concern even 
than the immediate post-war Realists with the complexity of under­
lying structures in contemporary world politics, they could point to 
both a level of Soviet military power relative to the United States and 
a readiness to employ that power in disputed Third World areas which 
were qualitatively new. In addition, the promise of detente as a 
constraint upon Soviet power, as also the promise of a new stability 
in an allegedly 'multipolar' world, had been seriously oversold in the 
early 1970s by the Nixon Administration, opening the way to charges 
that Soviet conduct in the Yom Kippur War and the Angolan crisis had 
flagrantly violated the 'code of detente'. Kissinger initially 
resisted these attacks, arguing that hard-line policies which had failed 
when the United States enjoyed clear military superiority would not work 
when that superiority had disappeared, that Soviet behaviour must be 
judged against specific contexts and not by criteria appropriate only 
to 'an ideal world', and that the United States could not regard
detente as a 'means of asking the Soviet Union to take care of all of 
154our problems'. But he also moved increasingly towards a new
emphasis on the deep and persistent ambiguities of the detente 
relationship; and in his final year of office he (and his deputy Helmut 
Sonnenfeldt) sketched the image of a 'flawed' imperial power, with 
strong proclivities towards 'geopolitical' expansionism, which was 
fleshed out in Kissinger's increasingly hardline analysis of Soviet 
policy in the Carter era
Moreover, this 'geopolitical' perspective was of relatively little
significance as a counter within the Cold War Internationalist camp to
the simplistic hawk concentration on the innate drives of the Soviet
Union. For 'geopolitics', in Kissinger's lexicon, did not involve a
structuralist emphasis upon a logic of geographical position to which
ccny power in that position would he s u b j e c t but merely constituted an
alternative label for his long-standing concern with the 'requirements
of equilibrium' and the restraint demanded of all parties to a
156'legitimate' international order. Thus, in a period in which American 
retrenchment from the globalism of the 1960s was matched by a new 
Soviet 'geopolitical momentum' in Africa and West Asia, the formula 
was perfectly compatible with the notion of a special threat to 
international equilibrium posed by innate Soviet expansionism -
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especially where the origins of that expansionism were directly traced,
as most notably by Pipes, to the geopolitical environment of the early 
157Muscovite state.
On the Post-Cold War Internationalist side, the central motif of
interdependence was also, in an indirect fashion, accommodating to the
hawk picture of an inherent Soviet challenge to a stable world order.
Admittedly, some Post-Cold War Internationalists showed far more
sensitivity than any of their 'Realist' opponents to economic and
developmental contradictions in world politics - especially where, as
with Shulman and Robert Legvold - they had come to wider international
concerns primarily through a focus upon Soviet foreign and Third World 
158policy. But the general tenor of interdependence rhetoric - 
especially in the first half of the 1970s - was calculated rather to 
obscure these contradictions, and to facilitate a left-handed 
assertion of an international harmony of interests in terms of mutual 
vulnerability. Given the further association of the 'new' inter­
dependence with the emergence of new constraints upon the legitimate 
use of force increasingly similar to those acknowledged in the domestic 
sphere, this perspective implied a much more sweeping censure of any 
major power which disregarded these alleged constraints than would have
been appropriate to the lightly mediated milieu of power politics
159depicted in the 'state-centric paradigm'. And once again, the hawk
literature portrayed the USSR as just such a maladaptive power, trapped,
in Eugene Rostow's words, 'by the traditional aspirations of the Czars
and by the newer ambitions of [its] Communist ideology... in the
imperial mood of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries - a mood which
180the Western nations have rejected with relief and conviction.'
Thus, by early 1977, Legvold could already point to a 'remarkable 
consensus' in the American strategic debate on the nature and 
international implications of Soviet power:
The common portrait is of a late-arriving military 
leviathan, in the bloom of military expansion, 
self-satisfied at last to have matched the power 
of its great imperialist rival, and fascinated by 
the potential rewards in the continued accumulation 
of arms. But most are also agreed that the 
Soviet Union is a seriously flawed power: economically 
disadvantaged, technologically deficient, bureau­
cratically scelerosed, and threatened by a society 
which is, in Zbigniew Brzezinski's words, 'like a 
boiling subterranean volcano [straining] agai^pi: the 
rigid surface crust of the political system'.
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Brzezinski himself appears to have vigorously promoted this line
in his capacity as National Security Adviser in the incoming Carter
administration. Not long before assuming that office, he had
speculated about the possibility of a military takeover as a solution
162to Soviet internal contradictions, and even about 'the disappearance
of the Soviet state' - a goal which the United States might promote by
'some realistic encouragement of pluralism via nationalism and
separatism' . ^  And in office he similarly declared (with a shrewd echo
of Trotsky's relegation of the non-Bolshevik left to the 'dustbin of
history') that the United States was 'challenging the Russians to
co-operate with us or run the risk of becoming historically irrelevant
164to the great issues of our time .
Admittedly, Brzezinski's direct political role was countered by
that of Shulman, as Soviet affairs adviser to Secretary of State Vance -
a situation conducive to a certain 'schizophrenia' in the posture of
the early Carter administration on Soviet-related issues.^ But the
secular trend was towards the Brzezinski line, which had evidently
triumphed well before the Afghanistan invasion, nominated by the
President himself as the watershed in his assessment of Soviet policy.
And the situation was much less equivocal under the Reagan administration,
in which the notably hawkish Secretary of State Haig figured as a
'moderate', engaged in a continuing and ultimately unsuccessful
contest for influence with the office of National Security Adviser
(where Pipes had become Soviet affairs specialist), with Defense
Secretary Weinberger, and with (among others) Eugene Rostow as the new
166head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. President Reagan's
own early pronouncements differed remarkably little from his earlier
campaign statements in their strongly negative portrayal of both
16 VSoviet policy and the Soviet social order; while Pipes (in an 'off
the record' but widely attributed interview) declared that 'nothing [was]
left of detente', that the administration believed that broad
negotiations were pointless until the Soviets abandoned 'the most
brazen imperial drive in modern world history', and that the Soviet
Union's economic problems would eventually confront its leaders with a
168choice between reform along Western lines or going to war.
A final point about this broad picture of an unequivocal imperial 
thrust by the Soviet Union concerns the dubious character of the
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evidence on which it ostensibly rested. There is, to begin with, the 
general problem of the extravagant implications drawn from the direct 
Soviet military activity in the Third World over the past decade, which 
had undoubtedly added a major and disturbing new dimension to earlier 
Soviet activity in this context, but which also remained, even after 
the Afghanistan invasion, less extensive than the comparable 
activity of the United States itself through to the early 1970s. But 
more specific instances of this problem are provided by two official 
government claims which, launched in the crucial years 1976-77, helped 
to fix a highly unfavourable image of the internal dynamics of Soviet 
power upon the American debate.
The first was the CIA's 1976 announcement that its estimates of
the Soviet 'defence burden' should be increased by approximately 100%
for the whole period since 1970. It must be emphasized that this
revision was not based on any substantial new evidence about
observabte Soviet capabilitiesbut rather on a change in the
techniques employed to estimate the economic costs to the Soviets of
capabilities already attributed to them. Moreover, the change in
estimating technique was evidently the result of intra-bureaucratic
struggles; and, according to the economist Philip Hanson, the limited
information which emerged about the competing techniques was primarily
indicative of the 'precarious nature' of all such economic estimates,
and suggested that 'rolling dice to determine the Soviet defence
169burden would have been about as reliable'. But though the status of 
such estimates has remained highly controversial, the insistence upon 
an inordinate Soviet defence burden has become a standard component of 
the official American position, culminating in the claims made in the 
glossy monograph on Soviet Military Power released in 1981 by the 
Reagan administration Pentagon.
According to this volume (which again contained nothing new about 
actual Soviet capabilities, but which was liberally sprinkled with 
obiter dicta reflecting the basic hawk case about Soviet policy and 
the Soviet social order) 'the estimated dollar costs of Soviet military 
investment exceeded comparable U.S. spending by 70 percent in 1979', 
capping 'a decade during which Moscow's policy has been to stress guns 
over butter'; and since the Soviet authorities, unlike their Western 
counterparts, saw defence spending not as a burden but as a 'necessity
85.
and a priority above everything else', further percentage increases
could be expected even if declining productivity should confront the
regime with 'a negative growth rate' .
The speculation about a negative growth rate raises in turn the
other major claim mentioned above: the prediction of a new Soviet
dependence on imported oil in the 1980s, which formed the centrepiece
of the highly unfavourable picture of Soviet economic prospects
171promulgated in CIA reports from 1977 onwards. This oil claim was
even more controversial than the military burden one; and by May 1981
the CIA had reversed its own position, predicting that the USSR would
172remain a net oil exporter throughout the 1980s. But the earlier
prediction had already provided ample fuel for 'grand design'
speculation regarding the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and had been
adduced by both the Carter and Reagan administrations as one factor
justifying an increased American military presence in the Persian Gulf -
where, according to Weinberger, the Soviets' emerging 'economic
necessity' for imported oil dictated 'their long-range objective of
173denying access to oil by the West'. Since the Reagan administration
was at the same time proclaiming its own readiness to intervene directly
should that be necessary to preserve the existing Saudi regime from
Iranian-style revolution, the vision of Soviet intervention in a dispute
174over oil showed considerable potential for self-fulfilling prophecy.
If the problem of self-fulfilling prophecy is important in regard
to this image of an internally generated Soviet imperial thrust in the
broad political domain, it is still more acute in regard to the hawk
thesis of a determined Soviet drive for a usable 'superiority' in the
more specific context of the strategic balance. Here, also, the
detentist/arms control 'orthodoxy' depicted in the polemics of the hawk
group was a notably transient and narrowly based phenomenon (as
Freedman notes, the Pentagon was making 'crude, contrived and
unconvincing' assertions about a Soviet first-strike goal as early as 
1751969); and here, also, the general return to a hard-line 
perspective in the later 1970s must be attributed primarily not to the 
emergence of new evidence about Soviet o cop abilities but to the renewed 
influence of highly pessimistic, Cold War assumptions about Soviet 
'intentions. The problem which preoccupied the 1970s debate - the long­
term threat of highly accurate 'MIRVed' missiles to the 'survivability'
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of fixed-based ICBMs on the opposing sides - was already clearly 
implied in American capabilities at the start of the decade; while 
Soviet capabilities in this respect actually grew more slowly than 
expected, at a rate which seemed to push the problem of 'Minuteman 
vulnerability' back to the mid-1980s at least. But 'though the 
arrival of the Soviet MIRV was delayed', observes Freedman, 'the 
[American] advance publicity (stretching over five years) meant that it 
had been as important, if not more so, than the U.S. MIRV in shaping
attitudes on the impact of multiple, accurate warheads on the strategic
. ,176balance .
As Freedman's account makes clear, the attack upon the SALT process
by hawk critics outsi-de the Nixon and Ford administrations was matched
by a conflict wdthdn both administrations over the underlying 'adversary
images' of the official intelligence agencies: between the CIA, which
saw the Soviet Union as open to genuine negotiations based on a
shared acceptance of the need for basic stability in the nuclear
balance, and the Pentagon, which 'emphasized a Soviet drive to military
superiority' and which, 'in the build-up to, and aftermath of SALT I...
177was a source of unyielding suspicion of Soviet motives'. Freedman
further argues that the CIA's adversary image was much more independent
of specific institutional requirements than was that of the defence
intelligence agencies, but that during the 1970s (and in part because
of this very lack of a strong institutional base) the CIA analysts
progressively lost ground to their opponents in the 'battle... for the
178soul of U.S. strategic arms policy'.
A landmark in this process was the 1976 National Intelligence
Estimate (NIE), formulated in the last days of the Ford administration.
The deliberations behind this estimate effectively brought together the
official and unofficial strands of the hard-line position on Soviet
intentions, through the appointment of a 'Team B' group of analysts,
chaired by Pipes, to draft a 'competitive estimate' to balance that
provided the CIA's 'Team A'. Team B was composed of known 'pessimists'
on the question of Soviet intentions (since Pipes claimed that there
was 'no point in another optimistic view'), and though ostensibly
independent of the intra-bureaucratic conflict, several of its members
were closely linked to the Defense intelligence agencies - and
179especially to Air Force intelligence. In addition, argues Des Ball,
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there was a direct input into the estimating process by General Keegan,
the outgoing head of Air Force intelligence, whose general position -
backed by an exotic array of specific claims - was that the United
180States had already 'lost the strategic balance' by 1972. This 
combination of influences produced a final estimate which was reported 
to be 'more sombre than any for a decade', and which 'flatly stated 
that the Soviet Union [was] seeking superiority over the United States 
forces'.181
The general handling of the 1976 NIE (including its subsequent
disclosure to the press by Team B members) clearly suggested an attempt
to head off any 'dovish' initiative on the part of the incoming Cafter 
182administration. There was, perhaps, no great reason for hawk
concern on this score: for the much publicized early proposal for 'deep
cuts' in SALT II was allegedly drafted by Senator Jackson, the leading
Democratic 'hawk', in terms which the Soviet authorities were almost
183certain to reject; while the hard-line perspective on Soviet motives
also had an influential champion in Brzezinski, who in 1977 commissioned
a study, chaired by Huntington, which concluded that the Soviets were
committed to the achievement of a 'true' nuclear warfighting capability.
In the middle of its term, however, the Carter administration did appear
committed to a SALT II agreement within the broad framework of the 1974
Vladivistock accords; and in this context the 'external' hawk campaign
reached a new pitch, particularly under the aegis of the Committee on
the Present Danger and through the medium of calculations by Nitze and
T.K. Jones (a Boeing Aerospace analyst who became an Assistant Secretary
of Defence in the Reagan administration) which presented a far more
alarmist picture of Soviet offensive and defensive capabilities than
185that presented by the administration itself.
Once again, the arrival of the Reagan administration resolved the
residual tensions between the hawk argument and the official American
position - as evidenced in the central propositions of the Pentagon
monograph on soviet Military Pooler. Thus the Soviets were said both to
be reliant upon 'force as a tool of domestic control' and to regard
'military force [as] the major propellant of change in international
affairs', being buttressed in their adventurism by their current 'belief
186that the correlation of forces has shifted in Miscow's favour'.
Though desiring to achieve their ends without 'nuclear war and its
184
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debilitating results', they rejected both 'Western notions of strategic
sufficiency [and] the concept of assured destruction', seeing 'the
development of superior capabilities wedded to a strategy designed to
achieve military victory and a dominant post war position as the only
rational approach to nuclear forces'. And, as regards nuclear war itself,
the Pentagon study claimed, 'Soviet strategic operational employment
plans, based on Soviet writings, point to seizing the initiative
187through preemptive attack [as] the preferred Soviet scenario'.
This document, of course, was closely related to the new
administration's campaign for a major increase in the American defence
effort, and most specifically for the more rapid development of the
contentious and extremely expensive MX missile system - an issue on
which the Carter administration had moved rather cautiously. However,
the MX issue also raised the most acute questions about the entire hawk
position on the central issue of ICBM vulnerability, since the Reagan
administration immediately abandoned, on internal political grounds,
its predecessor's plans for a mobile basing system for the new missile,
and thus the rationalization for it as more 'survivable' than the
188existing Minuteman force. Of course, the MX (with its ten extremely
accurate and powerful warheads) would still have a greatly enhanced 
offensive capacity against 'hardened' Soviet missiles: but in terms of
the commonly accepted logic of the American strategic debate, this 
would actually make it a more 'attractive' target for a Soviet first 
strike in an intense crisis situation. Moreover, since the long-term 
threat of ICBM vulnerability was a more comprehensive problem for the 
less 'balanced' Soviet forces than for the American nuclear 'triad', 
and since the now openly proclaimed American concept of limited nuclear 
war had always attracted a much more unequivocal Soviet rejection than 
the basic American concept of mutual deterrence, there was, once again, 
the prospect of hawk-influenced American policies directly promoting the 
kind of Soviet response they were ostensibly designed to counter.
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As suggested at the outset of the chapter, the pattern of the
middle and late 1970s debate substantially reproduced that of the
middle and late 1950s, the earlier occasion on which the prospect of
strategic 'parity' stimulated an intense American concern with the
danger of Soviet gains at the 'margins' of the great power
relationship and a preoccupation with the technical problems of
preserving a credible extended deterrent (and limited warfighting)
capability. Admittedly, there were important practical differences
between the two contexts. On the one hand, the Soviet pretensions to
an effective parity were now much less fragile than in the Khrushchev
era, while the Soviet challenge in the Third World was now buttressed by
a genuine, and highly visible, capacity for the extended projection of
conventional military power. On the other, the highly threatening
'adversary image' espoused by the hawk group no longer enjoyed its
almost unchallenged status of the 1950s; and it seems fair to attribute
its increasing sway in the late 1970s in part to the internal sociology of
the American foreign policy process, which allowed a disproportionate
influence to a relatively small but highly organized and articulate
189constellation of 'enemies and sceptics of detente'. However, this 
much granted, the larger truth remains that a broadly similar stimulus 
from the Soviet side produced a broadly similar response on the American, 
and that the existence of a formalized detente process and an established 
SALT framework exercised surprisingly little constraint upon the drift 
back to a Cold War ethos.
A corollary to this is that the hawk group were never, as their 
own publicity suggested, an isolated chorus of voices crying in a 
wilderness of detente illusions. Rather, they were merely the most 
extreme proponents of a position which remained influential even at the 
height of the 'detente era'; and they were able to ground their 
campaign in a basic core of methodological and substantive assumptions 
which were effectively shared even by most of their immediate opponents, 
and which predisposed a general reversion of the American debate tc 
deep suspicion of the Soviet Union, in proportion as the continuing 
idiosyncracy of the latter became more widely acknowledged. The most 
general of these assumptions - the pluralist image of a 'natural' 
equilibrium in conditions facilitating the free play of competing 
groups - has already been discussed; and it will provide a continuing
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motif of the critique of Western theory in Part II. But there were also 
more specific assumptions - about the nature of ideology/doctrine, 
about political 'rationality' and about the inner dynamics of social 
systems - which allowed the hawk group to make unjustified but (in 
the American context) effective claims that they were avoiding the 
ethnocentricity of their opponents, and paying due regard to the 
historical specificity of the Soviet Union and the specific content of 
the Soviet self-account.
In the first place, the positivistic, computerized strategic
analysis of the 1960s had driven a conceptual wedge between what one
hawk analyst of doctrine coyly calls 'the arcane arts of comparative 
190force posture', and what, in the hawk literature proper, is presented
as the equally arcane art of deciphering the 'Aesopian' communications
191of the Soviet political and military elite. This division, in turn,
has permitted a practical division of labour among the hawk group in
the presentation of what is, in effect, a 'package deal' interpretation
of the joint and reciprocal significance of Soviet posture and Soviet
doctrine: such that Pipes can buttress his analysis of Soviet doctrine
by citing the arguments of Jones, Luttwak and Nitze - 'an accomplished
expert in these matters' - about the commitment to superiority
192discernible in Soviet posture, while Nitze, for his part, can take as
given the testimony of similarly accomplished experts on doctrinal
issues - such as Pipes - that the Soviet Union is 'doctrinally
193committed to achieving world hegemony'.
This division of labour is crucial because it allows hawk analysts 
in either area to 'factor in' the extraneous assumptions without which 
such an unequivocal interpretation of either doctrine or posture would 
be impossible, while at the same time avoiding the genuinely reciprocal, 
hermeneutic approach to the two areas which their own substantive 
claims imply. Moreover, there is no obvious justification, except in 
the skewed analytical categories of the American strategic debate, for 
treating these two areas of inquiry as so arcane that they cannot be 
brought within the one unified and coherent conceptual framework. Thus, 
as will be argued at length in Chapter 4, there are only a few crude 
propositions about nuclear deterrence and warfighting which can 
usefully be related to the general political problems of the contemporary 
great power relationship - propositions which are much too crude to be
amenable to the kind of sophisticated mathematical computations favoured
in the American debate. And similarly, as will be argued in Chapter 7,
the contemporary hawk literature of doctrinal exegesis has added
remarkably little - even at the level of detailed nuance - to the
account of Soviet doctrine presented by Garthoff and Dinerstein twenty 
194years earlier (while Garthoff himself has cogently argued that,
insofar as there has been innovation in Soviet doctrine, the trend has
generally been away from those more threatening elements consistently
195emphasized in the hawk literature ).
The second point concerns the mainstream American concept of
ideology, and the latitude which this has provided for hawk
arguments discounting those elements unfavourable to their case within
the broad corpus of Soviet doctrinal statements. The immediate target
of such arguments has been the more overtly 'detentist' Soviet poti-ti-cal
doctrine and commentary on international issues, which - as American
analysts such as Zimmerman and Morton Schwartz have demonstrated - has
increased in both volume and complexity over the past decade or so;
but which is typically dismissed in hawk discourse as a mere propaganda
196screen for a continuing Soviet commitment to world hegemony. But
even this latter judgement rests on a conceptual divorce between
doctrinal and other evidence analogous to that already noted in regard
to the issues of military capabilities and intentions. On the one
hand, hawk analysts have displayed an almost obsessive concern with
the Soviet doctrine of a shifting correlation of forces, and have
invoked the concept of an overarching 'grand strategy' to justify a
conspiratorial reading of recent Third World developments which would
✓ 197not have been out of place in the Strausz-Hupe works of the 1950s.
On the other, they have displayed an ostentatious contempt for the
analytical significance of the Soviet 'working theory' of modern
history, within whose framework both the specific political doctrines
of Peaceful Coexistence and detente, and specific military doctrines
on the issues of deterrence and warfighting, are ostensibly to be
accom/'iod’&ted. Indeed, for Pipes - perhaps the most articulate exponent
of the hawk position - Soviet Marxism-Leninism has done no more than
intensify the 'extreme Social Darwinist outlook on life', permeating
both elite and mass consciousness, ingrained in the political culture
198of the old regime. 'There has never been', he argues^
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a political doctrine or a government with a keener 
sense of power relations... than the Soviet. The 
Soviet system is and always has been distinguished by 
extreme pragmatism. It is indeed the classic 
example of authority which, facing gigantic tasks of 
harnessing human resources,has utterly lost sight of 
its original aims'. ^
During the general shift in American perceptions of Soviet policy 
in the 1960s, such an emphasis on power political and traditional 
'Russian' themes had normally been associated with either a 'mellowing 
tiger' or a 'neurotic bear' image of the Soviet Union: with the 
implication either that it was settling down to a traditional and 
predictable great power role or that it had all along been animated by 
an excessive (and geopolitically determined) preoccupation with defence. 
But Pipes emphatically rejected both these positions, in favour of a 
near-verbatim restatement of the image of unlimited and undifferentiated 
expansiveness articulated by Kennan immediately after World War II.
While readily agreeing that 'Communist theory... provides no guidelines 
for the conduct of a rational foreign policy', he also insisted that 
Western conceptions of national interest were 'altogether alien to the 
Russian mind'. Thus there is no predictable pattern to Soviet 
expansionism - other than that of its 'pendulum' swings between 'targets 
of opportunity', and no identifiable set of concessions which would 
lead to an acceptance of the principle of stable coexistence. 'The 
evidence suggests that Russian expansion is motivated less by needs than 
by opportunities, less by what the elite wants than by what it thinks 
it can get... [and] is in large measure determined by internal rather 
than external factors, above all, by the tragic relationship of the 
regime to its people
This raises the third issue, regarding the criteria of 'rationality'
applied to Soviet doctrine and behaviour in the American debate. The
above account of Soviet expansionism may be classified (in Waltz's
terminology) as a 'second image' one, in that it explains Soviet conduct
not as a rational, realistic or appropriate response to objective
environmental factors (the 'third image') but rather as the product of
the inner dynamics of a special kind of power which is constitutionally
incapable of appreciating environmental constraints other than the
201overwhelming preponderance of a determined adversary. However, in the 
strategic debate proper, this image of mindless expansionism is
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characteristically associated with 'the rational actor approach', 
which is viewed in turn as 'fall[ing] within the framework of the
m 202totalitarian" perspective on the Soviet system'. Conversely,
arguments emphasizing the moderating impact upon Soviet foreign and
defence policy of competing demands for socio-economic reforms have
normally appealed to the allegedly pluralizing impact of bureaucratic
203politics within the Soviet system; while even those analysts - such 
as Zimmerman and Morton Schwartz - who have most strongly emphasized 
Soviet adaptation to the external environment have grounded their case 
substantially in arguments about 'systemic' or 'cybernetic learning' 
through the internal structural differentiation of the Soviet policy 
making process, as opposed to the more obvious learning of a regime 
striving to adapt an overarching analytical framework to a complex of 
problems about which that framework was, in the first instance, 
notably silent.
The most obvious source of this paradoxical situation lies in the 
specific interpretation of Soviet goals encapsulated in American 
adversary images of the Cold War era, which identified 'rationality' in 
the Soviet context as a totaZitarian rationality in pursuit of the one 
undifferentiated goal of world hegemony, and effectively screened out 
the Soviet authorities' own insistence on the domestic welfare goals of 
Communism from the core of Soviet doctrinal claims accepted as 
'meaningful' in American strategic circles. But this influence is 
reinforced by the ambivalent handling of the rationality issue in American 
strategic theory in general. On the one hand this has followed the 
broad pattern of behavioural social science in formally eschewing 
judgements about the substantive rationality or irrationality of major 
social and political goals, and concentrating instead on the criteria 
of instrumentaZ rationality implicated in judgements about the most 
efficacious choice of means to ends which can be taken as given. On 
the other, it has proposed criteria regarding appropriate and 
inappropriate styZes of strategic decisionmaking which covertly presume 
a pluralist ontology, and which imply that an 'ideological' (in the 
sense of monistic) approach to strategic issues must, ipso factos be 
substantively irrational.
This point has already been made in regard to the ostensibly generic 
Strategic Man of second wave deterrence theory, with his (liberal)
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economist's commitment to utility maximization and his appropriately
flexible calculus of costs and benefits. But the problem has, in one
sense, been exacerbated by the third wave critique of this model. For
though the issue of objective interest has at least been raised in the
third wave literature, the primary focus has remained the question of
decisionmaking style, and the primary innovation has been the
replacement of the maximizing image of a rational or appropriate
decisionmaking style with a 'satisficing', 'incrementalist' or 
205'cybernetic' one. Behind the portentous - and sometimes circular -
theoretical language, such arguments are fully in accord with the
classical pluralist demand for a pragmatic, piecemeal approach to
206major social issues. Thus the 1970s, when the intellectual
idiosyncracies of Russian Strategic Man finally became a matter of
sustained and widespread concern in the mainstream American debate,
brought that debate no closer to a truly generic conception of
207rationality for General Strategic Man. Similarly, there was from
this perspective no real contradiction in the hawk argument that the
Soviet leadership displayed a relentless instrumental rationality
(i.e. consistency) in the pursuit of a single, substantively irrational
'grand strategy' - for the two were ostensibly quite separate issues.
And since any monistic world view must have irrational implications
for practical decisionmaking, there was no need to consider whether
the specific core claims of Soviet military and political doctrine
were or were not appropriate to the specific structural contours of
contemporary world politics. The only relevant question was whether
or not those claims reflected the basic thrust of actual Soviet policy.
This leaves, finally, the question of the inner dynamics of Soviet
politics: the question, in Pipes' words, of 'why the Russians act 
208like Russians'. And in this regard, as already noted, the most
striking feature of the contemporary hawk account is the extent to
which traditional Russian, rather than specifically Marxist-Leninist,
elements are given pride of place in its refurbished totalitarian model
of the Soviet social order. The Russians, in effect, act like Russians
because they are Russians - endowed, in Pipes' influential account,
with all the less desirable attributes of the Tsarist political culture
and the ingrained suspiciousness of the general peasant mentality to 
209boot.
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This shift of emphasis, with its radical devaluation of the Soviet
Union's pretensions as the patron of world revolution, is not an
incidental one. Indeed, there would seem to be a direct connection
between the renewed emphasis after Vietnam and Watergate upon the
genuinely revolutionary character of the United States (which, President
210Carter asserted, was 'again a beacon to the world') and the rapid
flourishing of the curious image of a Soviet Union both threatening 
and somehow ludicrous - an unfortunate arriviste , always caught with 
last year's fashion in socio-economic structure, in levers of international 
influence, in world-view. But this shift also raises serious problems 
for the argument that Soviet expansionism is predetermined by internal 
structural factors (since, insofar as the Soviet social order is seen 
not as an alien imposition but as essentially continuous with deep- 
seated Russian traditions, it becomes the more difficult to argue that 
the regime can 'legitimate' that order only by turning domestic 
opposition outwards against a permanent apparatus of imagined foreign 
enemies). And, behind this lie more fundamental questions about the 
consistency and accessibility of the essentially reductionist reasoning 
used to establish this image.
This point may best be clarified by reference to Pipes' own
brilliant history of the 'patrimonial' political culture of the Russian
old regime. This work explicitly seeks 'the roots of twentieth-century
totalitarianism [not] in Western ideas... [but] in Russian 
211institutions'; and, while acknowledging the complexity of trends and
counter-trends in the long sweep of Russian history, is admirably
clear in tracing the genesis of patrimonialism to a highly constricting
complex of economic and military pressures which attended tl>e birth of a
212large Muscovite state in the early modern period. Thus Pipes's
case for the cultural/superstructural determination of Soviet 
international behaviour depends in turn on a genetic reduction, 
primarily at the superstructural level, back to this earlier period, 
and a further reduction to the infrastructural level at this point.
And in the earlier context it utilizes what might (for exposition 
purposes) be called an any one-into-Russians machine, seeking to 
demonstrate that any people (endowed with 'general rationality') would 
have acquired a distinctively Russian political and strategic culture 
had they been exposed to a similar complex of material pressures. It
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might therefore be expected that, at the contemporary 'end' of his
argument, Pipes would grant careful consideration to arguments
proposing industrialization, great (as in super) power status, and
mutual nuclear deterrence as powerful Russians-into-ccnyone machines at
work on the Soviet social order today. But he does not do this,
instead terminating his argument in the 1880s - when both the
industrialization of Russia and the contemporary transformation of
world politics were just beginning - on the grounds that 'the ancien
regime in the traditionally understood sense died a quiet death in
Russia at this time, yielding to a bureaucratic police regime which in
213effect has been in power there ever since.'
This criticism, of course, is directed not against the perfectly
reasonable boundaries established for Pipes' specific study of the old
regime, but rather against the lacunae in his general body of polemical
argument on the issue of adaptation in Soviet doctrine and political
life. Though the basic thesis of a Tsarist-Soviet continuity is
plainly crucial in the validation of this polemical argument (and,
indeed, of the arguments of hawk colleagues with less impressive
claims to an intimate acquaintance with Russian history and culture),
Pipes has nowhere explained in satisfactory detail why the massive
socio-economic transformation of the past 50 years should leave this
continuity thesis effectively unscathed. However, in a recent reply to
Kennan's assertions about major change in the post-Stalin era, he has
indicated his general belief that meaningful change - as opposed to
'mere fluctuations in the political climate, external appearance, and
even direction of national policy' - would require 'transformations in
the basic institutions of state and society' extending, inter alias to
the centralized Soviet economy.
[But] no such innovations have occurred. In 1978, 
the central institutions of the Soviet state remain 
what they were in Stalin's day, and, for that matter, 
they are not all that different from the ones Lenin had 
created in 1917-18, when he gave shape to Communist 
Russia... This being the case, it seems entirely 
inappropriate to speak of 'changes' of any magnitude 
having occurred in the Soviet Union since 1953.214
By insisting in this fashion upon specific institutional changes, 
Pipes effectively repudiates for the post-Stalin era the very process 
of interpretation, by which the totalitarian image of the Soviet Union
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was established in the first place: the process of 'reading behind'
the formally democratic institutions of the Stalinist state to the 
dictatorial rule of a self-perpetuating elite, and also - in Pipes' 
own analysis - behind the partly-obscured outline of the Soviet party- 
state to the still more fundamental realities of the Russian state 
tradition. I will be treating interpretative reduction of this sort as 
an inescapable feature of the analysis of all complex social orders; but 
it must be governed by basic rules of consistency. Insofar as Pipes and 
his colleagues violate those rules, their claim to address the historical 
specificity of the Soviet Union is unjustified, and their argument for 
the 'Russian' derivation of Soviet policy devolves upon assertions 
about unchanging (and inaccessible) 'essences' very similar to those 
implied in the fully-fledged totalitarian model of the 'Soviet system' 
in the 1950s.
I have attempted to demonstrate a basic circularity in the 
development of American attitudes to the Soviet Union in the post-World 
War II era, which has recently brought the strategic debate back to 
Cold War orthodoxies which had apparently been out of favour for over 
a decade, and for which there was no compelling justification in the 
objective development of great power relations in the 1970s. I have 
also argued that the hawk campaign contributed significantly to the 
re-establishment of those orthodoxies, and that its success is partly 
attributable to the influence of a body of shared positivistic assumptions 
which transcend the more obvious differences between the hawk group 
and their opponents. Thus the problem. What, then, is to be done?
The key point to emphasize is that the hawk insistence upon the 
need to address the historical specificity of the Soviet Union is an 
entirely valid one, however tendentious the practical development of 
this theme in the hawk literature may be. To say that a given analysis 
of the contemporary great power relationship is primarily a 'second 
image' one is not necessccP'i'lij to say - as Waltz himself has recently 
suggested - that it is an invalid, 'inside out' explanation of the
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dynamics of the 'international system.' ~ The 'abstract' structure of
world military power underpinning the states-system (and the
associated 'logic' of abstract great power status) is undoubtedly a
crucial starting point for the investigation of the parameters of
Soviet-American coexistence. But, as noted in the Introduction, it is
no more than a starting point; and there is no reason why considerations
about the geopolitical and developmental situation of both great
powers, and about the dominant features of their respective political
cultures, should be divorced from the multi-level structural analysis
advocated there. Nor is there any justification for converting the
problem into a formal 'levels of analysis' one, such that the movement
from 'domestic' to 'international' considerations becomes a progression
through a hierarchy of conceptual systems which remain, for all
21Gpractical purposes, insulated one from another. Such formal
distinctions between systemic levels, I will attempt to snow, reflect 
an untenable, positivistic concept of social systems; and they become 
irrelevant when theoretical inquiry is directed, as here, towards 
identifying the specific choices which social actors confront by virtue 
of their location in specific temporal and spatial contexts.
On the other hand, the problem of historical and cultural
specificity should not simply be translated into one of contrasting
'perceptions' in the Soviet-American relationship. This concept, indeed,
has provided the chief rubric under which hermeneutic themes have
217appeared in the positivistically inclined American debate; and in the
1970s, the dangers of misperception have been stressed by analysts who
acknowledge the tensions of the great power relationship but contest
the one-sided hawk explanation for it. However, important though the
issue of misperception and distorted communication undoubtedly is, it
is by no means the whole story. As Brian Fay observes, in regard to
the pure hermeneutic model:
An interpretive social science promises to reveal 
to the social actors what they and others are doing, 
thereby restoring communication by correcting the 
ideas that they have about each other and themselves.
But this makes it sound as if all conflict (or 
breakdown in communication for that matter) is 
generated by mistaken ideas about social reality 
rather than by tensions and incompatibilities 
inherent in this reality itself.
9 9 .
It is thus hardly surprising that the misperceptions argument 
has had little more impact on the mainstream American debate than the 
work of the 1960s Cold War revisionists, some of whom anticipated its 
basic case. To be told that a political adversary genuinely sees the 
world differently does not dispose of the question why it should see 
the world differently, especially when the adversary relationship 
entails a continuing threat of utter destruction to one's own civil 
society. There are major contradictions within the Soviet-American 
relationship, and unless the objective basis of these contradictions is 
directly addressed, the assumption that the source of all major problems 
lies in unreasonable, culturally determined assumptions on the Soviet 
side will be granted victory by default.
Ultimately, then, it is necessary not merely to acknowledge 
the distinctiveness of Soviet (and American) international perspectives, 
but to assess the appropriateness of those perspectives to the 
objective realities of contemporary world politics. This entails a 
commitment to a 'realist' epistemology, in terms of which the search 
for such realities may be justified, and the attempt to establish 
clear and delimited methodological principles with which to discipline 
the intense selection among substantive historical/sociological accounts 
which it demands in practice. It also entails the attempt to 
establish a truly generic (because essentially vacuous) notion of 
strategic rationality as action in the actor's own real interests , so 
that the burden of practical explanation may be transferred from self- 
sufficient 'systems' and 'processes' - whether of an 'equilibrium' or 
'revolutionary' variety - to the tension between specific cultural 
frameworks and the objective logic of historically specific material 
structures. The establishment of these principles, and the development 
of their most general substantive implications, will be the task of the 
next chapter.
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PART II
About suffering they were never wrong, 
The old masters ...





This part of the thesis sets out my own position on the central 
issues at stake in the contemporary Soviet-American debate on coexistence 
and related themes - the position, that is, which seems to me most 
readily defensible in the face of a broadly based intersubjective 
critique. The enunciation of such a position, to reiterate the argument 
so far, would seem to be demanded by the very terms in which the American 
debate over Soviet doctrine and Soviet intentions has been cast: one 
cannot adequately interpret Soviet doctrine without some attempt to 
establish what its basic 'problematic' might be, and one cannot evaluate 
its realism, or appropriateness to context, without attempting to sketch 
the most fundamental features of that context. Nonetheless, the attempt 
here to identify central 'realities' of contemporary great power coexistence, 
and to assess the legitimacy of political action in terms of those realities, 
involves broaching highly controversial issues which have been skirted 
by most participants in the American debate. It therefore seems desirable 
at this point to specify the limits upon the theoretical enterprise 
attempted in this part of the thesis.
First, I am assuming that the central issues at stake concern the 
social world, the world of intentional behaviour. Natural science issues 
clearly do fall into the Soviet-American debate (for example, the performance 
characteristics of weapons systems). But as was noted in Chapter 1, 
radically different conclusions on these issues have been reached even 
within the confines of the American debate, and the issues themselves 
acquire their special significance only in the context of assumptions 
about the social world. Thus methodologies commonly associated with the 
natural sciences are here accorded no privileged status in their own right. 
They are relevant only insofar as they are also appropriate to the 
investigation of the social world, for it is with the scientific status 
of beliefs about that world that this thesis is concerned.
Second, the concern here is not with the status of total 'world views' 
but with different approaches to a specific issue - great power coexistence -
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within a specific historical context. As Ernest Gellner observes, 'in 
our world it is not merely rulers and regimes, but also types of ownership, 
production, education, association, expression, thought and research 
which can have, or fail to have, legitimacy in the eyes of beholders or 
practitioners';1 and this general phenomenon of contemporary life has been 
writ large in the contemporary Soviet-American ideological struggle. But 
the only referents of that struggle relevant to this particular argument 
are those which would license relatively unambiguous statements that both 
sides ought to conform with certain prudential rules, because these rules 
were in the long run, or over-riding, or underlying interest of each.
This certainly does not mean that all developments within states may be 
ruled out of court, as irrelevant to the international issue of great 
power coexistence. But it does mean that a lot of developments within 
states and a lot of international relations may be treated as essentially 
irrelevant to the argument, whose core focus will be the two 'spheres' 
or 'realms' m aitioned in the Introduction: the politico-military relations 
of the two great powers, and the developmental politics of a limited 
group of economically and strategically crucial Third World states.
Third, it should not be necessary, even within the fairly strict 
limits defined here, to take an unambiguous position on alt significant 
issues, but only on those over which an apparent conflict between American 
and Soviet viewpoints exists. Moreover, I would argue that the degree 
of congruence between these viewpoints is in fact quite substantial, even 
on the major substantive issue over which they would appear, on the 
-surface, to be most in conflict: the preferred and anticipated direction 
of the 'world historical process'. For instance, while both sides may, 
in their ploys for support among crucial Third World states, court 
groups which might be described as 'Islamic fundamentalist', neither 
would be prepared to suggest that such states should or could revert to 
the social order which a truly fundamentalist Islamic programme would 
require. Rather both are effectively united in endorsing a vision of 
industrial society for the world as a whole, and divided only in regard 
to the type of industrial society which they claim to envisage and the 
means of realization.
Of course, a central component of the mainstream American case is 
that the United States is committed to promoting international conditions
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in which this new world society can emerge in an unplanned, pluralistic 
fashion, with due allowance for national, religious and other sources of 
diversity, whereas the Soviet Union allegedly claims the right and the 
duty to lay down, by force if necessary, a monistic, all embracing vision 
of world order supposedly sanctioned by scientific Marxist-Leninist 
analysis. I will be arguing that this distinction is a largely specious 
one. But it does offer a useful conceptual focus for the argument of 
these three chapters, not least because it provides the basic rationale 
for an American hawk reading of Soviet doctrine 'against the grain of its 
strong and reiterated insistence on the paramount importance of the 
avoidance of nuclear war, and of the likely occasions for nuclear war, 
in the continuing East-West struggle. Moreover, this focus can, for 
the purposes of conceptual analysis, usefully be linked to two specific 
philosophical charges against Marxism in general, which imply that a 
theoretical and political orientation of such a monistic kind must have 
totalitarian consequences in practice. The first charge is summarized 
in Popper's rigorous distinction between the genuinely scientific hypothetico- 
deduotive approach to the analysis of social issues, and 'the histovicist 
approach ... which assumes that historical prediction is their principal 
aim, and which assumes that this aim is attainable only by discovering 
the "rhythms" or the "patterns", the "laws" or the "trends" that underlie 
the evolution of history'. The second (which also appears in Popper's 
related attack on 'utopian social engineering') receives its clearest 
formulation in Michael Oakeshott's onslaught on the outright folly of 
Rationalism in politics, with its characterization of Marxism as 'the 
most stupendous of our political rationalisms ... composed for the
instruction of a less politically educated class than any other that has
3ever come to have the illusion of exercising power'.
The following discussion attempts a somewhat complicated double-sided 
enterprise: on the one hand, to establish a limited model of contemporary 
world politics which draws upon the resources of each of the two 
analytical traditions - the hypothetico-deductive and the hermeneutic - 
represented in extreme form by Popper and Oakeshott respectively; and 
on the other, to defend a modified conception of historicism and 
rationalism against the general critique encapsulated in the earlier, 
more polemical work of each thinker. To do this in a reasonable space,
I have accorded them a special prominence in this chapter as representatives
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of two anti-monist perspectives on social and political theory which I 
wish partly to endorse and partly to reject. This procedure inevitably 
involves a good deal of simplification of complex issues; but I believe 
it to be justified on at least three grounds.
First, the work of each thinker has a clear substantive relevance 
to the general trends of modern pluralist argument which this thesis 
attempts to engage. The contribution of the Popperian philosophy of 
science to the general scientific/behavioural project in American 
political and international theory has already been noted; and, on the 
other hand, Popper is still widely credited in Anglo-American discourse 
with having pronounced 'the last word' on the intellectual poverty of 
historicism.4 Oakeshott's influence is less immediately obvious, perhaps. 
But his general perspective appears to me to be clearly apparent in 
the more sophisticated modern defences of the classical/traditionalist 
approach to international theory;5 and in his treatment of the concept 
of tradition, he provides the fullest philosophical exposition of a 
concept which appears to me to be vital to the American hawk case for the 
Russi-an derivation of Soviet foreign policy, but whose implications are 
never adequately faced up to by any of these writers, including Pipes.
Second, Popper and Oakeshott are important to this argument in a 
broadly symbolic sense. The former has been intimately associated with 
the attempt to specify rigorous logical criteria for acceptable modes 
of causal explanation, whereas the latter appears to regard causation 
as a subject into which a gentleman would not enquire. Yet though they 
proceed from ostensibly polar epistemological assumptions, they converge 
in striking fashion upon a strong defence of piecemeal, as opposed to 
utopian or holistic, social engineering in political practice. This 
phenomenon implies that both these critiques of Marxism are strongly 
coloured by independently held political values, and this implication is 
strengthened by the fact that Popper and Oakeshott merely represent 
the extreme limits of what Gellner has called the 'pluralist chorus' - 
a 'remarkable consensus' among a diverse array of modern thinkers on 
the dangerous irrationality of monistic forms of social thought.6
Third, and without surrendering the above claim about the importance 
of their independently held political values, I wish to suggest that a 
further cause of the convergence between the political prescriptions of 
Popper and Oakeshott is that their epistemological assumptions are in
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fact a good deal less divergent than the rhetoric of either would suggest. 
Though both might balk at the characterization, each undertakes, in 
effect, to demythologize Marxism in terms of a radical empiricist 
definition of reality; and each is inevitably confronted by the 
problem, long ago pointed out by Hume, that an empiricist account of 
explanation must rest ultimately on nothing more precise than the 
association of ideas - and hence upon precedent, tradition, and the 
prejudice that things will continue to happen as they have been observed 
to happen before.7 Of course, Popper's falsificationist adaptation of the 
logical-empiricist programme was designed to get around precisely this 
problem: but, as will be argued below, it is impossible to establish a 
sufficiently rigorous criterion of falsification to meet this goal, 
despite the very considerable virtues of the concept as a more loosely 
formulated 'ethic of cognition ...'.8 By contrast, I would argue that 
Oakeshott is the legitimate 20th century heir to the tradition of Humean 
empiricism; and that if one did wish to defend a purely empiricist 
definition of reality, and simultaneously to account for the obvious 
competence of the human mind in gaining knowledge of that reality, one 
would have no other course than to resort to the extreme intuitionist 
doctrine propounded by him.
This is certainly not to endorse the Oakeshottian position, but 
rather to emphasize the point that a purely empiricist account of 
explanation will not stand up to scrutiny, and that if the purely 
empiricist account falls, so too does a good deal of the mainstream 
epistemological case against Marxism. This is a difficult and 
contentious issue, and it will in one way or another provide the theme 
for most of this chapter.
Explanation in Natural and Social Science
This section has a dual aim: to outline the characteristics common 
to explanation in both fields, and to establish in what senses the social 
sciences are different. These two themes are deeply interpenetrated in 
practice, and there will be no attempt to establish any formal separation 
of them here. Moreover, though I will be defending the goal of scientific 
analysis of social life, the scientific approach will be identified not 
with a rigorously defined methodology but with a distinctive 'ethic of
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cognition' which demands the intersubjective validition of knowledge 
claims among the widest possible (informed) audience.
On the one hand, this position entails the rejection of the logical- 
empiricist attempt to establish a specific logical form of explanation - 
centred upon the 'covering-law' account of causation - as the touchstone 
of genuinely scientific argument. Even in the natural sciences, 
explanation should be seen as at bottom a hermeneutic activity, in which 
unfamiliar or puzzling phenomena are rendered intelligible by subsuming 
them within a given frame of meaning (accompanied always by some concomitant 
modification of the frame of meaning itself), and in which the conclusions 
reached are always provisional and related to the prevailing concerns 
and standards of intelligibility of the relevant 'scientific community'.
The distinctive feature of the social sciences is their involvement in 
a 'double hermeneutic r involving a further encounter with the constitutive 
meanings of the wider social community under investigation; and their 
conclusions are therefore provisional in the second and more fundamental 
sense that shifts in consciousness within the wider social community 
may undermine the very regularities on which the arguments of the 
scientific community have been predicated.9
On the other hand, I also wish to reject the verstehen / eklaren 
distinction advanced by many hermeneutic theorists in an attempt to 
defend the special status of the human studies against positivistic 
claims about the unity of the natural and social sciences (together 
with the related idiographic/nomothetic distinction sometimes invoked 
to distinguish history from generalizing social sciences like sociology 
and economics). The assumption of this thesis is certainly that human 
behaviour must be accounted for in terms of human meanings, with methodological 
priority being accorded to the notion of rational action, or action in 
the agent's own real interests. Conversely, analyses which treat human 
beings as the puppets of impersonal historical or 'systemic' forces 
must be regarded as unscientific in precisely the same sense as appeals 
to the alleged purposes of a transcendent deity - in the sense that they 
are fundamentally inaccessible to intersubjective critique. But the 
same is equally true of all idealistic or psychologistic accounts of 
Verstehen as a process of empathy with the subjective mental experiences 
of others. Therefore, so far from taking the commitment to hermeneutic 
and rational analysis as the charter for an idealist form of social
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theory, I will attempt to show that such a commitment can be realized 
only in conjunction with a modified variant of 'the materialist conception 
of history1.
In developing these arguments in detail, it seems useful to begin 
with the notion of science as an ethic of cognition, which, on Gellner's 
acount, derives its thrust from the intersecting claims of the two great 
'selector' doctrines which have dominated modern Western epistemology:
(1) Empiricism A claim to knowledge is legitimate 
only if it can be justified in terms of 
experience.
(2) Materialism (alias mechanism, structuralism, 
with other possible variant names). A claim 
to knowledge is legitimate only if it is a 
specification of a publicly reproducible 
structure.l o
There are special problems with this distinction in the social 
sciences, in that the question of constitutive meanings enters into the 
identification both of the grandest 'material' structures and of the 
smallest items of 'empirical' data. These problems will be considered in 
the following section; but for the moment I should like to note the 
two-fold relevance of Gellner's concept of a cognitive ethic to the 
general pluralist/monist controversy in social theory. First, it helps 
to distinguish the basically commonsense, but extremely valuable, notions 
which lie at the heart of the empiricist and materialist traditions from 
the elaborate and sophisticated, but 'unattractive and implausible' 
doctrine of 'logical form' so strongly promoted in 20th century philosophy 
as the selector of knowledge claims.11 And second, it emphasizes the 
crucial point that the ontological claims of empiricism and materialism 
are at bottom metaphysical in the sense that religious and mythological 
ontologies are. Though both these doctrines offer separate (and, in part, 
mutually contradictory) criteria which deny legitimacy to religious and 
mythological accounts of relity, their own fundamental assumptions about 
reality are not directly testable in terms of their own criteria. Thus, 
as Alan Ryan suggests, assertions about the phenomenalist character of 
reality or the existence of determinate physical causes for all events 
are most usefully interpreted in a normative vein, as 'methodological
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instructions ... about the way to conduct science', which 'like any 
advice ... are to be assessed as more or less fruitful or fruitless'.12
It may seem pedantic to belabour this point, while at the same 
time endorsing the view that such instructions have proved, on balance, 
extremely fruitful in the natural sciences, and that they should, with 
due recognition of their ambiguities, be taken as the founding charter 
of the social sciences as well. However, while the empiricist and 
materialist world views may both be regarded as extremely important - 
and indeed as jointly indispensable to science despite the serious aspects 
of tension between them - it matters a great deal, for one's approach 
to the issues discussed in this thesis, which of the two perspectives 
is accorded the greatest deference in practice. And in the Western, and 
particularly the Anglo-American tradition, empiricism has very much 
received the inside running. It is not merely that the empiricist 
position has been far better represented in abstract philosophical 
argument, whereas the materialist one has received its strongest defence 
from thinkers such as Hobbes and Marx, whose real eminence was not in 
formal philosophy but in other fields.13 It is also that the modern 
empiricist tradition has quietly expropriated part of the materialist 
patrimony in the form of the 'mechanistic' model of explanation, and 
deployed it in polemics over social and political issues as a genuinely 
empiricist device, guaranteed ~ if employed in a discriminating, piecemeal 
fashion - to 'demythologize' the grand theoretical structures erected 
by full-blooded materialists such as Marx.
I wish now to argue that the modern empiricist contrast between 
genuinely 'mechanistic' social theories, which acknowledge the irreducible 
plurality of the social world, and 'mythological' or 'essentialist' 
theoretical structures like Marxism, which allegedly do not, is greatly 
overstated. Indeed, in its strong Popperian form, this contrast seems to 
me to be inconsistent both with the observable practice of the natural 
sciences, and with the falsificationist ethic which informs Popper's 
attempt to establish strict logical criteria distinguishing science from 
non-science.
To begin with the empiricist insistence upon the sovereignty of the 
facts. Empiricism offers an 'objectivist' criterion of truth as 
correspondence with the facts; but this position is tenable only on the
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basis of the prior metaphysical postulate of another correspondence between 
the facts (understood as sense-data) and the facts (understood as the 
'reality out there'). If this postulate were false (if reality did involve 
crucial features such as angels and interventionist deities which were 
inaccessible to human sensory equipment), the foundation would be cut 
away not merely from 'verificationist' versions of the empiricist case, 
but from Popper's 'falsificationist' reformulation of it as well. For 
while the latter carefully substitutes 'verisimilitude' for absolute 
truth as the goal of the scientific enterprise, it is perfectly conceivable, 
from outside the empiricist metaphysic, that an infinite number of 
falsifications by reference to the facts - as-sense-data could fail to 
provide any greater insight into the facts - as-reality.14
Moreover, this anomaly of the empiricist position cannot be resolved 
by a stance of outright phenomenalism, because to insist that one can 
know only the phenomena, in all their plurality and uniqueness, is to 
insist upon a formless and unstructured reality which could not be known 
at all. There must be selection and categorization of the phenomena if 
any sense is to be made of them; but if the selection criteria are not 
in turn linked to general statements about the way observable reality is 
structured into more and less fundamental relationships, there can be 
no way of assessing their fruitfulness relative to all the other 
selection criteria which might conceivably be employed.15 The account 
of such structuring which empiricism can generate from its own resources 
- the 'analysis of covering-laws as contingent universal statements of 
--regularities in the natural order'16 - is far too restrictive to account 
for the far reaching theoretical achievements of the natural sciences 
themselves. As is clearly acknowledged by the absorption of the rhetoric 
of mechanism into the orthodoxy of modern empiricism - to say nothing 
of the elaborate hypothetico-deductive assault on the follies of the 
inductivist strand of the empiricist tradition - the explanatory 
competence of the natural sciences can be understood only in terms of 
the creative, metaphorical activity of the human imagination, constantly 
striving to 'get behind' the facts and identify the deeper principles by 
which they are ordered or structured.
The key question, for the purposes of this argument, concerns the 
scope and level of abstraction of the 'deep structures' postulated 
behind the facts. And it is at this point that serious anomalies in
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the empiricist (and more specifically Popperian) case against Marxism 
begin to emerge. All the logic of Popper's falsificationist position 
requires that he should support theoretical abstraction of the widest 
scope practicable, for the most powerful and falsifiable theory (the 
one which generates the largest number of empirically testable hypotheses) 
should be the one which subsumes as many facts as possible under as few 
basic principles as possible. And in his approach to the natural 
sciences, where he comes out strongly against the instrumentalist view 
that theories are no more than ad hoc tools of research to be 
evaluated by their success in solving particular problems, he insists 
that the historical evolution of theoretical knowledge has accorded 
with the logical requirements of this falsificationist ethic, being 
'largely dominated by a tendency towards increasing integration and
1 7towards unified theories'.
However, when Popper turns to the question of our knowledge of the 
social world, the only type of theoretical activity which he is prepared 
to endorse is activity of an ad hoc, applied or technological kind. Grand 
theoretical structures like that of Marx are repudiated, and the 
preferred alternative is characterized in terms of an imagery of 
piecemeal social engineering which is strikingly reminiscent of Oakeshott's 
pronouncements on the same theme (if less determinedly pre-industrial in 
flavour). As H.T.Wilson points out, 'it is precisely the holistic and 
historicist commitment to the goal of conceptual and theoretical unity' 
which underlies the 'unremitting criticism' by Popper and his supporters
__of social theory conceived in terms of a reflexive and dialectical
1 8interaction with social practice.
Moreover, this contrast reflects a fundamental dilemma arising 
from the insistence upon strict logical criteria for what are to count 
as scientific assertions in the mainstream hypothetico-deductive account. 
The first point to emphasize is that, even according to that account, laws 
do not of themselves explain anything. To explain the occurrence of 
something, in a reasonably uncontroversial statement of this position, 
is 'to show why, given the circumstances, it had to occur - to show that 
nothing else could have occurred under these conditions'. But a 
statement of a law is merely a generalization that a de facto 
regularity, observable in the past, can be expected to hold good for the
1 2 8.
future as well; and this is just as true of nomothetic or covering laws, 
which assert the invariant (or probabilistic) co-appearance of certain 
types of phenomena, as it is of historicist laws, which purport to 
reduce an observable pattern of change to a basic progression or 'series', 
and to demonstrate that the series can be projected into the future.
One of Popper's strongest criticisms of historicism is that it confuses 
causal explanation with the mere identification of trends: but it is 
important to recognize that historicist analysis (except as defined in 
Popper's custom-built straw man) need not fall into this trap, and that 
covering-law analysis need not avoid it.20 The key question is whether 
the analysis also involves the attempt to get behind the facts and 
demonstrate, by reference to mechanistic or structuralist explanations, 
why the patterns in question must necessarily occur. If the analysis 
does attempt this extra step (as Marx's analysis obviously did) it 
meets the basic requirements of the deductive explanation: if not, it 
does not meet those requirements, whether or not the laws proposed are 
of the historicist or the covering-law variety.
Thus the covering-law model provides no positive assistance in
formulating plausible deductive explanations of phenomena, but merely
sets out criteria regarding the logical form in which explanations
independently arrived at must be cast if they are to be convincingly
tested. There is also no a priori reason why one should not identify a
given structure as the underlying 'generative' cause of various important
patterns of continuity in social life, while simultaneously predicting
-the dissolution of that structure, and the patterns of continuity
sustained by it, through the working out of its inherent contradictions
in the longer term. Indeed, I would argue, following Marx, that
without some concept of structural contradiction there could be no
adequate account of some of the most fundamental features of large-scale
historical change.21 However, once one considers the problem of adapting
statements about large-scale social change to the covering-law approach,
the logical distinction between that and the historicist approach begins
to dissolve. Whatever else may be said about the former account of
causation, it presumably must entail the view that the cause-effect
relationship is a transitive one, such that the effect of a cause is also
the effect of the cause of that cause (and of the cause of that cause,
2 2and so on, as Weber has observed, back to eternity). Therefore, a
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relationship between states of affairs A, B, C, and D which may be 
expressed in the covering-law form - Whenever A then B, Whenever B then 
C, Whenever C then D - may equally be expressed in the historicist form 
- A leads (indirectly but inevitably) to D.
Irrespective of the formal idiom involved, therefore, the basic 
question remains the same: is one to pursue the goal of an over-all 
coherence among small-scale explanations of social phenomena, or confine 
oneself solely to the investigation of small, isolated 'islands of 
intelligibility1 within the ocean of social life, adopting an essentially 
agnostic attitude to large-scale issues such as the development of 
Western capitalism? And insofar as one does address the larger issues, 
are they to be conceptualized, along Marxist lines, in terms of real, 
historically specific structures, or merely, as Weber suggests, as a 
'finite segment', selected on subjective grounds of value relevance, of 
'the vast chaotic stream of events, which flows away through time'?23
It is possible to identify two broad responses to this dilemma which 
have been influential in contemporary pluralist approaches to 
international relations. The first, and the most consistent with 
empirical principles, leads towards the technological perspective 
advocated by Popper. Since 'historicist' statements are repudiated, 
and non-trivial covering-law statements about human affairs are always 
limited to a specific historical and social context, the only appropriately 
modest goal for social theory is 'success', while the moment lasts.
One is thus left with the image offered by Cornelia Navari, in a recent 
attempt to spell out the implications of the 'mechanistic' viewpoint 
for international theory, of a multitude of 'small ... cause-and-effeet 
machines', living in an untroubled condition of peaceful coexistence 
with one another but demythologizing grand theoretical structures by 
their 'single-stage' preoccupation with the particular.24 But if all the 
big myths have been demolished, and all the little mechanisms (to mix a 
metaphor) are left marching to the beat of their own private drummer, 
what practical advance has been made over the unstructured confusion of 
the pure empiricist view of a world of sovereign facts?
In practice, this simple equation (mechanistic=small-scale=good) 
would be sustainable only if it were possible to test individual 
mechanistic explanations definitively against a realm of theory-neutral 
facts. However, one need not embrace the more extreme implications of
1 30 .
the Kuhnian notion of 'incommensurable' paradigms to hold that such a 
definitive" testing process is unattainable. As Imre Lakatos puts it 
(in the context of a general defence of 'sophisticated methodological 
falsificationism', and one drawing primarily on examples from the 'harder' 
of the natural sciences),'there are no such things as crucial experiments', 
in which promising theories are shot down in a two-sided encounter with 
a set of recalcitrant facts. Rather, the encounter is always at the 
very least a three-sided one between the facts, 'an explanatory theory 
to^judged by the "facts" delivered from outside, and 'an interpretative 
theory to judge the "facts" delivered from outside'. The respective roles 
assigned to the different theories are contextually determined by the 
problem under discussion, and the partisans of a beleaguered explanatory 
theory have always the option of attacking the explanatory credentials
2 5of the (till now unproblematic) interpretative theory.
Moreover, the inadequacy of the piecemeal, technological approach 
is further illustrated by Lakatos' positive arguments for the possibility 
of rational testing in science. The object of testing, he argues, is 
not an isolated theory but a 'research programme' - a 'series of theories' 
linked together by a common 'negative heuristic' or 'hard core' of 
assumptions which cannot be surrendered without abandoning the programme 
altogether. This hard core is defended tenaciously against empirical 
'anomalies', with tests being directed to the 'positive heuristic' or 
'protective belt' of 'auxiliary hypotheses which [may bell adjusted and
2 6readjusted, or even completely replaced, to defend the thus hardened core'. 
Falsification has an essentially 'historical character', occurring only 
occasionally and in retrospect, when a theory which has already survived 
multiple anomalies because of the lack of a more promising alternative 
is 'refuted' by another which can accowrux&te both the successful 
predictions of its predecessor and its failures as well. The basic 
criterion for a 'progressive problem shift' within a research programme 
plagued by growing anomalies is the development of new theories which 
combine greater empirical content with successful predictions, without 
either introducing ad hoc assumptions which erode the simplicity and 
economy of the hard core or introducing assumptions which directly 
contradict the hard core and thus prefigure the emergence of a new research 
programme altogether.27 Clarity in the definition of the hard core is 
thus of great importance in identifying the full implications of theory-
saving proposals, in making retrospective judgements on falsification, 
and in prising apart for testing purposes explanatory and interpretative 
theories which may become 'soldered together' in the practical development 
of a given research programme.28
Thus the central paradox of the Popperian position is that, by 
repudiating for social theory the kind of over-arching, 'essentialist' 
concepts implied in Lakatos' notion of the hard core, it effectively 
confines the social theorist to the application of trained 'judgement' 
to the interpretation of more or less 'intelligible contingencies' among 
particular clusters of events - a theme which has been developed most 
strongly by hermeneutically inclined opponents of the attempt to apply 
the covering-law model to the question of historical explanation.23 I 
certainly do not mean to reject all the arguments of this latter group: 
indeed, this thesis will closely follow their emphasis on the centrality 
of the actor's reasons to assertions about social action, and on the 
primacy of description and narrative in the practical explanation of 
social phenomena (from the most extended account, fleshed out with a 
mass of taken-for-granted 'corroborative detail' to the most minute 
dissection of a no longer taken for granted 'event' into a multitude of 
intersecting chains of 'sub-events'). 30
However, in the Anglo-American context, the defence of the traditional 
historical method has usually drawn upon some version of the verstehen/ 
eklaren and idiographic/nomothetic distinctions, together with a more 
or less explicit appeal to the notion of 'methodological individualism' - 
identifying the historical above all with the unique and the mutable, 
and rejecting not merely the covering-law approach to generalization but 
generalization in general as a major component of historical argument.31 
Insofar as such a concept of intuitive judgement is extended to the 
problems of generalizing social theory, it focusses attention above all 
on the dialectical process by which each new element of experience 
entering the realm of intelligibility in turn alters the entire conceptual 
field in terms of which it is rendered intelligible. In such a perspective- 
expressed in Oakeshott's account of human understanding, and in Pragmatist 
reformulations of the empirical approach in the American context - there 
can be no general criteria other than internal 'coherence' (and perhaps 
'elegance') for evaluating the knowledge claims implicated in a given 
'conceptual world' . 32
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Such frank relativism in the face of large-scale social issues 
has indeed been an important feature of the classical approach to 
international theory - which has been strongly influenced by the 
sceptical empiricism of diplomatic history, with its concern with the 
wisdom or folly of individual statesmen, on the one hand, and by quasi­
idealist accounts of the broad traditions of European international 
society, on the other. However, as will be argued in later sections, 
an implicit appeal to a monistic conception of the states-system can be 
discerned even in leading statements of the classical approach; and 
the tendency to make such leaps of faith was even more marked in the 
mainstream American debate, in which the influence of the behavioural 
aspiration towTards a far-reaching body of 'empirical' social and political 
theory was especially marked. In this second, more overtly theoretical 
response to the dilemma mentioned above, the discrepancy between 
epistemological premises and substantive results was particularly profound; 
but the anomalies of the enterprise were shrouded from its partisans, for 
several related reasons.
First, there was the widespread acceptance of the synchrony/diachrony 
distinction, which in turn masked the dubious character of the distinction 
between covering-law and historicist modes of argument. The one substantial 
body of non-trivial covering-laws produced in the social sciences - the 
laws of market equilibrium in marginalist economics - was hedged about 
in practice by so many ceteris paribus assumptions as to imply a grand 
historicist argument (though in this instance about continuity rather 
than change) accounting for the persistence of the broad social and 
political conditions which would render an equilibrium model of the 
market plausible. In turn, the historicist argument thus implied was 
explicitly enunciated (in a highly revealing division of labour in modern 
pluralist theory) by a variety of functionalist and systemic theories 
which, whatever their formal differences, were united by their assumption 
of the validity of formal synchronic analysis, with the implied Corollary 
that continuity, unlike change, required no special explanation.34 Of 
course, the proponents of such theories were not blind to the fundamental 
empirical problem of change in the modern world. But the covering-law 
campaign, by focussing so strongly on the illegitimacy of extended 
narratives anticipating massive change in social and political conditions ,
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also helped to disguise the fact that narratives about social and 
political continuity were narratives (i.e. accounts with a temporal 
dimension) at all.
Second, the wholesale transfer of mechanistic and organic analogies 
from the natural to the social sciences has made it difficult to think 
through the full social implications of theories couched primarily in 
these terms, and to identify the crucial anomalies within and between 
them. For instance, if the central propositions of marginalist economics, 
on the one hand, and of Parsonian 'normative functionalism', on the other, 
are expressed in terms of their distinctive 'models of man' and models 
of social structure, the above mentioned division of labour in modern 
pluralist theory can be seen to involve basic incoherencies. Both 
perspectives conceal beneath their ostensibly universal terminology 
a teleological assumption about the historical givenness of a very 
specific social order. But the economist's ideal construct assumes a 
population of calculating, utility-maximizing individuals confronting one 
another as free, equal and atomistic individuals in the market place - 
a combination which, if not confined to a very narrow range of 'economic' 
activities, would rapidly reduce society to a Hobbesian 'war of all against 
all'. Parsonian functionalism implies that the economy (the 'adaptive 
sub-system') can be effectively insulated within a cocoon of traditional 
and affective social and political relationships: but it solves the 
'Hobbesian problem of order' only by a circular argument which assumes 
that the normal individual's need disposition towards personal psychological 
'equilibrium' will lead to the widespread internalization of the prevailing 
social norms, with psychologically derived 'deviance' the main source of
o cthreats to the continuity of such a social order. However, these
glaring discrepancies between Economic Man and Sociological Man shelter
behind the more opaque relationships between concepts such as functional
equilibrium and market force equilibrium - concepts whose relative 'cash
value' cannot readily be assessed precisely because they are not really
meaningful descriptions of social life at all. 36 The result is that
fundamental anomalies within the broad corpus of pluralist/behavioural
theory have often been obscured, while essentially cosmetic distinctions
- as between functionalist, cybernetic and general systems approaches, for
3 7instance - have been greatly exaggerated.
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Third, there was the influence of the sophisticated methodological 
nominalism invoked, explicitly or implicitly, by the more ambitious 
behavioural theorists. This doctrine, together with the assumption of 
the availability of a theory-neutral observation language, provided 
for the development of far-reaching taxonomies and 'conceptual frameworks' 
which were rationalized as nothing more than sets of tautologies or 
definitional truths - filing systems for ordering (but not prejudicing) 
the data, whose utility could be indirectly assessed by the empirical
o otesting of operational propositions developed in terms of them. More
specifically, it licensed the influential Eastonian defence of 'constructive'
as against 'natural' systems noted in the previous chapter. Enquiry into
the real or natural existence of complex entities such as systems was a
blind alley, Easton argued. 'Any aggregate of interactions that we
choose to identify may be said to form a system'. And though this
strategy necessitated a further distinction between 'interesting' and
'trivial' systems, the former criterion would be met by any set of
interactions which were 'relevant Cto3 some theoretical problems ... show
3 9some degree of interdependence, and seem to have a common fate'.
On the surface, this sceptical approach to major organizing concepts 
solely in terms of their 'heuristic' usefulness would appear directly 
contrary to the reification of mechanistic and organic metaphors alluded 
to immediately above. But in practice, as M.Hollis and E.J.Nell point 
out, reification is the inevitable result of the attempt to construct 
rigorous conceptual models without committing oneself directly on the 
question of their correspondence with the real world. For the logical 
rigour of such a model depends upon the armoury of ceteris paribus 
assumptions with which it is hedged about, and the facts which would test 
its predictions must always be open to 'adjustment' on the grounds that 
ceteris were not paribus. 'Tests are thus decisive only when the facts 
fit the model', for only then is it clear that ceteris are paribus, and 
the positive predictions of the model, therefore, are 'standardly 
irrefutable'.4 0
Moreover, although this problem exists even for the natural sciences, 
as Lakatos' argument acknowledges, there is for social theory the special 
problem of ongoing historical change - in part because of purposive 
action directly inspired by various theoretical models - in the regularities 
of the social world. It is in this regard that the synchronic assumptions
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encapsulated in formal systems theory are crucial. Theoretical 
prescriptions of the Eastonian variety have the effect both of making 
the 'boundary' between 'system' and 'environment' crucial to the 
explanation of the 'normal' functioning of the system, and of removing 
the identification of that boundary from the area of empirical inquiry 
by building it into the original definition of the system (for instance, 
by relegating the 'economic system' along with the 'ecological system', 
to the general environment of the 'political system', thus making a 
major economic crisis as random an 'input' into the political system 
as, say, an earthquake).41 The basic rationale for this procedure - 
that all boundaries are essentially analytical conventions - does make 
sense within the context of an assumed infinity of potential 'social 
systems' revolving in a synchronic universe outside historical time.
But once one rejects this for the view that patterns of continuity, like 
patterns of change, must be demonstrated and accounted for over time^ 
the problem of boundaries - as between polity and economy in domestic 
social orders, for instance, or between states-system and world-economy 
in an allegedly 'interdependent' world order - can be recognized as the 
crucial theoretical and empirical issue that it is.
In summary, I would argue that neither of the two broad responses 
to the empiricist dilemma reviewed here is adequate; and that, insofar 
as even ostensibly a-theoretical pluralist thinking on international 
issues has normally assumed some kind of 'international system', both 
approaches have led towards general organizing concepts which, on the face 
of it, are immune to empirical challenge and criticizable only in terms 
of their internal coherence. Moreover, I would argue that the plausibility 
of small-scale explanations ultimately cannot be assessed without relating 
them to large-scale organizing concepts; that definition, description 
and explanation are inter-related at alt levels of abstraction; and that 
all three are implicated in narrative as the dominant mode of social 
analysis. Within this general commitment to the narrative mode, I will be 
further identifying social systems as structured historical repisodes r, 
and attempting to establish the reality of the states-system - the only 
truly plausible political system in modern history - as the pivotal 
support of the over-arching theoretical perspective on contemporary world 
politics developed in this thesis. This implies a concept of system 
very different from the behavioural one; and one which, while rejecting
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the teleological implications of mechanistic and organic analogies in 
the social sciences, presumes the explanatory power of 'real', historically 
specific social structures. It thus involves a general defence of 
methodogical realism, to which we must now turn.
The argument here for methodogical realism is a limited and, so to 
speak, left-handed one. It is directed not against the nominalist 
principle as such, but against the contrast drawn by empiricist thinkers 
such as the early Popper between the mythological qr 'essentialist' 
character of such Marxist concepts as 'the capitalist mode of production' 
and the genuinely scientific tendency to regard major organizing concepts 
merely as devices for handling the data and for generating conditional 
or counterfactual statements. The case for a thoroughgoing nominalism 
seem to me incontestable: but it should be a thoroughgoing nominalism, 
which extends right back to the primary convention that the facts 
(understood as sense-data) are the facts (understood as reality).
From this position of universal scepticism, the epistemological 
path would seem to divide in two radically different directions: the 
one towards the world-denying idealism of some Eastern religions, the 
"other towards Western science with its continued assertion of an 
'intersubjectively available' world. Under the latter metaphysic, the 
statement of universal scepticism may be reinterpreted in practice 
as a plea for the universal suspension of a priori disbelief, and for 
the assessment of all organizing concepts, from the smallest 'fact' to 
the largest 'material structure', solely in terms of their utility in 
advancing intersubjectively validated knowledge of the world. The 
ruling convention, that is to say, is actually a dual one: de jure 
nominalism combined with de facto realism. After the first blanket 
statement of scepticism, therefore, any further piecemeal expressions 
of the nominalist principle (to which the Popperian school has inclined 
in practice if not in theory) are not merely redundant but actually
1 37 .
subversive of the scientific enterprise. For they represent the 
piecemeal application of the realist subterfuge to certain concepts 
('hard facts') at the expense of others ('essentialist' material 
structures).
Another useful way of expressing this point is in terms of 
Oakeshott's analysis of human understanding. The key proposition is 
that understanding is 'a continuous, self-moved, critical enterprise 
of theorizing'. Every distinction between a 'this' and a 'that' - 
every identification of a specific 'going on' by abstracting it 'from 
all that may be going on', in terms of its own 'ideal character' as 
a 'unity of particularicity and genericity' - is a theoretical exercise.43 
Conversely, every stage in the open-ended process of theorizing, 
whatever its level of abstraction, represents no more than a 'conditionaal 
platform of understanding', at which the theorist may either turn aside 
and explore in greater detail the characteristics of an entity whose 
character as an intelligible entity is taken to be unproblematic, or 
else resume the theoretical enterprise by questioning the (now problematic) 
assumptions or postulates in terms of which the former intelligibility
• 4 4was constituted.
From this perspective, the distinction between description and 
explanation is always in part a contextual one, depending on the 
situation and on the judgements of individuals and communities as to 
what is problematic. One might, for instance, be involved primarily in 
either description or explanation in addressing any of the following 
distinctions: between a congeries of drunken street brawls and a 
political riot; between a fortuitous conjunction of essentially separate 
rebellions and a general revolution; between a proto-national, proto- 
bureaucratic modernizing empire and a modern nation-state; between a 
Chinese states-system in the era of the Warring States and a thousand 
year breakdown of effective central control within a nominally continuous 
Chinese world-empire. One might expect that the 'goings on' identified 
at the latter end of this spectrum would normally be regarded as far more 
problematic than those at the former. But for certain theoretical 
purposes 'historical states-systems' might well be taken as more or less 
given data, while the assumptions involved in classifying small-scale 
instances of 'collective violence' might be subjected to searching inquiry. 4 5
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Conceived in these terms, therefore, scientific inquiry appears 
as a process of thinking through the implications of a given 'conceptual 
world' - on a multiplicity of inter-related levels, from the most 
abstract to the most detailed, and with the aid of certain over-arching 
metaphors which are, normally, readily recognizable as such. Moreover, 
this perspective undermines the empiricist attempt to dismiss historicist 
reasoning as incompatible with the crucial operation of counterfactual 
analysis. The impression is sometimes given that this notion is 
relevant only to statements which can be rendered in covering-law terms. 
However, Ryan argues that even in the natural sciences counterfactual 
statements are more properly interpreted as 'causal narratives';46 and as 
regards social analysis, there is a particularly strong case for identifying 
them with an extensive range of 'imagined effects' - including historicist 
predictions and Rationalist utopias - whose common characteristic is 
that they tell a story about what would happen, or would have happened, 
if certain conditions were fulfilled.47 Thus it would be perfectly 
possible to construct a counterfactual 'decoding' of Marx's analysis 
of capitalism along the following lines: 'If it were the case that we
had access to reality through sense-data, and that we could get behind 
the sense-data to the deeper principles by which reality was ordered, 
and that I was right about what those deeper principles were, then this 
is what would be going on in the production and reproduction of capitalism'. 
One would scarcely bother with such an abstruse decoding operation in 
practice. But it is no more abstruse, I believe, than that proposed by 
the covering-law theorists for historical explanation in general and 
considerably more to the point.
There remains the problem of establishing the 'commensurability' 
of rival conceptual worlds, and securing their (relative) openness to 
the test of experience, rather than merely to criticism in terms of 
their own internal coherence. The most promising strategy here, drawing 
upon Lakatos' notion of a research programme, appears to be one which 
makes the interpenetration and internal structural divisions of such 
worlds the key to their hermeneutic mediation one against another.
However, it is necessary to qualify Lakatos' basic picture to account for 
two special points about social theories: first, that the distinction 
between hard core and protective belt is inevitably more fuzzy than for 
natural science theories; and second, that a crucial index of their
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fidelity to experience is their commensurability with the conceptual 
worlds of the social actors whose universe they purport to describe. I 
will now consider the implications of this double hermeneutic for the 
comparison of the two concepts proposed in this thesis as a decodification 
of the Soviet duality of 'international system' and 'world historical 
process': the modern states-system and the 'transitional' world-economy.
In the course of this argument, I will also attempt to clarify and 
delimit the commitment to historicism and monism implied in the earlier 
critique of pluralist approaches, both classical and behavioural, to 
international theory.
The first point concerns the importance of 'excess empirical 
content', linked more or less closely to hard core assumptions, as 
the key to the long-term evaluation of research programmes. It seems 
fair to argue that major social theories are confronted with new 
empirical challenges not, as with natural science theories, primarily 
through the ongoing development of experimental techniques, but rather 
through the historical ramifications of complex social structures, 
through historical shifts in the consciousness (or conceptual worlds) of 
social actors, and through the emergence of 'new' social actors as a 
result of major structural change. Thus classical Marxism is relatively 
'testable' precisely by virtue of those features commonly attacked as 
unscientific by pluralist theorists:namely, its monistic and historicist 
concern with developments within, and transformations of, large-scale 
historical structures. Conversely, the behavioural tendency to assume 
system boundaries and a synchronic dimension as a matter of definitional 
convenience (to say nothing of the pure pluralist rejection of any over­
arching theoretical concepts) militates against such 'testability' as is 
possible in the social sciences.
Of course, there can be no question of testability in regard to 
historicist concepts which are so all-embracing as to make it impossible 
to 'stand outside' and criticize them from any substantially independent 
position; and the formal Soviet doctrine of the world historical process 
must be regarded as methodologically indefensible in precisely this sense. 
But except for the ideological pieties which Soviet authors must observe 
on political grounds, there is no reason why the central analytical core 
of the Soviet position - the Leninist theory of imperialism and the 
accompanying 'world crisis' of capitalism - should be subsumed under 
such an all-embracing rubric. It is possible instead to relate the
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Leninist picture to the notion of a global 'transition' to industrialism 
which is regarded as contingent but given - leaving aside the question 
of whether such a structural break in modern history had to occur, while 
still maintaining that it is occurring and that it constitutes a general 
bounded framework for contemporary world politics.
The appeal here is to the notion of episodic analysis, and to the 
possibility of evaluating a bounded historical 'episode' both against 
conceivable futures which it excludes and against those past courses 
of events from which it is alleged to constitute a distinct break. As 
Gellner argues, this notion is applicable even if one takes the great 
modern transformation in economic, political and intellectual structures 
back to its origins in early modern Europe. The result, 'however large 
and fundamental ... is an episode in the philosophically relevant sense 
that it is an event in a wider world: literally and conceptually, it is 
not coextensive with that world'. However, a much more immediately 
relevant framework for the evaluation of the Soviet version of Leninism 
is Barraclough's notion of the 'transition' from modern to contemporary 
history - a fundamental realignment, initiated in the late 1880s and 
more or less completed by the late 1950s, of the underlying 'skeleton' 
or 'framework' of contemporary world politics. With this narrower 
focus upon the dialectic of European imperial expansion and the political 
and economic responses it evoked in the colonial and semi-colonial regions, 
the episodic nature of the transition becomes much more clearly defined.
So conceived, it cuts across a very different course of events formerly 
unfolding in much of the non-Western world, and the proposition that this 
transition has fundamentally changed the structure of world politics 
commits one to the exclusion of fairly clearly definable future courses 
of events in both the Western and the non-Western context.
It is still necessary to indicate what relevance the basic Marxist- 
Leninist perspective on the dynamics of world capitalism has to this 
theoretical enterprise, and to suggest a useful reconciliation between 
that perspective and the rudimentary notion of 'international system' 
soldered onto it by Soviet spokesmen over the Peaceful Coexistence 
era. To do this, one must address a second and more complex question 
about the 'research program' concept: that of the inherent plausibility 
or implausibility of hard core assumptions themselves. In the natural 
sciences, there would seem to be no reason for regarding any one hard
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core proposition (for example, 'no action at a distance') as inherently 
more or less plausible than any potential competitor. But in the social 
sciences, it does seem possible to pass judgement, if not on the inherent 
plausibility of basic explanatory assumptions, at least on the adequacy 
of the basic 'problematics' to which different social theories are 
addressed.
As Hollis argues (in an analysis with important affinities to that 
of Lakatos), the process of gaining access to a foreign conceptual world 
(or a foreign 'form of life' or 'tradition of behaviour') is analogous 
to that of decoding an unknown language. The 'Enquirer' can make no 
progress without establishing an initial 'bridgehead', involving 
'definitive interpretations of enough terms Cor practices!] to restrict 
possible meanings of others', and this must be done a priori, by 
identifying certain fundamental issues which must be addressed in any 
language' and imputing rationality (i.e. a mode of rationality accessible 
to the Enquirer) in the treatment of those issues by the 'Other Mind'.
Like Lakatos' hard core, such a bridgehead can generate a multiplicity 
of empirically testable hypotheses which may be retained, discarded or 
recycled in the detailed exploration of the new world; and if this 
exploration reveals excessive deviations in practice from the Enquirer's 
expectations about normal relationships between terms (or practices) and 
situations, it may lead in turn to retrospective changes in the bridge­
head itself. 'But there are wholly crucial limits' to the extent of such 
changes tolerable without the effective abandonment of the decoding 
proposal defined by that particular bridgehead, and there is no way round 
the a priori character of the original starting point:
.CThe Enquirer'sH only access to the Other Mind's 
experience is through interpreting behaviour and 
utterance. If he had to get at the phenomena 
before he could interpret and had to interpret 
before he could get at the phenomena, there would 
be no way into the circle. He assumes a single 
world being described in two languages less 
because there is than because there will have to 
be. On any other assumption he cannot begin at
n  50all.
The methodological implications of assuming rationality will be 
considered in the next section. At this point, however, it is important 
to consider whether there are any major substantive issues which one 
might reasonably expect to be addressed in any social order incorporating
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(as do the various orders considered in this thesis) a complex, over­
arching division of labour. I would argue that two such issues are 
identifiable: the maintenance of political order, through hierarchical 
patterns of power and authority; and the appropriation by restricted 
groups of a socially produced surplus. If one also adopts the generic 
terms authorization and allocation to refer to these respective processes, 
it should be possible to make a broad substantive distinction between 
redistributive social orders (whether 'national' or 'imperial') in which 
allocation is a sub-set of authorization and ultimately reflects the 
overall distribution of coercive power, and essentially capitalist social 
orders, in which allocation is substantially independent (and perhaps 
even predominant) principle, which reflects ultimately a distribution
of economic power substantially independent of any centralized coercive 51authority.
Such a formulation helps to highlight the historical specificity 
of modern capitalist social orders. But, more crucial to the present 
discussion, it also indicates a basic structural difference regarding the 
'givenness' of contemporary capitalism in the international as against 
the domestic arena. In the international sphere, the independence of 
transnational capital from any over-arching political authority directly 
reflects the fundamental political fact of a plurality of 'sovereign' 
states, together with a sufficient equality of power among the great to 
render the reduction of that plurality to a single central authority 
extremely unlikely without a devastating general war. Thus the 
structural pre-requisites of the modern capitalist world-economy (as 
emerges clearly from Immanuel Wallerstein's arguments on this point) might 
also be regarded, from a different standpoint, as the structural pre­
requisites of the modern states-system. And indeed, Martin Wight, the 
most impressive contemporary exponent of the latter concept, not only 
designates as a 'states-system' essentially the same politico-economic 
entity which Wallerstein designates as a 'world-economy' but like him 
points to the progressive expansion of that entity - always divided 
internally between 'core' and 'periphery' - from its European origins in 
the late 15th century to its global extension in the present day.
In the domestic sphere, by contrast, essentially redistributive 
social orders have been the norm rather than the exception, even for 
most of the history of the modern world-economy; they remain in evidence,
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in the shape of the socialist states, over a good part of the advanced 
industrial world today; and the barriers against a return to a 
redistributive order within established capitalist societies are not so 
much structural as political, reflecting the active preferences of ruling 
elites, and at least the passive acquiescence of broad masses, in those 
societies. Moreover, while one might reasonably conclude that these 
political restraints will remain extremely powerful, at least for the 
period considered in this thesis, in the advanced capitalist societies 
themselves, the same is not obviously true of those 'transitional' states 
which have been fully drawn into the orbit of the modern states-system 
and world-economy only through the rapid and traumatic developments of 
the past century. On the one hand, the impact of transnational capital 
has effectively disrupted the traditional social order in many of these 
societies, generating far-reaching social tensions without in itself 
promoting new political structures which might contain these tensions, 
or even the clear prospect of off-setting material improvements in the 
lives of the masses. On the other, these societies still retain major 
links to the great tradition of 'politics in command' from which the 
Western capitalist drive to 'insulate' economics from politics constitutes 
a recent and geographically-limited departure; their indigenous political 
cultures, for the most part, seem less conducive to an individualistic 
'capitalist ethic' than were those of Western Europe; and insofar as 
their ruling elites have supplemented these traditional values by a 
'nationalist' consciousness of their position in a highly competitive 
states-system, that consciousness in turn is likely to provide important 
incentives for attempts to bend the course of economic development to 
'national' political ends.
In summary, I would argue that the apparent stability of the capitalist 
world-economy as a whole is belied by the potential instability of its 
parts, and that both aspects of this phenomenon may be directly related to 
the same basic structural features of contemporary world politics.
Moreover, a similar assertion may be made in regard to the contemporary 
states-system, insofar as the stability of the great power relationship 
could be sharply affected by radical shifts in the politico-economic 
orientation of a number of leading transitional states. Indeed, it is 
precisely the phenomenon of a world politically plural - dominated by 
competing 'sovereign' authorities - yet economically more or less 
unified under the over-arching allocative framework of a single world
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market, which is constitutive both of the broad international status-quo 
and of the chief threats to that status-quo, and which makes it still 
illuminating to speak of an ongoing, but piecemeal, process of 'transition' 
in contemporary world politics.
It is now possible to summarize this discussion of the problem of 
bringing social 'research programmes' before the bar of historical 
experience. To begin with, theories which finesse the basic historical 
tension between authorization and allocation by a resort to synchronic 
assumptions and to definitional boundaries between political and economic 
systems may be regarded as not merely untestable but grounded in an inherently 
inadequate problematic. These considerations license the rejection of 
the recent 'interdependence paradigm', at least as a grand theory of 
world politics; for though its adherents have loudly proclaimed the 
current interpenetration of international politics and economics, the 
relationship which they depict is not a truly dialectical one but rather 
a mechanical juxtaposition of the established pluralist images of a political 
and an economic system, leaving effectively untouched the conceptual 
divorce between politics and economics which permitted each sphere to 
be conceptualized in 'systemic' terms in the first place. 53 Similarly, 
mainstream American modernization theory may be rejected as a description 
of the internal dynamics of transitional states, both because it too 
incorporates the substantive implications of this conceptual divorce 
between politics and economics and also because, as Wallerstein emphasizes, 
it effectively assumes that each national 'transition' can be treated as 
a discrete phenomenon, without significant reference to the wider 
international structures which create such major discrepancies in the 
options open to early and late entrants on this process.54
However, Wallerstein may himself be criticized for arbitrarily 
attributing to the allocative principle a general supremacy in the modern 
world which is belied by his own insistence that a pluralistic political 
configuration is a fundamental distinguishing mark of a world-economy. 
Moreover, despite his insistence on historically grounded theory,
Wallerstein in fact relies heavily upon a synchronic approach to 
capitalism as a world-system and upon teleological arguments about system- 
maintenance which militate against an examination of historically specific 
relationships within the period of the capitalist 'system' itself. 55 And 
despite the avowed Marxist orientation of his work, he shows less concern
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with structural contradiction than with the functional interdependence 
of the various actors in the respective roles - core, semi-periphery and 
periphery - in which they are cast by the allocative demands of the 
world market mechanism, with the result that the Soviet Union is formally 
classified as merely another core state of the capitalist world-economy, 
while China is relegated to the semi-periphery along with such a political 
minnow as Australia.56
By contrast with these approaches, this thesis will emphasize the 
lagged and contradictory character of social change (including the way 
in which different societies have tended to 'leapfrog' one another in 
the ongoing process of political, military and economic transition of 
the past few centuries),57while still seeking to highlight the bedrock 
determinants of this process in the broad structures of military and 
economic power in the modern world. However, even given this strong 
emphasis on historical specificity, the notion of a 'global transition' 
still presents the problem of 'standing outside' a monistic concept which 
effectively refers to the entire socio-political environment of the 
contemporary era. Though any attempt to reach a this/that verdict on 
whether the contemporary United States, for instance, was 'really' a 
nation-state or a multi-national empire would be monistic in its way, 
judgements on such an issue may at least be related to a range of 
material and cultural factors which are substantially external to the 
phenomenon in question. But how is one to refine the concept of 'global 
transition' in the direction of either 'states-system' or 'world-economy', 
when both the 'this' and the 'that' appear, on the accounts of their 
respective defenders, to fill out the entire conceptual space so as to 
allow no independent ground for criticism?
In the recent history of Western (including 'structuralist' and 
'neo-Marxist') international theory, the confrontation between states- 
system and world-economy perspectives has indeed suggested a clash of 
incommensurable paradigms - with the committed on either side talking 
past their opponents in self-contained theoretical languages, and the 
occasional attempts to bridge the gap relying on ad hoc judgements about 
the superiority of one or other perspective in illuminating specific 
substantive problems. 58 However, the argument here is that the 
'schizophrenic' pattern of Soviet international theory points the way 
towards the appropriate position on the states-system/world-economy
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relationship, and that the appropriate position is not either/or but 
both/and, across the entire spectrum of contemporary world politics.
The states-system and the world-economy are two aspects of the one great 
historical episode, reflecting respectively the fragmentation of the 
authorization principle and the essential unity of the allocation 
principle. And so far from introducing irremediable confusion into the 
analysis of world politics, this duality allows one to 'stand outside' 
each concept and criticize it from an independent base (or, to return 
to Lakatos' terminology, it provides at the highest level of abstraction 
alternate touchstones to which explanatory and interpretative theories 
soldered together in lower level analysis may be referred).
If the above strategy is to be a coherent one, both states-system 
and world-economy must be related to basic organising concepts of the 
scone kind. Ultimate conceptual primacy must be granted to either cultural 
or material determinants: to account for the states-system on the 
former grounds, for instance, and the world-economy on the latter would 
merely reproduce the problem of incommensurable paradigms within the 
one allegedly unified theoretical perspective. In this thesis, as 
indicated earlier, ultimate conceptual primacy is accorded to material 
factors. The states-system proper is identified as an essentially 
cultural phenomenon: an unusually discrete system of practices which 
provides (or rather mediates) the political order of an 'international 
society' of sovereign states. But these practices in turn are held to 
be structurally 'generated', in the centuries-long accommodation of 
international society to the over-riding structural features of anarchy 
among member states in general and hierarchy between the great and the 
rest. 59 The particular methodological problems of equating structural 
generation in this sense with material determination will be considered 
in the next section, along with the related problems involved in 
attempts to specify the 'logic of the situation' for collective actors 
in contexts of large-scale strategic interaction. However, in order to 
demonstrate the continuity between these two sets of problems, it is
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necessary first to elucidate the broader meaning attached here to the 
concept of structural (as opposed, to functional) generation of practices, 
and the distinctions proposed between the closely related concepts of 
system} structure and society.
In a very general sense (the sense which gives 'social contract' 
theories their central core of meaning), 'society' is the most fundamental 
explanatory concept in social theory. The various theoretical entities 
identified therein all involve human association in some measure; and 
if their characteristics cannot be explained as either intended or 
unintended consequences of the 'skilled and knowledgeable' interaction 
of social actors with a substantial ability to 'see through' the 
conditions of their social existence, they cannot be explained at all.60 
In particular, attempts to explain the persistence of practices by 
reference to their 'latent functions' - to their fulfillment of system 
'needs' of which the human actors in question are unconscious - 
represent exactly the same kind of unacceptable teleology as the direct 
reification of mechanistic and organic metaphors.61
On the other hand, the notion of a 'social contract' between 
free and equal contracting partners would be highly misleading in 
regard to any of the social orders, domestic or international, 
considered here. This raises the simplest, and perhaps the most 
fundamental, aspect of social structure: namely the implications of 
an hierarchical distribution of wealth, coercive power, and access to 
the sources of moral and ideological influence. This concept of 
hierarchy will be central to the perspective on contemporary world 
politics developed in this thesis: and I will also be drawing at times 
upon a basic distinction between society in general and the much more 
restricted polity of actors with privileged access to the centralized 
levers of political power and influence. Given this simple distinction, 
the issue of 'latent' versus 'manifest' functions may be restated 
substantially in structuralist terms, in that the 'integrative' functions 
of apparently irrational practices and institutions may be perfectly 
manifest to those elites who benefit most from the social order in 
question and who dispose of the greatest resources, ideological and 
other, with which to make their preferred definition of reality stick.
Of course, not even the most powerful and privileged groups make 
their history 'exactly as they please'; and the notion of structure 
further entails the recognition, at all levels of social hierarchy, of
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the tendency for social action to 'escape' from the control of human 
agents. One major aspect of this phenomenon - the unintended consequences 
of action - is very familiar in Anglo-American social theory: for instance 
in the micro-economic model of the competitive market or the 'action-reaction' 
model of international arms races. These two examples demonstrate not 
merely the point that the collective interaction of self-interested 
agents can generate structural constraints which are 'external' to the 
consciousness and purpose of the agents individually, but also the direct 
connection between the concept of structure and that of logical, or rational 
action. Indeed, if it were not for the daunting stylistic problems, it 
would be best to speak not of structures as such but of the structural 
(i.e. logical) properties of situations or relationships.63 Thus to 
explain an arms race in action-reaction terms is to assert that, at 
least at one level, the actors are responding rationally to the logic 
of the situation in which they find themselves, and to expound more 
generally on the 'security dilemma' in international relations is to make 
a similar assertion about the general structuring logic of anarchical 
interaction between sovereign states.*
But, important as these points are, formal models of this type 
are not in themselves adequate to the range of structural issues 
considered here (a point recently illustrated by Waltz's rigorous, but 
ultimately unsatisfactory, attempt to construct a structure-only analysis 
of the 'international system' on the analogy of micro-economic theory).64 
In the first place, such models are necessarily abstracted from any 
concrete historical and spatial context, so that, for instance, one might 
conclude that the overall situational logic for all actors in the class 
'great power' was effectively the same, and entertain unrealistic 
expectations about a transcendence of the 'security dilemma' through the 
higher logic of co-operation lying behind the more obvious logic of 
competition. By contrast, the argument here will emphasize the 
substantive and intrinsic opposition of interests between actors by 
virtue of their location at differing positions (with contradictory 
situational 'logics') in several overlapping social structures. Thus, 
as will be argued in Chapters 3 and 4, the prospects for detailed 
Soviet-American 'rules of the game' are sharply circumscribed by the 
opposing interests associated with the different geopolitical and 
developmental situations of the powers - to say nothing of the basic 
tensions generated by the contradictory structures of military and
* These issues are discussed in detail in Chapter 4.
149.
economic power underpinning the states-system and world-economy 
respectively.
Second, these formal models tend to promote a synchronic, 'all-or- 
nothing' perspective, which either endows major structures with an 
a-historical image of permanence (as in the treatment of the market in 
liberal economic theory) or else implies that they can be transcended 
all at once (as in the 'Idealist' strand of international theory after 
World War I and some of its 'world order' echoes today). In one sense, 
such a perspective was also a feature of classical Marxism, since, 
despite Marx's strong concern to establish the historical specificity of 
capitalism, he also implied that the socialist revolution would usher in 
an age in which the great structural constraints on human self-determination 
would be definitively transcended. However, Marx's comments on Germany 
and Russia also contained an embryonic 'second theory of revolution' in 
terms of uneven development; and it is this theme, developed more fully 
by Trotsky and Lenin, which primarily informs the conception of 
historical development in this thesis.65 In certain contexts (as in 
regard to the dramatically fluctuating fortunes of European colonial 
power over the past century), one may reasonably speak of the 'rise' and 
'fall' of major social structures, but the more pervasive phenomenon is 
an ongoing, dialectical process of structuring - a pattern of piecemeal 
emergence and transcendence in which an over-arching 'entity' such as the 
states-system may retain its basic identity despite very great substantive 
changes at lower levels of organisation.66
The analysis of this structuring process (exemplified, for instance, 
in Pipes' study of the rise of the 'patrimonial state' in Russia, in 
Perry Anderson's study of the lineages of European absolutism, and in 
Barrington Moore's study of the contribution of contrasting agrarian 
class structures to the development of contrasting patterns of economic 
and political 'modernization' among major states) involves recourse to 
'middle range' concepts bridging the gap between grand structures and 
detailed courses of events.57 I would argue that this role is filled by 
the Soviet concept of the 'correlation of forces', and also by the 
analysis of 'conjunctures' in the work of avowedly structuralist 
historians. But more familiar in the Anglo-American context is the 
notion of colligation, applied by W.H.Walsh to 'concrete universal' 
concepts (such as 'the Industrial Revolution') which designate 'complex 
states of affairs ... with both a temporal and a spatial spread ... which
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are systematically changing as a result of human effort or lack of effort'.68 
It might seem that these qualifications to the idea of structure 
effectively return the argument to the relativistic perspective criticized 
earlier in regard to pluralist social theory. However, even the systematic 
acceptance of colligation involves a commitment to historically grounded 
generalization well beyond that acknowledged in pluralist methodologies, 
and the concept of slowly changing 'deep structures' (such as the basic 
economic structures underpinning Pipes' complex narrative about the 
Russian old regime) remains essential to the wider approach. This is 
essential, as Braudel argues, not because such structures provide the 
whole story or anything approaching it, but because they provide a basic 
'reference grid' around which one can organize a more systematic study of 
all the different historical 'levels' which coexist in reality.69
Third, such formal models, especially insofar as they reflect
'methodological individualist' assumptions, tend to identify structure
solely with constraints upon action, and freedom for social actors with
the absence of structural constraint. The argument here, by contrast,
follows Giddens' emphasis on 'the duality of structure' and the 'mutual
dependence of structure and agency'. Structure is seen as both
'enabling and constraining', not merely as a barrier to action, but 'as
essentially involved in its production'.70 This is most obviously true
of the structuring power of ideas (or more correctly, of the thought
embodied in social practices, for the traditions and conventions which
shape much everyday activity operate primarily at the level of 'practical'
71rather than 'reflexive' consciousness). But it is also true of such 
gross material factors as the inequality and hierarchy which, along with 
similarly material considerations of geopolitics, have provided for the 
basic stability of expectations, centred around more-or-less agreed 
perceptions of competing 'national interests', underpinning the modern 
international society of sovereign states.
The above distinction between practical and reflexive consciousness 
leads into the second aspect of the 'escape' of social action from 
reflexive human control: the unacknowledged conditions of action.72 Three 
broad types of conditioning factors are relevant here: personal 
psychological, ideological and traditional/conventional. The first (which 
raises most directly the question of motivation which is not merely 
unacknowledged but in some sense unconscious) will be ignored in this 
thesis, on practical grounds discussed in the next section. The second
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is plainly crucial to the argument; but insofar as it spills over 
extensively into the area of reflexive or discursive consciousness, it 
may be more appropriately handled in the ensuing discussion of the theory/ 
practice relationship. The third involves precisely the sort of actions 
which could be defended as a rational response to publicly accepted rules 
and norms but seldom are rationalized in this way because of their 
conventional character; and it provides a very familiar theme in the 
discussion of structure in the Anglo-American context (to the extent that 
'social structure' and 'normative structure' are virtually synonomous in 
mainstream functionalist theory). In this thesis, also, normative factors 
are considered as an aspect of structure, but as a 'second order' one in 
methodological terms. And as a distinctive focus of attention, I would 
argue, they cast more light on the (notably limited) role of 'system' 
as an explanatory concept in social theory.
To begin with, it is worth reiterating the unacceptability of 
teleological appeals to system 'needs' (whether expressed openly or in 
the language of 'latent functions'), as also of the notion that system 
boundaries may be established as matters of definitional convenience. 
However, this much said, such formulations at least point towards the 
basic criteria which a system should fulfil to be a worthwhile candidate 
for social analysis. Put simply, a social system must run 'itself, in 
the sense of sustaining itself as a discrete and coherent set of practices 
over time. Moreover, this notion of practices 'running themselves' may 
also be applied, in a weaker sense, to the definition of a tradition; 
and both versions of the argument are functionalist in the one acceptable 
sense of this term:in that they account for the persistence of the 
various practices by reference to the mutual support which each receives, 
via a complex web of functional interdependence, from all the rest.74 Thus 
to attribute current Soviet and American policies towards their respective 
'spheres of influence' not to a realistic response to the logic of 
nuclear-era international politics but to the largely unreflecting 
acceptance of traditional notions about great power rights in general 
and core national interests in particular, would be to explain those 
policies as 'functionally generated' whether the formal language of 
functionalism was employed or not.
However, if functionalist explanation in this version is valid, 
it is also, in this version, very limited in scope. It can account for
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the persistence of an established set of practices, as also for the 
generation of particular actions by the inertial weight of such practices 
on the practical consciousness of human actors. But it can provide 
no meaningful account of the generation of practices in the first instance, 
nor of any large-scale, directional change in a set of established 
practices (whatever the claims made for the concept of 'dysfunction' 
on this latter point). On both these questions it is necessary to turn 
to notions of structure and structural contradiction: for instance, by 
explaining the spheres of influence convention as a rational response 
(from a great power perspective) to the logic of anarchical power 
politics as modified by geopolitical considerations, or by pointing to 
the declining security importance of direct territorial control and 
the deep-seated social forces behind contemporary small-power national 
sentiment as factors rendering the ideologically-charged spheres of 
influence claims of the current great powers increasingly irrational.
The methodological underpinning for these rather bald assertions 
will be set out more fully in the next section. For the moment, I 
wish further to explore the relationship between 'system' and 'tradition' 
in this theoretical perspective, and to suggest that the latter is 
much the more important theme in functionalist arguments of the type 
sketched above. Indeed, as regards social practices with an extensive 
substantive content, there would seem to be only one kind of entity 
which can meaningfully be described in systemic terms: the kind of 
small, isolated and economically primitive community described by 
Wallerstein as a 'mini-system' and designated elsewhere in this chapter 
as a discrete 'form of life'.75 Functionalist accounts of such entities 
are useful because their specific complex of cultural elements is 
normally more interesting than the primitive material 'base' which 
they share with many others of their kind; and the question of 
boundaries reduces, in large part, to one of physical isolation from 
outside influence, without which their fragile networks of interdependence 
would not retain such integrity as they do in the contemporary era.
Once one moves to the level of large, diverse entities with a 
complex division of labour, a direct conflict emerges between the issues 
of functional interdependence, on the one hand, and of the maintenance 
of boundaries vis-a-vis the 'environment', on the other. The truly 
important social boundaries in the modern world are those of the
153.
territorial state, which persistently cut across and disrupt the 
'natural' pattern of functional interdependence - reflecting above all 
crude material aspects of geography, and the distribution of wealth 
and coercive power which has allowed particular dominant groups to have 
their way at critical phases of the 'nation-building' process in 
particular areas. Moreover, there is at the 'national' level such a 
tangle of extant material interests, historically developing traditions,
and purpose-built but possibly antiquated institutional frameworks,
tothat to appeal to a systemic monism is^abandon the search for 'efficient' 
causes (or more and less fundamental relationships) in favour of a simple 
mystique of interdependence as such. There can be no real objection to 
the use of the term 'social system' instead of the terms 'social order' 
or 'society', as an alternative label for the same entity which conveys 
a general flavour of dynamic interdependence as against the respective 
connotations of structure and human agency in the other two cases. But, 
in contrast to the other two terms, 'system' has no genuine explanatory 
force in this context.
This leaves the level of 'world-system'. As Wallerstein rightly 
insists, this is the only plausible stopping-point after the 'mini-system' 
level for the identification of substantive social systems organised 
around functional interdependence. But couched in such terms, the concept 
of the world-economy does not eradicate the confusions introduced at the 
national level, but rather increases them in proportion to the extreme 
scale of abstraction involved. The modern world-economy is not a social 
system, nor a society, nor even a single civilization of the kind which 
characterized mediaeval and early modern Europe. The world-economy is 
'a world' (and in the contemporary era the world) considered from the 
aspect of one of its two great over-arching material structures: the 
allocative structure of world economic power. The importance of this 
structure is very great, as Wallerstein's own work shows: but the notion 
of a world-system, with its residual links to the teleological aspirations
7 6of functionalism, serves only to confuse the issue.
Finally, I would argue, there is only one large-scale entity in 
the modern world which may usefully be theorized in systemic terms: the 
states-system. Here is a set of practices - most fundamentally war, 
the balance of power, diplomacy, international law and great power 
hegemony - which have sustained their basic integrity and cohesion without
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the intervention of any central 'authorities' for between three and five 
centuries, according to historical taste. Moreover, these practices 
warrant the more specific designation of 'political system': first, 
because they stand out from their wider economic, cultural and religious 
environment far more distinctly than do so-called political systems in 
the domestic realm (even where, as in modern capitalist societies, the 
collective weight of the polity has been thrown strongly behind the 
'insulation' of politics from economics); and second, because they not 
only 'run themselves' in this sense but also 'run' their wider 
environment, in the sense of providing very loosely articulated rules 
of the game within which the substantive social order generated by the 
ongoing domestic and international struggles of the various powers may 
be accommodated. This abstraction from substantive issues is crucial.
The states-system is a viable political system precisely because it is 
not a substantive social system, and its central practices have provided 
viable rules of the game precisely because they have been primarily 
procedural in character and have for the most part intruded relatively
7 7little on the substantive enterprises of the great and major powers.
As a formal part of this argument, therefore, 'states-system' designates 
a far more restricted aspect of the modern world-historical 'transition' 
than 'world-economy', and is even narrower in reference than 'international 
society'. In practice, the terms 'system' and 'society' will be treated 
as loosely interchangeable, as indicating the political association of 
sovereign powers whose interactions are regulated by the above set of 
practices. But the states-system proper consists in the practices alone, 
which have endured so long precisely because they have been able to 
float, like lightly-burdened rafts, above the turbulent currents of the 
'world historical process'.
It is now possible to summarize the relationship between system 
and structure envisaged in this thesis. In many ways, this is the direct 
opposite of the relationship identified in mainstream American 
functionalism. In that theoretical context, the true weight of 
explanation is carried by system, which functions 'offstage', so to 
speak, behind the backs of the human actors, while structure is a largely 
superfluous concept, referring to the 'surface pattern' of relationships 
observable - from a necessarily synchronic perspective - in a functioning 
social system. In this thesis (leaving aside the special problem of the
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'purpose-built' institutional frameworks extant at any given point) the 
connotation of surface pattern is carried by system, though the patterns 
in question are not simply 'observed', but rather 'interpreted' or 'read' 
as a significant composition of 'presences' and 'absences' manifesting 
themselves over time. Moreover, the weighting of present and absent 
elements in this process of hermeneutic reconstruction necessarily 
involves explicit or implicit reference to 'offstage' deep structures 
- as when the historical irruptions of massive ideological conflict into 
the international arena are treated as less significant than the 
alternating intervals of 'balance of power politics', because the latter 
are held to reflect the 'true' logic of international anarchy whereas the 
former run counter to that logic. Finally, structures (or rather 
structural properties) carry the central burden of explanation in this 
perspective. But they must be inferred from the surface patterns they are 
believed to generate and weighted in importance by reference to the temporal 
and spatial 'spread' of those patterns - and thus the hermeneutic circle 
is closed.78
As regards complex domestic social orders, there will be such a
multiplicity of practices - reflecting a multiplicity of structures
'living' and 'dead' - that not even the most ruthlessly selective
interpretation could plausibly impose a single, systemic pattern upon
them. However, while 'social system' is only a courtesy title in such
a context, it remains vital to chart the contradictions and complementaries
between the most fundamental aspects of extant material structure, on the
one hand, and the 'great tradition' mediating the religious-cum-political
order of the society on the other.79 This great tradition may be equated
with the central corpus of organizing and legitimating practices which
define, at least for the majority of the 'polity', accepted ways of
handling major recurrent issues - practices, for instance, such as the
party control of the bureaucracy through the nomenklatura, which has
remained a constant feature of the Soviet politial order through massive
substantive changes at the economic, social and cultural levels, and
constitutes, in a more general sense, an important element of continuity
8 0with the 'patrimonial' traditions of the Tsarist state.
It must be emphasized that such a domestic great tradition is 
distinguished from the great tradition (nee system) of international 
society only by its relatively amorphous character; by its deep and 
continuous involvement in substantive issues; by its inherent
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vulnerability to manipulation by 'members' of the polity and especially 
by 'state managers'; and by the competition which it faces from a plurality 
of partially independent 'little traditions' holding sway over various 
segments of the society at large. If (to reverse the aquatic analogy 
employed above) the international great tradition has until recently 
resembled a single deep river with a clearly defined watercourse, joined 
only occasionally by tributary inflows from the domestic great traditions 
of the various leading powers, a domestic great tradition itself is more 
like a shallow river with levee banks, only the largest of many such in 
the immediate vicinity, intermittently dividing into multiple branches 
or losing its way in swamps, and subject to a variety of dams and artificial 
diversions in the interests of those with the 'engineering' resources to 
undertake such projects.
This distinction is important, since domestic as well as international 
traditions will loom large in this thesis, and it is necessary to reject 
the view - expounded most unequivocally by Oakeshott - that 'the tradition' 
of a properly constituted society should be inexhaustible, unfettered, 
and self-evident in its 'intimations', at least to the 'cognitively and 
otherwise well-born'.81 However, the basic characterization of system 
as a sub-category of tradition is even more important in evaluating 
Soviet (or other) theory and practice regarding interstate coexistence.
As an analytical focus, the states-system constitutes a unique 'platform' 
of continuity in a torrent of historical change, and it thus provides an 
indispensable starting point for the analytical 'disaggregation' of the 
global transition attempted in Chapter 3. As an explanatory formula, by 
contrast, 'the rules of the system' signifies nothing more than 'the 
arrangements by which international conflicts have traditionally been 
mediated'. In the classical 18th and 19th century phases of the system, 
moreover, the endurance of these rules and practices reflected in turn 
the endurance of the basic structure of military anarchy-cum-hierarchy 
which generated them; and the relatively simple, if momentous problems 
of conflicting 'national interests' to which they were addressed. Today, 
however, the tradition bearing them flows into a much more complex and 
contradictory material grid than it has so far been required to negotiate, 
and the consequent tensions between inherited practices and current
structural logic in turn make an important input into the tensions of the
8 2contemporary great power relationship.
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Although the perspective proposed here is sharply at variance with 
that of American functionalism, it does draw upon several themes 
associated with European 'structuralism', particularly as developed in 
the avowedly Marxist synthesis of Louis Althusser.83 Into this category 
fall the notion of structural as opposed to 'transitive' causation and of 
a structure which is present only in its 'effects'; the emphasis upon the 
'over-determination' of particular historical developments by a multiplicity 
of causal factors originating in different 'levels' of a given social 
structure; and the recognition that the interplay of major social 
contradictions at crucial historical junctures may produce not merely 
revolutionary change but also the long-term 'blocking' of such change.
As against this, however, I will be rejecting Althusser's radical demotion 
of human agents to the position of mere 'bearers' or 'supports' of the 
social structure. In this thesis, 'contradiction' - like 'structure' 
itself - refers to the logical properties of situations and relationships, 
and references to it presuppose bridgehead assumptions about rational 
human action, whether the referent be as narrow as the conduct of the Soviet 
leadership during the Cuban missile crisis or as wide as the centuries-long 
'generation' of the traditions of the Russian patrimonial state.
Finally, then, the core claim for the superiority of a structuralist 
perspective in social theory is that it allows one to combine generalizing 
argument with a focus upon the choices before temporally and spatially 
situated agents in a way which is constitutionally impossible for a 
functionalist/systems approach. The former approach itself involves 
synchronic assumptions in the sense that it invites a 'contingent but given' 
verdict on the complex of traditional 'rules' and situational 'logics' 
extant at any given 'point of time'. But these synchronic assumptions, 
which must be all-pervasive in discussions of a functioning social system, 
here involve merely a temporary methodological bracketing of the 'shifts' 
in material structures and 'flows' of practices which inform the structuralist 
image of the longer term.* Similarly, although there are obvious affinities
* Some inconsistency in metaphors will be apparent in the handling of 
these issues over the last few pages, but the problem is mainly one of time- 
scale. For a given 'point of time', it may be useful to think of a single 
structural hierarchy, ranging from the most basic material 'skeleton' to 
the most complex 'networks' of constitutive meaning. The middle term, or 
'conjunctural' dimension, may be represented by a 'lava-flow' model, 
suggestive both of a hierarchy of 'levels' and of differing tempos of 
development among them. As regards the long-term, one might say that 
structures shift, as with movements of the earth's crust, and practices 
flow, picking their way like rivers along the contours established at 
the structural level, but intermittently running out into the sand.
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between the concept of a multi-layered social structure and that of 
'levels of analysis' in American international theory, the former can 
accommodate not merely the concept of multiple contradictions but also, 
through the practice of colligation, that of differential tempos of 
development among the various layers. With 'middle range' theories of a 
functionalist variety, however, no amount of attention to detail can provide 
a more detailed resolution of a temporal course of events3 since such 
theories can only endow the facts with significance by confining them 
within the straitjacket of a timeless present.
Above all, I would argue, a structuralist approach allows one to 
reject the 'levels of analysis' distinction which has most bedevilled the 
American theoretical debate: that between domestic and international 
systems. I have already suggested that there are fundamental substantive 
differences between interstate relations, on the one hand, and relations 
among collectivities within states, on the other. But it is no part of 
the argument that these relationships should be conceptually separated 
on methodological grounds. Rather, it is only by conceptually 'situating' 
the actors of a national polity simultaneously within both contexts 
that one can fully appreciate the contradictory options among which they 
are required to choose. In regard to such actors, only two basic questions 
need be asked. At which point on the domestic and international grid of 
economic and military/police power are they located? To which confluence 
of central organising practices, domestic and international, are they 
exposed? In principle, these two questions should allow one to examine 
both the objective situational logic confronted by such actors and the 
major traditional or ideological pressures upon them to deviate from 
that logic in practice. The extensive claims for rational action and 
material necessity involved in this position will be defended in the 
next section.
The Logic of the Situation
Like the earlier defence of methodological realism, this argument 
for rational and materialist explanation is a limited and indirect one - 
an argument not about how the world is but about how it should be regarded 
in social theory. The starting point is one made by Vico over 250 years
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ago, but obscured in the Anglo-American context by the long ascendency 
of positivistic philosophies of science. If we are to assume that 
the natural world was purposefully made by anyone, we must assume that 
it was made by God; and God, precisely because He is God, cannot be 
expected to submit to intersubjective debate about the mysterious ways 
in which He has chosen to move. This consideration accounts for two 
of the most distinctive characteristics of modern Western science: its 
drive to rid the natural order of purposive but super-national actors 
and to 'people' it instead with tiny purposeless particles and vast 
impersonal forces; and the related insistence that any connections or 
relationships discerned in that order be acknowledged as heuristic 
devices imposed by man, not as part of any inherent logic of nature.
Only in this way can accounts of the natural order be made accessible 
to intersubjective critique. 'Observable behaviour' and 'observable 
effects' are (more or less) accessible to such a critique: divine 
purposes are not.
There can be no denying the practical fruits of this theoretical 
strategy. But it seems fair to attribute the successes of natural 
science not directly to its metaphysic of powers and forces - which is, 
at bottom, a confession of ignorance - but to the real (or de facto veal) 
regularity of the natural world. The position for social theory is 
almost the reverse of this. The social world exhibits fewer significant 
observable regularities than the natural world, and such regularities 
as do obtain have a disturbing tendency to change (with changing human 
consciousness) over time. Moreover, social theorists cannot avoid the 
issue of intentionality - and that on the evidence of both introspection 
and the senses. For if there is one fundamental, empirically observable 
characteristic of the social world it is the unique capacity of human 
beings for the purposive making and remaking of their social and physical 
environment. Thus the abandonment of statements about meanings and 
intentions for a natural science metaphysic of powers and forces does 
nothing to create a social world of stable and precisely observable 
regularities: but it does gratuitously abandon the most powerful means 
of access to social phenomena, and rule out the possibility of addressing 
the central issues in other than an ad hoc and theoretically inconsistent 
fashion.
These considerations, I believe, indicate a relatively powerful 
role for the principles of 'economy' (or 'parsimony') and rationality as
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criteria of theoretical adequacy in social, as opposed to natural 
science. In the natural sciences, a bland and general concept of 
rationality - the postulate of a world accessible to human reason - 
would seem to be a sine qua-non for the intersubjective validation of 
knowledge claims; and the economy principle may be regarded as little 
more than a refinement of this.85 The basic proposition, so to speak, is 
that God moves with sufficient reason, and with no move than sufficient 
reason - a proposition which leads directly only to fundamentally 
aesthetic criteria such as 'elegance' and in consequence leaves a 
strong practical requirement for standardized and rigorous testing 
procedures.
The social sciences, however, can draw (and can hardly avoid 
drawing) on a second, more specific concept of rational human action 
in accounting for the phenomena which concern them. And in this context, 
a much stronger claim may be made for the principle of economy. 'Rational 
action C or action which is perspicuous as a response to the most obvious 
"logic of the situation"! is its own explanation'.86 If a given action 
was obviously the most rational (or realistic) response to the given 
situation, the one response which any rational actor ought logically to 
have made in that situation, there is no need to appeal to psychological 
or traditional/ideological factors to explain it. For each of these 
approaches is less economical than the identification of the action in 
question as the logically obvious response to the objective situation; 
and the further complications which they entail are justified only 
insofar as the problem moves away from this admittedly rare paradigm case, 
requiring explanation of an actor's choice of one particular option 
within a range of more or less rational options, or .else for the choice 
of an objectively irrational option - one which no rational actor ought 
logically to have chosen.
It is important here to emphasize two aspects of scope in the 
subject-matter of the thesis which, I would argue, reinforce the practical 
case for close adherence to the methodological criteria sketched above. 
First, the primary concern here will be with large-scale instances of 
substantially strategic conduct: great power relations, and the internal 
dynamics of 'transitional' states. There will be no consideration of 
enclosed and stable 'forms of life', or even of complex but slowly changing 
old regimes (contexts appropriate to a primary focus on rules, practices
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and institutions); and the problems of the advanced industrial societies 
(which would seem to lie rather closer to the middle of the institutional 
analysis/strategic analysis spectrum) will appear only tangentially in 
regard to the domestic imperatives of the great powers.87
There should be little difficulty with the claim that the great 
power relationship itself is primarily a strategic one: but the use of 
this term for the relations of contending groups and classes in 
transitional states may be far more contentious, and the latter claim 
may be clarified by casting it in a form structurally similar to the 
former. Great power relations might be formally defined as the competition 
of coexistent forms of life (or of congeries of forms of life held within 
over-riding political and cultural frameworks) in a condition of 
relatively stable, anarchical inter-action over time. Analogously, a 
transitional situation might be defined as one in which: (1) forms of
life (or congeries thereof) succeed one another in rapid and traumatic 
fashion; (2) the formerly dominant political and cultural framework (or 
old regime) has been effectively undermined, and coercive action will 
help to determine which of several competing frameworks is established 
in the future (or whether any over-riding framework can be sustained at 
all); and (3) the hold on state power of the present incumbents is 
sufficiently tenuous to allow a substantial chance for rival groups to 
seize the state apparatus and lay down their preferred alternative. This 
is obviously a much weaker concept of a strategic situation than that 
applicable to the great power relationship, and it raises major theoretical 
problems which will be progressively addressed in this and the following 
sections. However, these problems will be held aside initially, and the 
evaluation of strategic conduct considered with great power relations as 
the paradigm case.
Second, though reference may be made for illustrative purposes to 
specific actions by identifiable individuals, the real concern here is 
with a generalizing theoretical framework for the prediction and evaluation 
of classes of actions or practices relevant to the problems of great 
power relations and transitional development, and the interaction between 
these two spheres. I have therefore rejected the notion of instrumental 
rationality (implied, for instance, in Popper's handing of the logic of 
the situation concept)88 in favour of the more controversial problem of 
judging whether actions are rational or irrational in themselves.
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Insofar as judgements about instrumental rationality presuppose knowledge 
of identifiable ends being pursued by identifiable agents, the notion 
constitutes a prescription for case-by-case empiricism only; and even 
case-by-case judgements about instrumental rationality are virtually 
impossible for such questions as the role of wars on a 20th century 
scale of destructiveness (conventional as well as nuclear) as 
instruments of national policy, or the rationale for the sacrifice of 
generations implicit in any form of comprehensive 'modernization' for 
most contemporary Third World nations.
In attempting to address these questions, therefore, I have linked 
the notion of situational logic to one which transcends the specific 
intentions presumed to underlie specific actions: namely, the notion of 
the actor's veal interests, 89 Moreover, to provide a convenient 
shorthand reference for the movement from identifiable individuals to 
typical actors required by a generalizing theory of this kind, I have 
formalized the comparison between General Strategic Man and Russian 
Strategic Man which, it was argued in Chapter 1, is already implicit in 
much of the contemporary American debate over Soviet intentions. The 
first distinguishing characteristic of General Strategic Man is self- 
evident. By definition, he always acts rationally, in accordance with 
the logic of the situation. However, if to act rationally on a continuing 
basis is to act in accordance with one's own real interests, it also 
follows that General Strategic Man must have real interests of his own to 
defend and promote; and these, I would argue, can derive only from his 
location in a particular social structure and his attachment to a 
particular form of life. General Strategic Man thus emerges as Russian 
(or American, or other) Strategic Man without his counterpart's distorting 
'perceptions' - a formulation which, while not really precise, captures 
the essence of the argument. General Strategic Man does have perceptions 
(since without preconceptions of some kind he could not structure the 
field and identify the logic of the situation); but his perceptions are 
by definition covvect3 and provide the yardstick against which the 
influence of specific ideologically and culturally formed perceptions are 
to be measured. Whereas Russian Strategic Man acts to defend and promote 
a specific (Russian) form of life, sometimes rationally and sometimes 
irrationally under the influence of his specifically Russian perceptions, 
General Strategic Man acts, rationally by definition, to defend and promote
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an unspecified form of life; and to act thus, in concert with those of 
similar interests and against those with opposing interests, is to 
exemplify 'general rationality' as this concept is used, formally or 
informally, in this thesis.
The mode of analysis suggested here will be set out more schematically 
later in the section, together with some simple observations on its 
relevance to the analysis of major international and domestic crises.
However, rationality assumptions of this kind have become highly 
controversial, and it may be useful first to consider the basic objections 
which might be offered from a contemporary pluralist standpoint. The 
issues in question might be summarized under four broad headings: 
collectivism, reductionism, materialism and determinism.
To begin with, it might be argued that collectivist assumptions are 
built into the above definition of general rationality; and insofar as 
that definition assumes an orientation towards some collective social 
form or forms, the charge is correct. In fact, I would argue, the 
definition encapsulates the minimum assumptions required for a pluralist 
theory of either domestic or international politics; but it involves 
reasoning processes decidedly at variance with those ostensibly employed 
by most pluralist theorists, at least as regards the former sphere. The 
question at issue may be dramatized by counterposing Marx's justification 
for predicting the historical behaviour of collective actors such as 'the 
proletariat' - on the grounds that 'private interest is itself already 
a socially defined interest which can be achieved only within the 
conditions laid down by society and within the means provided by society'
- with Popper's methodological individualist insistence 'that the "behaviour" 
and "actions" of collectives, such as states or social groups, must be
q nreduced to the behaviour and actions of human individuals'.
The argument advanced here grants the substance of Marx's case, by 
accepting that there could be no generalized discussion of individual 
needs and interests without the assumption that objective interests may 
be deduced in some fashion from an individual's location in an objective 
social structure and network of constitutive meanings. Such an approach
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seems necessary to make sense of substantive judgements of the kind 
commonly encountered in pluralist political analysis: that a given set 
of political leaders, through the 'appeasement' of an expansionist 
adversary, were 'betraying' the (objective) national interest; that the 
Soviet population had an objective interest in the maintenance of a 
stable second strike deterrent on the American side, though the bulk 
of them probably had no notion of the concept and would reject it if 
they had; that unrepresented interests existed on a massive scale in the 
Soviet social system, though the level of overt dissent there was in 
fact much less than in its more 'open' and 'responsive' American 
counterpart. Moreover, one might conceivably interpret the methodological 
individualist position in this way, since its modern defenders have 
usually rejected psychological reductionism (a point on which Popper 
has expressed strong agreement with Marx) and accepted that generalizing 
arguments can deal only with anonymous and typified individuals.91 But 
this in turn would reduce the whole anti-collectivist campaign to a 
'sham battle', turning on a terminological quibble to the effect that 
Marx could predict the revolution against capitalism of a multitude 
of proletarians but not that of a single collective actor called the 
proletariat. 92
The alternative course is to interpret the methodological 
individualist position as a commitment to a subjective notion of interests, 
identified with individual wants or desires which are by definition 
unstructured by collective influences (as a substantive commitment, in 
effect, to the individualist 'model of man', which Marx rejected, 
employed by the classical political economists). Given such a model,
Marx's analysis would have been invalid even if his expectations regarding 
the material development of capitalism had been wholly realized. For a 
proletariat composed of maximizing (or even satisficing) individualists 
would not revolt against an entrenched power structure, however oppressive: 
each member would consult his own individual logic of the situation and 
conclude that likely costs outweighed likely benefits. Nor would the 
enormous sacrifices involved in forced-draught industrialization on the 
scale of the first Soviet Five Year Plan be called forth, even in part, 
by moral exhortation about collective tasks and the general good: only 
massive and unremitting coercion would fill the bill. But equally armies, 
for the most part, would not fight; and, as recent attempts to develop
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a 'rational choice' theory of democracy have indicated, the bulk of
Q  Ocitizens would not vote except under compulsion.
Behind these implausible (not to say falsified) negative 
implications of the pure individualist model looms the positive 
'Hobbesian problem of order*:that a society of truly self-interested 
individuals (or even of truly self-interested groups of approximately 
equal size and strength) would tear itself apart unless their competition 
were radically restricted by the overwhelming power of a Leviathan state.
This problem is logically prior to any conclusions about the results of 
the free play of individual interests within a narrowly defined 'economic' 
realm in a established society; and there are, moreover, only two real 
alternatives to the Hobbesian solution, both of which return to 'collectivist' 
assumptions. Either order is indeed maintained by a powerful, coercive 
state, but one which is the instrument of a politically unified dominant 
class with a common interest in protecting the conditions for 'free' 
economic competition; or there is a fundamental consensus throughout the 
society both on the legitimacy of unrestricted self-interest in peaceful 
economic activities and on the necessity to restrict such competition 
to that sphere.
The normality of such a consensus, as William Connolly observes, is 
one of the most important assumptions in the pluralist account of 
contemporary American politics, and one of the least examined. Codified 
in the earlier-mentioned division of labour between utility-maximizing 
Economic Man and norm-internalizing Sociological Man, this assumption 
has presumably helped to obscure the significant contribution of simple 
inequalities in power to the maintenance of order in the advanced capitalist 
societies. But more important in this context is the curious echo of 
this assumption in 'second wave' deterrence theory - whose (American) 
Strategic Man operates, on the one hand, with a flexible cost/benefits 
calculus which is remarkably free of any 'come-what may' attachment to 
fundamental, culturally specific collective values, and on the other, 
within an impressive network of constitutive meanings, apparently shared 
with the adversary, about the legitimacy of a bargaining process in 
which even 'demonstration strikes' need not necessarily lead to general 
nuclear war. In conclusion, I would reiterate that general theoretical 
statements about interests presuppose some degree of collectivist 
orientation in the actors in question; and that theories built upon
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individualist models of man, so far from cutting back to the bedrock 
of human behaviour, actually incorporate high-level assumptions about the 
normality of a very specific social order.
As regards reductionismit is important to distinguish two kinds
of assumption in social theory which might be classified as reductionist.
The first, which I wish to reject, is the notion that certain imperatives
- normally economic or psychological - constitute the 'real' wellsprings
of human behaviour, and that explanations which fail to come to grips
with these imperatives are inherently inadequate. I will be attempting
below to defend a variant of materialist (though not merely economic)
reductionism purely on grounds of parsimony; but the question of
psychological reductionism should perhaps be addressed directly at this
point. The proposed mode of analysis provides for judgements about
culturally and ideologically determined 'false consciousness', but excludes
on practical grounds judgements about psychologically determined false
consciousness. The approach thus contrasts with the intermittent appeal
to psychological concepts such as 'paranoia' (not to say 'schizophrenia')
in some American discussions of Soviet strategic attitudes; and, more
significantly, with the tendency for Realist perspectives on international
relations to be associated with a strong pessimism about human nature
and to take the phenomenon of endemic conflict in international affairs
as a kind of paradigm for the human condition in general. On the face
of it, this Realist position might be taken as an argument from Orignal
Sin, and one which, while explaining nothing of international affairs
which could not adequately be accounted for by reference to their anarchical
structure, can function as a 'joker in the pack' for trumping Marxist and
9 5other doctrines of progress in regard to social life in general.
However, if it were possible to provide persuasive psychological arguments 
that aggression and lust for power were innate human characteristics, 
this aspect of the Realist metaphysic might be less easily dismissed.
In addressing this question, a further distinction should be made 
between a physiological psychology and all those approaches which may be 
broadly grouped together as psychoanalytic. The latter have nothing, 
except of the most plainly metaphysical kind, to say about the human 
condition in general; and they cannot be regarded as being in any sense 
closer to the natural sciences in either their objects or their methods
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than the other social sciences. Insofar as schizophrenia in individuals, 
for instance, can be brought within the scope of a generalizing 
psychological theory, it must be by treating it as an 'authentic frame 
of meaning' to be rendered intelligible by the hermeneutic and 
structuralist techniques of the qualified specialist. Thus the 
enterprise is no different in character from the study of the tensions 
and contradictions (or in ironic terms 'schizophrenia') of Russian 
Strategic Man: the difference is that the first enterprise must deal 
with the detailed case histories of individuals, the second with the 
centuries-long history of whole peoples and elites, and that the first 
can therefore have no place in a generalizing theory of large-scale 
strategic conduct. It makes sense, difficult though it is, to discuss 
the coherence and appropriateness to context of the apparent world-view 
of the Soviet elite: but to discuss the individual psychological 
makeup of that elite would be to surrender any pretence to serious analysis.
Quite different issues are raised by the question of a demonstration 
of the innateness of human aggression in terms of a physiological 
psychology. This would, involve general statements about mankind, or 
about large segments of mankind, and on the basis of theories which 
claimed to have genuinely bridged the gap between the study of intentional 
behaviour and the study of physical phenomena. But this would entail, 
at minimum, the demonstration of links between physiological 'events' 
with a determinate time span and a determinate physical location in 
the brain, and hermeneutically perceived 'states of mind' such as 
aggression.97 It is almost impossible to conceive of this being 
demonstrated persuasively, and certain that this goal has not been remotely 
approached as yet. It still seems reasonable, therefore, to regard all 
Realist injunctions to the political theorist to gaze fearlessly into 
the dark recesses of the human heart as appeals to Original Sin, and 
to reject them as inaccessible to intersubjective critique.
However, if the argument here is not reductionist in the foregoing 
sense, it does imply an attempt to reduce the densely textured 
interdependence of social life to much simpler sets of relationships, or 
structures. Indeed, I would argue, following Gellner, that all genuine 
explanation must be reductionist in this sense.98 Nothing can be 
explained in terms of itself, and nothing can be explained in terms of 
everything else. Arguments which insist on either the uniqueness of
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everything or the interdependence of everything amount effectively to the 
same thing - a restatement of the basic problem which theoretical analysis 
is supposed to address. There remains, admittedly, the crucial problem 
of where a potentially infinite regress should be halted in any given 
case. But this must be a matter for practical judgement, based on the 
nature of the thing-to-be-explained and the nature of the evidence which 
can be brought to bear on it; and I will be assuming, on grounds already 
indicated, that the appropriate focus for the issues considered in this 
thesis is upon large-scale aspects of social structure, both 'material' and 
'moral' (with even the proposed 'models of man' involving generalizations 
about social structure at one remove).
Even this form of reductionism, however, has attracted strong 
criticism from pluralist theorists. For instance, Maurice Keens-Soper, 
in an explicitly Oakeshottian treatment of the 'practice' of the classical 
European states-system, has attacked the whole activity of 'model-building' 
in international theory for 'contriving an unnecessary divorce between 
theory and practice, and so licensing an inconclusive and wanton dilemma 
about "isomorphism"'. Keens-Soper's identification of theory solely 
with the exploration 'of the thought already embodied and at work in 
practice', certainly provides a useful corrective to the kind of 
behaviouralist model-building which abstracts the 'entity' being theorized 
from any recognisable historical and moral context. But his argument in 
turn glosses over the importance of another kind of contextual issue - 
that of the distinction between primarily institutional and primarily 
strategic situations - in evaluating accounts of actions and practices 
solely in terms of their relevant constitutive meanings.
For instance, there is a great practical difference between 'accounting 
for' a particular aspect of religious ritual in a relatively enclosed 
form of life by the assertion that 'the Azande typically behave in that 
fashion in situations of that kind', and accounting for recent Soviet 
military activities in Africa and West Asia with the assertion that 
'Russians typically behave in that fashion in situations of that kind' . 100 
In the first case, one can claim to be bringing a specific practice into 
a coherent relationship with an encompassing form of life already 
extensively described by oneself or others. The second involves confronting 
an extremely selective distillation of Russian/Soviet perceptual and 
behavioural characteristics with a strategic situation only lightly
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mediated by the over-arching practices of the modern states-system - and 
a situation which (as will be argued at length in Chapters 3 and 4) is in 
many respects unprecedented in modern international history. Therefore, 
if evidence about the traditional practices of the European great powers 
in general and of Russia in particular is to be brought to bear on this 
situation, it must be by arguments which assert a substantial degree of 
structural continuity despite the obvious elements of change, and it is 
only in terms of massively simplifying models that the comparisons demanded 
by such arguments can be organized.
Implicit in this commitment to explanatory models as such, I would 
argue, is a further commitment to assertions about fundamental/derivative 
relationships among what John Plamenatz has called 'the larger sides of 
social life'. Plamenatz' own opposition to this approach is partly 
grounded in the general pluralist argument from the interdependence 
to the practical uniqueness of everything. But he also mounts an important 
argument specifically against the kind of materialist reduction advocated 
by Marx; and since I wish to preserve an attenuated claim for the 
methodological priority of a 'material infrastructure' over an 'ideal 
superstructure', its basic thrust should be considered here. Because 
all social relationships are to some extent clothed in constitutive 
meanings, Plamenatz asserts, it is possible to turn Marx's argument 
effectively on its head, through the recognition of one very special 
fundamental/derivative distinction in social analysis. In his view, 
it cccn validly be maintained that 'co-operative forms of production 
and exchange', on the one hand, and custom and morality, on the other, are 
pre-requisites of the kind of complex social order which produces classes 
and formal legal systems alike.
But basic or fundamental, in this sense, means 
only primary or universal. Morality and custom are, 
for example, fundamental in relation to law because 
they must exist before there can be law, and because 
they are common to all societies while law is not; 
they are not fundamental in the sense that, where 
there is law, they determine its character while it 
does not determine theirs. l o 1
With this argument, Plamenatz evidently intends to relegate the 
fundamental/derivative distinction to an abstract, vacuous world outside 
history and culture, which is relevant only to formal arguments designed 
to establish that norms as such are essential to social life. And it is
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certainly true that, as regards complex domestic social orders, one can 
derive substantive conclusions from an analysis of primary or universal 
elements of social life only by importing - as did the classical social 
contract theorists - hidden cultural assumptions into one's treatment 
of the State of Nature. But, as Hedley Bull demonstrates, there is
one society in regard to which a rigorous analysis in terms of elementary 
or primary goals can lay bare a good part, though by no means the whole, 
of the substantive story: the anarchical society of sovereign states. 103 
Yet this context is also precisely the one in which it is impossible not 
to recognise the determining impact of grossly material factors upon 
social roles and norms and practices: in the division between great powers 
and the rest; in the divisions between industrially developed powers and 
the rest, in the divisions among great powers upon geopolitical grounds; 
in the great differences in freedom of maneouvre between those small 
powers which fall within great power spheres of influence and those which 
do not, and so on.
The example of the states-system also exemplifies the wider problem 
of the strain towards idealism in pluralism/empiricism in general. It 
is certainly true that a concern with material 'deep structures' can 
degenerate into a claim to a privileged knowledge of mysterious essences 
at work behind the screen of mere experience; and the evolution of 
classical into Soviet Marxism is in many respects a good example of such 
a degeneration. But the practical requirement for large organising 
concepts is equally pressing for any avowedly empiricist analysis which 
strays into such a wide-ranging area as contemporary world politics; 
and where reference to material structures (other than geopolitical) is 
ruled largely out of court, a disproportionate emphasis will fall upon 
those organising features - such as ethnic, racial and religious 
differences - which can readily be observed on the surface, so to speak, 
of world politics. Given the existence in the international arena of 
collectivities so readily visible even to the naked empiricist eye, the 
injunctions of methodological individualism have usually been honoured 
in the breach rather than in the observance. But their residual 
influence has tended to push pluralist explanations of the collective 
loyalities at work in a distinctly psychologistic direction - as with 
Morgenthau's explanation of modern nationalism in terms of the 
'compensatory' projection onto the state of 'individual power drives',
the frustration of which has allegedly been 'magnified enormously' by 
the atomizing processes of contemporary mass society.104 Such arguments, 
by implicitly deciding the fundamental/derivative issue on empiri'cist- 
cum-idealist terms at the outset, beg the prior question of whether 
national and other collective loyalities can be accounted for on more 
economical and available grounds.
It is now necessary to consider directly the question of materialism^ 
and indeed to reconsider the materialist/empiricist dialectic which, at 
the outset of the chapter, received qualified endorsement as the founding 
charter of the social as well as the natural sciences. This in turn 
involves linking the earlier argument for methodological realism to the 
double hermeneutic identified as the distinguishing characteristic of 
social theory, and defending materialism purely as an epistemelogical 
'selector' of theoretical adequacy. Strictly speaking, the dialectic
underpinning social theory is not between grand theoretical structures 
and inescapably theoretical statements about discrete 'facts', but 
between grand theoretical structures and inescapably theoretical 
statements about tiny clusters of constitutive meanings. The materialist/ 
empiricist relationship is thus more properly identified with the 
interplay of structuralist and hermeneutic techniques for ordering and 
interpreting an assumed social reality. But, this much granted, the 
concept of a material foundation to that reality remains integral to the 
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The relevant distinctions are set out in Figure 2.1. It is 
essential to reiterate that the distinction between material structures 
and frames of meaning is not intended as an ontological one; and, 
similarly, that the distinction between strategic and institutional 
analysis implies nothing more than a 'methodological bracketing' of 
one or other of two modes which are both involved in some measure in 
all areas of social inquiry.105 The argument is merely that distinctions 
between primarily strategic and primarily institutional contexts are 
sustainable at the 'macro' level; and a rhetorical key to the use of 
such distinctions in social theory is provided by characteristic metaphors 
of the kind at the bottom of Figure 2.1. As one moves across the spectrum 
from 'skeleton' to 'network', one is moving from primarily structuralist 
to primarily hermeneutic analysis: from an evaluation of particular responses 
to material situation x against a yardstick conception of what any rational 
actor would do in that situation, towards a general understanding of the 
major practices constituting form of life y^^
Thus, as regards the primarily strategic arena of great power relations, 
one might distinguish between 'ideal' and 'material' elements in 
contemporary Western accounts of Soviet conduct in the Afro-Asian region: 
between appeals to cultural/ideological imperatives or the expansionist 
hubris of a 'latecomer' great power, on the one hand, and references to 
geopolitical logic, an altered balance of great power forces, and 'puli' 
factors deriving from structurally induced disorder in key Third World 
states, on the other. Such distinctions are crucial to the evaluation 
of the overall hawk interpretation of Soviet policy, and I would argue 
that materialist arguments have methodological priority, in two different 
but related senses.
First, as already indicated, arguments about what any great power 
would do in a given situation are more economical than arguments which 
assume (or invite one to take on faith) a particular understanding of a 
highly complex cultural and ideological formation, and require the 
mediation of the 'perceptions' derived therefrom against the objective 
logic of the situation. Of course, it may well be that an adequate 
account of much Soviet behaviour can only be had on these latter terms.
But this raises in turn the second point: that the required knowledge 
of the alternate cultural formation must be based, via 'bridgehead'
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assumptions about rationality, on materialist reasoning at a further 
remove.
The relevance of this second point is clearest where the materialist 
bridgehead is sharply separated in time from the context of the cultural/ 
ideological determinism which it is called upon to support, as with the 
explanation of contemporary Soviet expansionism offered by Pipes. There 
are really only two alternatives to the kind of materialist reduction 
involved in Pipes' attempt to ground the Russian patrimonial tradition 
in the early history of the Muscovite state. On the one hand, one might 
confine the argument solely to the *superstructural' level by refusing 
to admit that any period or context made a greater contribution to the 
formation of the 'seamless web' of Russian political culture than any 
other. Such an appeal to a 'tradition of pure usage' (exemplified most 
clearly by Oakeshott, and in part by Pipes himself in his treatment of 
the Soviet3 as opposed to the Tsarist era) effectively translates the 
functionalist stress upon the interdependence of everything into a 
diachronic idiom; and it may be rejected, like any other species of 
radical functionalism, on the grounds that it provides not an explanation 
but a restatement of the problem.107 On the other, one might conceivably 
deny this particular material derivation of the Russian political tradition 
by grounding it primarily in another superstructural influence, such as 
the centuries-long contact with the political practices of the Muscovite's 
Tatar overlords. But this in turn would entail either a materialist 
reduction at some further remove, such as the derivation of Tatar practices 
from the problems of extending a tribal system of rule to the governance 
of a massive empire; or else a reductio ad adsurdwn which brought the 
argument finally to rest with some tribe in Central Asia about which 
nothing empirical was known, but whose political practices could 
allegedly be inferred from the political practices of the contemporary 
Soviet regime. In short, unless the chain of cultural determinism is 
to reach back to eternity, the generation of the practices in question 
must be traced to a material 'initial condition' which is identifiably 
inside the historical process, and not outside as in the State of Nature 
variant proposed by Plamenatz.
The argument, therefore, is very much a methodological one; and 
insofar as it preserves a residual distinction between infrastructure and 
superstructure, as notional extremities of the spectrum of 'levels' in
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any complex social order, the infrastructure is defined by the distribution 
of both economic and directly coercive power. As regards the breach thus 
entailed with the Marxist concept of 'the base', I would simply argue 
that the latter reflects the highly specific political and social order 
of early industrial capitalism (especially in England), and that for 
the issues considered in this thesis it is also essential to highlight 
the material underpinnings of the far more pervasive historical phenomenon 
of 'politics in command'. However, while this 'materialist conception of 
history' is clearly much weaker than the Marxist one, the dilution of the 
claim for economic factors does not render the argument merely trivial.
At least it makes the moral dimensions of social authority methodologically 
subordinate to its basis in coercive power, whereas pluralist theorists, 
insofar as they have treated power as a property of collectivities rather 
than merely of relations between individuals, have tended to reverse these 
methodological priorities. Thus Parsons (in perhaps the most substantial 
such ananalysis, and one followed closely by Johnson in his 'breakdown' 
theory of revolution) employs a monetary analogy for the relationship 
between power, authority and force - suggesting that in a properly value 
co-ordinated society individuals will readily 'invest' their 'confidence' 
in the capacity of the authorities to pursue collective goals, thereby 
rendering resort to coercive measures unnecessary.108
Such an analysis automatically casts revolution as an unnatural 
phenomenon, explicable only in terms of a massive 'power deflation' in 
which legitimate authority loses its value and the authorities are 
increasingly driven to a desperate reliance on the cruder medium of force. 
However, as Giddens points out, Parsons' emphasis on the symbolic role 
of force in 'stable power systems' effectively ignores the crucial 
historical process of 'power inflation', whereby 'confidence' in the 
authorities 'is developed and expanded in societies'.
But in power inflation coercion and force may be the 
foundation of a consensual order in a very different 
way. The history of societies shows again and again 
that particular social forms are often at first 
implemented by force, or by some other form of definite 
coercion, and that coercive measures are used to 
produce and enforce a new legitimacy. It is in this 
sense that power can grow out of the barrel of a gun. 
Force allows that manipulative control which can then 
be used to diminish dependence on coercion. l o 9
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This point is directly applicable to the forcible pursuit of 'a new 
legitimacy' in transitional situations, as well as to the sphere of 
great power relations, where the established balance of 'legitimate' 
interests is routinely subject to 'renegotiation' on the basis of 
shifts in the material balance of forces; and thus the notion of material 
determination - in the first, if not the last instance - is crucial to 
the argument of this thesis.
Finally, there is the issue of determinism. The proposed mode of 
rational analysis might also be called a 'quasi-causal' one, in that it 
rests on a concept of 'practical necessity' as a 'logical or conceptual 
link between an actor's situation, goals and actions';110 and the same 
point applies, on a larger scale, to the concept of the structural 
'generation' of practices, traditions and forms of life. Appeals to 
necessity have commonly been attacked as determinist by pluralist 
thinkers, with Popper, for instance, insisting that 'any unprejudiced 
view of politics' must recognize 'that anything is possible in human 
affairs'.111 However, it is difficult to take this statement seriously, 
at least as a methodological prescription for social theory, since it 
would have precisely the same practical implications as the assumption 
that everything is determined by the (in human terms arbitrary) will of 
an interventionist God. By contrast, the assumption of a world ordered 
by determinate, structural relationships at least provides the basic 
'regulative principle' for an analysis dedicated to establishing the 
most obvious structural factors which sharply reduce the range of human 
choice in practice. 112
Such an approach is not determinist, in the sense of making human 
actors the puppets of impersonal forces or subordinating them to a 
teleology of social systems and processes. It merely asserts that, given 
a deductively bounded situation with identifiable structural properties, 
it should in principle be possible to determine (in the sense of thinking 
through) all the choices which a rational actor might make, up to and 
including - but not beyond - a successful attempt to break out of the 
identified boundaries of the situation. Moreover, the crucial notion
of contradictions in the logic of the situation implies that the great 
majority of cases will present a range of alternative, more or less 
contradictory options all falling within the broad spectrum of rational 
action. But even where one particular course of action is identified as 
the logical one - for instance, the avoidance of nuclear war on relatively
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trivial matters of national honour or 'credibility' - no denial of human 
free-will is necessarily implied. One can maintain that an action or 
practice is objectively irrational without in any sense suggesting that 
it is impossible.
However, insofar as the concept of practical necessity lends itself 
to assertions about 'true' and 'false' consciousness, the argument might 
also invite Isaiah Berlin's complaint about determinist theories which 
effectively collapse their 'is' and 'ought' claims together, purporting 
to identify in the regularities of social life 'not merely something 
given, brute fact, something unchangeable and unquestionable', but also 
'values which are either somehow "embedded" in the facts themselves or 
"determine" them from some "transcendent" height or depth'.114 The 
practical danger noted here is very real: but an element of moral 
intervention in the reality being described is inherent in any social 
theory. It is evident in the positivistic tendency to reify social 
systems in terms of 'balancing mechanisms', 'feedback mechanisms', and 
the like; in the extreme hermeneutic approach which, by assuming 'an 
inherent continuity of practices ... systematically ignores the 
possible structures of conflict within a society, structures which would 
generate change'; 115 and in the effective combination of these two 
kinds of reification, via a circular concept of social role, in Parsonian 
normative functionalism.
The real need, therefore, is not for illusory attempts to escape 
this interventionary dimension of social theory but for a disciplined 
awareness of the problems, especially reification, which it entails.
Such an awareness, paradoxically, is best promoted by a 'realist' 
approach to the notion of interests and the structured opposition of 
interests - without which, indeed, the notion of 'rule-governed' behaviour 
is itself incoherent. If the logic of the situation were always self- 
evident and the same for every a c t o r there would be no need to postulate 
the existence of rules telling the actors 'how to go on'. Norms or
rules may thus be associated with the common need to mediate contradictory 
or opposing interests which different actors have by virtue of their 
location at different places in an overall social structure. Moreover, 
insofar as norms are directly related to the opposition of interests, 
they 'have at every moment to be sustained and reproduced in the flow 
of social encounters'. From the viewpoint of strategic conduct, as
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Giddens points out, the 'normatively co-ordinated legitimate order' of 
institutional analysis 'represents claims3 whose realisation is contingent 
upon the mobilization of obligations through the medium of the responses 
of other actors'. 117
Once again, the example of the states-system rtsceiy illustrates 
the importance of a materialist conception of social structure in making 
assertions about cultural and ideological determination accessible to 
intersubjective critique. It demonstrates with special clarity the 
distinction between the meaningful content of a set of practices and the 
location of that set of practices within a social structure, and the 
parallel distinctions between being structurally located in a particular 
social role, acting in a manner appropriate to that role, and contributing, 
by the performance of a role or roles, to the integrated functioning of an 
ongoing social system. The connections between these different aspects of 
a social role must always be regarded as contingent and problematic; and, 
as G.A.Cohen argues, the key point to remember is that for any analysis 
of social roles in terms of 'rights and duties' there can also be a 
parallel analysis in terms of 'powers and constraints'.118 Thus it is in 
principle perfectly reasonable to say that an actor is conforming to 
the established 'rules' only because it is as yet unaware of its own true 
strength, or that it has at present an accurate awareness of major 
constraints upon its aspirations but will seek a radical revision of its 
situation when it judges that those constraints have largely diminished 
or disappeared. Though such statements are still often regarded with 
suspicion when applied to, say, the struggle of classes within states, 
they have been commonplace in the discussion of relations between states 
for centuries.
It must be stressed that the mere opposition of interests - even on 
a large scale - does not necessarily signify a fundamental structural 
contradiction threatening the entire social order; as the longevity of 
the states-system, based upon the routinized incorporation of organized 
violence within a basic corpus of 'conflict resolution' procedures, once 
again graphically illustrates. It also seems clear that the contradiction
between socialized production and privatized appropriation identified by 
Marxism as the chief internal engine of the breakdown of capitalism has 
been crucially 'overdetermined' by international factors in the history 
of the advanced capitalist societies; while contemporary socialist
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revolutions have been substantially shaped by international pressures 
which, mediated by the indecisive but disruptive reforms of old regime 
'state managers', have thoroughly 'preempted' the unfolding conflict 
of bourgeoisie and proletariat depicted in the classical Marxist scenario.
However, this much granted, it also seems fruitful to emphasize 
the deep contradictions involved in the attempts of ruling elites in 
transitional societies to defend the existing social order simultaneously 
against external pressures and against the threat of domestic revolution. 
Moreover, the states-system in its present phase exhibits a structural 
contradiction commensurate in its enormous implications with the 
structural solidity which has ensured the longevity of the system to 
date: in that central war remains indispensable as the ultimate sanction 
of diplomacy and the balance of power, yet has finally become a manifestly 
irrational instrument of policy in this regard. Since the moderating 
influence of the long-standing opportunities for imperial expansion into 
'peripheral' regions - logically contingent but historically crucial to 
the balance among the core powers - has also recently 'turned into its 
opposite', the contradictions of international and domestic politics are 
coalesced in a manner which makes the reification of equilibrium 'systems' 
in either realm singularly inappropriate.
The notion of rational analysis will now be developed in two stages: 
first, with regard to the actions of great power decision-makers in 
situations of international crisis; and second, with regard to the challenge 
posed to established practices by disruptive outside influences upon 
transitional states. The distinction between actions and practices is a 
somewhat arbitrary one, since, as Giddens emphasizes, social action is 
in general best conceptualized as a 'continuous flow' - from which 
conscious decisions to act (or not to act) constitute a temporal break 
of 'reflexive ... attention' into the ongoing practical consciousness 
underpinning day-to-day activity. 119 However, an emphasis upon 
conscious reflection is peculiarly appropriate to international crisis 
situations, consideration of which may lead in turn to the more complex
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problems involved where the 'rationality' of traditional arrangements 
is called fundamentally into question in the domestic context.
Figure 2.2
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Figure 2.2, then, presents schematically the proposed criteria for 
the evaluation of a major instance of strategic conduct (such as the 
Soviet regime's conduct during the Cuban missile crisis). The central 
proposition is that such conduct may be evaluated by reference to a set 
of factors (primarily material, but also ruling international conventions 
on matters such as spheres of influence) which are objective in the 
sense of having a reality independent of the 'perceptions' of the actors 
in question, and which collectively provide the situational logic with 
which the actors must come to grips. None of these factors, strictly 
speaking, should be regarded as causes of the action in question. Rather, 
they collectively structure and limit the range of options which a rational
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actor, possessed of all the relevant information, would have to regard 
as viable; and where the action does fall within that range, it may be 
regarded as both autonomous and rational.
Where the situational logic is so stark that there is really only 
one viable option - as in the Soviet leadership's decision to back 
down over Cuba in the face of American 'escalation' - there is little 
more to be said. The most economical and satisfactory explanation of 
such a manifestly rational action is that it was the obvious thing to 
do in the circumstances. More commonly (as, for instance, with the 
Soviet leadership's initial decision to introduce the missiles into Cuba) 
the problem will be to account for the emergence of one among a range 
of more or less appropriate or realistic responses to a hierarchy of 
more or less contradictory situational 'logics'. Such accounts appeal 
to what might be called 'special rationality', in that assertions about 
what any rational actor would do are refined by assertions about specific 
traditional/ideological influences on the actor's judgement. (e.g. by 
reference to a traditional Russian penchant for cutting corners in 
'catching-up' situations, to account for the initial, relatively high- 
risk Soviet strategy in the Cuban crisis). Finally, the argument also 
recognizes a third class of actions (such as a putative Soviet decision 
to initiate military conflict rather than back down in the Cuban crisis) 
which are manifestly irrational3 and for which the only really accessible 
explanation is in terms of the weight of specific traditional/ideological 
influences which blotted out the logic of the situation, and the 
distinction between objectively viable and non-viable options, in the
I p nperceptions of the actors concerned.
Of course, the categories are set out in such procrustean terms 
merely to exemplify the underlying structure of the argument; and in 
practice most actions would appear as more or less rational, realistic 
or appropriate - as partially, but only partially, atributable to 
traditional/ideological influences. However, it must be emphasized 
that the application of the term 'special rationality' to such actions 
is not meant to suggest any notion of the 'logic of the situation as the 
actor saw it'. The logic referred to here is in the situation3 whatever 
the actor's perceptions of that might be. Moreover, explanations of such 
actions are structurally similar to those involved in the simpler case 
of manifestly rational action. In addition to objective factors
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(including objective lack of information and the objective 'pressure of 
events'), subjective 'perceptual' factors are now invoked to account for 
the practical closure of various options. But the actor is said to 
have recognized at least part of the range of viable options and to have 
chosen autonomously and rationally within that range. And insofar as 
the wider question of interests is involved, it is the actor'# veal, and 
not merely perceived interests which are said to have been served.
Perhaps the most important claim in all this is that questions 
about the traditional/ideological motivation of essentially strategic 
conduct are different in kind to questions about its objective 
rationality or irrationality, and are also second order questions which 
need be addressed only insofar as inferences about situational logic 
fail to produce an unequivocal answer. In practice, as noted above,
it will normally be necessary to invoke these second order considerations: 
indeed, the problem of establishing a satisfactory picture of other 
actors' perceptions is one of the most enduring in practical diplomacy.
But an equally crucial problem is that of establishing the extent of 
the other's 'legitimate' (i.e. objective) interests; and if the 
preceding argument is valid, these are both hermeneutic enterprises 
which must take their starting point from the identification of a 
bridgehead of 'general rationality' in the other's conduct - most 
obviously in regard to fundamental shared problems such as nuclear 
'crisis management'. For diplomacy as for social theory, therefore, the 
prescription is to work outwards from the bridgehead3 not inwards from 
the furthermost reaches of special rationality (or even manifest 
irrationality) in the conduct of the other. Insofar as the hawk emphasis 
on the extreme ethnocentricity of Soviet policy effectively reverses 
this prescription, it virtually guarantees a hostile verdict on that 
policy, allowing even such a plausible instance of manifest rationality 
as Khrushchev's retreat over Cuba to be reinterpreted as further proof 
of the need for enduring American military preponderance to ensure 
Soviet adherence to the most elementary rules of international prudence.
We may now shift the focus from great power relations to inter-group 
contention in these larger transitional states whose economic and/or 
strategic importance makes them especially vulnerable to 'external' 
pressures from the modern states-system/world-economy. As suggested 
earlier, this is a shift from an unusually stable to a highly unstable 
pattern of strategic interaction: from a context in which individual
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crises occur against a backdrop of relatively stable 'core' interests 
among a relatively stable great power 'polity', and in which the status 
quo ante is a meaningful if always contentious point of reference, to a 
context which is defined precisely by the irretrievable dissolution of 
the status quo ante , and in which not merely the balance of core interests 
but the composition of the polity and the very cohesion of major 
collectivities are brought fundamentally into question. In the first 
context, the extreme improbability of any one actor definitively resolving 
the clash of core interests on its own terms is a powerful incentive towards 
long-term moderation: in the latter the strong prospect that a clash of 
core interests will be so resolved (by one's opponents if not by oneself) 
is a powerful incentive towards the all-out pursuit of the most obvious 
prerequisite for success in this struggle - namely, control of the state.
This basic strategic logic would have no obvious revolutionary 
implications if those who already controlled the state (namely the 
'dominant class' or the core members of the polity) could unite around 
a 'modernizing' strategy calculated to provide the economic, organizational 
and military resources necessary to meet the external challenge without 
fundamentally altering the established property and power relations within 
the society itself. However, measures adequate to the first criterion 
are almost certain to violate the second over the longer term, confronting 
the dominant class with an historically-unfolding contradiction in their 
real interests, such that a 'rational' case may be made both for major 
reforms to avert greater dangers and for holding the line at all costs.
Thus even the most impressive examples of 'revolution from above' have 
been pushed through by determined 'state managers' against the resistance 
of substantial sections of the dominant class, and where either the 
strength of this internal resistance or the intensity of the external 
pressures is particularly great, the intra-polity conflict may open the
way to full-scale 'multiple sovereignty' and to possible 'revolution 
12 2from below'.
The basic structure of such a revolutionary situation is suggested 
by Figure 2.3 (which follows Charles Tilly's 'polity model' of domestic 
contention, with modifications to highlight the importance of external 
pressures and the potential autonomy of semi-professional 'state managers' 
in regard to the dominant class as a whole).123 The model indicates the 
possibility of at least a three-fold split within a transitional polity:
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between the state managers, who are most directly exposed to international 
pressures and most favourably placed to initiate major political and 
economic reforms; those core groups of the dominant class not directly 
linked to the state as such, who are most likely to have the will and 
the capability to resist such efforts at reform; and the dissident elites 
(such as the pre-revolutionary Russian intelligentsia), whose vision of 
more fundamental change and marginal status in the polity makes them most 
likely to widen the intra-polity conflict by forming coalitions with mass
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actors in the society at large. The combination of such a split with 
the social dislocation produced at the mass level by forced-draught 
economic and political 'modernization' may thus satisfy Lenin's 'absolute 
law' that revolution can occur only when a social order is disrupted 
both from below and from above - 'only when the "tower ctasses" do not 
want the old way and when the "upper classes" cannot carry on in the 
old way '.124
The importance of this crude schema (whose relevance to the more 
diffuse class structure of the contemporary Third World will be considered 
at length in Chapter 3) is that it allows one to relate specific 
revolutionary conjunctures to the over-arching structures of the 'global 
transition' without invoking any concept of an unfolding 'world 
revolutionary process', and without attributing to any of the crucial 
group actors (with the exception of the dissident elites) any motivation 
other than the desire to defend already established interests and positions 
within the constraints of a structural transformation largely beyond 
their control. As regards the contemporary Third World, however, this 
picture of an 'unmediated' structural logic substantially understates 
the pressures for far-reaching change, since traditional legitimating 
ideologies are now challenged by at least three types of doctrinal 
rationalization of different historical features of the modern transition: 
Marxist-Leninist theories of revolution; pluralist (and especially American) 
'development' theory; and the 'state-centric paradigm' of modern 
international society. The implications of this multiple theoretical 
intervention in the 'normal' course of Third World development, and the 
inadequacy of those pluralist arguments which see in Marxism a special 
source of ideological distortion in contemporary world politics in general, 
will be considered in the next section.
Tradition, Theory and Practice
Two basic issues are addressed in this section. The first, and most 
general, is the inescapable tension between formal theoretical analysis 
and traditional legitimating concepts implied in the above account of 
the structural 'generation' of practices. Although this emphasis upon 
the innate 'logic' of social structures entails no presumption of strict
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necessity, the argument has relied on other terms such as rational, 
realistic and appropriate which have inescapable normative overtones.
If it is fair to say that what is rational, realistic or appropriate 
changes with changes in historical context, then this consideration 
applies not merely to the explanation of actions and practices but to 
the judgement of them as well.
Of course, the issue is never simply one of a direct confrontation 
between 'irrational' inherited practices and 'rational', 'demystifying' 
analyses of prevailing structural logic. Every theoretical paradigm 
involves a massive, and disputable, simplification of reality; and every 
theoretical paradigm, whatever its pretensions to 'value-freedom', is also 
in some measure a moral paradigm3 which either endorses aspects of an 
existing social order or prescribes alternatives to them.125 As Oakeshott 
observes, the notion of a purely 'empirical' style of politics, unmediated 
by any such moral paradigm, is 'merely impossible, the product of a 
misunderstanding'; and even in primarily strategic contexts there is 
a lot to be said for Wight's claim about the long run superiority of 'the 
idea of a common moral obligation' over 'the idea of a common material 
interest' in keeping open 'the crack ... through which civilization can 
creep'. However, the practical effectiveness of such moral claims
is likely to be greatest in contexts - such as the traditional states- 
system - where they conform most closely to the logic of a relatively 
stable social structure, and least in highly unstable contexts - such 
as domestic revolution - where corresponding prudential constraints 
on the all-out pursuit of strategic advantage are lacking.
The second, more specific, issue is whether analyses of contemporary 
great power coexistence can be situated against an international 'framework 
for choice' at all commensurate with the framework normally acknowledged 
in the sovereign state - the concept of which, Michael Donelan argues, 
has loomed in traditional political theory (domestic and international) 
as a kind of epistemological equivalent of the Hobbesian Leviathan, 
'bristling with ideas against the outsiders' as the former bristles with 
guns, 'porcupine, powerful and good'. There are really only two
consistent positions on this question, which may be described - using 
Wight's terminology for the competing 'paradigms' or 'traditions' in 
Western international theory - as (pure) Revolutionism and (pure) Realism. 
For the former, 'separate states are but an arrangement of [the] primordial
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moral community of mankind', and a temporary and unsatisfactory arrangement 
which must be replaced - by violence if necessary - with a political, 
economic and cultural framework truly expressive of the immanent reality 
of 'world society'. For the latter, the only genuine community 'given 
to us by history' is the separate state - with 'international relations 
... a mere space between states, a desert of crude power, mitigated at 
best by a network of pragmatical customs and by pragmatical, unstable
1 2 9co-operation'.
Both Realist and Revolutionist approaches are readily identifiable 
in the history of the modern states-system: the former as one enduring 
strand in the attitude of all great powers; the latter as an intermittent 
but occasionally dominant theme, and one modestly exemplified in the 'world 
order' preoccupations of both the Soviet Union and the United States in 
the contemporary era. However, the greatest importance, on Wight's account, 
attaches to the Rationalist via media between these two extremes: the 
central constitutive tradition of international society which recognizes 
that society, with all its imperfections, as a major social achievement 
to be safeguarded against excesses of national egoism, on the one hand, 
and of solidarist aspirations for the transcendence of its anarchical 
limitations, on the other. I have no wish to deny the centrality of
this Rationalist tradition to the European states-system, nor even its 
continuing relevance today. But I would argue that it represents not a 
genuine via media but a necessarily incoherent compromise between opposing 
elements: a muted veai'potitik in respect of the basic logic of 
international relations, coupled with an appeal to extraneous moral 
sanctions grounded in the common elite culture of a Europe of multiple 
great powers (a phenomenon which itself originally constituted a revolutionary 
breach with the political and cultural universe of mediaeval Christendom).
This uncertain and fluctuating compromise (which is also characteristic 
of most soi-disant Realism in the Anglo-American context) has thus much 
greater affinities than commonly acknowledged with the 'schizophrenic'
Soviet oscillation between the future goal of world socialism and the 
present reality of coexistence with capitalism - once the far-reaching
structural and cultural crisis engendered by the recent global extension 
of states-system and world-economy is taken into account.
The relevance of these two issues to the current American debate 
about Soviet doctrine and intentions needs no emphasizing. But it also
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seems fair to say that both have been inadequately addressed in the 
mainstream of American international and 'development' theory. As 
regards the 'normative/empirical' relationship, the continuing influence 
in American international theory of the positivistic drive to separate 
these elements has most recently been demonstrated in the work of Waltz, 
who mounts a telling critique of the incoherence and theoretical 
imprecision of the whole behavioural movement, but nonetheless attempts 
to sustain a clear distinction between his own concern for a genuinely 
scientific theory dedicated to the 'prediction' and 'control' of 'system- 
level' developments in international politics, and the approach of 
'traditional political theory, which is more concerned with philosophical
1 o Iinterpretation than with theoretical explanation'.
Moreover this aspiration towards a 'policy science' based upon the 
reification of social systems is even more pervasive in the pluralist 
theory of domestic social change, where the fundamental historical 
continuities represented by the states-system are conspicuously absent, 
and a Popperian rhetoric of piecemeal social engineering is belied by 
a theoretical dependence on the overtly holistic and covertly historicist 
perspective of functionalim. Thus Robert Merton classifies the pursuit of 
social change without regard to latent functions as 'social ritual rather 
than ... social engineering'; while Johnson portrays revolution as an 
unnecessary and 'morbid' rejection of the inherent commitment in social 
organization to the restriction of violence, 'both purposefully in terms 
of the conscious policies pursued by a society's members and functionally 
in terms of one of the unintended consequences of the value-coordinated
T O Odivision of labour'. Without the positivistic evasion of the inherent
tension between 'facts' and 'values', neither of these claims is at all 
persuasive. The first is merely an assertion about the obvious fact of 
functional interdependence, linked to a covert value premise in favour 
of non-intervention; and it may be directly countered by Lenin's injunction, 
in response to the analysis of functional interdependence which he found 
in Hegel, to 'get hold of the "basic link" and you will be able to move 
the whole chain'.133 The second rests on little more than the definitional 
truth that self-equilibrating systems ought to be self-equilibrating. 
Moreover it bears a striking resemblance to the proto-functionalist 
argument which led Burke to imply that the French Revolution, but for an 
inexplicably successful conspiracy of intellectuals, need never have
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happened - though Burke's frankly religious teleology is transmuted 
into an abstract teleology of social systems, and the retreat to synchronic 
analysis replaces his confident depiction of a great self-regenerating 
social organism, 'a permanent body of transitory parts ... at one time 
never old, or middle aged or young, but in a condition of unchangeable 
constancy, mov[ing ] on through the varied tenor of perpetual decay, fall, 
renovation and progression'.134
In turn, this positivistic tendency towards reification and the 
evasion of value questions directly prejudices the treatment of the 
state/states-system relationship in much American analysis. The most 
obvious problem here is that of the 'billiard ball' model of the state, 
which - as Navari points out - can disguise the fact that both the modern 
sovereign state and the international 'state of nature' were to some 
extent historically 'instituted'» The billiard ball model does indeed 
provide a crude hold on the reality of international relations, but it 
does so partly because of an intra-system convention 'that the state is 
for certain purposes a billiard ball' - with the system being both emptied 
of extraneous non-state interactions and filled with conventions supporting 
the identification of 'state' and 'nation' as international actors.
Insofar as the simpler variants of Realism have passed over the historical 
specificity of those conventions and the historical specificity of the 
social structures which lie behind them, they have tended to derive
allegedly essential rules of coexistence, in circular fashion, from the
13 5original 'compact which began the great state of nature'.
Of course the inadequacies of the billiard ball model have been 
strongly attacked by behavioural theorists and, with less theoretical 
rigour, by the recent interdependence school. However, the solution has 
been either to treat the state as merely one international actor among 
many, or to relegate it to the status of a 'levels of analysis' problem, 
thus surrendering the relative clarity of the Realist picture without 
moving any closer to an historically adequate theory of the state. As 
will be argued at length in Chapter 3, the modern states-system is 
incomprehensible except by reference to the modern state as the central 
political nexus between the individual's sense of 'general obligation'
(to the community of mankind) and 'involuntary special obligation' (to 
relatives, neighbours and fellow citizens).136 Only by highlighting 
the historically specific and problematic character of this nexus - and 
not by ignoring it on methodological grounds - can the contemporary
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position of the state be brought into true perspective.
In the following discussion, therefore, the logic of the pluralist 
position will be explored not in its characteristic American idiom but 
through a language which both acknowledges the innately historical and 
moral character of the theory/practice relationship and permits a 
simultaneous focus on the substantive problems of international and 
domestic politics: the language of international and domestic traditions, 
expounded most notably by Wight and Oakeshott respectively. At once, 
however, a fascinating and revealing contrast appears in the meaning 
attached by each thinker to the key term 'Rationalist'. For Wight, as 
already noted, Rationalism is the central constitutive tradition of modern 
international society - a subtle, fluid and ill-defined body of wisdom 
reflecting centuries of practical and undogmatic search for the middle way 
between the extremes of Realism and Revolutionism. For Oakeshott, by
contrast, Rationalism is precisely that dogmatic elevation of technical 
over traditional or practical knowledge which has allegedly flowed from 
the 'incursion' of inexperienced elites and classes into European and 
world politics since the 16th century onward; and it is precisely the 
Rationalist's inexperience in the political milled - akin to that of 
'a foreigner or a man out of his social class', with less true understanding 
than 'a butler or an observant housemaid' - which dominates his approach 
to politics, generating a fetishism of, and fanaticism about technique 
which reaches its most dangerous proportions in Marxist revolutionary 
theory.13 8
This contrast might seem merely a matter of idiosyncratic terminology 
on either side, especially given the prominence of Oakeshottian themes 
in contemporary statements of the classical approach to international theory. 
However, I would argue that the real explanation lies in the contradictory 
implications, for the broad structures of international as against 
domestic politics, of the ever-growing concentration of economic, coercive 
and ideological resources in the modern territorial state. In the 
international realm, this phenomenon has generated the paradigm case of 
the rationality of tradition, and has, on balance, made the characteristic 
pluralist theme of piecemeal engineering the most realistic or appropriate 
response to the over-riding logic of the situation. But in the domestic 
sphere, the transformative capacities of the state, the general spur of 
uneven development, and the example of specific 'great' revolutions have
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effectively made it impossible to defend the self-sufficiency of tradition 
without resort to the kind of elaborate mystification practised by 
Oakeshott.
The crucial point is that pluralist international theory - both 
behavioural and classical - has not adequately confronted the theoretical 
implications of the point so often emphasized by Wight and others in 
arguments for the uniqueness of international politics: that unlike 
domestic politics it is not readily susceptible of a progressive
1 O Qinterpretation. Moreover, this failure may be attributed to basic
organizing assumptions - the behavioural assumption of synchrony, or 
the pessimistic, quasi-religious view of human nature held by several 
leading classical theorists - which have already been rejected here on 
methodological grounds. By contrast, the following discussion will 
emphasize those shared structural factors which have promoted both an 
impressive continuity in international political arrangements and an 
ongoing transcendence of domestic political frameworks which feeds back, 
more or less decisively in different historical contexts, into the 
international sphere.
In essence, the dominant Western moral paradigm of interstate 
coexistence can be traced back to the recognition at the Peace of 
Westphalia of the disastrous consequences, in a morally diverse community 
of states, of warfare over ultimate values. The solution, initially ad 
hoc but with 'momentous implications', was to establish a compact which 
embraced war itself, and which recognized the inescapable necessity of a 
'morality of consequences'. Thus, James Mayall argues, 'necessity was 
recognized as a legitimate reason for restraint, for the avoidance of 
war over ultimate values. But the princes retained the right to go to 
war among themselves over secondary questions, that is, in support of 
another kind of necessity, reasons of state'.140
The same preoccupations are readily apparent in 'mainstream' Anglo- 
American thinking today. Kenneth Thompson states baldly that, 'since 
nations in the present anarchic world society tend to be repositories of
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their own morality, the ends-means formula has prevailed as an answer to 
the moral dilemma'.141 Kissinger identifies the statesman's task as the 
reconciliation of 'what is considered just with what is considered possible', 
but reduces the sense of justice to a simple outgrowth of 'the domestic 
structure of [the] state', and its implementation to the discovery of 
the leeway offered by the clash of competing national interests.142 
Wight and Bull both offer more complex accounts than this, the former 
addressing the order/justice issue in terms of the interplay of 'the 
moral order, the legal order, and the balance of power', the latter 
emphasizing the tension between international and world order, and 
between individual justice, interstate justice, and world justice. But 
even Bull insists that 'unlike order, justice is a term which can 
ultimately be given only some kind of private or subjective definition', 
and that, in a general sense, order can be regarded as 'prior' to justice, 
in that 'it is the condition of the realization of other values'.143
These various statements indicate the essential core of the agreement 
between the Realist and Rationalist positions on the structural 
distinction between international and domestic politics: a distinction, 
in Wight's words, between the issues of 'man's control over his social 
life' and those of the 'ultimate experience of life and death, national 
existence and national extinction', between a domestic 'realm of normal 
relationships and calculable results' and an international 'realm of 
recurrence and repetition - the field in which political action is most 
necessarily repetitious'.144 In terms of practical claims3 as noted 
above, Realists have been more consistent in their insistence on justification 
by necessity and on the individual state's need for freedom to pursue its 
own self-interest without reference to customary constraints. But this 
very consistency derives substantially from a 'pessimistic' model of man; 
and without this unwarranted, high-level assumption, the Rationalist 
concept of international society may be seen as a truer reflection of the 
contradictory logic - of conflict and cooperation - inherent in the 
international anarchy.
Moreover, as Bull has cogently demonstrated, a structuralist defence 
of the Rationalist position can also be mounted against the Revolutionist 
perspective on world society, on the grounds that a minimal, procedural 
order among states (which safeguards the substantive order within states)
14 5is preferable to any currently feasible alternative. But such an
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approach entails abandoning any attempt to expand the case against 
international Revolutionism into a proscription of domestic revolutionism, 
for the general importance of custom and tradition as historical 'carriers' 
of the logic of international cooperation does not entail the appropriateness, 
sine die, of the historically specific traditions of European/Western 
international society. The fundamental dilemma remains. Either 
Rationalism rests on a specific value preference for the international 
ethic of a world of princes - the 'special morality of satisfied powers', 
and of satisfied groups within powers. Or it asserts an enduring common 
interest of states as such in what Burke called 'one of the greatest 
objects of human wisdom - to mitigate those evils which we are unable 
to remove'.146 This in turn divorces the logic of a world of sovereign 
states from the problem of revolutionary transcendence within states, and 
leaves the necessity of existing domestic arrangements to be established 
in its own terms.
As regards this latter issue, Oakeshott's argument is particularly 
interesting for its apparent reconciliation of Burke's defence of 
prejudice - 'the bank and capital of ages and nations'147 - with the 
much more radical (not to say rationalist) variant of historicist 
functionalism advanced by Hegel. In both respects, the positive echoes 
of the earlier thinkers are less significant than the 'absences' dictated 
by Oakeshott's need, in developing their themes, to finesse the massive 
structural transformations of the intervening period. Where Burke could 
still combine a 'frankly irrational' political theory with an 'economic 
ideology of pure Adam Smithianism', in a single, if incoherent, image of 
the social organism, 148 Oakeshott narrows the focus drastically to an 
ethereal tradition or 'practice' - a 'flow of sympathy' which is such 
'a tricky thing to get to know' that it must not even be cribbed by its
1 4defenders, let alone wrapped in the rawer breath of Rationalist detractors. 
The liberal/pluralist position on the economy appears covertly in a 
stipulative distinction between the centrally directed policy of the 
state conceived as 'enterprise association' and the genuine politics of 
the state concerned as 'civil association' - in which individuals are 
associated, as equal individuals, solely in terms of their subscription 
to common moral practice and not at all in terms of their subscription 
to common substantive purposes. But Oakeshott's concern to defend the 
latter solely in moral, rather than prudential or consequential terms, in 
turn leads him to rule out of court the fundamental politics/economics
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nexus of the Industrial Revolution era. Terms such as Capitalism,
Bureaucracy, Centralism and Pluralism, he argues, are 'totally irrelevant' 
to the distinction between the two moral paradigms of civil and enterprise 
association. Civil association is not a 'free enterprise' association, 
with which it is often confused, but a 'no-enterprise' association. 150
Thus the concept of tradition - ostensibly historical in its very 
core - is reduced to an idealist orthodoxy which is in practice as 
abstract and timeless as the behavioural concept of system. Moreover, 
this same paradoxical combination of a functionalist mode of argument 
with a denial of the collective implications of functional interdependence 
would seem to be inherent in all pluralist accounts of the 'watchman state' 
holding the ring for the free play of competitive interests. It is no 
accident that modern pluralism has developed elaborate theoretical 
rationales for ignoring the substantive content of institutions in domestic 
social orders. It makes some sense to speak of a minimum procedural 
order in regard to the anarchical society of sovereign states. But under 
conditions of modern industrial capitalism, a commitment to domestic 
political pluralism (or alternatively to piecemeal social engineering) is 
a commitment to a substantive social enterprise.
The transmutation of the Hegelian notion of philosophy as 'afterthought' 
is even more revealing. This allows Oakeshott to insist that ideologically- 
inspired political planning can never rest on genuine prediction, but merely 
on a 'crib' or 'abridgement' of tradition; and to satirize Rationalist 
expectations of progress as mere 'illusions that wait for the ignorant and 
the unwary' . 151 But behind the stylish rhetoric lies some basic sleight 
of hand in regard to the concept of tradition, which oscillates 
between the entire culture of society, on the one hand, and a narrowly 
defined political tradition, on the other. 152 Oakeshott's own 
prescription for political innovation through the 'pursuit of intimations' 
either means nothing or else prediction and planning on the basis of past 
practice, the practice of a 'traditional' ruling elite. Rationalist 
prediction and planning is not a wholly different enterprise, but the 
same enterprise incorporating the practices and the material conditions 
of a far larger sector of society, which are ruled out of consideration 
in Oakeshott's account on the definitional grounds that they are not 
part of the tradition. However, it is precisely the capacity of
traditional institutions and established moral paradigms to accommodate 
major new social contradictions that is at issue in periods of major 
structural transformation. This is the real significance of the Hegelian 
doctrine of transcendence, whose implications, when detached from Oakeshott's
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sliding-scale definition of tradition, are deeply revolutionary. In 
Windsor's words:
...not only does mind develop over time; it continually 
transcends itself ... This means that moral laws are 
now laws only in a limited sense. They are the 
codification of what we have achieved so far. They are 
open to transcendence as we go on discovering. Discovering 
how the moral order has demanded victims whose own 
potential for transcendence has been sacrificed to the 
maintenance of a social framework. In other words, society 
becomes inherently oppressive.
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Finally, Oakeshott's obiter dicta on revolutions in general and 
the Russian revolution in particular indicate very clearly the implications 
of divorcing the notion of tradition from an identifiable material context 
in periods of great structural change. Whereas Johnson merely claims 
that revolutions are unnatural events which need not happen, Oakeshott 
implies that they do not happen. His assumptions forbid the possibility 
that ideology may be not merely a crib but a critique of tradition, and 
that the Rationalist's programmatic concern with the whole of society may 
be an index not of political inexperience but of sensitivity to the 
inadequacy of existing political frameworks in an increasingly complex 
society. Therefore, he insists that a revolutionary ideology can be 
only the exported crib of another tradition; that the programmes it 
generates will prove basically irrelevant to what actually happens (the 
French and Russian revolutions, for instance, involving merely the 
'modification' of ancien regime conditions); and that 'salvation' 
(presumably a restoration) must ultimately come from 'the unimpaired 
resources of the tradition itself'.154 As for the Soviet regime - those 
'private enterprise usurpers, operators of the most fraudulent coup d'etat 
of modern times' - their only claim to authority 'is the dwindling asset 
of being able to be mistaken for the legitimate successors of the Tsars, 
made plausible by their conduct, by their direct inheritance of an 
apparatus of government, and in the recognition they have received from 
other governments' . 15 5
This judgement is only a more extreme version of that offered by 
writers such as Pipes and Brzezinski, for whom the Bolsheviks merely 
'perfected', or at most temporarily 'revitalized' the Tsarist system. 156 
Moreover, though Pipes is as discreet as Oakeshott about the Industrial 
Revolution in his own major statement on the development of the Russian 
political tradition, he has elsewhere invoked the thesis of Tsarist-
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Soviet continuity in support of an unfavourable contrast between modern 
Russia, where militarism allegedly produced industrialism, and modern 
Germany, where the reverse relation obtained.157 It may therefore be 
useful to compare this continuity thesis to E.H.Carr's discussion of 
why Oakeshott's 'salvation' (a Thermidorean reaction) did not occur 
in the Russian case.
At the very centre of Carr's account lies the notion of structural 
contradiction, and of the state as an agent of social transformation.
He emphasizes the isolation of the Bolshevik party by the mid-1920s. He 
acknowledges that all previous lawlike generalizations (including Marxist 
theory) about the course of revolutions, plus the general surrender under 
NEP of 'the radicalism of revolutionary doctrine [to] the conservatism of 
administrative empiricism' suggested that 'the country would settle down 
into a modified bourgeous capitalism on a Russian national pattern'. But 
the ultimate result - 'a paradox which falsified every current prediction 
and appeared to frustrate every attempt at rational analysis' - was the 
massive Stalinist drive for collectivization and industrialization, 
with its enormous attendant costs.158 And though Carr's analysis pays 
due regard to specific Russian factors such as the established tradition 
of convulsive modernization through 'revolution from above' and the 
paucity of surviving ancien regime institutions, he presents his most 
'profound' cause - the weakness relative to the party of both proletariat 
and bourgeoisie, which both permitted and demanded a new Bolshevik 
initiative if fundamental revolutionary advance were to be resumed - as 
an extreme example of a more general 'altered balance of social relations' 
demanding an increasing dominance of politics over economics in all modern 
states. The collectivization programme is thus, on Carr's account,
both the conscious choice of a ruthless elite, pushed through against the 
resistance of the very masses of which it claimed to be the vanguard, and 
also a genuine reflection of a situational logic which mass action had 
helped to create - 'few great men hav [ing] been so conspicuously as 
Stalin the product of the time and place in which they lived'.160
There can be few more illuminating insights into the complex inter­
relations of the terms 'rational' and 'realist' encountered in the 
foregoing discussion. In Popperian terms, Stalin's 'revolution from 
above' must appear as the paradigm case of the historicist's catastrophic 
resort to utopian planning as his own predictions crumble before reality. 
By Oakeshott's account, the spectacle is of a Rationalist of the most 
inexperienced stripe, his technique cribbed from alien traditions proving
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totally inadequate, reaching back for 'salvation' to the most brutal 
resources of an autocratic native tradition. Carr's account incorporates 
both these strictures, but his primary emphasis is very different. He 
eocpZains the event as a realistic, appropriate, or rational response to 
an unprecedented situation; he judges it by criteria that are Rationalist 
in Wight's sense, balancing the massive human costs against the enormous 
new breach made in the 'laws' of material necessity; and both explanation 
and judgement are grounded in an historicist perception of the place of 
the Soviet experience in an ongoing transformation which has produced 
the modern world.161
Different judgements could be offered, but not by Oakeshott. Carr 
presents collectivization partly as a highly structured 'practical necessity', 
partly as a momentous 'intelligible contingency' of the kind which both 
Oakeshott and W.B.Gallie regard as the distinguishing feature of historical 
understanding. But where Gallie recognizes, in addition to sheer 
accident, contingencies involving the kind of shift in consciousness 
described by Carr, Oakeshott allows no distinction among contingencies, 
insisting that no event can be causally related to any other, or placed 
in, or shown to diverge from any pattern of development.
The historical past is without moral, the political 
or the social structure which the practical man 
transfers from his present to his past. The Pope's 
intervention did not change the course of events, it 
Was the course of events, and consequently his action 
was not an 'intervention'. X did not die 'too soon'; 
he died when he did. Y did not dissipate his 
resources in a series of useless wars: the wars 
belong to the actual course of events, not to some 
imaginary illegitimate course of events.
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Oakeshott thus prescribes not only Carr's historical 'framework for 
choice' (and the alternatives advocated by critics who accuse Carr of 
collusion in the relegation of the Bolsheviks' opponents to the 'dustbin 
of history'), but his own as well. For Stalin's massive 'intervention', 
like every other Rationalist excess before and after, was the course of 
events. And Oakeshott can criticize them only by reference to 'some 
imaginary illegitimate [tradition directed] course of events' spanning 
the 'four, six or eighteen centuries' during which, as Gellner observes, 
the Rationalist 'poison' variously appears to have entered European politics. lf
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I have attempted to show that structuralist concepts of 'practical 
necessity' are essential to both explanation and judgement in any large- 
scale area of social inquiry, being routinely (if covertly) invoked in 
pluralist accounts of international politics despite the deep suspicion 
with which they are treated in pluralist accounts of domestic politics. 
Indeed, there would seem to be an inverse relationship between devotion 
to unique facts and sensitivity to historically specific structures and 
conjunctures, as evidenced by the easy movement from unique events to 
an all-embracing tradition in Oakeshott's analysis, or from particular 
institutions to the 'needs' of an entire social system in American 
functionalism. Pluralist international theory in practice escapes this 
teleological fallacy, because the 'system' which it invokes is also a 
structured historical episode unique in its historical and spatial spread. 
However, while the 'international anarchy' provides for an unusually 
strong criterion of historical necessity, this criterion is neutral as 
regards substantive domestic orders. Thus, insofar as one attempts to 
preserve today the more substantive criteria implicit in the classical 
paradigm of international society, one must also address the more complex 
questions of domestic historical necessity so strikingly raised by the 
Soviet development experience.
Similarly, I would argue that Pipes' comparison of Russia and 
Germany essentially in terms of the internal dynamics of 'militarism' and 
'industrialism' is wrongly formulated, encouraging a narrow focus on 
specific developments in the interwar period, on the one hand, and 
extremely general, idealist assertions about the imperatives of deep- 
seated national traditions, on the other. The missing element in such 
an account is the critical phase of socio-economic transformation, 
perhaps a century long in each case, and marked by a series of specific 
conjunctures often crucially 'overdetermined' by international factors. 
Given such a perspective, I would argue that the WettpohtLK of Wilhelmine 
and Nazi Germany was both more continuous with traditional great power 
practice and less appropriate to the emerging structures of contemporary 
world politics than the Soviet combination of Socialism in One Country, 
Peaceful Coexistence and indirect pursuit of world revolution.165
The basic point, to reiterate, is that the relative weight of 
'traditional' as against 'theoretical' ideologies in the formation of a
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policy, and the objective rationality or irrationality of that policy, 
are essentially separate questions. However, while it is crucial to 
emphasize this point against the evaluative criteria often brought to 
bear on Soviet policy, it is also true that the intensity of the 
collision between traditional and theoretical ideologies has been of 
great practical importance in the development of Soviet policy in 
particular and contemporary world politics in general. Some more specific 
comments on this collision will therefore conclude this section.
First, social theorizing of the monistic kind is inescapable in 
periods of structural transformation, and is itself a further transforming 
agent, which challenges ruling moral paradigms, and helps to undermine 
the ' given-ZKi^ s* of established social orders. This is most obviously 
true of self-consciously critical theory, which - on Jurgen Habermas' 
definition - aims to provide human actors with 'information about law­
like connections' which shape their lives, so that 'the level of unreflected 
consciousness, which is one of the initial conditions of such laws, can 
be transformed'.166 However, this dimension of social theory does not 
depend merely upon the intentions of the individual theorist: it may 
also result from the focus of conservative or 'Realist' critics on the 
enduring need for order. To explain the underpinnings of continuity is 
also to point to possibilities for change, and all attempts to lay bare 
the structure of social reality must indicate that some features are 
less 'invariant' than others. The only varieties of social theory which 
do not have such implications are those 'non-interventionist' theories which 
refuse to identify key structural properties or to establish clear hierarchies 
of causal factors, but rather insist upon the interdependence and/or the 
uniqueness of everything. Such theories are really sophisticated 
restatements of dominant moral paradigms, which seek to defend the latter
from the inroads of monistic and interventionist analyses, whether
16 7radical or conservative in impetus.
In some cases, as with Oakeshott, the tendency of such theories to 
mystify social relationships and shroud social contradictions is 
fairly obvious in the form of the argument itself. But a similar result 
is achieved by a policy science approach, which combines an ostensible 
commitment to disciplined theoretical analysis with an insistence that 
issues be considered piecemeal, on their merits, leaving the main 
structure beyond question. Indeed, I have suggested that the two approaches
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perform complementary functions, so to speak, and that the emergence of 
a kind of division of labour between them has been an important aspect 
of the Anglo-American liberal/pluralist tradition. On the one hand, 
there has been the consistent tendency, from Locke through Burke to 
Oakeshott, to reconcile market morality, in respect of the economy, with 
traditional morality, in respect of political 'arrangements'. On the 
other, there has been the evolution of the policy science perspective, 
with a positivistic notion of rationality spilling over from the 'self­
regulating' economy to the modern bureaucracy, precisely to rationalize 
that political intervention made necessary by the failure of the economy 
to live up to its self-regulating image. In the approach of normative 
functionalist theory in the United States, these two trends might be 
said to have met in the middle.
Furthermore, it must be stressed that these kinds of theoretical 
mystification are not confined solely to the pluralist approach. Both 
can readily be observed in the official Soviet self-account. The dominant 
theme here has been a policy science one, with distinct functionalist 
and systemic overtones, which implies that the era of dialectical leaps 
is over, and that the central problems of Soviet development are now ones 
of piecemeal, though centrally directed, reform of the established order. 
However, the Brezhnev era has also witnessed an increasingly systematic 
appeal to tradition, not merely the tradition of 'Marxist-Leninist 
science' or the Russian tradition as a whole, but also, as Agnes Heller 
emphasizes, the tradition of Soviet rule, now well into its seventh 
decade. Of course, there continue to be yawning gaps in the past
appealed to for the purpose of legitimation; and in its emphasis on 
a piecemeal, 'creative' use of precedent and its refusal to seriously 
address the question of large-scale trends in Soviet history, the official 
Soviet line contains fascinating echoes of the Oakeshottian approach.
Second, while one must reject the notion that traditional paradigms 
should be given exclusive rights to explain phenomena which they also 
act to perpetuate, 'the essential importance of tradition and 
routinization' in social reproduction must be given full acknowledgement. 
In Giddens' words:
The sedimentation of institutional forms in long­
term processes of social development is an 
inescapable feature of all types of society,
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however rapid the changes they may undergo.
Only by grasping this conceptually, rather than 
by repudiating it, can we in fact approach the 
study of social change at all.
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It is also necessary to reiterate the dual dimension - both enabling 
and constraining - of tradition, and of social structure in general. The 
notion of political 'languages', and of politics as a 'conversation', 
primarily captures the former dimension; and it is most obviously 
applicable to those contexts in which, for structural reasons, no one 
authority is able to lay down the law without significant competition - 
as with the evolving practices of the European states-system or the 
international 'tradition' of political and social revolution of the 
modern era. However, even such loosely articulated practices as these 
involve a major constraining dimension, and even a limited control over 
their evolution may be regarded as a major power resource, as the Soviet 
and Chinese contest over the 'language' of international Communism 
indicates. 170 In regard to the dense social structures of complex 
domestic societies, it is absurd to speak, as does Oakeshott, of a 
central political 'practice' as a 'vernacular language' whose resources 
are equally available to all. 171
Moreover, it is necessary to recognize that where the constraint 
of established norms and practices falls excessively upon one particular 
segment of society, they may be not so much internalized as recognized 
as 'external' obstacles to be manoeuvered round - as Waltz speaks of 
small powers seeking to 'manoeuver in the interstices of [the] balance 
of power'. This is particularly obvious in the case of small nations
in a great power's sphere of influence, enmeshed, for objective structural 
reasons, in someone else's web of constitutive meanings. But as Percy 
Cohen suggests, there is reason to suspect that the same is true in a 
number of domestic contexts, such as the position of the black community 
in South Africa. In both contexts it seems reasonable to speak of
potentially strategic situations, in which established obligation claims 
are heavily dependent upon the sanction of raw force.
Third, although both the great power relationship and the politics 
of transitional Third World states are here treated primarily as areas 
of strategic interaction, this strategic logic is reflected in the 
dominant moral paradigm only in the former context. In Third World states,
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as Gellner suggests, the contradiction between inherited assumptions 
and situational logic is one of the more obvious sources of revolutionary 
tension:
It is virtually a tautology that the transition 
cannot be peaceful and smooth, and that it must 
at some stage involve treason and violence: for 
it must involve transfers of authority which cannot 
be validated, and which can scarcely be conceived, 
in terms of the concepts of the ancient order.
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This is certainly not to suggest that traditional concepts are 
irrelevant to the course of development in such contexts. They are 
clearly of profound importance, particularly since, as in the case of 
Islam, they are likely to invoke still potent transcendental sanctions.
But it does seem fair to expect such concepts to figure primarily as 
resources employed in the struggle to establish conflicting versions 
of the material transformation rather than as the dominant framework 
within which the material transformation must be confined. This 
expectation is only partly dependent on an estimate of the material 
imperatives likely to be faced by the elites of strategically placed Third 
World countries. There is also the multiplicity of traditions in complex, 
literate but 'pre-modern' societies, allowing for divergent modes of 
'traditional' legitimation for competing political responses to what is,
i *7 cafter all, an unprecedented material situation.
In addition, there is the further impact of the response, until 
recently 'specific to the modern West', which 'involves the disavowal 
of tradition as such as a form of legitimation'. As Giddens argues, 
this goes beyond the general phenomenon of 'disenchantment' emphasized 
by Weber, and involves the direct application of monistic reasoning 
about change to the production of change:
Its most acute expression is found in the ascendancy 
of historicity as a mode of historical consciousness: 
the active mobilization of social forms in pursuit of 
their own transformation. Whatever the precise nature 
of the relation involved, there is no doubt that the 
triumph of historicity in this sense accompanies the 
rise of modern capitalism. The age of modern 
capitalism is the age that marks the dominance of 
two distinctive kinds of collectivity: the 'legal- 
rational' organization and the secular social movement.
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Finally, one must note the role played by such movements and 
organizations (and movement-organizations) as superstructural 'carriers' 
of concepts and organizing structures across temporal and spatial 'gaps' 
in the contemporary world. Kenneth Minogue has observed that to speak of a 
tradition of revolution is to invoke the notion of tradition jumping gaps.1 
But this notion fails to capture the extent to which political action has 
systematically transformed material conditions in recent history - as 
in the role of the Bolshevik party in the Soviet Union or, on a wider 
scale, as in the extension of Western diplomatic and economic practices 
and structures to the post-colonial Third World. A more appropriate 
analogy for such phenomena lies in Perry Anderson's discussion of the 
mediaeval Christian Church as ' the one single institution ["which] spanned 
the whole transition from Antiquity to the Middle Ages in essential 
continuity ... the main, frail aqueduct across which the cultural 
reservoirs of the Classical World now passed to the new universe of 
feudal Europe . . . ' . 1 78
Western critics might balk at describing the Bolshevik party as a 
frail aqueduct. But frail it certainly was, being deeply interpenetrated 
with Tsarist 'bureaucratic culture' in the 1920s, and effectively smashed 
in the 1930s during the consolidation of the(in many respects very 
traditional) Stalinist system. Conversely, while Western theorists 
are acutely aware of the fragility of the web of conventions which 
mediates the stable order of a now global states-system, they often 
seem notably unaware that, from some Third World viewpoints, that system 
must seem a towering structure of inequality rather similar to that 
depicted in the totalitarian model of the Soviet Union.
The point is that neither the future of the modern states-system 
nor that of transitional Third World societies can be discussed adequately 
in terms of 'unfolding' conceptions of change. In both contexts 
processes of structural transformation are at work, in which 'traditional' 
and 'scientific' features are likely to be 'spot-welded' together in the 
emerging social structures, and in which far-reaching ideological 
conflict is part of the logic of the situation.179 Any 'rules' for 
Soviet-American coexistence in such a context must be at the bottom rules 
of prudence, and they must rest upon something more solid than mere 
tautologies about interdependence. One must, in effect, demonstrate 
'something given, brute fact, something unchangeable' - something which,
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to paraphrase Hegel, is the more manifestly rational for being the 
more persistently actual. I believe that the only serious candidate 
for this position remains the classical concept of the states-system. 
But neither its strengths nor its weaknesses in this role can be 
adequately appreciated unless it is clearly detached from the attempts 
to establish the notion of an equilibrium system as the master concept 
for contemporary world politics.
State and Society in Pluralist and Marxist Prospective
This final section attempts to relate the Soviet account of world 
revolution to the wider Western tradition of speculation on state and 
class formation, and to highlight in particular its contrasts with the 
American pluralist perspective. This represents something of a digression 
from the primarily methodological issues discussed so far, but it seems 
important at this point to defend the relevance of the official Soviet 
account to the states-system component of the states-system/transition 
model of world politics sketched in the next two chapters. If practical, 
and indeed theoretical statism is the test of fidelity to the states-system, 
then the Soviet Union may be counted among the first of the true believers 
- ranged, along with China and the majority of Third World states, against 
the growing chorus of transnationalist and interdependence rhetoric 
emanating from both government and academic sources in the West in general, 
and the United States in particular. However, many Western critics have 
taken this very statism as convincing evidence of the analytical 
sterility of Marxism and the irrelevance of formal Marxist values to 
actual Soviet policy, both domestic and foreign. On the one hand, 
totalitarian theorists have hammered away at the contradiction between 
an entrenched Soviet Leviathan and the regime's alleged commitment 
to the 'withering away' of the state. On the other, pluralist critics 
of Soviet foreign policy have claimed to discern under the fog of 
Soviet rhetoric a kind of vulgar-Machievellian Realism, attributable to 
the attempt to operate in the international arena without any meaningful 
conception of international society. And both images have recently been 
strongly reinforced by the hawk picture of a Soviet elite mouthing the 
phrases of Marx but inextricably linked, through Stalin, to the traditions 
of Russian autocracy.
This critique rests upon a powerful half-truth. But it also
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involves a highly simplistic view of the Marxist perspective on state 
and revolution, and reflects in turn an ethnocentric American perspective 
on these issues. It is not, I would suggest, a matter of a simple 
contrast between the Soviet approach to world politics and a Western 
tradition embracing the United States. Rather, Soviet and American 
perspectives should be seen as the polar extremes of a crucial 
transcendental/instrumental division, reaching back at least as far as 
Hegel, on the nature of the modern state, with the European tradition 
of international society falling more or less in the middle.180
I have already suggested that there were three major intellectual 
sources of the American pluralist perspective: classical political economy, 
with its emphasis on the 'insulation' of economy from polity; the Whig- 
Liberal political tradition, with its emphasis on constitutional checks 
and balances; and the sociological tradition of normative functionalism.
In all three cases, the original source incorporated a recognition that 
the transcendence of conflict within 'civil society' was a serious 
political problem. The treatment of civil society by Adam Smith and his 
colleagues of the Scottish enlightenment partly anticipated Hegel in
1 ft 1demonstrating the polarizing impact of the modern division of labour, 
and this point appeared even more clearly in the work of David Ricardo, 
who, Marx noted, 'consciously Cmade3 the antagonism of class interests 
the starting point of his investigations'. Throughout the 19th century,
of course, liberal economists moved progressively away from a concern 
with society as a whole towards the totally a-historical marginalist 
approach - whose ostensibly rigorous analysis of the economic 'mechanism' 
implicitly assumed a political order in which major class divisions would
1 ft ftnot be permitted to impede the objective operation of the free market.
As regards liberal political theory, the problem was even more starkly 
expressed in Hobbes' argument from an atomistic model of man to the 
necessity of a Leviathan state, while Locke's rationalization of limited 
constitutional government was achieved only by building class division 
and class cohesion, and a basic inequality in political right, into the 
heart of his model.184 Finally, functionalist sociology had important 
roots in the response of conservative European thinkers to the dual 
challenge posed by the French and Industrial Revolutions to traditional 
social orders. Mediated by Durkbeiw this response found its way into 
modern American social theory above all in the Parsonian preoccupation 
with normative consensus as the solution to 'the Hobbesian problem of 
order'.18 5
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Thus the innocence of modern American pluralism about the state as 
an object of class struggle is something of an anomaly even in regard 
to its more obvious historical sources. In Britain, to say nothing of 
continental Europe, the 19th century doctrine of the watchman state was 
strongly challenged - and modified - by the continuing power of 
paternalistic conservatism, by rising socialism, and by the interventionist 
Benthamite strand within the liberal tradition. In United States itself, 
the traditional Whig concern to combine constitutional government with 
the use of state power in defence of unequal property divisions was a 
dominant theme in the moderate Realism, of the Constitution and the attendant 
constitutional debates.186 And though the pluralist image of a self­
regulating system of interests loosely structured by a weak state 
appeared in its essentials as early as Tocqueville's analysis of Jacksonian 
America,187 the specific political framework of modern American capitalism
was finally decided only by the massive and partisan use of state power
1 8 8in the Civil War and Reconstruction era.
Thus the characteristic pluralist synthesis of democratic and 'stake
in society' themes - with its refusal to consider seriously the question
of objective interests not articulated in group activity, and its easy
shift from the earlier fiction of freely competing 'ind'iV'idudls to the
notion of (more or less) freely competing groups - reflects a highly
selective reading even of the uniquely privileged history of American
capitalist development.189 Nonetheless, it seems clear that the enormous
material strides of the post-Civil war period provided a secular
confirmation for a distinctively American value system already partly
established in the colonial era: a basic consensus around an individualistic,
property-oriented concept of democracy; a powerful commitment to the
virtues of unity-in-diversity; an assumption of the unproblematic character
of material and social progress; and an overt distrust of 'utopian' theory,
19 0linked to a deep commitment to the theory embodied in American practice.
Even the two manifestly revolutionary aspects of the later American 
experience - the successful absorption of a huge and varied intake of 
immigrants and the economy's exponential strides in technological 
innovation - helped to reinforce the dominant moral paradigm. Altogether, 
there were strong incentives to classify the American experience as one 
which (always excepting the Civil War) had transcended the violent conflicts
of European politics to establish a condition of continuous 'revolution 
19 1by consent'.
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The impulse to universalize this already selective reading of the 
American experience has proved a potent one in this century, generating 
the expectation of natural harmony in a freely-trading world, and of 
the ready progress of 'underdeveloped' nations towards an established 
(pluralist) model of modern society. Of course, the United States' new 
world role entailed a growing involvement with antithetical value-systems, 
and the post “1945 vogue for Realism was envisaged as an attempt to combat 
the oscillation between the extremes of 'isolationism' and 'messianism' 
which this experience had allegedly produced. However, as was
suggested in Chapter 1, the more significant point is the ease with which 
the Realist concern with political balance (based in turn upon the 
assumption of an unchanging human nature) could be assimilated to the 
'messianic' vision of a stable, harmonious, pluralist world order.
Indeed, in the ambivalent character of the adulation extended to 
the American constitution - on the one hand as a pragmatic, but 
enormously successful balancing mechanism, and on the other as a symbol
19 3of the United States as a kind of 'moral cosmos' for its citizens 
one might discern the reason why order as such3 rather than a specifically 
state-centred zntemat'LonaZ order, became the central preoccupation of 
American foreign policy. There must always be a certain Gestalt-like 
field/ground relationship between political order and the 'pursuits of 
happiness' which it is supposed to facilitate, but this has a special 
dimension in the American tradition which is nicely demonstrated in 
W.W. Rostow's 1971 pronouncement, after his own intimate involvement in 
the Johnson Administration's prosecution of the Vietnam war:
In the end, the glory of America has been not its 
relative material wealth but the sense of its 
transcendent political mission in reconciling 
liberty and order. However imperfectly fulfilled, 
this transcendent mission has been recognized in 
the end, by Americans and by peoples in every 
part of the world.
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A very different relationship between order, freedom and progress - 
revolving round the perception of solidarist, rather than cross-cutting,
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conflict in civil society - is depicted by the Hegelian-Marxist tradition. 
Despite its overtly idealist framework, Hegel's vision of dialectical 
progress was also grounded in an immanent critique of classical political 
economy which - with its account of the dynamics of pauperization, social 
polarization, and economic imperialism - anticipated many of the 
conclusions of Marx. Indeed, as Shlomo Avineti points out, this analysis 
of the ills of modern civil society was the only area of Hegel's work in 
which a problem was consciously left unresolved. But the overall
thrust of his social philosophy was undoubtedly an 'integrative and 
mediating' one, which looked to the transcendence of the contradictions 
of civil society, partly through the integrative role of corporations, 
partly through the operation of a representative political pluralism, and 
above all by the unifying modern state, administered by the bureaucratic 
'universal class'.196 And given his own methodology, with its denial 
of the possibility of a standpoint outside history and the unfolding 
historical consciousness, Hegel was thus compelled, in effect, 'to 
assume that history had already come to an end'. With the French 
Revolution and the establishment of the modern rational state, the 
definitive model of social transcendence was now generally available, 
the medium through which, in the ensuing 'appendix to history ... history 
fulfills itself'.197
Marx's materialist inversion of the dialectic - the centrepiece of 
his fusion of Germany philosophy and British political economy, and 'the 
guiding thread for my studies' - was forthrightly expressed in the 1859 
Preface to his Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy. Having 
asserted the determinate relationship between the ideological, legal 
and political superstructure and the 'real foundation' of production 
relations which 'are indispensable and independent of men's will', Marx 
went on to identify structural contradiction as the central engine of 
historical development:
At a certain stage of their development, the material 
productive forces of society come into conflict with 
the existing relations of production, or - what is 
but a legal expression for the same thing - with the 
property relations within which they have been at work 
hitherto. From forms of development of the productive 
forces, these relations turn into their fetters. Then 
begins the epoch of social revolution. With the change 
of the economic foundation, the entire immense 
superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed. ^
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Even here, however, Marx insisted upon the distinction between 'the
material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which
can be determined with the precision of natural science', and the
manifold 'ideological forms in which men become conscious of this
conflict and fight it out'. And his work in general certainly provides
no warrant for the reduction of the superstructure to a mere 'epiphenomenon'
of the economic base. The distinguishing characteristic of man for Marx
was forethought, the ability 'to raise fa] structure in imagination
before he erects it in reality; and his emphasis on the link between
historical forms of consciousness and social being was an integral part
of the claim that, within the structural constraints engendered by their
199 . .social interaction, 'men make their own history'. More specifically, 
Marx's rejection of the Hegelian vision of the state transcending the 
conflicts of civil society, and of the supposed universality of the 
bureaucracy, in no sense constituted a denial of the crucial importance 
of political action to the question of historical progress. Rather, 'the 
Hegelian idea of a "universal class" stripped of its hypostasis, becomes 
a vehicle for historical explanation', and the partisan employment of the 
state by such a class the central feature of the 'epoch of social 
revolution'.2 0 0
On this account the normal role of the state, assisted by a complex
network of ideological and interest group forces, was the maintenance
of the existing order. But, argues John McMurtry, in those specific
instances in which a 'fundamental contradiction' in the mode of production
had arisen, Marx saw the state as 'an agency for the qualitative alteration
as opposed to maintenance of the economic order, in accordance with the
requirements of productive force development'. This could occur only
when the state had been seized by a fully self conscious revolutionary
class, and in this role the state was clearly a progressive force. For
the success of the revolutionary class depended precisely on its capacity
temporarily to unify civil society, to appear 'from the very start ...
2 0 2not as a class, but as the representative of the whole of society.
For Marx of course, the end result of the bourgeois revolution remained
the triumph of a new particular interest in civil society, with the state
- its executive 'but a committee for managing the common affairs of the
2 0 3whole bourgeoisie.' - reverting to a role of simple class coercion.
By contrast, the proletariat was 'a class which is the dissolution of all
209.
classes', and although the proletarian revolution would be followed by 
a period of political 'dictatorship', in which the residual elements 
of the old order were eradicated, this would be merely the transition to 
a condition in which the conflictual basis of the state was finally
2 0 4transcended.
This identification of social revolution above all with the political 
action of a rising class reflected a broader tendency, in the special 
circumstances of the early 19th century, to assimilate the experience of 
the 'bourgeois' political revolutions to the greater transformation 
apparently pre-figured in the early stage of the Industrial Revolution 
in England;and it left little of substance to be said about the post­
revolutionary role of the state. Marx clearly recognized the complexity 
of class differentiation in capitalist society, for which his 'two-class 
model' sought only to delimit the dominant trend, and also, with the 
establishment of the Bonapartist Second Empire, the opportunity for a 
quasi-independent role for the bureaucratic state in conditions of
O  Q Ctemporary balance between competing classes. But the problem of an
'independent' post revolutionary state could not arise so long as the 
proletariat actually came to power as 'the self-conscious, independent 
community of the immense majority'; and despite Marx's recognition of 
counter-trends, the grounds for this fundamental assumption were 
graphically derived in Capital from the 'immanent laws of capitalistic 
production itself'. On the one hand there would be continuous 'centralization 
of capital' in the hands of an ever-narrowing circle of monopolists, 
increasing socialization of the labour-process, growing dislocation in 
national economies, and the 'entanglement of all peoples in the net of 
the world market'. On the other, the proletariat - its numbers 
constantly swollen by recruits from other classes - would grow in uniformity 
and wretchedness, but also in revolutionary consciousness, 'disciplined, 
united and organized' by the very process that was simultaneously driving 
the capitalist system to its final crisis:
The monopoly of capital becomes a fetter upon the mode 
of production, which has sprung up and flourished along 
with, and under it. Centralization of the means of 
production and socialization of labour at last reach 
a point where they become incompatible with their 
capitalist integument. This integument is burst 
asunder. The knell of capitalist private property 
sounds. The expropriators are expropriated. 2 0 6
2 1 0.
This theory, it must be reiterated, offered not a teleogical but 
a structuralist, quasi-casual explanation of revolution, in terms of 
the political action of historically situated social groups. Marx's 
doctrine of an objective proletarian interest actually indicated the 
problematic character of class consciousness, implying an 'historical 
conflict between theory and practice', whose resolution depended upon 
the proletariat's subjective recognition of that interest. Even Marx's 
vagueness regarding the period after the socialist revolution was 
consonant with a refusal to predict historical developments which fell 
outside the structural parameters he claimed to have identified.
'Precisely because the transition from capitalism to socialism was the 
historical function of the proletariat as a revolutionary class',
Herbert Marcuse points out, 'the specific political forms of this 
transition appeared as variables which could not be fixed and established 
by theory'. And, conversely, the proletariat could be expected to discover 
appropriate forms precisely because the 'objective historical coincidence' 
between the breakdown of mature capitalism and the revolutionary action 
of the entire proletariat was the revolution. 'If this class does not 
exist, that is, act as a class, then the socialist revolution does not 
exist'.2 0 7
Moreover, Marx specifically objected to the attempt of a Russian 
critic to transform his 'historical sketch of the genesis of capitalism 
in Western Europe' into 'an historico-philosophical theory of the path 
of development prescribed by fate for all nations',208 while his embryonic 
'second theory of revolution' as a product not of mature capitalism but of 
the impact of uneven development upon more backward societies obviously 
had much more complex implications for the post-revolutionary relationship 
of state and society. But he did offer a 'scientific' prediction 
regarding the development of the Western proletariat, and he did, in 
general, reflect the prevailing 19th century assumption that developments 
in Europe would determine the fate of the rest of the world. And it is, 
therefore, fair to say that an important part of the Marxist legacy - 
especially as mediated through the positivism of the later Engels - was 
the conviction that history would come to an end with the triumph of the 
proletariat.
But not with a bang. For Marx's successors faced the very situation 
which his own reconciliation of theory and practice could not accommodate.
2 1 1 .
With the growing evidence of the ability of capitalism to improve the 
material well-being of the mass of the population, the crucial revolutionary 
coincidence 'passed', and 'the revolutionary potential of the working 
class seemed to recede throughout the developed world'. This constituted 
a fundamental change in the subjective and objective conditions for 
the revolution which 'in the long run decided the fate of Soviet Marxism'
- and led to a total reappraisal of the period of transition in terms of 
a Soviet task of 'building a socialist society coexistent rather than 
subsequent to the capitalist society, as the competitor rather than the 
heir to the latter'.209
The theoretical starting point of this reappraisal was provided 
by Lenin's threefold adaptation of classical Marxism. There was the 
theory of imperialism, which accounted, on the one hand, for the 
temporary ability of monopoly capitalism to export its own structural 
contradictions and to secure a period of 'class peace' through the bribery 
of the 'upper stratum' of the working class, and, on the other, for the 
impending emergence of a different kind of revolutionary situation arising 
from the inter-imperialist conflict. There was the tentative elaboration 
of a 'dialectics of backwardness', by which the uneven development of 
capitalism was shown to have shifted the revolutionary frontier to the less 
developed nations. And finally there was the doctrine of the vanguard 
party, which, given the Russian combination of an immature proletariat 
and an ineffectual bourgeosie, would both precipitate the democratic 
revolution and organize the ensuing 'revolutionary-democratic dictatorship
p i nof the proletariat and the peasantry'.
While in one sense freely adopting Marxism to the Russian Populist 
tradition, Lenin was also, like Trotsky and Rosa Luxembourg, reviving 
the original Marxist concern with subjective political action as against 
the economic determinism of Social Democracy in the advanced nations.
But this new synthesis of theory and practice still rested on the 
assumption that the phenomenon of 'class peace' in those nations was 
temporary, and that the democratic revolution in Russia would trigger 
the wider socialist revolution in Europe, upon which not merely the 
success, but even the survival of the Bolshevik experiment would depend. 
When the long-term future of the isolated Soviet state within a hostile 
capitalist environment was finally resolved in favour of the Stalinist 
version of Socialism in One Country, the authoritarian potential of Lenin's
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approach was realized in full. The dictatorship of the proletariat and 
peasantry resolved itself into a dictatorship of the Bolshevik party 
over the proletariat and the peasantry, and the very concept of 
revolution, 'which in 1917-1918 ... still meant to Communists the 
liberation of society from outworn political and spiritual fetters ... 
came to stand for the reshaping of society by a dictatorial regime in 
control of a centralized state apparatus and an all pervading party 
organization'.211
This marked the final abandonment of any genuine concern with the 
unity of theory and practice, which gave way to a blatantly manipulative 
combination of voluntarism for the party and determinism for the masses.
The concept of objective class interest, which for Marx was subversive 
of the established order,became the bulwark of Stalinist positivism. With 
subjective interpretation of that interest now the exclusive prerogative 
of the vanguard party, the 'objective' requirements of the revolution 
were determined by the practical policies which the regime found it 
necessary to adopt in the course of its project of 'socialist construction'. 
Thus the extraordinary Soviet claim 'to be living in the middle of a 
period of transcendence, and yet to be able to foresee the end';212 for 
the transition period now became a new 'appendix to history', whose end 
was effectively defined by its beginning - by the basic self-definition 
of the Bolshevik revolution as a self-sufficient socialist revolution.
However, this has had different implications in the domestic and 
international spheres. In the former, a basic picture of non-dialectical 
progress - of a Soviet society 'transcending en bloc' - has been invoked 
both to sanction official ideological innovation, and to prescribe private 
debates with alternative futures and - what is in many respects the same 
thing - with historical possibilities foreclosed by Stalinism. Above all, 
this has involved an emphasis on the transformative role of the superstructure, 
with the unprecedented Soviet Leviathan being justified by its role not 
merely in 'the abolition of classes and the elimination of foreign 
aggression', but also in 'the creation of a material basis Cfor Communism!! 
and the education of a new man'. Under Stalin, given his all purpose
use of 'capitalist encirclement' and his insistence on the intensification 
of the class struggle with the closer approach of Communism, the 
reconciliation of the reality of an 'independent' state with the utopian 
vision enshrined in Lenin's State and Revolution was relatively simple.
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Soviet policy, Stalin argued, aimed at 'the highest possible development
of the power of the state, with the object of preparing the conditions
of the dying out of the state', a 'contradiction' which 'completely
2 14reflects Marxist dialectics'.
But with Khrushchev' s 1959 announcement both of the ending of the 
capitalist encirclement and of the creation of a 'state of the whole 
people', and the subsequent retreat from his promise of an early 
achievement of Communism to that of an indefinite period of 'developed 
socialism', the transition period and the 'transitional' stage have 
tended to acquire a conceptual self sufficiency totally at variance with 
their Marxist origins.* Indeed, in their deterministic linking of 
'developed socialism' to the imperatives of the 'scientific-technological 
revolution', and their bland categorization of the political dissent as, 
in effect, merely 'deviant' social behaviour, contemporary Soviet 
ideologists often display an overt concern with the maintenance, rather 
than the transformation, of the existing 'system' reminiscent less of 
Marx than of Western functionalism. As one statement of the emerging 
moral paradigm expresses it:
The undisputed superiority of socialist democracy, 
which is inspired and directed by the Communist 
party, consists of the fact that it guarantees social 
progress in conditions of political stability, 
unshakeability, and is based on the close union and 
unity of all classes and strata of the population, of 
all nations and nationalities.
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In the international sphere, by contrast, the Soviet Union has
faced the enduring reality of a capitalist world-economy, and the master
concept has been that of the General Crisis of Capitalism, with the
opportunities that this creates for political action to break the links
in the chain of imperialism. This was of limited significance during
the Stalin era - when the 'Capitalist Encirclement' held theoretical sway;
and Stalin's theory of world revolution was aptly caricatured by Trotsky
as a 'building-block' one, which envisaged the piecemeal construction of
'a world socialist economy, after the manner in which children erect
2 16structures with ready-made blocks'.
However, the position of Stalin's successors has been a good deal 
more complex. On the one hand, the anti-colonial revolution greatly
* These ideological developments are discussed at length in Chapters 
5 and 6.
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increased the plausibility of the negative revolutionary goal of detaching 
vulnerable building blocks from the edifice of world capitalism; and 
one important part of Khrushchev's justification of Peaceful Coexistence 
with the capitalist powers was a renewed emphasis on revolutionary 
advance both among the Western proletariat and in the Third World. On 
the other, it became increasingly clear in the 1960s that this had 
given two important theoretical hostages to the fortune of the historical 
process: that China, not the Soviet Union, might well appear a more 
relevant model of the 'national-liberation' movement, and that burgeoning 
Communist movements in the developed world might provide ideological 
support for 'revisionism' within the Soviet bloc. Thus, while there has 
been no actual repudiation of Khrushchev's doctrine of 'different roads 
to socialism', there has been an increasing tendency to emphasize that 
basic development patterns such as 'developed socialism' are essential 
to the process, to limit the Soviet 'internationalist' commitment to 
governments (or credible alternative governments) which seem likely to 
accept close links with Soviet policy, and to insist that any 'fundamental 
restructuring'of international relations must be duly planned, controlled
2 17and corrected .
Any inferences drawn from these comparisons must inevitably be 
tentative. There is, clearly, a great deal of manipulative, post facto 
rationalization in the Soviet employment of the Leninist world-view: 
and in the American case one should speak less of a unified world-view, 
than of a particular ethos. However, given the unprecedented interpenetration 
of 'states-system' and 'world-economy' issues, both great powers' 
inherited conceptions of a preferred world order must reasonably be 
expected to retain an analytical significance quite different from that 
which would have been appropriate in the earlier 'multipolar' system of 
European nation-states. Insofar as both the Soviet Union and the United 
States have each borrowed their more formal international order values 
from that now partially superseded system - of which neither has had 
extensive practical experience - a belated, and only partial integration
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of these with their respective world order values should not be surprising.
Furthermore, on the methodological argument advanced here, the 
dimension of historicity in both world order perspectives is extremely 
important. The complexity of the forces in contemporary world politics 
suggests that their future course must be more than ever an area of 
'radical uncertainty'. In such a situation, as Arthur Burns suggests, 
political 'rationality' has two crucial senses: 'internal self consistency',
and 'openness to information, and a propensity to adjust one's opinions 
and plans to it', which are potentially incompatible. And while the
Soviet postulate of a transition towards an historically determined 
socialist world order is often unfavourably contrasted - on such criteria 
of rationality - with the American expectation of a 'pluralist' world, 
a focus upon the notion of transition itself suggests that this issue 
is far more complex.
First, the Soviets do postulate a distinct transition period, which 
both Soviet historical experience and the inescapable identification 
of socialism/communism with a certain level of economic development have 
alike contrived to invest with a degree of genuine historical depth. By 
contrast, the American intellectual inheritance, and pre-1945 experience, 
has encouraged rather the identification of pluralism as the natural 
condition of modern society - with 'transition' a largely residual category. 
And while both leaderships may be said to display a notably 'voluntarist' 
attitude to international affairs - over and above the normal management 
pretensions of great powers - the Soviet doctrine of the 'correlation 
of forces' does constitute a theoretical acknowledgement, however crude, 
of structural parameters for which there is no clear counterpart in 
American thinking.
Second, the general commitment to pluralism in American theory tends 
to obscure the contingent relationship between domestic pluralism and a 
plurality of states. A pluralist world may be conceived of in two basic 
ways: as an international order, with sovereign states as the pivotal 
actors; or as an 'interdependent' world order, with states merely one 
set of prominent actors in competition with a range of transnational 
groupings. Insofar as the Soviet Union has adopted a building-block model 
of world revolution, identifying the class struggle in the Third World 
primarily with the struggle of 'progressive' regimes to emancipate their 
countries from capitalist domination, it actually offers a theoretical 
rationale for international pluralism in the transition period. By
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contrast, the assumption that national independence, domestic pluralism 
and an Open Door world-economy could all flourish together was a major 
prop of the Wilsonian tradition in American foreign policy; and the 
continuing strength of this tradition has been exemplified in the upsurge 
of interdependence theory and rhetoric in the post-Vietnam era.
Third, the negative (anti-imperialist) dimension of the statist 
Soviet approach to Third World issues is supplemented by a positive 
developmental rationale for the state which is applicable, if sometimes 
tenuously, to the policies of numerous authoritarian but strategically 
placed Third World Clients.219 Lacking such an official 'transition 
ethic', United States policy makers have tended to waver between an 
espousal of democracy and human rights which proves difficult to implement 
in practice, and a generalized commitment to order (or stability) often 
not congruent with a genuine acceptance of the implications of a plurality 
of states. Moreover, as argued in Chapter 1, this concern for 'order' 
can be traced to the 'legalistic-moralistic' Wilsonian tradition, as 
readily as to its Realist critique - the most significant aspect of the 
post-1945 preoccupation with 'national security' being a change in 
American assessments of the instrumentality appropriate to the establishment 
of a desirable 'world order' framework. The belief in the attainability 
of such a comprehensive framework proved much more durable, and even, as 
was indicated by the Johnson administration's Indo-China policy, capable 
of coexistence with a self-consciously Realist approach to the question of 
limited war. The point is reinforced by the most recent swing back from 
the interdependence paradigm towards a self-conscious Realism, which has 
been expressed most dramatically in the foreign policy posture of the 
Reagan Administration. Despite some sophisticated academic restatements 
of classical 'states-system'themes, and of statist/mercantilist perspectives 
on the world-economy, the dominant current has been a return to the 
globalist rhetoric of the 1950s and the 1960s, with Soviet expansionism 
returning as an all purpose threat to a stable order in the Third World.
Finally, therefore, the argument comes back to the relationship 
between international theory and the theory of the state. American theory 
and American rhetoric on international issues have exhibited a series 
of Gestalt switches on the issue of political order. Now you see the state: 
now you don't. And this pattern can be directly related to the inadequate 
concept of the state in American perspectives on domestic politics.
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American pluralism, to borrow Macpherson's comment on pluralist theory 
in general, 'cannot afford' a grand theory of the state, because such a 
theory would expose the incompatibility between the model of man upon 
which pluralist theory rests and the model of society which it depicts.220 
Even more obviously, the Soviet authorities cannot afford, while 
professing their allegiance to Marxism, to develop a fully fledged theory 
of the state under 'real existing socialism'. But as regards the Third 
World, I would argue, the (essentially Stalinist) Soviet theory and 
practice of state-making is a good deal more relevant, and addresses an 
issue which is met by neither the American pluralist perspective nor 
the traditional European concept of international society.
It must be acknowledged that the concept of states-system detectable 
in the Soviet account is rudimentary in the extreme. But a rudimentary 
concept of the system is all that can reasonably be expected. The name 
of the game, in C.A.W.Manning's words, is 'let's play sovereign states'221 
the game of 'let's play states-systems' merely follows as a corrollary 
of this. The need is not for the elaboration of formal rules for an 
elaborate formal system existing outside time, but rather for the 
investigation of the tensions between the inherited practices of European 
international society and the structural logic of contemporary world 
politics. A valuable starting point, I believe, lies in a states-system/ 
transition decodification of the long-running Soviet drama of the 
international system and the world historical process. The story is extant, 
and is written in very choice official Soviet. The text undoubtedly needs 
much cutting and shaping to meet the interests of a wider audience. But 
the basic theme is arguably more compelling than ever.
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AND THE 'WORLD HISTORICAL PROCESS'
Structures and Historical Change
Chapter 2 attempted to establish the requirements for a theoretical 
perspective upon Soviet-American coexistence which would, first, 
locate the problem in its specific historical context and, second, 
address itself simultaneously to the issues of continuity and change.
This chapter will attempt to sketch such a perspective, and, by placing 
the modern states-system in an historical context of industrialization, 
imperialism, and political and social revolution, to indicate the 
narrow boundaries within which the patterns of continuity designated 
by the term 'states-system' should be sought.
The perspective envisaged here may most usefully be classified 
as a World-historical one - a term recently revived by several theorists, 
not merely of Marxist persuasion.1 Though the argument developed here 
takes its starting point from the official Soviet account, it is 
predicated upon an emphatic rejection of the Soviet claim to 
scientific knowledge of an all-embracing unilinear and teleogical 
pattern of historical development. But on the other hand, it also 
involves the rejection of those synchronic modes of analysis which 
tend to divorce contemporary world politics from their concrete 
historical context. This is most obviously the case with behavioural 
systems theory; but it is also true in some measure of most classically 
oriented accounts of the states-system, of interdependence theory, 
and of structuralist and world-systems approaches to the contemporary 
world-economy. The aim here is neither to collapse the states-system 
into an all-embracing historical process nor to reify it as an entity 
abstracted from historical time, but rather to consider it as a bounded 
world-historical episode3 and one part of the wider episode of the global 
transition to industrialism.
The notion of episodic analysis is, in itself, useful primarily 
in a negative sense, as a cautionary reminder of the historical 
contingency of the phenomena in question. The argument here shares 
Wallerstein's assumption that contemporary world politics must be 
conceived of as a totality; and if the proposal were merely to
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substitute the term 'global transition' for the term 'world-system', 
there would be no change to the basic problem - of theorizing the 
historical development of a single entity - which originally directed 
Wallerstein towards a synchronic analysis on the explicit analogy of
othe solar system. The positive methodological point, to reiterate, 
lies in shifting the weight of explanation from system to structure, 
and to the presumption of rational action within structural constraints.
It is this shift which allows one, in principle, to preserve the 
concept of an overarching, total framework while simultaneously 
disaggregating that framework into a number of competing situational 
logics and frames of meaning which can provide mutual checks upon each 
other's mythic pretensions to exclusive explanatory status.
The practical problem is to achieve this disaggregation without 
lapsing back into an essentially unstructured pluralism. There are,
I believe, two crucial entering wedges available for this purpose in 
the present argument. The first is the modification of the general 
concept of the transition by Barraclough's notion of a more specific 
transition, from around 1890 to the mid 1950s, which established the 
new framework of contemporary world politics.3 On the one hand, this 
entailed the rapid incorporation of the remainder of the globe within 
the orbit of the European states-system and the now industrialized 
world-economy. On the other, both states-system and world-economy 
were themselves radically transformed - not least because they were 
now finally brought together on a global scale around a common 'reference 
grid' with at least four major components: the 'abstract' structure 
of military power; the structure of geopolitics; the 'abstract' 
structure of economic power and the structure of differential stages 
of economic development. The discussion here is predicated on the view 
that this 'grid' has provided the basic framework of great power 
relations, whether of cold war or detente, since at least the mid-1950s, 
and that it will most likely continue to do so until the mid 1990s - 
for instance, that the global configuration of military power will 
remain fundamentally bipolar, and that the Soviet Union will remain 
much more obviously an 'advanced industrial society' than China, yet 
less 'advanced', in several important respects, than the leading 
capitalist states.
Of course, there are major empirical complexities shrouded by
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these extremely generalized categories. One might, for instance, 
reasonably expect very great differences in consumer expectations in 
the Soviet 'industrial society' of the early 1980s as compared to 
that of the early 1950s, with concomitant implications for the 
regime's room for manoeuvre on major issues of resources allocation. 
Similarly, the broad concept of a bipolar military balance is not 
meant to deny the modified hegemony enjoyed by the United States 
throughout much of the non-European world during the 1950s and 1960s, 
nor to preclude the possibility that one or other great power might 
establish a limited military preponderance in the next 10-15 years. 
Moreover, the time-span suggested here for this current framework of 
world politics - roughly 40 years - is hardly a longue duree as the 
world in general has gone. But it does represent considerable 
stability in basic structures as compared to the massive dislocations 
of the first half of the 20th century. And such a perspective 
establishes much more clearly the basic point made earlier about the 
transition in general: that it may be regarded as both contingent 
in the long sweep of history, and given, as an overarching framework 
for the issues discussed in this thesis. As Barraclough has argued, 
the question of European origins, which has preoccupied most Western 
historians as well as theorists like Wallerstein and Wight, is less 
important than these fundamental structural transformations which have 
established the new 'skeleton or framework within which political action 
takes place'.4
This point is a complex one, and it may be made clearer by 
considering the grounds for Wallerstein's argument that the term 
'transition' should not be used either for the process of global 
'incorporation' discussed by Barraclough or for what I have called the 
transitional development initiated in the newly incorporated Third World. 
'In fact', Wallerstein asserts,
these two processes do not involve the 
transformation of feudalism into capitalism 
but are aspects of the development of the 
capitalist world-economy which, over historical 
time, has expanded extensively (incorporation) 
and intensively (the progressive proletarianisation 
of labor and commercialisation of land).
5
This point is of major importance in countering the assumptions of
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those 'modernization' theories, such as Rostow's 'stages of growth' 
schema, which treat the transition of individual national societies 
as a process largely independent of the specific international 
context in which such transitional societies are situated. However, 
the paradox of Wallerstein's position is that the untenable assumptions 
of 'unfolding' development which he rejects in regard to individual 
societies are reproduced in his work in regard to the world-system as 
a whole. In fact, the early history of the world-economy and states- 
system, so far from revealing an innate, mechanistic principle which 
has gradually manifested itself on an ever-increasing temporal and 
spatial scale, is important precisely because it allows us to disentangle 
the general, reproducible logic of states-systems and transitional 
development from those historically specific features of the wider 
environment which have undergone such basic transformations in the 
contemporary area.
The second entering wedge is the specific, limited notion of political 
system developed in the previous chapter, and the associated claim that 
the states-system is the only genuine political system in the modern 
world. The point is not merely that the states-system is important 
in itself, as the fundamental framework of such international order 
as has been achieved in the modern era; but also that this importance 
of the states-system provides an independent criterion of 'value relevance' 
for the disaggretation of the world-economy as a subject for theoretical 
analysis. Unlike the states-system, which is properly identified solely 
with the practices of interacting soverign states, the world-economy, 
as Wallerstein insists, is a genuine wovld; and precisely because it is 
a genuine world it is far too complex to be usefully theorized in systemic 
terms. However, by counterposing the basic practices of the traditional 
states-system to the four-fold material 'reference grid' for contemporary 
world politics nominated above, it should be possible to select out from 
this wide world a small group of national entities which, by virtue of 
their location at the intersection of various crucial material frameworks 
and frames of meaning, are of special importance to this analysis because 
of their importance for the stability of the states-system in general 
and of great power coexistence in particular.
The basic selection requirement is for middle-ranking powers which 
are strategically and/or economically important to the great power 
relationship, on the one hand, and are located in politically ambiguous
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regions outside established spheres of influence, on the other. Such 
criteria would select, first and foremost, the major states in the 
African and West Asian 'arc of instability; and second, their counterparts 
in an East Asian arc stretching from the Koreas to Indonesia (but 
excluding China and Japan). Moreover, I would argue that this mirrors 
a selection process going on, so to speak, in the contemporary world. 
States with great economic significance, such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, 
become by that fact strategically significant; states whose initial 
significance is primarily strategic, such as Egypt and Taiwan, attract 
the economic ministrations of the great and major powers; and both 
categories are thereby selected for a process of transitional development 
which, I will attempt to argue, carries with it a substantial bias towards 
extreme, and possibly revolutionary politics.
This may seem a longwinded way of establishing what is, after all, 
a commonplace of the contemporary American debate: that 'instability' in 
such crucial Third World regions is threatening the stability of the 
Soviet-American relationship. However the key point is not merely 
what areas are selected but upon what principles they are selected, 
and the extraneous assumptions attached to the selection principles 
commonly employed in the American debate. In that context, there is 
a strong tendency to advance ground rules for the great power relationship 
which effectively assume the general value relevance of 'stability' not 
merely within the states-system as such but also within the domestic 
affairs of transitional states and in their orientation towards a 
predominantly capitalist world-economy. The argument here, by contrast, 
is that the one clear ground of common value-relevance on these questions 
lies in the structural logic and established practices of the states- 
system, and that these certainly do not support the view that stable 
great power coexistence can best be ensured by attempts to preserve the 
status quo within the world-economy and within individual transitional 
societies.
This is perhaps the major reason for insisting upon the world 
historical veality of the modern states-system, as a discrete system of 
practices which has retained its general identity throughout several 
centuries of far-reaching economic, social and political change. Though 
the substantive theme of the importance of interstate relations is not a 
noticeably Marxist one, the methodological assumptions employed here 
are closer to those of Marx than to those most apparent in the mainstream
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American debate. I have assumed that a 'realist' perspective on the 
states-system is more conducive to clarity than an 'ideal type'/
Constructive system' approach - the latter being more sceptical in 
theory but often more permissive in practice, allowing the behavioural 
bias towards synchrony and 'equilibrium' to fill out the conceptual 
universe. On the other hand, I have tried to avoid the strain towards 
an essentially idealist explanation of international conflict, in 
terms of permanent, innate characteristics of human nature, detectable 
even in ostensibly Realist works of international theory.6 The point 
to emphasize is not just the importance of the political order represented 
by the states-system but also the narrow limits of that political order 
in the material context of contemporary world politics. Only by emphasizing 
the material foundations of the states-system, as a unique pattern of 
continuity within a real global transformation, can one place the 
relationship between transition within states and stable relations 
among states in a genuinely historical perspective.
Several important points may be made about the way that relationship 
is treated in this argument. First, I would argue that - once the 
equation of continuity (or stability) with a synchronic dimension and 
change with a diachronic dimension is rejected - one can identify a 
common logic of explanation involved in the discussion of future trends 
in regard to both the states-system and transitional development. In 
each case it is important -
(a) to identify in the contemporary world reproducible grand 
structures (or more precisely situational logics) which 
limit the range of human choice in specified situations 
and cause outcomes to fall within specified limits:
(b) to examine the plausibility of these structures by 
reference to similar situations in the past, which we 
can now to some extent 'stand outside': earlier stages 
of the modern states-system and earlier states-systems; 
and earlier instances of transitional development 
within the great modern transition:
(c) to distinguish general manifestations of the structures 
in question from more specific historical phenomena 
attached to earlier instances of them; and
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(d) to situate these structures, thus delimited, once 
more within the specific temporal and spatial 
context of contemporary world politics.
7
Second, as the last of these points makes clear, the proposed 
mode of analysis is inevitably a circular, hermeneutic one, in which 
the disaggregation of the global transition is preliminary to its 
reaggregation around more clearly delimited points of reference. As 
one recent writer, in an attempt to define the 'essence of Marx's 
dialectical methodology', has put it, 'the abstract is made concrete 
only when integrated into a concrete whole from which the initial 
abstraction was originally made - a process involving a constant 
shuttling about between parts and whole' . 8 The argument here is 
emphatically not that the phenomena of the states-system and transitional 
development represent the whole of contemporary world politics. The 
argument is rather that they constitute two islands of intelligibility 
which can be defined with particular clarity, and which are especially 
relevant to the central concerns of this thesis: the minimum prudential 
rules for stable Soviet-American coexistence, on the one hand, and the 
most likely source of recurrent challenges to the two great powers to 
depart from these rules, on the other.
Third, this approach seeks to avoid that oscillation between an 
indiscriminate monism and an incoherent pluralism which, I have argued, 
has often characterized the treatment of these issues in the American 
debate. On the one hand, in contrast to those analyses which effectively 
subsume Third World 'instability' within the all embracing logic of 
a global geopolitical struggle between the great powers, it asserts the 
substantially autonomous roots of such instability in the process of 
socio-economic change within transitional states. On the other, it 
rejects the view that radically different patterns of interaction can 
legitimately be accounted for by individual explanations incorporating 
radically different a priori assumptions. Though falling far short 
of a 'general theory' of contemporary world politics, the interpretative 
framework sketched here does involve the assertion that the very different 
patterns identified - of exceptional continuity in the case of the states- 
system and exceptional change in the case of transitional development - 
can be derived from the same set of assumptions about the nature of man 
and the logic of strategic interaction.
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So far, in justifying this attempt to incorporate a prediction 
of extreme, even revolutionary social change within an analysis of 
the parameters of contemporary great power coexistence, I have 
emphasized the common logic of explanation involved in discussing 
both the states-system and the process of transitional development.
If one can generalize (make predictions) about the development of the 
former, one can also generalize in a similar fashion about the development 
of the latter. However, the case can be stated with equal force in 
terms of the pivotal role of the transitional state as a common 
substantive focus in both scenarios. If shared norms of Soviet-American 
coexistence are to be identified, they must be sought above all in the 
limited, instrumental order traditionally provided by the states-system, 
at the basis of which lies the assumption of the givenness of a world 
of sovereign states. Yet in certain crucial areas of contemporary 
world politics, it is precisely the continuance of formally constituted 
states as discrete, relatively 'hardshelled' and relatively stable 
units which is problematic; and the central problem lies in the 
implications of historical processes of economic development and state­
making. Therefore if one cannot generalize (make predictions) about 
the development of the 'world historical process', one cannot generalize 
about the development of the 'international system'.
These observations apply most obviously to the position in the states- 
system of societies deeply caught up in the process of transitional 
development - societies which, as Reinhard Bendix observes, 'have 
perhaps been called "the new states" prematurely. For that designation 
presupposes what is still at issue'.9 However, the problems so starkly 
in evidence in such societies have a much wider resonance, for under 
global conditions of uneven development and leapfrog patterns of social 
change, all societies are to some extent faced with the continual need 
to accommodate 'the disruptive impact of ideas and industrial processes 
taken over from abroad'. The capacity of a given society to handle 
this ongoing challenge, Bendix argues:
is conditioned to a considerable extent by the social 
and political structure it has inherited from the 
past ... today, even economically developed countries 
struggle with the unresolved legacies of this process 
although they have achieved a functioning political 
structure, i.e., the state. Accordingly, the achievement 
of 'the state' is always provisional ... l o
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Moreover, while the process of uneven development is of fundamental 
importance in this context, it must also be emphasized that for 
transitional Third World societies this process is telescoped together 
with the initial process of state-building itself, which for the 
great 'founder' states of the European system - such as Britain and 
France - was spread out over several centuries and substantially 
completed before the great economic transformation got underway. As 
F.H.Hinsley points out, the nation-state (or more correctly the state- 
nation) is the key to the modern states-system - not merely in the 
general sense that nationalism and international relations are 
'inseparable, if different, facets of a single phenomenon of the 
division of men into political groups', but also in the more precise 
sense that the central practices of the states-system depend upon the 
general acceptance of the 'political and territorial' as opposed to 
the 'cultural and linguistic' concept of the nation. The former 'framework 
of political organization and political loyalty', Hinsley asserts, is the 
only one within which - given the very existence of diverse political 
entities - 'the unavoidable conflict between them can be made productive 
and kept restrained'.11
Therefore, while the states-system may reflect the 'natural' logic 
of anarchically interacting units, those units themselves are very much 
human artefacts, the result of a lengthy clash between rival imperialism 
which,at a crucial historical conjuncture, was arrested before the 
establishment of a single world-empire. Indeed, Hinsley argues, the 
notion of arrested imperialism is virtually synonymous with the notion of 
the nation-state, for state government is that pattern of government 
through the administrative principle which must be developed when 
government through the social principle - characteristic of single tribes 
or city-states - is impossible. Thus 'the key to the nature of the 
state, and in its turn ... to the movement of the political loyalty of a 
society into the national stage', lies in the 'distinction or divergence 
between society and government which is the raison d retre of the state'. 
And thus every state, whether self-generated by a collection of communities 
or imposed on them by conquest, 'has begun as an empire in the one
unimpeachable definition of empire - the rule of the government over
12more than one social community'.
The problems of uneven development and state-making have been 
deeply intertwined in the history of the modern states-system since at
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least the late 18th century, with the advent, in Britain and France, 
of the "Dual Revolution" - economic and political - of the modern 
era. On the one hand, the relations of the major states have been 
bedevilled by an ongoing and 'serious redistribution of their relative 
power', a pattern which, as A.F.Organski has argued, is in general 
much better captured by the term 'power transition' than by the 
orthodox notion of the balance of power.14 On the other, the at least 
nominal incorporation within the system of a great many entities at 
the most primitive level of national integration has provided a permanent 
source of potential catalysts for great power tension generated by the 
former factor. The two World Wars stand as reminders to the perils 
inherent in this combination; and although, as Hinsley argues, the 
great power relationship today is one of more genuine balance than has 
existed for almost a century, at the level of state-making the system 
has, in large part, reverted to the disordered situation associated 
with its origins in early modern Europe.15 Most obviously, there is 
the extraordinary proliferation of 'new states' since 1945. But the 
European nation-state - the hard-won core unit of the traditional 
system - has been transcended at the great power end of the spectrum as 
well, with the passage of great power status to two great, continental 
and multi-national empires. That the contemporary great powers are 
both empires rather than nation-states in the established European 
sense - a point much emphasized in Western commentary on the Soviet 
Union, though much less commonly acknowledged in respect of the United 
States - carries with it serious immediate problems for the legitimation 
of traditional 'national interest' styles of foreign policy, if not, 
in the longer term, for the legitimation of the state itself.
These themes will be developed more fully later in this and the 
following chapter. But the argument so far should indicate why I believe 
it is both necessary and possible to break with those forms of analysis 
which, whether or not they explicitly rely upon a synchronic notion of 
social systems, abstract the modern states-system from its specific
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historical context of profound socio-economic transformation, with 
all its far reaching implications for that system's constituent unit 
- the nation-state. Of course, American international theorists have 
been more overtly concerned with problems of social change and with 
the interplay of domestic and international levels of analysis, than 
have their classically-oriented British counterparts. But, as I have 
argued in the preceding chapters, the pervasiveness of behavioural 
assumptions and synchronic models in their work has caused them to 
surrender the clarity of the classical perspective on the states- 
system as such without the compensation of genuine insight into those 
transitional processes which make a simple states-system perspective 
inadequate today.
Indeed, whether the explicit focus is upon the transformation of 
international politics or upon the 'modernization' of domestic societies, 
the characteristic American analysis is remarkably similar. Because 
the dominant methodology can deal only with functioning social systems, 
and because social structure is identified merely with surface patterns 
which are meaningful only on the assumption of the functioning of 
synchronic systems, the notion of transition can mean nothing more than 
an interregnum between 'traditional' and 'modern' states of society - 
an interregnum which may be theorized only by the identification 
of various synchronic 'snapshots' along the way as more or less traditional 
or modern. 16 Where a major subject of analysis, such as the Soviet 
Union, persistently fails to fit either stereotype, it must inevitably 
appear as an aberration from the normal pattern of development, 
permanently struck down by a 'disease of the transition' - just as the 
recent reversion, in American international theory, to themes of 
geopolitics and mercantilism often carries with it the implication that 
such primitive approaches are necessary only as a realistic response 
to an atavistic Soviet refusal to acknowledge the requirements of order 
in an interdependent world.
I propose here to take a directly opposite tack, both substantively 
and methodologically. Although I will be attempting to establish a 
specific and bounded paradigm case of 'transitional development' in newly 
industrializing societies, the argument here is that, in a more general 
sense, transition is the normal condition of all modern societies. 
Conversely, instead of measuring the progress of more 'primitive political
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systems' - domestic or international - against a model of systemic 
equilibrium for which the only compelling empirical referents are the 
United States and perhaps Britain for limited periods of their modern 
history, the states-system will be taken as a paradigm case of political 
continuity in the modern world. By equating structure not with the 
surface patterns observable at a given moment in time but with the 
underlying situational logic organizing such patterns ovev time, and 
by focussing upon the historical interplay of particular change-inducing 
and continuity-inducing structures, it should be possible to grasp what 
can never be adequately grasped in synchronic analyses - whether of 
individual 'modernizing' societies or of contemporary world politics 
in general - the many layered persistence of traditional practices 
through periods of fundamental change.
To emphasize once again, the explication of the abstract logic of 
the states-system and of transitional development is no more than a 
beginning. Those concepts acquire significance only when re-integrated 
into a specific historical context; and to satisfactorily explain a 
specific momentous event, such as the Soviet regime's great leap into 
a crash programme of industrialization and collectivization in 1929 , 
one must go beyond abstract models to a detailed quasi-causal analysis 
of the complex intersection of material structures and the confluence of 
inherited practices to which the actors in question were exposed. But 
because the states-system/transition model provides an empirically grounded 
contrast between an abstract logic of continuity and an abstract logic 
of change, it helps one to prize apart for analytical purposes those 
crucial elements of continuity and change which are soldered together 
both in practical activity and also in those colligatory concepts - 
such as imperialism, industrialization and bureaucratization - which 
provide an indispensable preliminary purchase on Weber's 'vast chaotic 
stream of events'. Such use of dramatic contrast to 'sharpen our 
understanding of the context in which more detailed causal analysis can 
proceed' is held by Bendix to be the main use of comparative analysis; 
and his explicit strategy for a comparative study of transitional 
societies which avoids the stultifying influences of the simplistic 
tradition/modernity dichotomy may also stand as a statement of the 
approach envisaged in this chapter.
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By means of comparative analysis I want to preserve 
a sense of historical particularity as far as I can 
while still comparing different countries ... I ask 
the same or at least similar questions of divergent 
materials and so leave room for divergent answers.
I want to make more transparent the divergence 
among structures of authority and among the ways 
in which societies have responded to the challenge 
implicit in the civilizational accomplishments 
of other countries. l 7
Of course the contexts compared here are far more abstract and the 
treatment of them is far sketchier than is the case with Bendix's detailed 
study of certain key modernizing societies. However, situations of 
large scale strategic interaction are more susceptible to characterization 
in terms of a few bold strokes, precisely because they are situations 
in which the material skeleton stands out with special clarity from 
the various networks of constitutive meanings. Indeed, I would argue 
that the states-system's unique character as a fragile social artefact 
clearly reflecting an over-riding material necessity is precisely what 
makes it a powerful searchlight into the problems of domestic politics 
- rather than, as has sometimes been suggested, the essentially 
untheorizable 'untidy fringe' of the latter.
Giddens rightly points out that 1 if routine is such an important 
feature in the continuity of social reproduction, we can approach an 
account of the sources and nature of social change in the industrialized 
societies through attempting to indicate the conditions under which the
1 8routinized character of social interaction is sustained or dislocated'. 
But the states-system is a context in which strategic interaction is 
the routine, and the periodic disruption by war and crisis of 'normal' 
intercourse between states is one of the fundamental ways in which 
the continuity of international society is reproduced over the longer 
term. In Bull's words :
It may be argued that it is perverse to treat war 
as an institution of the society of states, but 
in the sense that it is a settled pattern of 
behaviour shaped towards the promotion of common 
goals, there cannot be any doubt that it has 
been in the past such an institution, and remains 
one.
1 9
An explicit contrast between this situation and that produced in newly
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industrializing societies by the collision of new material structures 
with established frames of meaning should illuminate not merely these 
two limiting situations but also the densely institutionalized world 
of the modern industrial state.
The next two sections, therefore,will approach the issue of 
the states-system and transitional development in terms broadly reflecting 
a common constellation of questions. What is the relevance to political 
order of stable and unstable hierarchies of military and economic power?
Of the scope of the relevant 'polity' and the size of its accredited 
membership? Of coercion, consensus and consent? Of economic interdependence 
and the modern division of labour? Of uneven development? After these 
separate discussions, designed to elucidate the logic of each situation 
in a hypothetical ceteris paribus world, I will attempt to re-integrate 
them into the general context of contemporary world politics, and 
finally to consider the general implications of the picture thus sketched 
for the process of detente between the Soviet Union and the United States.
The States-System
If one is to establish fundamental norms of coexistence, one must 
demonstrate in some measure what Murray Forsyth calls 'the inner necessity 
of a society of states'. The obvious place to begin this enterprise is 
with the classical paradigm of the modern states-system as a single, 
continuous, political association of armed sovereign states, which 
jointly manage their anarchical interaction around a common core of 
institutionalized practices: the balance of power, diplomacy, war, 
international law, and the special status of the great powers.21 This 
paradigm is plainly superior to the behavioural 'systems' approach 
pervading much American international theory in that it neither, as with 
Kaplan, confines itself to demonstrating the internal necessity of wholly 
vacuous formal models, nor, as with Rosecrance, proposes a new system 
to accommodate every substantial variation in the general empirical 
pattern of interstate relations over the past three centuries. Admittedly 
the traditional paradigm does incorporate a significant dispute over the 
chronological limits of the system; ranging all the way from the claims 
of Wight and Garrett Mattingly on behalf of the late 15th century to 
Hinsley's claim on behalf of the mid 18th; and it leaves open the
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entire question of the world-economy, which as argued earlier, may 
be regarded as the other side of the coin from the states-system.
These issues will be taken up later. But for the moment it seems 
useful to see how far the states-system depicted in the traditional 
paradigm can be accounted for by the 'pure' logic of anarchical 
interaction without recourse to the geopolitical, economic or 
ideological considerations around which disputes about origins, and 
about the discrete character of the states-system, revolve.
It is, I think, fair to say that the classical paradigm locates 
the inner necessity of the states-system in the balance of power. This 
is most obviously true of Waltz (who despite his overt 'systems' 
approach, may be regarded as a classicist malgve lui).23 Indeed, it is 
striking how completely his ambitious attempt to bring off the 
'Copernican Revolution' so lacking in the work of earlier behavioural 
theorists of international systems reduces to a rigorous explication 
of the necessary relationship between anarchical interaction and power 
balancing behaviour. But it is hardly less true of Bull, who provides 
the most systematic recent statement of an overtly classical approach.
War between states, for Bull, is an institution of the society of states 
because it can serve the requirements of both international law and the 
balance of power; but international law, in turn 'depends for its very 
existence ... on the balance', while the steps necessary to maintain 
the balance' (such as war) 'often involve violation of the injunctions of 
international law'.24 Moreover, it is clear that Bull is not merely 
concerned with the appropriateness of balancing behaviour for individual 
states, but wishes to establish 'the general balance or equilibrium of 
the system as a whole' as in some sense a basic goal of international 
society. Drawing a distinction between this general balance and any 
'particular balance', 'including the 'dominant' (or 'central') balance 
between the great powers, he continues:
It is part of the logic of the principle of the 
balance of power that the needs of the dominant 
balance must take precedence over those of the 
subordinate balances, and that the general 
balance must be prior in importance to any local 
or particular balance. If aggrandisement by 
the strong against the weak must take place, it 
is better from the standpoint of international 
order that it should take place without a 
conflagration among the strong than with one.
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This statement exemplifies both the strengths and the weakness of 
the classical paradigm. In contrast to behavioural systems theory, it 
offers a clear sighted acknowledgement of the logical, and empirically 
observable, implications of a profoundly unequal distribution of 
military power. But the clarity of this picture is compromised by 
the residual tendency towards reification of the system exemplified 
by the notion of the 'general balance or equilibrium of the system as 
a whole'. The redundancy of this notion can best be shown by 
reconsidering Bull's point in terms of the situational logic confronted 
by the great powers, on the one hand, and the small and 'middle' powers 
which ostensibly comprise the bulk of international society, on the other.
Plainly, the notion of a general balance adds nothing whatever 
to that of the dominant or central balance in elucidating the logic of 
the great powers' relations among themselves. And if the question is - 
why the great powers should choose to interfere in some local or 
particular balances rather than others, one must surely look not to 
some aesthetic concern on their part with overall equilibrium but to 
those specific considerations - economic, geopolitical or ideological - 
which lead them to assume that identifiable interests of their own are 
involved in certain cases and not in others.
As for the small powers, they must accept that their own relationships 
are always potentially linked to the dominant balance through the 
possibility of great power intervention; but the traffic in this regard 
is almost exclusively one way, downwards from the great, not upwards 
from the small. A small power might actively encourage individual 
great power interventions which seemed likely to further its own 
interest, or seek to mobilize international opinion and an extended 
concept of international law against great power intervention in general, 
or merely 'hope ... to lie low and escape notice'. But there are no 
grounds (on the basic assumption of general rationality) for assuming 
that the behaviour of small states in general should exhibit any 
consistent pattern in this regard, nor for assuming that small states 
should necessarily take any position at all in regard to the dominant 
balance (and a fortiori to the 'general balance ... of the system as 
a whole'). It is not that the state of the great power balance is 
unimportant to the small. It is rather that, fundamentally important 
though it is, there is, in general, nothing effective they can do about
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it; and therefore no clear reason why they should try to do anything 
consistent about it. They have, for what it is worth, the freedom of 
impotence.
These considerations license a modification of the classical 
paradigm which is crucial to the whole argument of this chapter. A 
balance or 'equipoise' among the great (in the simple sense of the 
absence of an enduring individual preponderance) iS the sine qua non 
for the emergence of an international order - the order of a states- 
system as opposed to that of a world-empire. But the central structural 
principle of an established international order is hierarchy -  the 
preponderance of the great as a group over the rest; and unless the 
great powers are regarded as the only genuine members of international 
society, it must be acknowledged that the traditional practices of 
this society have depended fundamentally upon the inequality of its 
members. This point is most directly acknowledged by Tucker, in his 
attack on the expropriation of the doctrine of the equality of states 
by the weak in a system with a 'history of inequality par excellence', 
tempered only by a 'rough and precarious equality of the strong'.
Moreover, Tucker clearly identifies inequality as a key feature of the 
structural logic (or inner necessity) of interstate relations. 'The 
international system', he argues, ' has always been in essence oligarchical 
(unequal) because it has been anarchical'.27
Superficially, Tucker's position appears directly opposed to that 
of Waltz, who attempts to draw a fundamental distinction between 
hierarchical and anarchical systems. But the opposition is only superficial. 
Waltz draws heavily (if implicitly) upon the economists' picture of 
perfect competition in establishing the notion of a structure of 
international relationships beyond the control of any individual actor, 
just as Bull relies on essentially Hobbesian reasoning to establish that 
an international order, sustaining the 'elementary or primary goals of 
social coexistence', is an interest of.men in general.28 But in describing 
the empirical reality of international order, Waltz relies upon the 
concept of oligopolistic competition; and Bull depicts not a Hobbesian 
'war of all against all' among equals, but a structured Lockean society 
of unequals, whose central 'goals' might be more accurately characterized 
as the goals of the hegemonic powers. The great powers, Bull argues, 
contribute to international order not just by the management of their
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mutual relations but 'by exploiting their preponderance in such a way 
as to impart a degree of central direction to the affairs of international 
society as a whole'.
The inequality of states in terms of power 
has the effect, in other words, of simplifying 
the pattern of international relations, of 
ensuring that the say of some states will 
prevail while some will go under, that certain 
conflicts will form the essential theme of 
international politics while others will be 
submerged.
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Thus Waltz's hierarchical/anarchical distinction may be replaced with 
a distinction between two patterns of hierarchy: hierarchy with a single 
effective sovereignty (as in world-empires and nation-states); and 
hierarchy with dual or multiple sovereignties (as in a states-system or 
a temporary 'revolutionary situation' within a given world-empire or 
nation-state). Such a reformulation I believe, offers a much clearer 
insight into the character of the modern states-system in at least four 
important respects.
First, it directs attention to the lengthy process by which the 
states-system initially became established as a going concern in Europe 
before its expansion onto the global stage - a process involving an 
'extraordinary decline' in the multitude of states inherited from feudalism, 
as large states endeavoured 'to absorb small ones while at the same time 
following the principle of compensation so as to maintain a balance of 
power'. This process of reduction (which has of course been radically 
reversed by the more recent break-up of empires, first inside Europe 
and then without) was itself one important way in which the initial 
inequality of states worked to further simplify their interactions during 
the classic period of the European states-system. An even greater 
simplification, of course, would have been the establishment of a single 
world-empire, which as both Wight and Wallerstein note, from their 
respective sides of the question, has been the characteristic development 
of states-system/world-economy situations before the modern era.32 And 
indeed it was no foregone conclusion, in the early centuries of the European 
international anarchy, that it too would not be resolved in this 
fashion, a point strongly emphasized by Hinsley. Not until the mid-
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18th century, he asserts,
did the actuality and conception of a collection 
of great powers in Europe finally replace the 
earlier framework of existing fact and inherited 
thought in which, while more than one state had 
always existed, it had been natural for one 
power to be rated above the rest, and impossible 
for that power's pretensions - resisted though 
they had always been by other states - to stop 
short of the control and protection of 
Christendom.
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This raises the dispute over chronological origins mentioned earlier. 
But the dispute is of limited significance only for the argument developed 
here, which rejects the notion of a single unfolding principle of the 
modern states-system for an emphasis upon the dialectic of structural 
change and political practice. Hinsley's general argument, with 
the special weight which it accords to mu'lt't'p'Le balance as the signature 
of the modern states-system, should be rejected in favour of Wight's 
argument for the basic internal coherence of the entire period from 
the 1490s onward, in contradistinction to the mediaeval period preceding 
it.34 But the connection drawn by Hinsley between the consolidation of 
European absolutist states and the consolidation of the structure of 
anarchical interaction between them is itself a compelling one; and this 
in turn pushes the maturing of the states-system forward towards the 
advent of the Dual Revolution, and towards the ongoing challenge of 
uneven industrial development in Europe and latterly in the world at 
large. On the central implication of these overlapping phases of the 
system's development, Wight is, if anything, even more emphatic than 
Hinsley: 'The most conspicuous theme in international history ... is the 
series of efforts, by one power after another, to gain mastery of the 
states-system - efforts that have been defeated only by a coalition of 
the majority of the other powers at the cost of an exhausting general 
war'.3 5
Second, therefore, the notion of the balance of power may be regarded 
as an inadequate description of the basic relationship even among the 
great powers of the 'mature' states-system. Of course, the concept of 
great power itself assumes, in tautological fashion, that the capabilities 
of the powers so designated are essentially 'in balance'; and where 
such a situation does hold in practice for an extended period, there are
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obvious incentives (which will be discussed at length in the next 
chapter) for the powers in question to work towards policies of 
contrived balance informed by the moderating notion of 'legitimate' 
self interest. More generally, however, the balancing imperative which 
Waltz seeks to establish as the underlying principle of anarchical 
interaction may be more accurately rendered as an imperative towards 
competitive emulation ; 36 and this imperative, operating within the 
broad context of industrialization and global expansion which has 
characterized the last two centuries of the system, has produced a 
dominant pattern not of balance but of 'power transition'.
As employed by Organski himself, this concept is excessively simplistic 
- essentially an extrapolation of the Rostovian stages of growth thesis
o 7into the area of international theory. But a consideration of the
dialectical character of uneven development and the geopolitical 
complexity of the present system merely reinforces the significance of 
those 'transitional' phases in which powers are rising to or declining 
from great power status, or threatening to break out of the ring 
altogether to establish overall hegemony. It has characteristically 
been in such periods of uncertainty that major conflicts have occurred; 
and even in a period in which new challengers emerged fairly slowly, and 
in which international 'power' was a fairly unidimensional and calculable 
quality, it often proved notoriously difficult for European statesmen 
(and for historians in retrospect) to determine whether a given challenge 
was directed towards a 'legitimate' rearrangement of the existing pattern 
of costs and benefits or towards overthrowing the system itself. In 
contemporary world politics, in which major challenges to the existing 
pattern of economic costs and benefits can come from states with negligible 
weight in the states-system as such, the effects of, say, Western 
uncertainty about the character of the Soviet challenge are greatly 
compounded.
Third, an emphasis upon hierarchy (and on the relationship between 
nights and duties and powers and constraints) is necessary to explain 
the character of international law and the paradoxical character of the 
doctrine of the equality of states. International law, as Bull points 
out, must be defined tautologically, as that 'body of rules' governing 
international relationships which 'is considered to have the status of 
law'.39 The special characteristic of international law, he argues,
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is that it consists solely of 'primary rules' prescribing particular 
modes of behaviour, without any of the 'secondary rules' or 'rules 
about rules' which in domestic societies provide for the recognition, 
adjudication and, where necessary, change of primary rules.40 Where 
problems demanding these procedures arise - and they must arise 
repeatedly in a context of power transition - they must be solved by 
joint or unilateral self help on the part of the powers involved.
And though this does not necessarily imply a special 'affinity of right 
and power' which is absent from domestic legal orders, it does mean that 
no criteria exist 'to distinguish right (and law) from a particular 
exercise of power provided only that the exercise prove[s] effective'.41
For the great powers of the traditional system, therefore, the 
international legal order rested not upon coercion (in that they could 
each respond to attempted coercion in similar vein), nor upon consensus, 
but upon consent. 42 Their mutual engagement provides the only truly 
plausible empirical analogue in modern history of Oakeshott's notion of 
politics as civil association; and this free association of equals 
in respect of an enduring common practice was possible precisely because 
the members of the great power 'polity' were so few and the inequality 
between them and the rest of international society so marked. Conversely, 
if the position of the smaller powers is to be explained in terms of 
consent ('implied' or otherwise) this must be recognized as consent to an 
order which, by virtue of the imbalance of coercive power, they had no 
hope of changing. Among the near-great, individual challengers could 
push their way, or be co-opted, into the winners' circle. But the 
small as a group, unlike a disadvantaged class in domestic society, had 
no prospect of altering their situation through collective action, 
whether of a 'revolutionary' or 'trade union' character.
Of course, the inequality of powers also cushioned the conflicts 
between the great by the prospects it provided for aggrandizement against 
the weak. This was especially true of those colonial regions where even 
the limited constraints of international law did not apply. Emphasizing 
the prevalence in the 19th century great power balance of the compensations 
principle as a 'principle of equal aggrandizement', Tucker continues:
Indeed, it is only in retrospect that we can fully 
appreciate the extent to which such moderation as 
the balance of power introduced in Europe depended 
upon the immoderation of its working outside Europe.
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It is in the closing period of the traditional 
system, roughly in the three decades preceding 
World War I, that a structure of imposed 
inequality between the core of European states 
and the Asian and African periphery of colonies, 
protectorates and semi-sovereign entities became 
the most pronounced.
4 3
Fourth, the perspective advanced here helps to clarify the problem 
of economic interdependence in contemporary world politics. The point 
made above about the great powers as a civil association could also be 
stated in terms of a distinction between formal/instrumental and 
substantive aspects of order: to the extent that each power is free 
to determine its own substantive domestic order, there is a meaningful 
prospect of stable agreement on instrumental order (Bull's minimum 
goals of social coexistence). Thus it may be argued that the relative 
absence of economic interdependence among the great powers has been 
an important contributing factor to the unique longevity of the political 
order represented by the traditional states-system.
Waltz, in his own criticism of American interdependence theory, has 
attempted to establish low functional interdependence as a natural 
concomitant of the international anarchy. Because states cannot afford 
a position of large scale dependence on potential enemies, he argues, 
they are driven to develop a broadly similar range of capabilities; and, 
conversely, they are free 'to leave each other alone' in regard to 
substantive issues.44 However, while this argument is applicable to the 
mutual relations of great powers, there were no comparable inhibitions 
on the development of great power dependence upon the resources of 
subordinated colonial regions. And it is precisely the case that the 
abstract logic depicted by Waltz has been subverted by the rapid 
transformation of these colonial regions into a militant majority of 
notionally equal members of contemporary international society.
With the emergence of this pattern of grossly asymmetrical global 
interdependence (or more accurately, with the ending of the long 
standing 'insulation' of states-system and world-economy), there emerges 
a genuine prospect of successful trade union activity by the mass of 
weak states. On the one hand, they have the ideological resources of 
the doctrine of the equality of states - originally a claim 'advanced 
by the strong against the strong', but now a key principle upon which
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the unprecedented expansion of the earlier states-system depends.
On the other, the substantial asymmetries between the structures of 
the states-system and the world-economy militate against a common 
front of the strong against the weak. Though the economic requirements 
for contemporary military capability would probably preclude any 
genuine great power support for drastic redistribution of the world's 
wealth, ample potential exists for the kind of dissension among the 
great, permitting increased assertiveness at the lower levels, against 
which Churchill implicitly warned Stalin at Yalta:
... the government of the world must be entrusted 
to the satisfied nations, who wished for nothing 
more than they had. If the world government were 
in the hands of the hungry nations, there would 
always be danger. But none of us had reason to 
seek for anything more. The peace would be kept 
by peoples who lived in their own way and were not 
ambitious. Our power placed us above the rest.
We were like rich men dwelling at peace within their 
habitations.
4 5
To summarize this argument, the true 'inner necessity' underpinning 
the framework of a states-system is the imperative towards competitive 
emulation among the great and the near great. In certain specific 
historical contexts, the mutual costs involved in the untrammeled 
operation of this imperative may encourage more conscious policies of 
moderation and contrived balance among the great. But there is no 
necessary connection between such policies and moderation of the great 
towards the small: in fact the reverse has often been the case. Drawing 
upon Tilly's terminology for the discussion of political contention in 
domestic social orders, we may say that the states-system has been 
characterized by a particularly clear distinction between the wider 
society of formally acknowledged sovereign states and the effective polity 
of great and near great powers.46 It is by no means clear this arrangement 
can be sustained in the contemporary era. But the fact remains that 
the linchpin of the more settled periods of international order to date 
has been great power hegemony, whether formally expressed in terms of 
concert or through diffuse and tacit understandings about spheres of 
influence, joint 'management' of crisis situations, compensations, and 
the like.
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Moving from the abstract question of logical necessity to the 
states-system as a contingent historical phenomenon, it is also clear 
that the cohesion of the European society of states was heavily 
dependent upon the continued existence of an 'outside' world, which 
both provided a field for colonial expansion and helped to define 
Europe as a political and cultural entity. This geographical division 
has now been terminated, at least for the foreseable future, with 
implications which will be discussed in the last two sections of the 
chapter.
Finally, there is the question of the system's constituent unit, 
the dynastic-cum-national state. The traditional states-system, in 
Manning's phrase, was 'a true society of notional entities'.47 More 
simply, it was a club for princes; and its continuing viability has been 
dependent upon the continuing ability of increasingly complex states to 
manage their most vital interactions in terms of the practices appropriate 
to a political association of princes. Of course, this has not been a 
completely static association. As noted above, it has been consistently 
faced with the problems of unequal development among its members, and 
its capacity to accommodate these problems has been in large part due 
to the very looseness of its central practices. But nonetheless, one 
can usefully draw a distinction in this respect between the states-system 
and its alter ago, the world-economy. The world-economy is the realm of 
uneven and combined development - a realm of diverse social forms, and of 
politics in the Leninist sense, which 'begins where the masses are'.48 
The states-system is the realm of development which is uneven but not 
combined - a realm of politics in the Oakeshottian sense, 'another country' 
in which the masses and the diversity of social forms are 'packaged' by 
the sovereign state. Of course, this is merely a graphic way of 
expressing the basic theory of the game of the states-system - the 
convention that states have to do with each other solely as states.
This is a convention which has been massively breached at various points 
in the system's history, and which may be unsustainable in future. The 
central issue here is that of transitional development and state-making, 
to which we now turn.
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The Transition
A useful place to begin this discussion is with Hinsley's emphasis 
upon the imperialist origins of the European nation-state. Hinsley's 
argument is valuable because it indicates clearly that neither the 
triumph of raison d'etat nor the emergence of nationalism is sufficient 
in itself to account for the stable political order achieved by the 
European states-system. For the raison d ’etat principle set no obvious 
bounds to the process of dynastic imperialism . by which the earliest 
great powers had emerged from their mediaeval environment; and the 
linguistic and cultural patchwork of early modern Europe was calculated 
to provide endless occasions for conflict between rival nationalisms 
conceived primarily in linguistic/cultural terms. These twin dangers 
could be averted only by the emergence of a national loyalty focussed 
primarily upon the state as a discrete political and territorial entity 
- a development which, Hinsely argues, was in general the product of the 
16th to the 18th centuries. National consciousness itself had much 
earlier roots, in the lengthy process of mutual adjustment between states 
seeking to break ’down competing loyalties within their asserted boundaries 
and subordinate communities seeking to resist their encroachments. But 
it was only in this latter period, when 'relations between states 
replaced relations within the body - politic as the paramount influence 
on the concept of the nation', that there occurred 'a steady shift away 
from the cultural and linguistic criteria of the nation as a concept, 
towards the definition of the nation in political and territorial terms'. 
This development, in turn, was inextricably connected with the 'shift from 
imperialism to coexistence [which] inaugurated or heralded the modern 
career of the states-system'. For only through lengthy practical experience 
of 'the law of diminishing imperial returns' among a constellation of 
states of approximately equal weight and territorial efficiency could the 
newly exalted principle of raison d ’etat be tamed by the corrollary 
principle that each state's 'imperialism' could not legitimately exceed 
its established boundaries.49
Thus the emergence of reasonably integrated national communities 
focussed around newly powerful proto-bureaucratic states made possible 
a situation in which, on the one hand, the goal of the 'control and 
protection of Christendom' could gradually disappear from practical
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political calculations without, on the other, giving way to a simple 
scramble among major states for outlying territory untempered by any 
conception of 'legitimate national interest'. But this process also 
meant that 'national' objectives could no longer remain the exclusive 
preserve of hereditary monarchs, and that the state itself became an 
unprecedented prize in the internal struggle to realize such objectives.
The 'modern career of the states-system', therefore, was linked directly 
to the career of an even more modern phenomenon - the political and 
social revolution. In Tilly's words:
In the West of the past five centuries, perhaps 
the largest single factor in the promotion of 
revolutions and collective violence has been the 
great concentration of power in national states 
... over the span of European history, one can 
see a long slope of resistance to central control 
followed by a fairly rapid transition (mainly in 
the nineteenth century) to struggle for control 
ovev the central state. In the records of collective 
violence, this shows up as a decisive shift away 
from localized tax rebellion and the like to 
conflicts involving contenders articulating 
national objectives, organized on a national scale, 
and confronting representatives of the national 
state.
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Of course, if the consolidation and territorial spread of the modem 
bureaucratic state has been one of the great world-historical themes of 
the last two centuries, the consolidation and territorial spread of the 
modern industrial economy has been the other. In this regard (as indeed 
in regard to the development of the modern state) the crucial phenomenon 
is uneven development; and here too we can observe a complex dialectic 
between the processes of domestic and international politics.
On the one hand, as Hinsley points out, uneven development has 
persistently threatened the always provisional achievement of the territorial 
state and the selfconscious notion of stable interstate coexistence built 
upon it. This conception of the states-system survived, and was indeed 
strengthened by, the challenge of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars; 
but it was seriously threatened, throughout the ensuif)^ century, by a 
resurgence of the linguistic and cultural concept of the nation. Separate 
in origin to, and never acquiring 'any but a coincidental association' 
with, the contemporaneous movement for the democratization of the 
state unleashed by the Dual Revolution, this concept nonetheless flourished, 
and inflicted defeats on both liberalism and socialism, wherever economic
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development was both 'sufficient to produce discontent with existing 
political forms [and] insufficiently advanced or insufficiently rapid 
to permit the state to make progress with the assimilation of its 
various peoples'.51 However, its achievement, in Alfred Cobban's words, 
was almost totally confined to 'state breaking', as opposed to 'state
tr omaking'. Its inadequacy in the latter role was graphically illustrated 
by the fortunes of the East European succession states established by 
the World War I settlements. These certainly left 'far more individuals 
... ruled by their "own people" than previously'. But, in the near total 
absence of social and economic conditions conducive to integration, they 
provided fertile ground for the spread of quasi-Facist ideologies, and 
vulnerable targets for the Nazi regime which, in its own exploitation of 
pan-German sentiment, realised the full potential of cultural nationalism 
as an engine of universalist imperialism5-3
These problems persist in the contemporary states-system, and on a 
vastly expanded scale. Admittedly, there has been the impressive durability, 
noted by Mayall, of the convention of mutually recognized 'stateness' 
among the constuent units. The fragile legitimacy of many post-colonial 
regimes has ensured that European state theory - 'necessarily scornful of 
culture' - achieved a 'success in non-European markets [which] has been 
overwhelming';54 and this has helped to buttress a Third World consensus 
that self-determination should be a once only process, which to date has 
withstood all major Secessionist challenges which have not attracted the 
active support of a substantial outside power. But, equally, the positive 
process of 'state-making' necessary to supplement such a position has 
scarcely begun in many areas. For these states, as Hinsley points out, 
have emerged in conditions reminiscent not of 19th century Eastern Europe, 
but of Europe in general before the first wave of modernization in the 
17th century; and within their societies the existing 'political loyalty 
wavers uneasily between pan-ism and tribalism' - forces with which the 
existing regimes are often impelled to compromise, despite the negative 
implications for their task of national integration.55
However, while uneven development has in this sense generated 
powerful centrifugal tendencies within many of the weaker and more 
vulnerable units of the modern states-system, it has on the other hand 
called forth, among backward but potentially great powers, successive 
demonstrations of the transformative capabilities of the centralizing
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state applied to the industrial economy. First in Japan and a newly 
unified Germany, and then more profoundly in the Soviet Union and 
China, it was demonstrated that laissez-faire constituted not the 
essential model for all successful attempts at large-scale industrialization, 
but more simply the only economic framework within which such 
industrialization could have emerged in the first instance. 'Initially', 
as Gellner observes,
there is no question of doing it collectively 
because there was no question of doing it 
knowingly at all ... But once the opportunities, 
the enormities, and also the dangers and 
difficulties are appreciated, it is far more 
plausible that the effort should be inspired 
and supervised from above. Who is to wait for 
the operation of the Hidden Hand? It is in 
the main conspicuous by its absence.
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Moreover, the Soviet achievement - despite its enormous costs and 
its manifest links to the earlier tradition of 'revolution from above'
- established not merely the state but the revolutionary party as a 
plausible protaganist of this process. As Otto Kirchheimer points out 
(and as Lenin himself readily acknowledged) the transformation of the 
state by crises such as World War I has also effected a major breach in 
the 'confining conditions' which earlier revolutionaries faced even 
after the successful seizure of power. While, on the one hand, the 
dislocation of war and economic crisis provides revolutionary movements 
with special opportunities to seize the state, on the other they stand 
to inherit the intellectual, technical and organizational equipment to 
direct the country's human and natural resources towards planned programmes 
of social transformation, as well as 'endlessly and technically refined' 
propoganda supports for their task of mobilizing the masses. Thus
the revolution of the 20th century obliterates the 
distinction between emergency and normality ...
Under these conditions Soviet Russia could carry 
through simultaneously the job of an economic and 
political, a bourgeois and a post-bourgeois 
revolution in spite of the exceedingly narrow 
basis of its political elite.
5 7
Of course, it would be ridiculous to predict a rash of such great
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revolutions in the Third World over the next 10-15 years, or to depict 
Communist-style revolutions as the obvious strategy for overcoming the 
confining conditions of transitional development in general. Despite 
the exceptional national resources underpinning them, both the Soviet 
and Chinese revolutions were profoundly shaped, and deeply compromised, 
by structural constraints reaching back to the initial emergence of a 
revolutionary situation;58 and the Kampuchean tragedy has demonstrated 
that an attempt to disregard domestic confining conditions by an ill 
prepared and extremely unrepresentative elite, catapulted into power 
by circumstances largely extraneous to the society in question, can lead 
to unmitigated disaster. Nonetheless, there are reasons for believing 
that the telescoping together of the processes of state-making and 
economic development in contemporary transitional societies may also lead 
to a corresponding blurring of the distinctions between 'normal' and 
revolutionary politics in such contexts.
The key to the argument is the acceptance of an essentially political 
view of the revolution. Great revolutions, like the great wars with 
which they are often associated, are 'distinctive conjunctures of socio- 
historical structures and processes', which must be comprehended 'as complex 
wholes ... or not at all'.59 But they are extraordinary because they 
reflect an extraordinarily complex conjuncture and not - as the 'breakdown' 
theories of mainstream American social science would have it - because 
they represent an aberrant or diseased state of social interaction. 
Revolution, like war, is the continuation of politics by other means, 
reflecting 'ongoing contests for resources, influence and hegemony 
previously managed within existing diplomatic channels'.60 From such 
a perspective, Rod Aya argues, it is possibly to identify 'three distinct 
exp licanda' typically collapsed together in breakdown theories of revolution, 
- 'each of which can occur (and has occurred) without one or both of the 
others happening as well: the disintegration of the central state authority 
into multiple sovereignties; the transfer of power; and the capacity of 
ruling groups to foster societal transformation'.61
Each of these three phenomena is to some extent observable in the 
situation of the 'new states', not as a result of revolutionary upheaval 
per se but as part of their direct inheritance from the colonial or semi­
colonial past. In many instances, the initial transfer of power from 
the colonial rulers has been only the first, indecisive step in a series
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of equally indecisive transfers among competing sections of the 
indigenous elite. The prospect of rapid degeneration to full-scale 
multiple sovereignty has also been an ever-present threat, above all 
for those states grappling with the legacy of the unusually arbitrary 
boundaries established by the European colonial powers in Africa. And 
at least for those larger Third World states whose resources and/or 
geographical position accord them a central place in the calculations 
of the major powers, the choice of withdrawing from the roller coaster 
of industrial development is arguably not a genuine one. Their situation 
may fairly be described by Elbaki Hermassi's comment on the situation of 
the Bolshevik rulers in Russia: 'the goal of narrowing the economic gap 
[is] not arbitarily imposed by ... the elite, it [is] rather a fundamental 
claim on the regime and a condition of its ultimate viability'.62
Moreover, the international environment in which these states have 
been established arguably shifts the balance of costs and benefits in 
regard to the seizure of the state significantly in a revolutionary 
direction. One obvious implication of Tilly's and Kirchheimer's arguments 
is that, in long established nation-states, the very capabilities which 
make the state a glittering prize for groups seeking social transformation 
will also make it very difficult to seize from the existing power holders 
- which accounts for the close connection between great revolutions and 
the turmoil engendered by great wars. But most post-colonial elites have 
inherited 'the ready-made framework of a div'ig'iste state', thinly disguised 
by a 'patchwork' of democratic forms hastily manufactured in the last 
years of colonial rule.63 In such situations the potential value of 
the state may well appear to much outweigh the costs of attempting to 
seize it, particularly when the prospect of asymmetrical - or asymmetrically 
effective - support for contending factions by outside powers is added 
to the account. Of course, such outside intervention might decide 
the issue in favour not of revolution but of counter-revolution. But, 
from the perspective of this argument, the fundamental point is that 
the incentive to encourage it exists, and constitutes an autonomous 
'puli' factor exacerbating great power competition in regard to 'unstable' 
regions of the Third World.
For these reasons, I believe that it is valid to regard revolution 
as an extreme instance of the logic of transitional development in general, 
and to use the notion to identify features which may be present in wider
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transitional contexts, though not in the same critical conjuncture.
In the remainder of this section,therefore, I will attempt to work 
outward through three concentric circles of phenomena involved in the 
concept of transitional development: revolution, which may reasonably be 
expected in one or two important Third World countries in the next 
decade; forced-draught industrialization, which may be regarded as a 
likely project for all the major 'new influentials' in the Afro-Asian 
region; and state-making, which may be regarded as a problem for Third 
World states almost without exception.
The political concept of revolution adopted here has been developed 
in several recent works of comparative sociology and political theory 
whose authors have rejected both Dürkheim-influenced 'breakdown' theories 
of revolution and the simple 'rising class' schema of classical Marxism, 
while at the same time strongly endorsing Marx's general approach to 
revolution as a rational political activity explicable in terms of the 
balance of class and state forces.64 This perspective has been most 
formally expounded by Tilly, whose 'polity model' of revolution was 
referred to in the previous chapter. Building upon Trotsky's notion of 
dual power, and also upon the notion, originally advanced by George 
Lefebvre in regard to the French Revolution, of 'multiple semi-autonomous 
revolutions converging into a single Revolution', Tilly has identified 
the phenomenon of 'multiple sovereignty' as the key issue for the 
investigation of both revolutionary situations and revolutionary outcomes. 65 
Multiple sovereignty, on Tilly's account, commonly occurs when the normal 
pattern of competition among 'member' groups in the polity - the collective 
elite enjoying routine, low cost access to the government apparatus - 
degenerates into outright conflict resulting in coalitions between one 
or more member groups and outside 'challenger' groups seeking to press 
redistributive demands from below. 'In any event', as Aya observes in 
his succinct summary of this position,
multiple sovereignty effectively begins when 
mobilized political contenders - be they 
dissident elites, popular movements or a
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tactical coalition of the two - are rebuffed 
in their bid for authority - sharing by 
incumbent power holders, and then obtain 
practical recognition for their claims to 
exclusive legitimacy from important segments 
of the population at large. When, in other 
words, strategic groups in a given country 
are confronted with conflicting demands from 
both government and rebel authorities for 
taxes, troops, supplies and continuing 
allegiance - and deliver to the rebels, the 
revolution is on. It ends when, by victory, 
defeat, or partial accommodation of the 
alternative coalition, one group or alliance 
commands a stable monopoly over the concentrated 
means of coercion and taxation.
6 6
This is a fairly simple and commonsense schema. But as Tilly 
points out, it emphasizes and predicts very different features of 
revolutionary situations and revolutionary outcomes than do theories of 
the breakdown variety;67 and its implications also fit rather neatly 
with the inferences about the sources of political stability and instability 
which I have derived from the above discussion of the states-system. First 
and foremost, the political model emphasizes the basic point that in 
societies marked by a substantial degree of integration and economic 
interdependence, on the one hand, and by sharp inequalities in the 
distribution of costs and benefits, on the other, a centralized apparatus 
of coercion, redistribution and administration must always be a potential 
object of solidarist class struggle. This certainly does not mean that 
highly unequal social orders are incapable of long-term persistence - 
a proposition that is refuted by the most casual survey of the record 
of anczen vegzmes throughout the world. 'Repression works', as Tilly 
bluntly observes. Or as Moore, approaching the subject through the 
difficult notion of legitimacy, puts it:
People are evidently inclined to grant legitimacy 
to anything that is or seems inevitable no matter 
how painful it may be. Otherwise, the pain might 
be intolerable. The conquest of this sense of 
inevitability is essential to the development of 
effective moral outrage. 69
However, one can say that a broadly stable hierarchy of power, and 
a general cohesion on the part of ruling groups in dealings with the rest
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of society, are fundamental to the long-term continuity of such social 
orders. The potential for violent change is therefore inherent in 
those developments - central to the modern transition - which disrupt 
the cohesion of ruling groups while simultaneously altering the balance 
of forces throughout society. 'In the longer historical view', Tilly 
comments,
the changes which have most often produced the 
rapid shifts in commitment away from existing 
governments and established polities are processes 
which directly affect the autonomy of smaller 
units within the span of the government: the 
rise and fall of centralized states, the expansion 
and contraction of national markets, the 
concentration and dispersion of control over 
property ... Over the long run, the reorganization 
of production creates the chief historical actors, 
the major constellations of interests, the 
basic threats to those interests, and the 
principal conditions for transfers of power.
70
Second, to consider this question from the bottom up, it can be 
expected that the crucial mass actors in revolutionary situations will 
be those with some assets to defend, some resources to defend them with 
and some social 'space' in which to mobilize. 71 This point has been 
extensively documented in regard to the urban crowd, the declining 
artisan class, and the emerging industrial proletariat; and it seems 
equally true of the peasantry - the one invariant contributor to the 
coalitions which have made great revolutions to date. Both the view 
that peasant rebellions are merely elemental, unthinking responses to 
intolerable social conditions and the view that such rebellions reflect 
the impact upon a normally acquiescent peasantry of the moral dislocation 
and anomie induced by transition seem equally false. Within the context 
of an acceptance of the inevitability of the overall social order, the 
traditional peasantry sustains its own conception of a social contract 
in regard to its specific interests, and has its own 'little tradition' 
of rebellion - 'collective bargaining by riot' - in defence of those 
interests. 72 Moreover, Eric Wolf points out that it is precisely the 
middle peasantry - 'the main bearers of peasant tradition' - who are 
'most exposed to influences from the developing proletariat', and who, 
through their propensity to form coalitions with urban radicals, are 
'the most instrumental in dynamiting the peasant social order'.
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Emphasizing the 'decisive' importance of the peasantry's relation 
'to the field of power which surrounds it', Wolf concludes:
There is no evidence for the view that if it 
were not for 'outside agitators' the peasant 
would be at rest. On the contrary, the 
peasants rise to redress wrong; but the 
inequities against which they rebel are but, 
in turn, parochial manifestations of great 
social dislocations. Thus rebellion issues 
easily into revolution, massive movements to 
transform the social structure as a whole.
7 3
Third, there is the whole question of the relationship between 
revolutionary situations and revolutionary outcomes. As Tilly points 
out, the psychologistic underpinnings of breakdown theories suggest that 
the revolutionary situation itself must be marked by explosive violence, 
which, by providing a mechanism of 'tension release' for a morally 
disrupted society, should in turn give way to a fairly rapid decline of 
violence and a 'return to normalcy'. By contrast, the political (or 
'contention') model denies that large scale violence is necessary for 
the emergence of a situation of multiple sovereignty, but predicts that, 
once such a situation has emerged and been resolved in favour of the 
revolutionary coalition, a high level of violence will continue for an 
extended period as different segments of the coalition strive to 
realise their particular objectives in competition with erstwhile allies.74 
Furthermore, this emphasis upon the complex interplay of competing groups 
against the background of an extraordinarily dynamic and unpredictable 
course of events also repudiates the kind of reasoning which derives 
Stalinist totalitarianism from the 'ideological imperatives' of the Leninist 
(or Marxist) view of revolution. A revolutionary intelligentsia - cum - 
party is the most likely source of an overarching, future-oriented 
definition of a desirable revolutionary outcome (which will certainly not 
be produced by the ubiquitous revolutionary protagonist, the peasantry); 
but the definition so produced is likely to owe at least as much to the 
logic of the particular situation as to any directives enshorifl^ d in an 
ideological 'crib' of previous revolutionary experience.
A related, and highly important point is that if the initial success 
of a revolutionary coalition is not to produce merely the permanent 
fragmentation, or foreign takeover, of the state power for which the
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various contenders have fought, one group or faction must restore 
general ovdev, contain the 'revolution in the revolution', and direct 
the entire upheaval towards more or less coordinated national goals.
It has been above all the attempt to do this, without surrendering in toto 
their initial vision of socialist transformation, which has ultimately 
brought successful Communist parties into partial or total collision 
with the peasant forces whose actions have, in large part, produced 
the situation which initially enabled them to seize power. This need 
not always involve the party's attempt to smash peasant resistance to 
its desire for far-reaching social transformation, as in the Soviet case.
The party may also see itself as battling with 'adventurist' excesses, as 
when peasant radicalism threatened Chinese Communist efforts to conciliate
■7 Cthe 'national bourgeoisie'. But from either perspective the process 
involves both the attempt of a small elite to impose its programmes 
upon those masses which it claims to represent, ccnd. the attempt by the 
legatees of the state power to impose national priorities upon groups 
whose basic goals are not merely parochial but also, given the international 
conjunctures in which such revolutions typically occur, in large measure 
anachronistic.
This last point is developed most fully in Theda Skocpol's analysis 
of the three unquestionably 'great' modern revolutions: the French, the 
Russian and the Chinese. Skocpol's argument is particularly significant 
here because of the emphasis she places upon both the international 
dimension of revolutions and the potential autonomy of the state - and 
upon the intrinsic connection between these two factors. Criticizing 
Tilly and the recent group of structural Marxist theorists for failing to 
go far enough in this direction, she insists that the 'state's involvement 
in an international network of states' shapes its development as 'an 
autonomous structure, with a logic and interests of its own not necessarily 
equivalent to, or fused with, the interests of the dominant class in
7 6society or the full set of member groups in the polity'.
The specific interests of state managers are above all diplomatic 
and military, and when confronted with international crises they may 
initiate reforms and impose new financial demands which, because they 
threaten the established position not merely of subordinate but also of 
dominant classes, may in turn produce a revolutionary situation within 
the society. Moreover, she argues that such great revolutions have
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resulted in the emergence of a new, more professional group of state 
managers, who take up the uncompleted task of political and social 
reform in a context still deeply influenced by the structural constraints 
which had caused the attempts at reform to issue in revolution in the 
first place. 7 7
Though Skocpol suggests that 'in some sense, potential for social
7 8revolution has been built into all modernizing agrarian bureaucracies', 
she is in general cautious about extending her approach from large and 
politically ambitious states like France, Russia and China to the post­
colonial states of today. But her emphasis upon international, and more 
specifically geopolitical pressures does seem applicable to the situation 
of the group of Third World 'new influentials' upon which I have focussed 
here; and the notion of transitional state as an amphibious creature 
grappling with the multiple contradictions of the the two very different 
environments is clearly reflected in her description of revolution-prone 
ancien regimes. 'The state', she argues, 'is fundamentally Janus-faced, 
with an intrinsically dual anchorage in class divided socio-economic 
structures and an international system of states'. It is not the 
activities of domestic social groups alone, but their intersection with 
international pressures, and the manoeuvres of state managers to extract 
resources 'precisely at this intersection', which account for 'the 
political contradictions that help launch social revolutions and for the 
forces that shape the rebuilding of state organizations within social 
revolutionary crises'.79
This point leads outwards to the second set of issues mentioned 
above, concerning the project of rapid industrial development in leading 
Third World states. These 'follower' states, as Bendix has called them,( 
are placed in a deeply contradictory relation to the 'pioneer' states 
which have industrialized before them, and one can discern a sharp dialectic 
of necessity and choice in the situation confronted by their ruling 
elites.80 They are impelled towards the industrialization project by 
the pressures of a deeply hierarchical states-system and world-economy, 
by domestic population growth and the 'demonstration effect' of advanced 
industrialism on the expectations of their own populations, and - though 
this is the most contradictory factor - by developing national pride. They 
have, on the one hand, strong incentives to exploit the developmental 
advantages of 'backwardness' - the opportunities for 'skipping stages' 
in regard to technology, principles of industrial organization, scale of
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enterprises, and the like - noted by Alexander Gerschenkron in the 
experience of Germany, France and Russia. 81 But, on the other hand, 
they encounter a far more highly structured world-economy than the 
first great 'late-industrializers', a situation in which, many left-wing 
critics have argued, extensive control of advanced technology by 
transnational corporations is one more factor helping to lock Third World 
nations into a pervasive situation of structural dependence. Finally, 
the great Communist revolutions of this century have presented 
contemporary follower societies not merely with the opportunity to take 
over specific techniques from pioneer societies but also with the 
prospect of choosing between profoundly different modes of economic, 
social and political organization.
It is possible at the outset to specify one pattern to which 
the development of these countries in the next couple of decades will 
almost invariably not adhere: the combination of economic Zaissez-faire 
and liberal-constitutional government broadly exemplified in the Anglo- 
American experience. 'At bottom', as Moore observes, 'all forms of 
industrialization so far have been revolutions from above, the work 
of a ruthless minority1;82 and where industrialization must proceed amid 
intense pressures for rapid growth and without the environmental cushioning 
which assisted much of the Western process, an extensive resort to 
political coercion and to solidarist ideologies for the purpose of 
surmounting 'the rigours of the hump' seems inescapable. But even 
leaving aside this point - and Moore's impressive argument that a 
revolutionary assault on aneien regime social structures was a necessary 
preliminary to the emergence of the great Western democracies - the 
prospect of liberal-constitutional solutions in traditional societies 
is undermined by the simple necessity to choose, on the run, between 
modes of development with very different social implications for the 
foreseeable future. The logic of this situation has been nicely summed 
up by Gellner:
The crucial power in transitions is the power 
to decide which turning to take, being at the 
wheel at the big and rare road forks: generally, 
these turnings are approached only once, and 
the decision determines just what subsequent 
road forks if any, will be available ... In 
stable contexts, one can play for marginal 
advantages and accept defeat, tolerate opposition
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and refrain from pushing every advantage to 
the utmost, in the knowledge that tomorrow 
is another day. In transition, tomorrow is 
not another day: it is an other day altogether.
He who is in power now will mould that tomorrow, 
and hence control now is incomparably more 
valuable than the quite spurious hope of a later 
turn. Rival politicians in transitional societies 
like to think of each other as the local Kerensky.
8 3
These arguments accord with the general experience of Cold War
incursions into the pattern of Third World development, in that the
clients of the great powers have characteristically been distinguishable
not in terms of democracy or totalitarianism, but of the more or less
capitalist or socialist orientation of their similarly authoritarian
thettregimes. However, it is also abundantly clear by now^the Soviet 'model' 
per se is unlikely to attract much direct imitation in the Third World, 
any more than the Anglo-American example. Rather, there would appear 
to be three broad developmental patterns extant, which may be classified, 
following Hermassi, as national popular, state capitalist, and periphery 
capitalist.84 Of course, these are inevitably somewhat procrustean 
categories, which drastically simplify the contradictory political 
demands of a highly complex military, economic and social situation.
But with this proviso, I would argue that the larger and strategically 
more significant states considered here are likely to adhere, in general, 
to the middle ground of this developmental spectrum for the next decade 
or so.
The two extremes, for various reasons, both seem likely to attract 
a smaller number of consistent followers. The national popular road, 
with its emphasis upon 'self-reliance, egalitarian patterns of development, 
and a fair amount of mass participation',85 has normally been associated 
with political revolution; and though Tanzania stands as an exception to 
this generalization, it is supported by the record of Soviet illusions 
and disillusions about 'national democratic' states in the 1960s (an issue 
discussed in Chapter 5). Moreover, the goal of extensive self-reliance 
does impose heavy costs on all but the largest states, such as the Soviet 
Union and China; and China itself - which, Hermassi argues, is usefully 
regarded as the leading exemplar of the national popular road - has 
recently acknowledged these enduring costs with its limited opening to 
the capitalist World.
271 .
At the other extreme is the alternative of periphery capitalism: 
'development through greater integration within the world capitalist 
system' with heavy reliance upon export-oriented industries and upon 
adaptation to the investment strategies of transnational corporations.
This strategy would seem an unsatisfactory project for the populous 
and/or politically ambitious states considered here, despite the 
extensive support currently accorded it by Western economists and 
Western dominated financial institutions.86
In the first place, it is highly vulnerable to the vagaries of 
demand, and to political decisions on protectionist issues, in the 
advanced industrial nations; and it is also arguable that its most 
impressive exemplars to date - such as Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea 
- have been successful not merely because they benefited from a period 
of sustained boom in the world economy, but also because there were 
initially so few nations actively taking this road. Second, this 
strategy presents in its most extreme form the phenomenon of encapsulated 
capitalistic development in the Third World - a phenomenon which 
Clifford Geertz, has christened "Singaporeanization", to emphasize that 
Singapore has succeeded in part because it 'has actually managed to do 
what it is a practical impossibility for Manila, Jakarta, Delhi-Bombay, 
Beirut, Algiers, Rabat-Casablanca, Dakar, Lagos-Ibadan, Kinshasa or 
Nairobi - politically remove itself from any wider entity at all . . . '.
The two middle-sized countries which have followed this route for an 
extended period - South Korea and Taiwan - have enjoyed special 
historical advantages in respect of social and educational infastructure, 
and international issues have been a prominent factor making for 
ideological solidarity at least at the elite and cadre level. But each 
has been marked by a 'dualistic' social structure, and by the 
'marginalization' of the masses which accompanies encapsulated development; 
and South Korea has already experienced major revolts against the 
established regime. Third, extended subordination to outside investment 
strategies is likely to be unacceptable to states which, I have suggested, 
are impelled towards industrialization in part by international and 
geopolitical pressures. Again, Taiwan and South Korea are exceptions 
whose peculiar features support the wider argument. For their initial 
burst of industrialization took place in the context of direct geopolitical 
pressure from the two great Communist powers, while of the two great
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capitalist powers intimately involved with their development, the 
United States was a geographically removed patron in a period of global 
ascendancy and Japan, for its own complex of reasons, was not seeking a 
military position at all comparable to its economic capacities. Even 
in East Asia, the clarity of this situation is likely to be increasingly 
eroded in future, and the fluid power relationships in West Asia and 
Africa will make some measure of industrial self-reliance a probable 
goal for the more important states of the region.
All this suggests that the most likely broad strategy for such 
'semi-periphery type countries sufficiently large to aspire to regional 
hegemonic roles' is state capitalism - a strategy which, Hermassi 
suggests, involves 'a conflictual mode of participation in the world- 
economy ' .
It seeks to secure an independent developmental 
base for a country in the name of nationalism 
and populism. In this option a state seeks to 
redefine the terms of dependence through control 
of the foreign sector, economic diversification, 
the adoption of high technology, and at least a 
partial incorporation of a significant portion of 
the working population.
8 8
The most substantial experience of state capitalism to date has been 
in Latin America, where the record indicates that it is an unstable 
mode of development, subject to the emergence of major crises in the 
populist coalitions underpinning it, and an 'unintended alternation between 
revolutionary and counter-revolutionary elites'. The most recent overall 
trend has been towards reactionary stabilization policies in societies 
which have exhausted their early potential for 'easy' industrialization 
based on import substitution, and whose movement towards more export 
oriented strategies has overlapped with a period of world economic downturn. 
The result, in many important cases, has been 'the juxtaposition of 
renewed economic growth with deepening poverty' - with 'roughly 75 per cent 
of the populace excluded from the fruits of economic progress' - and 
with extensive political efforts to demobilize a working class partially
• 8 9mobilized in the earlier period.
Somewhat paradoxically, the case for state capitalism, and even 
periphery capitalism, as a potential engine of independent capitalist 
development has recently been taken up by dissenting voices within the 
structuralist and neo-Marxist debate. The point at issue is the implicit 
functionalist cast of much dependency and world-systems theory, which,
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taken to the extreme, suggests that it would be virtually impossible 
for individual nations to break out of the straight jacket of dependent 
development except in the context of the downfall of the system as a 
whole. This implication has been challenged, from a more conventional 
Marxist perspective, by Bill Warren, who argues that independent 
development - involving growth in strategic sectors, and growing host- 
country control over technology and foreign capital input - has begun 
to occur 'rather rapidly' in a number of Third World capitalist 
countries, opening the possibility of revolutionary change in the longer 
term. This position remains controversial within the neo-Marxist debate, 
but it has been cautiously supported by, among others, Wallerstein 
himself. Semi-peripheral countries, he argues, are by virtue of their 
intermediate position better able to take advantage of a period of 
general downturn in the world economy than either the core countries or 
those of the periphery tout court. However, there are also the strong 
pressures of 'competition between semi-peripheral states', and the fact 
that the successful 'promotion' of one or more countries to core status 
progressively raises the threshold for equivalent gains on the part of 
the rest - factors which may encourage a 'more politically "radical" 
stance' on the part of some semi-periphery elites:
Fearing that they may lose out in a game of 'each 
on his own' against the core powers, they may come 
to favour a strategy of collective transnational 
syndicalism which inevitably pushes them 'leftward' 
more in terms of international policy, but with 
perhaps some carryover in terms of internal 
redistribution. (A good example might be Algeria's 
aggressive role in the Group of 77, OPEC and elsewhere, 
combined with the moves internally towards 'land 
reform').
92
I will return to these questions at the end of this section. But 
first it is necessary to consider the last complex of issues nominated 
above, those of state-making and nation-building. I have already 
foreshadowed my acceptance of the argument that states make nations and 
not vice-versa, and that the sources of modem nationalism are to be 
located primarily in the social impact of the uneven development of 
capitalism - an argument which, as Tom Nairn puts it, accounts for 'the 
most notoriously subjective and ideal of historical phenomena [as] a
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by-product of the most brutally and hopelessly material side of the 
last two centuries'.93 Uneven development, Nairn argues 'is a politely 
academic way of saying "war" .... that "development war" (as one might 
call it), which has been fought out consistently since the eruption 
of the great bourgeois revolutions'. And within this framework of 
ongoing conflict, nationalism stands 'over the passage to modernity 
... as human kind is forced through ... it must look desperately back 
into the past, to gather strength wherever it can be found ...'.94 
Thus, when advancing capitalism 'smashed the ancient social formations 
surrounding it, they always tended to fall apart along the fault-lines 
contained inside them' - lines which 'were nearly always ones of 
nationality', occasionally ones of religion, and 'never ones of class'.95
This is a complex position, which is set out more formally by 
Gellner, who endorses Nairn's general argument, while denying that it 
has any particular connection with Marxism. 'The theory', Gellner points 
out,
does not replace 'class' by 'nation' as an 
explanatory notion: It makes the crystallization 
of 'nations' a consequence of (a) inequality,
(b) the situation in which, unlike pre-industrial 
conditions, inequality can no longer be easily 
tolerated, and in which (c) the significance of 
culture ('nationality'), in an economy requiring 
literate educated personnel, is very great.
9 6
The same basic logic, Gellner argues, accounts for both the state­
making and state-breaking dimensions of modern nationalism. On the first 
count, transitional development, by dissolving the cohesive structures of 
traditional societies, creates for the first time a genuine sociological 
imperative for a 'co-cultural' relationship between elite and population 
at large. The key to the satisfaction of this requirement, he suggests, 
is universal education in a common literate language. This language may 
normally be derived by raising to literate status a prominent vernacular 
of the territory in question: but in other aspects this 'nation-building' 
process has very little to do with the cultivation of existing ethnic 
and cultural differentia, which are often precisely what must be 
transcended.97 However, such differentia may promote powerful divisive 
forces, where 'the uneven diffusion of industrialization and modernization' 
impacts upon a pre-industrial 'empire' in such a way as to leave a large
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and culturally distinct group excluded from the developmental benefits 
beginning to accrue to the population of the more advanced section 
(or, alternatively, where the advanced section is itself a minority, 
and subject to political discrimination). Then, the emergence of a 
mass 'national' discontent will coincide with an overwhelming incentive 
for the intelligentsia of the disaffected group to mobilize a struggle 
for that 'national liberation' which - given the fact that intellectuals 
are no longer 'substitutable across frontiers' - promises to convert 
them from second class citizens to the ruling class of a new state.
But in either case, such 'nationalism is not the awakening of nations 
to self-consciousness': rather, in response to the 'needs for growth', 
it 'invents nations where they do not exist'.98
This argument, to reiterate, accords a pivotal role to the state 
in the development of nationalism in general. Indeed, even the formation 
of 'old, continuous nations' such as Britain, France and Spain can be 
seen as a contingent process which might well have produced very different 
territorial arrangements, and in which the state's violent extirpation of 
competing loyalties through pogroms, internal crusades, mass expulsions,
'Russifications' and the like was a central feature. However, m  much 
of the contemporary Third World the potential importance of the state, 
and of the orientation of state managers, is enormously enhanced by 
the fact that not merely a national community but also a coherent class 
structure in the Marxist sense remains to be created. 'Depending on the 
action of the state', asserts Alain Touraine, 'classes take one form or 
another. They do not preexist as political agents to the intervention of 
the state: they are determined by it'.100 In certain isolated instances, 
such as Saudi Arabia, a traditional ruling elite has survived to preside 
over a dramatic leap in economic power; but in general 'the weakness of 
traditional social classes and the distorting impact of uneven development 
have created conditions of political initiative and ideological space' 
in which political power passes to that least defined of all social 
groupings - the petit bourgeoisie. 101
These considerations also suggest that, in those circumstances where 
the system of rule is something more than a thinly disguised military 
dictatorship, there will be strong tendencies towards one party states 
with a quasi-revolutionary ideology and organizational structure. Especially 
in Africa, a multi-party system is liable to institutionalize ethnic and
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tribal divisions. And, more positively, the characteristic political 
tasks of a revolutionary party - of mobilizing previously marginal 
strata, on the one hand, and reducing the condition of multiple sovereignty 
through which it came to power, on the other - are tasks with which, I 
have suggested, the political leadership of almost all new states must 
grapple in some measure. One characteristic of extensive revolutionary 
situations, Tilly argues, is that they provide the revolutionary 
coalition with extensive experience 'in forging its own instruments of 
government independent of the existing holders of power. The party, the 
army, or the insurrectionary committee becomes the skeleton (or perhaps 
the blueprint, or both) of the new government'.102 Given the fact that 
most new states can look back to some form of 'revolutionary struggle' in 
the pre-independence era, and the continuing example of a small group 
of states in which the concept of revolution has a much more substantial 
empirical referent, the attractiveness of the 'vanguard party' concept is 
hardly surprising.
Finally, it is important to reiterate Hinsley's distinction between 
the political/territorial and linguistic/cultural concepts of the nation. 
The consolidation of existing Third World states within their established 
boundaries is in many respects an ugly and problematic process. But it 
conforms to the pattern by which nation-states have often been established 
in the past; it is in part a direct response to the pressures of the 
system of advanced industrial states in which the new states find 
themselves; and the defence of established territorial entities, against 
the multitude of irridentist and national-liberation claims to which they 
might plausibly be exposed, has been strongly endorsed by the regional 
organizations most obviously affected - notably the OAU. Within this 
context, I would argue that Third World ideologies which incorporate a 
substantial component of Marxism in their definition of 'national' goals 
are less of a threat to the stable operation of a global states-system 
than those which draw primarily upon the kind of religious pan-ism 
represented by the recent upsurge of 'political Islam'.
This argument should not be over-stated. Marxism-Leninism itself 
is ostensibly a pan-ism of a special kind. And, furthermore, Soviet 
foreign golicg (like American foreign policy) has been quite opportunistic 
in this respect, readily exploiting pan-Islamic and pan-Arab sentiment 
against Egypt, for instance, when the Sadat regime chose to define
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Egyptiän national interests in a way which enhanced American objectives 
in the Middle East. Nonetheless, I would argue that the Soviet 'building 
block' approach to world revolution is, if anything, a factor supporting 
the integration of these transitional states into the network of the 
states-system - not merely because of its general statism and its emphasis 
upon matters of party organization, but also because of its bedrock 
association of economic -  rather than religious, racial or ethnic - goals 
with progress towards socialism.
It is now possible to draw together the threads of this argument 
about transitional development. The overriding point is that it is 
meaningful to speak of a 'national-liberation' struggle for states in this 
situation - a struggle involving, as Marxist-Leninists of all stripes 
have long insisted, both a political and an economic dimension. Hermassi 
expresses this point by contrasting Third World 'national revolutions' 
with both the democratic revolutions exemplified by Britain and France and 
the developmental revolutions exemplified by the Soviet Union:
What is at stake becomes clear through [a] brief 
delineation of intrasocietal backwardness and 
intersocietal dependency. Considering the 
weight of those confining conditions, the real 
task of revolutions in the new states can neither 
be to carry out the program of early democratic 
revolutions nor to fulfill the later developmental 
ones, but to create societies in which both kinds 
of accomplishments become possible ... the legitimacy 
of new regimes is primarily future-oriented and can 
only call for the most stupendous tasks of creative 
societal construction.
l o 3
Such a perspective suggests that, while the Soviet experience is 
patently not an appropriate blueprint for contemporary Third World 
development, it does remain an important general reference point, which 
illustrates an encounter with basic problems largely absent from the 
American experience. The claim that the Soviet ideological offensive in 
the Third World involves merely the attempt to graft an alien class-based
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doctrine onto essentially nationalist struggles rests upon a serious 
oversimplification of both Soviet Marxism and modern nationalism. As 
several writers have observed, the search for legitimacy in transitional 
societies effectively recreates the Slavophil/Westerner problem of 19th 
century Russia on a world scale; and Third World elites must (as did 
the Soviet regime in practice) grasp both horns of the dilemma simultaneously.1
Second, the complex structure of contemporary world politics makes 
it especially necessary to today conceive of revolution not as a 'single 
dramatic event' but as 'an extremely long-term struggle within and 
between increasingly more complex societies'; and to recognize in the 
spectrum of Third World development 'a plethora of possibilities for 
which the dichotomy - revolution/reform - is simply too restricted ...,105 
Even in Latin America and East Asia, to say nothing of West Asia and 
Africa, the processes of transformation discussed here must be regarded 
as far from completed; and the onset of more independent economic 
development among leading Third World nations must be situated against 
the enlarged social space created by the ending of Western/American 
hegemony in the Afro-Asian region, and by the striking access of economic 
power to the OPEC nations. Therefore, given the earlier argument that 
revolutionary action results primarily not from moral dislocation and 
anomte but from a dramatic extension in the opportunities available 
to previously subordinated groups to press their demands for radical 
change, there is no justification for assuming that the more advanced 
Third World capitalist states have passed the point at which their internal 
political processes can administer major shocks to the capitalist world 
order.
Of course, one must distinguish in this context between full-scale 
revolution from below and major changes of direction initiated from 
above as the result of a coup or a shift in allegiance on the part of 
an established regime. However, the concern here is not with social 
revolution as such but rather with the kinds of shift of economic and/or 
strategic alignment which are likely to provide occasions for confrontation 
between the great powers. Such shifts, I would argue, are likely to 
come from above in considerable numbers over the next 10-15 years; and 
even a couple more upheavals of the dimensions of the Iranian revolution 
may have a potent demonstration effect in encouraging bids for power by 
disaffected elites, and hedging of bets by established elites, in
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countries where similar constellations of factors appear to obtain. In 
this connection, also, it is worth noting that the suz genevzs situations 
in Southern Africa and the Middle East have caused a carry-over of 'first 
stage' national liberation issues into an era of growing Third World 
hostility to the operations of what remains an essentially capitalist 
world-economy. The Palestinian issue has already had the effect of 
pushing even conservative Arab states into more radical postures vzs-a-vzs 
the West than they might otherwise have adopted; and the South African 
issue can be expected to have a similar effect upon African states in 
the 1980s, while a revolutionary transfer of power in that country must 
be regarded as a serious prospect in the longer term.106
Third, (and this is a further general reason for believing that 
radical initiatives may come even from apparently conservative elites 
in the forthcoming period) it is essential to remember that they are 
exposed to a variety of contradictory situational logics and inherited 
frames of meaning, which cannot adequately be depicted in terms of any 
one all-embracing scheme (whether of the states-system or of the world- 
economy) . Thus, while it is in one sense true to say that such elites 
have been successfully co-opted into the states-system by the attractions 
of the convention of sovereignty as a bulwark of their own positions 
against domestic rivals and against each other, it is also true that 
they have increasingly demonstrated their ability to utilize that 
convention as a collective resource in pushing for alterations in the 
world structure of economic power. Conversely, while the control of 
strategic economic sectors or the political mobilization of the masses 
might be supposed to be of no concern to mere 'liaison elites' presiding 
over a particular segment of the world-economy, such issues might be 
expected to be prominent concerns of state managers disposed to assert 
a claim to regional autonomy and/or hegemony within a world of states. 
Moreover, as Hermassi suggests, the fluidity of class structures greatly 
increases the importance of culture and ideology as factors in the 
development of Third World states; and here too it might be expected 
that African and Asian elites will have, in general, much less reason 
to identify themselves with the values and structures of a Western 
dominated states-system/world-economy than those Latin American elites 
in regard to whom the notion of 'liaison' status was initially formulated.
Finally, the concern here is not merely with what is actually done
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in the Third World but with great power perceptions of what is done and 
expectations about what might be done in the future. Although the 
arguments advanced here do suggest a continued erosion of a Western 
political and economic position which remains, on a global scale, a 
highly privileged one, they do not necessarily suggest substantial divect 
gains either to the Soviet Union itself or even to a distinctively 
socialist world revolutionary process. However, as Burns has emphasized, 
world politics is a 'conversation' operating on a multiplicity of levels 
and in a context of 'radical uncertainty', in which all participants 
are compelled to impute not merely current but future intentions and 
capabilities to their various co-respondents.108 Thus in an era in 
which revolution has once more been placed 'on the agenda' of world 
politics, and in which, moreover, one of the two great powers still 
professes its commitment to world revolution as a central goal, while 
the other has evolved an elaborate doctrine of multi-level 'deterrence' 
of threats to the status-quo, the great power relationship may be severely 
strained by contingencies much below all-out revolutionary change. As 
Hermassi puts it:
The world historical character of revolutions 
means, among other things, that they introduce 
political ideals and principles of legitimacy 
to existing power arrangements that are 
threatened by their explosive novelty and demands 
for societal restructuring. They exert a 
demonstration effect far beyond the boundaries 
of their country of origin, and have a potential 
for triggering waves of revolution and counter 
revolution within, as well as between, societies.
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In this section, I have considered this phenomenon from the inside, 
attempting to show that international pressures are calculated to promote 
extreme, and possibly revolutionary politics in contemporary transitional 
states. In the two remaining sections, I will attempt to re-establish the 
wider context, placing the phenomenon of transitional development first 
against the backdrop of the evolution of the states-system in general, 
and second against the evolution of great power relations in the post- 
World War II era.
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The States-System in Transition
The notion that the contemporary era has witnessed or is witnessing 
a fundamental transformation of the 'international system' has been a 
common one in the mainstream American debate, with three major factors 
being variously adduced to account for this development. First, there 
is the emergence of bipolarity, which, Waltz maintains, has been regarded 
by 'almost everyone' as constituting a change of system - with a 
concomitant amount of attention being paid to the alleged return to the 
condition of multipolarity in the 1970s. This issue will be left to the 
next chapter, where I will be following Waltz in treating the great 
power configuration as fundamentally bipolar now and for the foreseeable 
future, but following more overtly classical theorists such as Bull in 
regarding the Soviet-American bipolarity as no more than an important 
stage in the evolution of a single modern states-system. Moreover, in 
keeping with the argument that hierarchy, not balance, is the central 
ordering principle of the system as a whole, I will be suggesting that the 
technical point of bipolarity is less significant than the concrete fact 
of the passage of great power status to two continent-spanning empires 
with very different orientations towards a predominantly capitalist 
world-economy.
Second, there is the phenomenon of nuclear deterrence, which again 
will be left to the next chapter. This is clearly of fundamental importance, 
but here too I will be downplaying those issues commonly emphasized in 
the American strategic debate - sophisticated strategies for crisis 
bargaining, signalling, and the manipulation of 'credibility' and 'commitment' 
in the cause of extended deterrence. Rather, I will be suggesting that 
the truly crucial theoretical question involves not these mechanics of 
deterrence - about which only a few obvious things can usefully be said - 
but the impact upon states as social and political entities of a 
situation in which preparations for central war are kept before the public 
consciousness as never before, but in which neither side can now embark 
upon such a war with any reasonable expectation of emerging with a 
recognizably intact civil society - even in the event of its own 'victory'.
These qualifications lead on to the third major factor commonly 
invoked as a cause of actual or potential system transformation in the
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Contemporary era - global interdependence. The concept is a vague one, 
in which the new tensions of the 'Trilateral' relationship, the 'North-South' 
confrontation, and the still limited participation of the socialist 
countries in the capitalist world-economy are reconciled at the level of 
rhetoric rather than that of theoretical analysis. But the vagueness 
is in part the result of an attempt to address a number of genuinely 
crucial structural changes in terms of a concept which - because it is 
essentially abstract and synchronic in character - cannot adequately 
accommodate them. Insofar as there is a concept of global interdependence 
(and such a concept would seem essential to any claim on these grounds 
about the transformation of the international system as such) it must 
in turn incorporate a recognition of the interplay among three aspects 
of the global transition described by Barraclough: the qualitative 
alteration in great power strategic interdependence resulting from nuclear 
weapons; the universalization of the great power adversary relationship 
resulting from the global extension of the states-system; and, also 
stemming from this latter factor, the emergence of a multitude of 'new 
states' in an extensive region of the world-economy which lay, until 
recently, largely beyond the boundaries of 'international society'.
Without the assumption that the great powers now effectively checkmate 
each other on a world scale - while still jointly providing a structure 
of constraint upon undue military adventurism by powers of intermediate rank 
- it would be logical to expect the growing 'salience' of economic issues 
to result not in a more pacific era of international 'low politics' but 
in an era of neo-mercantilist imperialism. And without an acknowledgement 
that the basic novelty of North-South interdependence lies in the fact 
that there are now, in at least some instances, two effective sides to 
an economic relationship - between core and periphery - which was always 
intensely politicized, the true character of the growing salience of 
economic issues in this context is distorted beyond recognition.
Stated in these terms, the notion of interdependence does direct 
attention to fundamental aspects of contemporary world politics which are, 
in general, merely kept at arms length rather than genuinely confronted 
in recent restatements of the classical paradigm of the states-system.
But the interdependence argument is not mormally stated in these terms.
In the first place, as Tucker points out, interdependence theorists have 
never really come to grips with the problem of order in an international
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environment which, even if increasingly interdependent, remains 
fundamentally anarchical. Rather, relying implicitly upon a kind of 
Cobctemte commercial functionalism (and,one might add, upon Durkheimian 
assumptions about the growth of 'organic solidarity'), they have assumed 
'that interdependence itself is largely constitutive of order, that an 
interdependent world must establish its own set of rules and constraints, 
and that this order does not include force, the ultima ratio that 
characterized and defined the traditional system'.110 Admittedly the 
association of 'complex interdependence' with harmony of interest has 
recently been downplayed by Keohane and Nye, and there has emerged a 
'managerialist' school on this question analogous to the managerialist 
school of modernization theorists. But even these more sophisticated 
accounts tend to evade questions of structure, and to obfuscate the 
central role of inequality, of both military and economic power, in 
the contemporary world order.
In the second place, interdependence theorists have sought to establish 
the novelty of their theoretical enterprise by contrasting it to a 
machtpolitik caricature of Realism, which ignores the notion of 
international society so central to the more substantial accounts of the 
classical approach to the states-system. 111 Thus Keohane and Nye, starting 
from the standard behavioural dichotomy between structure and process, 
insist upon the need for a concept of international regimes as 
'intermediate factors between the power structure of an international 
system and the political and economic bargaining [process] that takes place 
within it'; and they argue that Realism cannot adequately explain 
contemporary 'regime change' because it fails to 'differentiate significantly 
among issue areas in world politics', and assumes as the 'basic dynamic' 
of the system that changes in the 'overall structure' of military power 
will lead directly to appropriate changes in 'the rules that comprise 
international regimes' . 112 However, the Rationalist strand of the 
classical tradition already offers its own richer and more historically 
grounded conception of 'international regimes' - in the sense of the 
institutionalized practices of the states-system. And so far from taking 
the structure of military power as the key to international order, 
theorists of this persuasion have sometimes placed such emphasis upon the 
importance to the traditional system of an elite 'international culture' 
of Christendom/Europe as to imply that the absence of such a unifying 
culture constitutes the key to the manifold challenges to the global
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international order of today.*
These criticisms point the way to an alternative approach which 
preserves the recognition of the fundamental importance of economic 
interdependence (combined with massive inequality) in the contemporary 
world, without postulating the transformation of an all-embracing 
'international system' abstracted from its concrete temporal and spatial 
context. First, it is important to focus upon the specific and limited 
concept of the states-system outlined earlier. Strictly speaking the 
states-system is nothing more than a persistent system of political 
practices (or pivotal, and exceptionally durable 'international regime'); 
but, more loosely, it is a political association of states ('a real 
society of notional entities') whose interactions as states are 
characteristically managed in terms of its central practices of war, 
great power hegemony, the balance of power, diplomacy and international 
law. The central feature of the contemporary system is that the formal 
membership of its political association has expanded enormously, and 
that its practices have been greatly extended in geographical scope to 
become the putative foundation of a global political order. The question 
at issue, therefore, is not the transformation of an all-embracing 
international system, but the place of the states-system tn 'the 
transition' occasioned by the global outreach of European economic and 
military power in the last century - and it is a question to which the 
Leninist theory of 'imperialism' and the accompanying 'world crisis' of 
capitalism has obvious relevance.
Second (and in keeping with the position developed earlier on the 
monism/pluralism debate), a conception of overall structure remains 
indispensable to clarity in the investigation of individual issue- 
structures. But it is necessary to insist upon ttio 'overall' structures 
in contemporary world politics - the structures of military and of economic 
power, underpinning the states-system and the world-economy respectively. 
This approach entails rejecting, on the one hand, the attempt to directly 
confront an unmediated multitude of issue structures and, on the other, 
the inclination of classical theorists to apply an impressionistic 
conception of 'overall power' to the ranking of states within the single 
framework of the states-system.
As regards the latter, admittedly, it is possible to discuss the 
'classical' period of the European system in terms which combine the sense
* This comment is also applicable to ostensibly Realist theorists 
such as Morgenthau and Kissinger.
285.
of paying due attention to the complexity of overall power with a 
generally coherent ranking of powers based ultimately on estimates of 
their m'lX'itcivy efficacy. This is in part because differences in 
organizational effectiveness among the absolutist monarchies (as between 
Prussia and Russia, for instance) could have a substantial impact upon 
their relative military effectiveness; in part because the enormous 
impact of differential industrial capacity did not make itself truly felt 
until the advent of the 'second' Industrial Revolution in the late 
19th century; in part because Britain, the one power which did gain an 
early lead in industrial development, had strong geopolitical incentives 
not to throw its full weight into the continental struggle; but above 
all because the world-economy of this period was 'another country' from 
the states-system not merely functionally but always to some extent 
geographically. 'Throughout its development', Wight observes,
the economic horizon [of the modern states-system] 
has stretched beyond the limits of diplomacy.
Commerce has cast a nimbus of activity and 
connexions round the political system prefiguring 
as it were the next stage of its outward growth, 
whether that came about through colonial expansion 
or the admission of peripheral states to membership.
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In other words, the periphery of the world-economy has always run 
ahead of the periphery of the states-system (a factor which in part 
accounts for the special relationship of Britain to the other powers 
of the European core). But this geographical asyntnetry was terminated 
by the 'new imperialism' and the subsequent anti-colonial revolution; and 
this development, together with the insatiable resource demands of the 
advanced industrial societies, has bestowed upon a number of 'new state' 
actors in contemporary world politics a degree of economic power grossly 
disproportionate to their present and foreseeable military power. Of 
course this new 'power of the weak' is ultimately dependent upon the 
persistence of an international order in which their assertion of sovereignty 
over resources within their territorial scope is normally respected by 
the strong. And while one certainly should not discount the importance 
in this connection of egalitarian sentiments within the advanced societies, 
or the recognition on the part of the leaderships of those societies that 
the alternative to an international regime of general non-intervention 
might be chaos, it seems fair to argue that the bedrock constraint upon
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the strong is the Soviet-Western division on the future of the world- 
economy mentioned earlier.
Moreover, this division, in turn, directly reflects the structural 
transformation in the relationships of great and major powers in the 
contemporary era. Precisely because the Soviet Union is so large (and 
also because of the nuclearization of military capabilities) it can 
effectively match an American rival with almost twice its GNP, and 
overshadow major European and Japanese neighbours which are much more 
developed in overall terms. Because it stands closer to the 'hump' of 
industrialization and its leaders can call upon the political structures 
and solidarist ideologies forged while surmounting that hump under 
adverse conditions, they will probably be able to sustain the 
disproportionate burden involved in maintaining great power status in 
the intervening period before Soviet economic actuality truly begins 
to reflect Soviet economic potential. For the duration of this power 
transition, and of the associated power transitions of China and the 
leading Third World powers, the conception of the states-system and 
the world-economy as two interdependent but partly contradictory 'realms' 
occupying the same geographical space will remain an indispensable one.
Third, it must be emphasized that, since economic interdependence 
is not in itself constitutive of political order, the persistence of 
reliably 'hardshelled' and self-centred states is a structural prerequisite 
for the persistence not merely of the contemporary states-system but also 
of the contemporary world-economy. If it were the case, as many 
interdependence theorists imply, that the state was being 'slowly but 
surely drained of its autonomy' as an actor in a world of states, 114 then 
the end result of this process (in a world of massive cleavages along 
economic, racial, religious and ideological lines) would be not a Cobdenite 
utopia of pacific free trade but a 'new mediaevalism' which, as Bull 
suggests, would be likely to produce 'more ubiquitous and sustained 
violence and insecurity than does the modern states-system' . 115
The quality which, for the purposes of this argument, makes for 
a hardshelled state is one quality which is susceptible to empirical 
testing, but only intermittently and on criteria much cruder than the often 
favoured ones of 'sensitivity' and 'vulnerability' interdependence, 
communication flows, and the like. The basic issue is patriotism, or 
whether, in the last analysis, the nation will fight for the state as a
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territorial and political entity (and also, for the major powers today, 
whether the relevant populations will continue to support defence 
postures involving the continuing risk of utter destruction to their 
civil societies). If states in general do remain hardshelled in 
this sense, then the system can be overthrown only by the physical 
destruction of its leading members or the successful imperialism of 
a dominant power (which may in future amount to much the same thing). If 
they do not - if, for instance, 'revolutionary defeatism' becomes a 
general phenomenon - then the states-system as such ceases to exist.
For the next decade or so, it seems safe to rule out any fundamental 
retreat from the use of coercive power by the great, and with it both 
the 'new mediaevalism' and the Cobdenite utopia (to say nothing of that 
perennial vision of world government which has enjoyed another resurgence 
in recent years). However, a much more plausible possibility is a 
modified version of the kind of intra-system imperialism, by assertive 
powers with only a tenuous sense of international society, exemplified 
in the history of early modern Europe. There would seem little reason for 
the great powers themselves to seek general territorial expansion (as 
opposed to the forcible control of specific supplies of important 
resources) in this period; but there is considerable reason to suppose 
that, given a general deterioration in the existing order, military 
expansionism would become a significant factor in areas (such as Africa) 
where national entities are as yet largely unformed. And among the great 
and major powers, such a deterioration could easily see an upsurge of 
mercantilist and ideological conflicts (with the second, perhaps, 
rationalizing the first), which were geographically overlapping rather 
than, as in the early modern era, largely confined to separate geographical 
arenas. For these reasons, therefore, I believe that the contradictions 
of contemporary 'global interdependence' and the prospects for accommodating 
them within established 'international regimes' should be placed against 
this wider historical background. In the remainder of this section I 
will briefly consider the evolution since the early modern period of two 
crucial relationships: between the states-system as framework for its 
constituent states and the state as framework for its constituent 
communities; and between the advance of the states-system and, running always 
before it, the advance of the modern world-economy.
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The point made above about the crucial importance of patriotism 
to the operations of the states-system may be expressed more fully as 
follows: for stability of expectations in a context of 'power politics' 
it is necessary that ruling elites be able to 'deliver' their respective 
populations in military contests for reasons of state, and be able - and 
willing - to keep them out of military conflicts over ultimate values.
It is often implied that this power politics pattern is the 'normal' 
condition of relations between states, from which 'revolutionary' eras 
of major ideological conflict constitute an unnatural departure: but, 
as Wight points out, this is not an historically-grounded inference but 
merely 'a statement of belief about the way international politics ought 
to go'.116 In terms of his 'long' history of the states-system (which 
encompasses the Reformation/Counter-Reformation era), he distinguishes 
three great periods of revolutionary power politics, roughly equal in 
time-span, collectively, to the three periods in which pursuit of reason 
of state has prevailed;* and if one actually takes the embryonic system 
back to the early 15th century, as both Wight and Mattingly are at times 
inclined to do, the enormous upheaval of the Hussite rebellion in central 
Europe also comes into the picture. In each of these 'recurrent waves
of international revolution', Wight observes, the prevalent aspect of 
international society has moved from that of a 'loose company of sovereign 
states' to that of a 'more organic unity' - but a 'unity sharply broken 
by a horizontal fracture', which transforms the balance of national and 
international loyalties and 'blurs the distinctions between war and peace,
1 1 ninternational war and civil war, war and revolution'.
Several important points may be made about such periods of 
international conflict over ultimate values. First, there has 
characteristically been a close association between the ideological conflict 
and the conscious imperial thrust of a temporarily dominant power; and 
such periods are sometimes characterized as a simple struggle between 
revolutionary forces, seeking to overthrow the system in general, and 
legitimist powers, seeking to defend it. But while this may be true of 
the conflict over the socio-political fabric of international society, 
the revolutionary challenge to the principles of the states-system is 
inherent in the nature of the conflict itself. The cuius regio principle
* Wight's suggested divisions are: non-revolutionary, 1492-1517, 1648- 
1792,1871-1914; and revolutionary, 1517-1648, 1792-1871, 1914-60. He also 
suggests 1559 as an alternative date for the beginning of the first 
revolutionary period.
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(in regard, each time, to a different manifestation of ultimate values) 
is effectively repudiated on both sides, and its reinstatement is 
primarily dependent on the conflict's being fought, or deterred, to a 
draw. The most serious challenge to the system, therefore, would be 
posed by the combination of an ideological sense of mission with 
preponderant national power; and in this respect the high Cold War period 
would seem to correspond more closely to the Hapsburg-Protestant struggle, 
where dominant power resided on the 'counter-revolutionary' side, than 
to the more commonly adduced example of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic 
Wars.
Second, the most obvious reason why major movements for social 
transformation issue into international military conflicts is that 
this is the only means by which they can make their way in a social milieu 
encased in the concentric structures of state and states-system; and the 
more firmly consolidated state and states-system become, the more 
inevitable it becomes that those movements which do make their way will 
be attached in some fashion to the national goals of a major power. In 
the still embryonic power structure of the early 15th century, the radical 
wing of the Hussites in Bohemia maintained themselves for almost 15 years 
as an independent military force whose field armies defeated five crusades 
and ultimately 'threatened all the surrounding countries'.119 In the 
Reformation/Counter-Reformation era, the social revolts against the onset 
of landlordism and absolutism - as distinct from the religious struggles 
which served the political needs of the Protestant princes - were isolated 
and suppressed with relative ease.120 The organizational reforms of the 
French Revolution, and its mobilization of the 'nation in arms', fuelled 
a further imperial thrust under Napoleon by a French state which had long 
been the dominant continental power, but only after the revolution as a 
movement for extensive social reform had already suffered its own domestic 
Thermidorean reaction. In this century, the Soviet experiment existed 
in a state of intermittent seige from 1917 until, it might be argued, the 
early 1950s - a factor which must be accounted, along with the Tsarist 
inheritance and the aims and methods of the Bolsheviks, as an important 
cause of the extreme statism which has characterized the Soviet variety 
of 'real existing socialism'. And similarly intense international pressure 
was exerted upon China and Vietnam, with China being invested in sequence 
by both the United States and the Soviet Union, and Vietnam by both the
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United States and China (in addition, of course, to the long rearguard 
action by the original colonial power - France}. In the modern states 
system, and above all in its contemporary phase, it is possible to 
extend to far-reaching domestic change Carr's comment about change with 
an overtly international dimension:
Power used, threatened, or silently held in 
reserve, is an essential factor in international 
change; and change will, generally speaking, be 
effected only in the interests of those by whom 
or on whose behalf, power can be invoked.
12 l
Third, the issue is not solely one of the justice or unjustice 
of demands for domestic change, but also of the impact of massive social 
change upon the 'legitimacy', and ultimately the stability, of established 
regimes. Although the imperial challenge issuing from the French Revolution 
was itself defeated, Wight observes, the 'theoretical attack upon the 
foundations of international society' with which it was associated - the 
replacement of 'tradition by consent, prescription by national self- 
determination' - ultimately became 'the new orthodoxy' on questions of 
international legitimacy.122 Indeed, if the concept of a world-historical 
transition proposed here is a valid one, the continued efficiency of a 
states-system dependent upon the existence of reliably hard-shelled and 
self-centred states could only have been imperilled by the triumph of the 
whole-hearted legitimist policy of the Holy Alliance. And similarly, 
without in any sense endorsing the Soviet position on national liberation 
as the wave of the future, it is arguable that the Soviet Union, by making 
a space in the international order for the emergence of collectivist 
forms of socio-political organization, has actually enhanced the prospects 
for its further evolutionary development as a system of states.
To pronounce upon what might have happened without the Soviet role 
would be straining the claims of counter-factual analysis. But the 
historical record does not offer very much support to gradualist 
perspectives on this question, whether in regard to the American role 
since World War II or to that of the great powers of the 19th century 
European Concert. Wight himself appears to support a gradualist position 
in regard to the delaying role of the latter, arguing that because the 
'second international revolution had been contained and long drawn out, 
it had not been so destructive as the first' (i.e. the Wars of Religion). 123 
Commenting upon Burke's ability to recognize that the religious wars
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had not dissolved, but merely introduced a degree of diversity into, 
international society, and his inability to recognize that a similar 
judgement might be applicable to the French revolutionary challenge,
Wight warns of 'the danger of certain kind of historicism' in the 
assumption that Burke's intransigence was entirely inappropriate. A 
'central paradox' of international society, he suggests, may be that 
the modification, rather than the dissolution, of its principles of 
legitimacy depends upon the existence of forces ready to fight against 
any change.12 4
It is, of course, part of the logic of this position that such 
modification would not occur at all in the absence of forces prepared, 
initially, to fight for total change. But furthermore, one's estimates 
of the costs of the 19th century delaying action against the movements 
for democracy and national self-determination must depend very substantially 
upon one's judgements about the relationship between this process and 
the great European upheavals of the early 20th century. Wight states a 
fairly representative Anglo-American position in his emphasis upon the 
Bolshevik revolution as an outstanding 'example of how personal force and 
doctrinal fanaticism can cut across the regularities of power politics', 
and in his argument that 'Communism evoked Fascism', with the two 
ideologies thereafter feeding on each other's hostility and polarizing 
international society.125 However, this interpretation would seem to 
overstate the independent contribution of the Soviet Union to the final 
breakdown of European international society, and to understate the 
contribution of those very forces of ancien regime persistence which had 
held in check the advance of liberalism during the 19th century. On 
balance, the more persuasive picture is that of Mayer, for whom the 
two world wars were 'umbilically tied' together as 'nothing less than 
the Thirty Years' War of the general crisis of the twentieth century', 
and were attributable above all to the persistence of a 'pan-European' 
ancien regime into the era of large scale capitalist industrialization 
by all major powers:
The Great War was an expression of the decline 
and fall of the old order fighting to prolong 
its life rather than of the explosive rise of 
industrial capitalism bent on imposing its 
primacy. Throughout Europe the strains of 
protracted warfare finally, as of 1917, shook 
and cracked the foundations of the embattled 
old order, which had been its incubator. Even
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so, except in Russia, where the most 
unreconstructed of the old regimes came 
crashing down, after 1918-1919 the forces 
of perseverance recovered sufficiently to 
aggravate Europe's general crisis, sponsor 
fascism, and contribute to the resumption 
of total war in 1939.
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The above comments on the question of the hardshelled state are 
concerned primarily with the development of 'mass' consciousness - with 
the attitude of various communities to nation and state, as opposed to 
religion, race or class, as militarily effective objects of loyalty.
But the issue can also be stated in terms of 'prince' consciousness - 
in terms of the attitude of state managers to their relationships with 
their national communities, on the one hand, and with their colleagues 
in international society on the other hand. The latter issue, in turn, 
may be divided into two: the conception of a neutral or instrumental 
international order, involving shared norms about legitimate limits on 
national self-aggrandizement, and the substantive 'international culture' 
deriving from the states-system's origin as the legatee of the ecumenical 
civilization of mediaeval Europe.
I have already argued that a consensus upon legitimacy in Kissinger's 
sense is an inner (or logical) necessity of international relations only 
among great powers in a period of extended equipoise, that such a consensus 
has in practice obtained only for limited periods in the history of the 
European states-system, that where it has obtained it has been confined 
primarily to the dealings of the great among themselves, and, indeed, 
that such moderation as has been acheived among the great has depended 
in part upon the prospects for compensations at the expense of the weak, 
above all on the ever-expanding colonial frontier. This last point will 
be resumed below, in the discussion of the states-system/world-economy 
relationship. But it is also worth emphasizing here that during the 
most obvious period of formal great power cooperation - the Concert of 
Europe years, 1815-1854 - the moderation of the ruling elites in regard 
to one another was further buttressed by their common fear of revolutionary 
movements, whether liberal or nationalist or both, within their own 
societies. Admittedly, the attempt of the Holy Alliance powers to employ 
the Congress system for the active suppression of domestic change broke 
down, both because their own ideological solidarity was undercut by more 
immediate national interest considerations and because the British were
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unwilling to be drawn into such a far-reaching interpretation of the
defence of the status quo. But as Carsten Holbroad points out, the
basic British position was not a liberal one, but a more circumscribed
form of conservatism; and until mid-century the great powers 'were
all ranged, if in varying degrees, against dissidence in their own
societies ... If they would rarely act together against revolution
because of their rivalries, they would never act against each other
12 8for fear of encouraging revolution'.
In this sense, the European lower class filled the role of intra­
system 'barbarians' for the ruling elites of the Concert powers, serving, 
as had the Turk in an earlier period, to moderate inter-elite conflicts.
Of course, after the general failure of the 1848 revolutions, the intense 
fear of radical social upheaval went into a lengthy recession, and 
nationalism was harnessed to conservative causes by politicians such as 
Bismarck and Cavour. But even the constitutional advance of liberalism 
and democracy, Mayer argues, was perceived by aristocratic state managers 
as a fundamental threat in the longer term; and the resurgence of this 
fear, in the 'latter-day aristocratic reaction' of the late 19th century, 
was a potent factor fuelling the imperialist fever and the intense 
national rivalries leading up to World War I.
Mayer's position - which identifies the 'over reaction of old elites' 
to their exaggerated fears of capitalist modernization and popular ferment 
as 'the inner spring of Europe's general crisis'129 - is a consciously 
polemical one, which may in turn understate the genuinely destabilizing 
impact of the new social forces. Moreover, it must be emphasized that it 
was not merely because of a changed social environment that fear of the 
masses no longer exercised a restraining influence upon great power 
relations, but also because, from at least 1900 onwards, the balance 
among the great powers was fundamentally disturbed in a way that it had 
not been during the Concert period. However, Mayer is persuasive in his 
insistence that 'the cult of war was an elite, not a plebeian affair' 
which, while successfully communicated to substantial sections of the 
middle and lower classes, did not arise as a 'spontaneous clamour ... 
among the presumably aggressive and blood-thirsty masses' Moreover, 
since World War I, mass-based pacifism has become a significant factor 
in the relations of the core powers of the states-system, initially 
among the Western democracies of the interwar period, and now again among
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Western European populations which see Europe as the one certain 
casualty of any head-on collision between the great powers.
This of course, leaves open the proposition that the Soviet Union, 
by virtue of its 'totalitarian' political organization, will be able, 
like the Axis powers, to exploit a one-sided abdication of military 
commitments on the part of the Western Powers. This proposition will 
be considered in later chapters; but for the moment I wish merely to 
emphasize the inadequacy of the view, advanced more or less strongly 
by writers such as Kissinger and Morgenthau, which establishes a link 
between the immoderation of contemporary world politics and the decline 
(usually antedated) of the aristocratic international society of the 
traditional system.133No doubt the emergence of mass politics has 
imparted an overtly 'ideological' tone to the relationships of the great 
amd major powers. But the more fundamental point is that those relationships 
have undergone structural transformations to which the practices of the 
traditional system and its central 'morality of consequences' provide no 
satisfactory answer. Above all, as Mayall points out, the enormous 
implications of nuclear war impose upon potential belligerents 'two 
conflicting demands': on the one hand, they must fight for 'limited 
political ends' which do not threaten the central nuclear balance; and 
on the other, they must fight only in defence, and not for self- 
aggrandizement, however ambiguous these concepts may be. 'Nowadays, it 
seems, states must fight only over fundamental questions, which they 
cannot safely do for the very reasons that were recognized in the Peace 
of Westphalia: 132 and if they cannot actually fight over fundamental 
questions, state managers are inexorably driven, in their attempts to 
justify the existence of weapons whose use could be justified only on 
such grounds, to direct against the opposing side the fear and loathing 
which might otherwise be directed against the weapons themselves.
Similar considerations apply to the evolution of the substantive 
international culture underpinning the prudential norms of the modern 
states-system. As Hinsley points out, both Christendom and the early 
concept of Europe had a strong contra-barbarians element, and an ambivalent 
relationship to the concept of international order as such. On the one 
hand they clearly buttressed the consciousness of a single international 
society among the European states: but on the other, they looked back 
to the single world society of medieval Christendom, and provided a
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natural reference point for would-be imperial powers proposing to restore 
Europe to its lost unity. In the 13th century, a more sophisticated 
conception developed which incorporated the operations of the states- 
system within a vision of Europe as a uniquely advanced unity-in-diversity. 
But this vision also carried a strong, albeit disguised, bias towards 
a particular kind of substantive world order, especially when filtered 
through the more pervasive pluralist assumptions of Anglo-American 
social and political theory. Ideas of this sort contributed one strand 
to the Social Darwinist ideologies which sanctioned the imperialist 
outburst of the late 19th century. And they also cast the 'semi-Asiatic' 
Tsarist empire in a distinctly ambiguous light, somewhere between the 
genuinely European members of international society and the Turk 
himself - a perspective which has been strongly revived in recent 
discussions of the Soviet 'bureaucratic police state' by Pipes and his 
colleagues of the hawk persuasion.134
This issue is important because the Soviet rise to full great power 
status in the contemporary system has coincided with the formal 
incorporation within its political association of the multitude of Third 
World states. It is now plainly impossible for a European international 
culture to provide the cohesive influence which it provided in the 
traditional system, and the 'diplomatic culture' of the world's diplomatic 
elites, while obviously significant in its own sphere, is too narrow 
(and indeed too European) to fill the gap. If contemporary international 
society is to recover some of the coherence of its predecessor, it must 
draw upon social and political ideals which directly acknowledge the 
unprecedented interpenetration of states-system and world-economy in the 
contemporary era. 'Such a perspective', argues James Mayall,
is provided ... by what may be called without undue 
exaggeration, the imperative of modernization ...
This new world view involves a set of shared 
positions and aspirations, which regulate or at least 
support participation in international society. They 
include a rather specialised notion of national self- 
determination as the basis of legitimate authority; 
a secular and materialist approach to social and 
economic affairs; a belief in and a desire for 
technological advance, and an ethical position which 
is, notionally at any rate, egalitarian.
I have already expressed the view that the modernization imperative
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'is an imperative for at least the strategically placed Third World 
states upon which the argument of this thesis is focussed. Nonetheless, 
it is difficult, after recent developments in Iran and elsewhere, to 
fully accept Mayall's contention that 'this myth of the modern industrial 
state transcends even quite deep ideological differences', along both 
East-West and North-South lines, 'about the route to be taken to the
I O Cearthly paradise'. It is therefore significant that the growing
evidence in recent years of fundamental hostility to Northern modes of 
development by influential forces in the Third World should have 
coincided with a resurgence of Soviet-American conflict over world order 
issues; and that the initiative in this resurgence has lain primarily 
on the American side, where exaggerated expectations of Soviet 
convergence in the 1960s and early 1970s have given way to an equally 
exaggerated characterization of the Soviet social order and the Soviet 
world view as atavistic survivals from a reactionary and imperialist 
past.
This is a difficult and contentious question, and the above judgement 
is directed less towards the concrete foreign policies of the great 
powers - for both have been notably opportunistic, if in a rather floundering 
fashion, in their responses to the growth of forces such as 'political Islam' 
- than to the direct ideological struggle between them, and its role in 
the legitimation of their respective defence postures. In this regard, 
a fine but important distinction can be drawn between the Soviet and 
American positions, along the lines of Waltz's distinction between second 
and third image explanations of international aggression. Soviet 
apologists, though very strong on the aggressiveness of American policy, 
have characteristically related this not to national characteristics 
but to the structural factors of capitalism and imperialism; and, as 
will be indicated in Chapter 6, the last decade has seen a growing 
flirtation with the none-too-Leninist notion that a capitalist United 
States, properly contained, might be indefinitely divested of its worst 
imperialist characteristics. By contrast, the view of the Soviet order 
as Tsarism writ large is a classic second image one, in that it identifies 
the Soviet Union as a special, maladjusted kind of state, with which stable 
coexistence is effectively impossible, and whose world order claims are 
no more than the latest rationalization of the ongoing alienation of a 
power permanently incapable of adjusting to the development of modern 
history.
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We may now turn to the second important relationship mentioned 
above, between the advancing states-system and the advancing world- 
economy of the modern era. One strand of thinking on this relationship 
may be dismissed at the outset - that which construes the military and 
political expansion of the Western nations as essentially a reflection 
of the innate expansionist dynamic of the developing capitalist economy. 
Not even the 'informal imperialism' of 19th century Britain or the 20th 
century United States can be satisfactorily explained without reference 
to the idiosyncratic goals of the relevant state managers; and, 
conversely, none of the postulated structural imperatives of capitalism 
- such as Lenin's emphasis upon the drive towards the export of surplus 
capital - can be convincingly reconciled with the record of the advanced 
capitalist societies in the post-colonial era. However, this does not 
dispose of the link between capitalism and imperialism. It does not 
provide 'much solace', Pettman notes, to be told
that capitalists do not have to behave in 
exploitative ways, that they simply prefer to 
do so, like 'water seeking its own level ...
[looking] out the paths of least resistance to 
profit - the most lucrative markets and 
investment opportunities, the least costly 
source of raw materials'. The line of least 
resistance (and maximum return) drawn across 
the last four hundred years by sharp capitalist 
practice may still lead to the inequalities 
apparent today. 1 3 7
Indeed, the argument can be made in rather stronger terms than this. 
Ultimately, it is 'real existing capitalism', like 'real existing socialism', 
whose characteristics are crucial to this analysis; and if those who seek 
to establish the imperialist dimensions of capitalism cannot legitimately 
appeal to the inner dynamics of a reified capitalist 'system', neither 
is this recourse open to those who would argue that capitalism, in its 
'pure' form, has no connection with imperialism. Modern capitalism is 
the social order which has been developed in and promulgated by the 
leading capitalist states of the modern era. And even in the case of 
Britain, which, as the first industrializing state, inevitably came at 
the process in a substantially laissez-faire fashion, the contribution 
of the state, and of the empire carved with the aid of the state, was 
crucial.
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Of course, in Britain's own case, mercantilism did give way in 
time to a golden age of domestic laissez-faire and of primarily 'informal' 
empire; and her economic predominance, combined with her partial 
detachment from the European balance of power, made possible a quarter- 
century period, roughly from 1848 to 1873, in which free trade 'became 
sovereign in the political economy of European and world capitalism 
... a brief parenthesis in the persistent reality of government 
regulation of economic life'.138 But this period, Hobsbawm argues, was an 
essentially transitional one, 'when both developed and underdeveloped 
sectors of the world had an equal interest in working with and not 
against the British economy, or when they had no choice in the matter 
...'. And one crucial underdeveloped sector which had no choice in 
the matter was India, 'the only part of the British Empire to which 
laissez-faire never applied', and a 'gold-mine' so vital to the empire's 
overall payments pattern 'that a great part of British foreign and 
military or naval policy was designed essentially to maintain safe 
control of it'.140
The Indian situation was merely an extreme example of the fundamental 
importance of naval power to Britain's wider imperialism of free trade.
In its dealings with the underdeveloped world, notes Hobsbawm, British 
industry 'in a sense ... expanded into an international vacuum, though 
parts of it were empty because they had been cleared by the activities 
of the British navy, and were kept empty because rival trading powers 
were unable to leap across the British-controlled high seas'.141 This 
British hegemony, of course, did not survive the challenges from other 
rising industrial powers. But an impressively similar general pattern 
appeared in the next major interlude of international free trade > 
inaugurated by the global preponderance of the United States in the 
generation following World War II. The relationship between the strategic 
reach of the American state and American economic expansion has been 
succinctly summarized by Huntington:
... the power of the United States government in 
world politics, and its interests in developing 
a system of alliances with other governments 
against the Soviet Union, China, and communism, 
produced the political condition which made the 
rise of transnationalism possible. Western 
Europe, Latin America, East Asia and much of South
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Asia, the Middle East, and Africa fell within 
what was euphemistically referred to as 'the 
Free World', and what was in fact a security 
zone. The governments within this zone found 
it in their interest: (a) to accept an explicit 
or implicit guarantee by Washington of the 
independence of their country and, in some cases, 
of the authority of their government; and (b) 
to permit access to their territory by a variety 
of U.S. governmental or non-governmental 
organizations pursuing goals which those 
organizations considered important.
142
The link between preponderant power and relatively free trade is 
no accident.143 If one looks to the traditional states-system for practices 
designed to regulate military competition in the peripheral regions of the 
world-economy, it is difficult to find anything other than a tentative 
agreement to insulate struggles in this region from the balance in the 
core. Some writers, indeed, have depicted the advance of the states- 
system as a simple expansion into a 'periphery of politically empty spaces' 
Wight has contested this 'orthodox answer', arguing that the states-system 
had, from the outset, a 'dual' or 'stereoscopic' aspect, involving 'two 
concentric circles, European and universal'.145 However, though he 
notes the tentative attempts by various European theorists to assert the 
natural law rights of infidels and barbarians, and the intermittent 
tendency of European sovereigns to treat on equal terms with formidable 
outsiders like the Turks, he suggests that the 'more regular and important' 
expression in diplomatic practice of the dual character of the states- 
system was the distinction between paix maritimes and paix continentales 
- most formally associated with the wars of the 18th century, but 
effectively dating back to the Peace of Cateau-Cambresis in 1559. On this 
occasion, France and Spain needed to safeguard their European peace 
from their continued conflict in the Americas, and settled on 'a verbal 
arrangement, which formed no part of the treaty', to establish a 
geographical line beyond which 'acts of hostility would not violate the 
treaty nor constitute grounds for complaint, and whoever was strongest 
would pass for master'. This concept of 'the "amity lines", which divided 
the zone of peace from the zone of war', was increasingly appealed to by 
other powers, especially England.
1 44
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Its original meaning was negative and concessive; 
it acquired a new interpretation, positive and 
permissive. 'No peace beyond the line' became 
almost a rule of international law, giving 
freedom to plunder, attack and settle without 
upsetting the peace of Europe. Its original 
application, moreover was to the West Indies, 
the realm of those whom Lorimer was to designate 
as savages; but it was soon extended to the East 
Indies, where the great European companies circled 
round the kingdoms of the barbarians.
146
But what if there are no barbarians? The implications of the closure 
of the colonial frontier - which loomed large in the thinking of both 
Lenin and German geopoliticians - have unfolded in stages throughout 
the century: the belated abandonment by the democracies of the Hoare-Laval 
proposal on the 1936 Abyssinian crisis (a quite reasonable 'compensations' 
measure by the canons of traditional great power practice); the 
decolonization process, which produced the phenomenon of an intra-system 
periphery of formally equal new states; the Suez crisis, which demonstrated 
the limits upon independent interventionist action by major powers below 
the rank of the great; and the further prospect, with the emergence 
of Soviet-American parity in the late 1960s, that outright intervention 
even by the great powers, clearly outside their respective spheres of 
influence, could be attended by unacceptable political costs. Wight 
himself comments (writing in 1971) that 'the amity lines have reappeared' 
in the Soviet-American contest, one of whose 'unwritten understandings ... 
has been that the peace of Europe shall be warily preserved while the 
struggle is pursued for influence and position throughout the Third 
World';147and I will be suggesting in Chapter 6 that the Soviet detente 
offensive, developed after the 1971 Twenty-Fourth Congress, incorporated 
some notion along these lines. However, the vehemence of the American 
response to Soviet assertiveness in the Afro-Asian 'arc of instability'
- culminating in the extravagant claims made about the implications of the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan - indicates rather that the general 
insulation of the central balance from Third World conflicts before the 
1970s should be attributed primarily to the existence of an American 
global preponderance which the Soviet Union was initially in no position 
to challenge. In the event, the development of 'rules of the game' in 
respect to the Third World contest was one of the more conspicuous omissions
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from the rapprochement of the great powers even during the high detente 
years, and the problem was carried through into an era in which not 
merely the tensions between the great but also the contradictions in 
the Third World have again been thrown sharply into relief. Some 
considerations on this issue will conclude the chapter.
Transition and Detente
A detente is a relaxation of tensions. An international detente 
is a relaxation of tensions between states. It should therefore be 
possible to reject at the outset the complaint sometimes voiced in the 
American debate that the Soviets offer no serious theoretical account 
of the substance of detente, elaborating instead on the dialectic of 
conflict and cooperation which, in their lexicon, constitutes Peaceful 
Coexistence. The concept of detente, like that of deterrence, involves 
little more than the definition of a situation; and there is, therefore, 
very little theoretical to be said about the substance of detente as 
such, though there is a good deal to be said about the kind of framework 
of interstate coexistence in which an extended relaxation of tensions 
among leading powers might be expected to develop.
Second, it should also be possible to dismiss a much more persistent 
American criticism which is one basic strand of the overall hawk case: that 
Soviet attempts to 'compartmentalize' detente, restricting it solely to 
the sphere of interstate relations, render the concept meaningless except 
as an instrument of propaganda. Thus Theodore Draper likens 'detente' to 
'appeasement' as a 'perfectly good word ... made unusable because it 
had been perverted in practice', attacking the 'schizoid' attempts to 
distinguish between spheres of interstate and intra-state relations, or 
between elements of conflict and cooperation in the former sphere, as 
'semantic games' which 'are hopelessly muddling and are contaminating all 
discourse on world affairs today'.148 However, this position reproduces 
in regard to the specific issue of detente the general error involved 
in extending the idea of an international system to embrace the whole 
of world politics. I certainly do not mean to endorse completely the 
official Soviet position on the distinction between interstate and intra­
state relations, which is undoubtedly self-serving and often contradictory.
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But it follows from all the previous argument about the logic and 
traditional practices of the states-system that, in a conflict-ridden 
international environment such as the present one, the prospect for a 
significant detente between the great powers must rest in large part 
upon their ability to distinguish a limited range of their interactions 
as states over which they can agree to cooperate despite extensive 
conflicts on other issues.
One important qualification should be made to this characterization 
of detente as an essentially tautological concept. An international 
detente is a relaxation of tensions without War; and a generalized detente 
among the leading powers of the system - as opposed, for instance, to the 
periods of relaxation among the powers of the European concert which 
followed the Napoleonic Wars and the Prussian wars with Austria and France 
- would be an unusual achievement. But such a detente was widely 
envisaged in the early 1970s; and, moreover, it was held to reflect 
the successful negotiation of a period of structural transformation which 
would, in the previous history of the system, probably have occasioned 
a major war. Indeed, it seems useful to adopt Alistair Buchan's 
description of this process - 'change without war' - as a touchstone for 
evaluating 'the detente' between the Warsaw and Nato alliances in general, 
and the Soviet Union and the United States in particular.149 But the 
argument here is that the most striking external manifestations of 
change in the early 1970s - the Soviet Union's emergence as a true global 
power and the new assertiveness of leading Third World states in their 
dealings with the developed world - were the reflection of a more fundamental 
realignment in the underlying structures of world politics which had been 
largely completed by the late 1950s and which, reaching back as it did 
to the turn of the century, had itself involved two world conflicts of 
unprecedented scale. Moreover, until the late 1960s the primary American 
response to the rise of Soviet power, and to the threat of Soviet/
Communist gains in the Third World, was one of political and military 
containment; and the new Soviet military assertiveness in the Afro-Asian 
region, coming on top of the 1973 Middle East war and the associated oil 
crisis, would seem to be the largest single factor behind the rapid 
souring in the approach to detente of successive United States administrations 
from 1975 onward. The basic contention, therefore, still stands. The 
detente, to date, has been not the basic framework of change, but rather
303.
a particular, and possibly transient reflection, in the relations of 
the leading powers, of a basic, long-developing, and often violent 
change of framework.
If it is not very useful to attempt to theorize the substance of 
detente as a relationship between the great powers, one might focus instead 
upon the substance of detente policies pursued by one or other of the 
great powers. Such an approach is adopted by Coral Bell. She defines 
detente as 'a mode of management of adversary power', and attempts to 
establish the factors which led, after 1969, to a shift from cold war 
to detente as 'the dominant mode or strategy of managing adversary 
relations in the central balance' - with special emphasis upon an 
American strategy, developed by Kissinger, which sought to employ a two­
pronged detente offensive to maximize American flexibility in the 
developing triangular relationship with the Soviet Union and China.150
The question of concrete detente policies is obviously an important 
one, and will be one consideration in the later discussion of the 
evolution of Soviet doctrine in the Khrushchev and Brezhnev periods.
But it would not be satisfactory as a primary focus for the argument 
developed here. On the one hand, overt policy positions on this question 
- especially on the American side - have fluctuated widely over the last 
decade, with both great powers reacting not merely to established 
capabilities and behaviour, but to imputed intentions and imputed future 
behaviour on the part of the adversary. On the other hand, I would argue, 
a preoccupation with the shifting surface of policy tends to distract 
attention from the underlying continuity of both the broad material 
situation and the broad world views of the respective leaderships - 
including, on the American side, the successive administrations from 
Nixon to Reagan. For these reasons, therefore, it seems more useful to 
relate the issue of detente to the broad structural concerns of this 
chapter as a whole, asking to what extent the altered material framework 
of contemporary world politics might be expected to create a mutual 
interest in extended detente between the great powers, and to what extent 
perceptions of such an interest might be modified by dominant conceptual 
frameworks in either case.
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I have already suggested that contemporary world politics may 
usefully be considered in terms of a material grid with four major 
components: the abstract structure of military power; the structure 
of geopolitics; the abstract structure of economic power; and the 
structure of differential stages of development. As regards the first, 
the argument here is that the global power configuration remains 
essentially bipolar, although the great regional strength of China 
and the growing conventional power of Japan have clearly established 
a multiple balance in the East Asian region, and the emergence of a 
United Europe would create a mutliple balance on a world scale. In 
addition, the bipolar balance of the post-World War II era has been 
much more stable than the multiple balance of the preceding fifty years; 
and the Soviet-American relationship itself is now more symmetrical 
than it was during the first post-war generation. It may therefore be 
stated that the 1970s, when the themes of emerging multipolarity and 
emerging Soviet preponderance vied for prominence in much of the 
American debate, actually saw the maturation of a bipolar configuration 
which had already provided the longest period of stable great power 
relations in this century.
These structural considerations help to clarify what might otherwise 
seem an anomalous notion: that of extended, generalized detente at the 
great power level. Both sides have invoked such a concept during the 
more optimistic years of the 1970s detente, with the Soviet authorities 
speaking of there being 'no alternative' to detente, and of making 
detente 'irreversible', and with Nixon and Kissinger speaking in rather 
similar terms about their proposed 'stable structure of peace'.151 
In a situation of multiple balance, such statements would be questionable. 
In such situations, detente is probably best thought of as a tnans'it'iona.Z 
stage in relations between powers, which might either lead on to entente 
and perhaps to informal or formal alliance, - as did the Anglo-French 
detente on colonial issues in the early 1900s - or else give way to a 
renewed period of heightened tension and perhaps, ultimately, to open 
conflict. However, this is not obviously true of a bipolar context, for 
it is part of the logic of such a situation that the great power 
relationship should also be, in Arnold Wolfers' words, 'the relationship 
of major tension'.152 It would normally require a large measure of
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ideological solidarity - such as plainly does not obtain in the Soviet- 
American case - to truly override such tension; and if such solidarity 
did obtain, the resulting entente between the great powers would bid 
fair to become a condominium of the great vis-a-vis the rest of 
international society - which might well seem from the latter perspective 
an even more nakedly hierarchical arrangement than that of a concert 
among the great powers of a multiple balance.153
Thus the view, sometimes encountered in the American debate, that 
a relaxation of tensions can have no lasting significance if it does not 
lead on to genuinely cordial relations ignores the special qualities 
of a bipolar configuration of power. On the other hand, it is also 
incorrect to suggest that there is no alternative (other than war itself) 
to an extended detente between the great powers. This is an alternative, 
which arguably has been more common in the historical record: namely, 
extended cold war. However, it is still reasonable to regard cold war 
as an unsatisfactory and perilous solution to the Soviet-American 
relationship in the period immediately ahead of us. In the first place, 
major cold wars of the past, such as 20 years' struggle between Elizabethan 
England and the Spain of Philip II, have characteristically ended in full 
scale conflict. Second, in the geographically circumscribed context of 
the traditional European system, direct military clashes 'beyond the 
line' could be insulated for lengthy periods from the struggle in the 
core - an option which is effectively unavailable to the great powers today. 
Third, cold war in a bipolar situation places a premium upon arms racing 
(since the opportunities for improving one's position through alliance 
movements are necessarily limited); and an indefinite arms race in the 
present context, complicated by the problems of continuous innovation 
in weapons systems and of the major disparities in the economic situation 
of the great powers, must be regarded as increasing the overall danger 
of war.
As regards the structure of geopolitics, it is possible to distinguish 
two different kinds of problem. The first is the relatively special one, 
which has none the less received considerable attention in Anglo-American 
international theory, of the relationship between the leading sea power 
and the leading land power of any given era. I will leave this question 
to the general discussion of balance in the next chapter, merely noting 
here that perspectives which accord to the United States the kind of
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'balancer' role often attributed to Britain in the 19th century system 
are highly questionable in regard to the 'closed', global system of 
the contemporary era. The second, more general issue is often discussed 
in terms of mechanistic analogies about 'power vacuums', but may 
usefully be conceptualized here in terms of the simple question whether 
the international environment, in a given era, is relatively 'empty' or 
relatively 'full'.
It is a fairly commonsense proposition that a relatively empty power 
environment should allow scope for the protagonists to a conflict to 
disengage, if they have the political will, and to redirect their energies 
in alternative directions. This is perhaps most obvious in the relations 
of large world-empires in the pre-modern era. 'The relations between the 
Roman Empire and the Persian empire in its successive manifestations', 
Wight observes, alternated between periods of 'mortal conflict' and 
'periods of high mutual esteem'. Similarly the lengthy struggles between 
Eygptians and Hittites during the 14th and 13th centuries B.C. were 
terminated in 1272 B.C. by a treaty of peace and friendship which appears 
to have held good for around fifty years, and which, Holbraad suggests, 
constitutes one of the earliest identifiable examples of a great power 
condomnium.15 4
Of course, these are not examples of detente as defined here, but 
rather of the succession of periods of amity and cooperation upon periods 
of exhausting war. But more to the immediate point, such lengthy periods 
of relative disengagement were possible because the 'worlds' in question 
were not integrated within the framework of a single states-system, and 
the physical space between them, at the prevailing levels of technology 
and political organization, could in any case not be 'filled' with 
contending forces on a permanent basis. Admittedly, the Eygptian-Hittite 
relationship represented a transitional situation in this respect. 'The 
revolution in communications' of the late second millenium, Wight argues, 
went some considerable distance towards integrating these two worlds, 
together with the lesser ones of Babylonia and Crete, producing 'a 
virtually unique example of ... a secondary states-system, that is to say, 
one whose members are themselves not unitary sovereign states, but complex 
empires or suzerain state-systems'.155 However, this shadowy entity was 
relatively soon overthrown by the further manifestation of the very 
forces which had initially brought it into being, as its various worlds
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were more completely integrated into the expanding Assyrian world-empire.
The point is that, in the longer term, space has normally encouraged 
expansion rather than the conscious limitations of goals, and that, with 
the advance of military technology and military organization, empty 
worlds have consistently been filled up. This process reached its apogee 
in the imperialist outburst which laid the foundations for the contemporary 
global system. The existence of so much room for manoeuvre might allow 
room for individual detentes between specific powers - as when France 
and England subordinated their colonial rivalries to their greater fear 
of Germany. But the overall dynamic of the new imperialism was 
towards a heightening of the tensions leading to World War I.
It is possible to identify more plausible examples of conscious 
political initiative towards relaxation of tension, within the framework 
of a developing states-system, in situations where the international 
environment might be perceived as uncomfortably full. I have already 
noted Hinsley's argument that the 'modern career' of the states-system, 
based on a conscious commitment to coexistence as opposed to intra-system 
imperialism, originated in the response to the evident dangers of 
untrammelled raison d ’etat in the conflicts of the 18th century great 
powers - dangers highlighted by the successive partitions of Poland, which 
ultimately removed this buffer between Austria, Prussia and Russia totally 
from the European power equation. Similarly, there was a revival of 
the practices of the European Concert in the 1870s, after the wars of 
the previous decade had created two new great powers, Italy and Germany, 
in the heart of Europe.156
Once again, these developments were not 'pure' examples of detente, 
in that they each represented the accommodation of political leaders to 
an altered structure of power established by central war; and as the 
stability of these structures was eroded over time - primarily by internal 
developments within France, in the former case, and Germany, in the latter - 
they gave way to renewed tensions and war. But the post-1870 period 
also demonstrates how, in periods of rapid fluctuation in the relative 
power of states, the perception of a crowded international environment 
can provoke an aggressive imperialism, as well as a moderate commitment 
to coexistence. For within a generation, the German leadership was 
turning away from Bismarck's concern with the legitimation of the new 
European distribution of power towards a preoccupation with the prospect
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of a crowded international environment on a global scale. This 
concern with the structure of the emerging global system eventually 
issued in a project 'to weld together in the heart of Europe the core 
of a German-dominated empire strong enough to compete on terms of 
equality with the other great world powers of the time, imperial Russia, 
the United States, and the British empire' - a project which was 
spelled out in the secret war aims of Imperial Gemany and openly proclaimed 
as a centrepiece of Nazi ideology.157
In summary, then, a substantial relaxation of tensions within an 
integrated structure of great powers is likely to require that each 
party be aware of considerable pressures, emanating from the others, for 
it to moderate its own ambitions, but at the same time feel that it is 
not being driven into a corner. Furthermore, extended periods of moderate 
'power politics' are most likely where the leading powers are operating 
within the kind of stable framework established by a decisive war: a 
generalized and extended detente, growing out of a major period of 
'change without war', would be a rare achievement (though perhaps an 
essential one in the contemporary international situation). On both these 
grounds, it is arguable that the optimum time for a generalized detente 
in the post-war period - and a major lost opportunity in this respect 
- was in the middle 1950s. On the one hand, the broad geopolitical 
skeleton of post-war world politics had by then been clearly established: 
in East Asia with the consolidation of communist power in China, the 
economic revival of a capitalist Japan, and the stalemate in Korea; in 
Europe with the de facto division of Germany, the neutralization of 
Austria and Finland, and the effective demonstration that American 
rhetoric about the 'liberation' of Eastern Europe was merely rhetoric.
Some of these developments were unsatisfactory to the United States, 
which was arguably rather more revisionist than the Soviet Union in regard 
to the core elements of the de facto World War II settlement. But that 
settlement itself, as Hinsley suggests, had a structural significance 
similar to that of Westphalia or Vienna:
Unlike the inescapably artificial settlement of 
1918 - a settlement which was made at the point 
in the period of transformation when international 
instability was at its height, and which made the 
instability all the greater by trying to shape the 
world to the wishful thinking of its makers - that
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of 1945 was made when the disparities previously 
set up by the uneven development of power and of 
the modern state were at last being brought to an 
end, at least for a long time to come, by the 
passage of time. It may even be said that it made 
itself, so much is it the case that its most solid 
parts are those which have not been ratified.
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On the other hand, the middle 1950s were also a unique time in which 
the international environment could be perceived as both dangerously 
full and comfortably empty. Once the Soviet Union had established a 
credible nuclear capability against the North American continent, the 
two great powers were locked into a situation in which any direct conflict 
between them involved the possibility of destruction on an unprecedented 
scale for each. But they had, nonetheless, an option for physical 
disengagement never possessed by their European predecessors (with the 
partial exception of Britain); and the liquidation of the European 
colonial empires was producing over much of the globe a relatively empty 
world of new states which in themselves offered no pressing challenge 
to the existing power structure. Moreover, insofar as this region was 
already overshadowed by power projected from the core, that power was 
projected by the United States itself and by a still formbidable Britain 
and France. However, over the next decade, the United States raised its 
military arsenal, both nuclear and conventional, to new heights of power 
and sophistication; and extended its global reach to a stage which saw 
the deployment of half a million troops in a region - Indochina - which 
on any concrete geopolitical or economic grounds appeared peripheral to 
American interests. Of course, this was not simply a calculated strategy 
of escalation on the part of American leaders. They were responding to 
Khrushchev's early 'rocket rattling', to his adventurist initiatives on 
Berlin and Cuba, and to a doctrine of national liberation which they 
interpreted as a global challenge to 'stability' in the non-communist 
world. But the fact remains that the United States took the initiative 
in raising the global contest to a higher plane, and that when a 
comprehensive great power detente was attempted, it was attempted in a 
global environment 'crowded' not merely by the global reach of the United 
States and the Soviet Union, but also by the rise of China and of other 
aspirants for regional hegemony.159
The other two elements of the world political grid mentioned above 
- the abstract structure of economic power and the structure of differential
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stages of development - may be taken together here. I have already 
suggested that the Soviet Union does not have an interest in the 
preservation of the present distribution of economic power at all 
commensurate with its interest in the present distribution of military 
power. This statement requires some qualification. It is hard to 
believe that the Soviets would seriously welcome the prospect of a major 
depression among the core capitalist states - not least because they 
may suspect that a movement towards fascism, rather than towards 
revolutionary socialism, would be the more likely response to such a 
development in key societies such as the United States and Germany.
And even in regard to the Third World, the Soviet Union's posture has 
changed with its own internal development and its growth as a world 
power. In the last decade or so, to use Richard Lowenthal's term, it 
has increasingly appeared less as an anti-imperialist than as a 'counter- 
imperialist' power, concerned not merely with 'winning political or 
ideological influence in the Third World, but [with] strengthening the 
Soviet bloc's economic basis and [with] reducing the West's economic 
superiority' - a strategy which has involved a campaign for closer econmic 
ties with neighbouring Western clients such as Iran (under the Shah) and 
Turkey, as well as with 'socialist oriented' states such as Syria, Iraq 
and Algeria.160
However, the basic asymmetry of interest remains, and in the original 
detente policies of the Nixon administration there was a direct 
acknowledgement of the desirability of shaping American economic contacts 
with the Soviet Union so as to offset this. American leaders spoke of 
building up 'in both countries a vested economic interest in the maintenance 
of an harmonious and enduring relationship', or, more baldly, of using 
economic ties as 'a tool to bring about or to reinforce a more moderate 
orientation of [Soviet] foreign policy, and to provide incentives for 
responsible international behaviour'.161 And though the implicit liberal 
optimism about the pacific implications of economic interdependence (with 
its similarity to the expectations often held for great power relations 
before World War I) might well be questioned,162 the basic strategy 
indicated in such statements was a logical corrollary to the Nixon doctrine. 
In the era of post-Vietnam retrenchment, the United States was increasingly 
impelled towards a strategy of indirect 'management' in the Third World 
through the co-option of prominent regional powers. This was the 
continuing reality behind Kissinger's belated adoption of the rhetoric of 
global interdependence after the 1973 oil crisis; and it could hardly
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be expected that the Soviet Union would consent to play by the rules 
of this American designed game unless it, too, was co-opted by major 
economic incentives specifically tailored towards that end.
However, the post-Vietnam atmosphere also made this proposition a 
very difficult one to effectively 'sell' in the American political debate. 
From the Angola crisis (and indeed from the 1973 Middle East War) onwards, 
a chorus of dissent swelled against the policy of expanding economic 
ties, while from the Soviet viewpoint the promise of this relationship 
had been compromised from the outset by the American Congress's action, 
through the Jackson-Vanik amendment, in tying MFN status to changes in 
Soviet domestic policy. Moreover, although the Nixon adminstration 
had strongly denied that it was contemplating technology transfers of a 
kind that would be damaging to American security, its opponents attacked 
in much more general terns, suggesting that the United States, by 
offsetting Soviet inefficiency in crucial areas such as agriculture and 
advanced techology, was assisting the Soviet regime to circumvent an 
otherwise essential reform of an economic order which channelled a great 
proportion of resources into defence and defence-related industries.
With the growing perception of Soviet military adventurism in the Third 
World, this view rapidly gathered strength, and it had effectively 
triumphed with the Carter administration's new restrictions on sensitive 
technologies even before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
As was noted in Chapter 1, the plausibility of this general argument 
was substantially dependent on two specific CIA assessments: one of 
which, the drastically upgraded estimate of the Soviet 'defence burden', 
has remained highly controversial; and the other of which, the prediction 
that a decline in domestic oil production would make the Soviet Union a 
net oil importer by the mid 1980s, was finally reversed by the CIA itself 
in early 1981. More generally, it appeared to involve the assumption 
that the Soviet Union's economic weakness vis-a-vis the United States was 
not merely a reflection of an earlier stage of economic development, 
but rather the reflection of fundamental flaws in the Soviet economy 
which could not be rectified without the effective dismantling of the 
prevailing social and political order. The Soviet requirement for 
advanced Western technology was seen not as an instance of the pattern 
to which the major industrial societies, such as the United States, had all 
conformed at an earlier stage of their development, but rather as a
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confirmation of a sustained Soviet incapacity for innovation in this 
area; and the general sluggishness of the Soviet economy after 1973 
and the consequent setbacks to a decade or more of impressive improvement 
in general Soviet living standards were taken as a further confirmation 
of this thesis - although this period had produced a deep ongoing 
malaise in the leading capitalist economies as well. These judgements, 
together with the perception that the Soviet Union faced an early 
fundamental challenge from China, and that it had very few assets in 
its dealings with the Third World other than raw military power and the 
will to use it, all dovetailed to produce the notion - to which Kissinger 
himself subscribed after leaving office - of a 'window of opportunity', 
in which the Soviet leaders may be attracted towards an aggressive 
military posture in order to exploit a fortuitous, and transient, period 
of superiority and momentum over an intrinsically stronger but temporarily 
lethargic West.
However, if one takes the line adopted here - that Soviet economic 
problems, while deep-seated, are not crippling, that a truly independent 
Chinese challenge to the Soviet position is a matter for the longer term, 
and that there are autonomous forces in the Third World working towards 
a further erosion of the formerly hegemonic American position, even if 
they do not promise any substantial direct access of strength to the 
'socialist camp' - one will see Soviet interests - even on the most 
simple calculations of rea'llpolit'Lk - as best served by a relatively 
moderate military profile over the next decade. Not only would an aggressive 
military posture be likely to provoke an extremely strong response from 
the United States, given the record of American responses to much more 
ambivalent challenges in the past; it would also be calculated to weld 
together the other major industrial powers and China in that anti-Soviet 
'strategic consensus' which is an avowed objective of current American 
policy. By contrast, a lower Soviet profile would allow free play to 
the unmistakeable divisions between the advanced capitalist societies 
over their 'Trilateral' relations, North-South issues in general, and 
policy towards West Asia and Africa in particular; while at the same 
time maximizing the prospects for involving the Europeans and Japanese 
in the development of the Soviet Union's enormous resource base, 
thereby building up Soviet strength in the longer term. Finally, it 
seems clear that the Soviet authorities have an objective economic
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interest in containing the economic burden of armaments, which is 
at least comparable to that on the American side. Whatever the true 
cost to the economy of the Soviet military establishment, it must be 
proportionately much higher than the comparable American figure; and 
though the Soviet authorities have demonstrated their willingness to 
impose this cost over a lengthy period in order to match the United 
States militarily, there are obvious adverse social implications of 
this which have received increasingly open Soviet acknowledgement. Only 
if one takes the position that the domestic stability of the Soviet 
regime would be directly threatened by the diversion of resources away 
from the military and heavy industry and into the consumer sector - a 
position which rests essentially upon an unreconstructed 'totalitarian 
model' of the Soviet social order - can one reject outright the notion 
of a Soviet interest in detente as a means of containing the burden of 
the arms race.
These points will be developed further in Chapters 4 and 6. However,
I should like to conclude this discussion with some brief remarks on the 
possible impact of broad world views upon American and Soviet perceptions 
of their 'objective' interests as sketched here. The basic proposition 
is that an extended detente might be combined with major great power 
disagreement on world order questions if each side believed that a stalemate 
in the 'short term' (especially in the area of direct military interaction) 
was compatible with the victory of its own preferred world order in the 
longer term. Both the Soviet and American regimes do formally claim that 
they believe this; but the Soviet position, on balance, seems more 
consistent. It is grounded, via a doctrine of Peaceful Coexistence, in 
a working theory of history which emphasizes long-term struggle for the world- 
economy, (and, more generally, in a centuries long Russian tradition of 
'catching up' with the West); and it has remained remarkably consistent 
since 1956. The American position is more ad hoc, and has exhibited 
great fluctuation on the question of the world-economy. In particular, 
the high detente period in the American political debate was closely 
associated with the proliferation of pacific expectations about
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interdependence, which gave way in the wake of the 1973 oil crisis to 
a new emphasis on security of supply for key resources. Economic 
questions suddenly shifted from the realm of the longer term, in which 
they were viewed through deterministic liberal assumptions about harmony 
of interests, to become short-term political issues which increasingly 
appeared as the most pressing sources of likely great power conflict.
These developments were in part a manifestation of the paradox 
discussed in previous chapters; that precisely because of its empiricist 
repudiation of the notion of deep structures mainstream American thinking 
inclines, in one way or another, to subsume all significant aspects of 
contemporary world politics within a single international (or world)
'system' - making it very difficult to accept the notion of separate 
spheres of conflict and cooperation in the great power relationship, or 
to contemplate that analytical separation of world political tempos which 
becomes increasingly important as the tempos themselves become 
increasingly intertwined. By contrast, the Soviet preoccupation with the 
interconnectedness of everything, being combined with a preoccupation with 
structure and contradiction, in practice focusses attention on these 
separate spheres and tempos in a fashion which must appear illegitimate 
from an American perspective.
The Soviet approach will, of course, be discussed in detail in Part 
III. However, we may briefly note here its continued attention to the 
fourfold concern which Albert Meyer depicts as the essence of Leninist
analysis: 'long range strategy, short range strategy, concrete analysis
163of the current moment, and abstract theory'. Moreover, such an
analytical predisposition does not necessarily imply a predisposition 
towards unwonted expectations of revolutionary advance. Lenin also 
analysed phenomena such as capitalist 'stabilization' in this manner; and 
Soviet analysts of the contemporary correlation of forces must accommodate 
a Soviet great power stake in the transition period quite beyond Lenin's 
own terms of reference. Thus, for example, a decision between a cautious 
or activist approach to a particular Third World conflict might invoke 
a wide variety of goals and related tempos: the world wide triumph of 
Communism; the setting of ever more countries securely on the non­
capitalist road; the erosion of the stability of the imperialist edifice 
through the piecemeal removal of its 'neocolonialist1 underpinnings; the 
establishment of a bandwagon effect among the uncommitted, by building 
a reputation for effective and reliable political and military support 
- for backing, or perhaps for creating, fewer Kerenskys than the opposition;
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and the consolidation of the position of - in Gromyko's authentically
19th century formulation - 'a major world power [with] widely developed
international ties, which cannot remain indifferent even towards events
which might be territorially remote but which affect our security and164
the security of our friends'. It seems fair to assume that day to
day considerations would concentrate at the latter (raison d'etat) end 
of this spectrum. But the point is that both detente and competitive, 
intra-system imperialism reside in this region, the distinction between 
the two being primarily determined by the degree of genuine balance 
within the system, and the degree of genuine international society 
supporting it.
Finally, the Soviet line on the recent detente has involved not a 
rejection of the whole idea of international society, but rather an 
insistence that it can be built only from the inside out, with currently 
possible agreements, based on relatively clear mutual interest, not being 
tied to developments in areas where possibilities for early agreement 
are minimal. This position accords with the general perspective on the 
history of the states-system developed in this chapter. But even the 
core question of what would constitute a mutually acceptable relationship 
of balance and deterrence has in practice occasioned major contention 
between the great powers. This question will form the centrepiece of 
the next chapter.
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BALANCE, DETERRENCE AND COEXISTENCE
Structural Problems of Contemporary Coexistence
I have argued that, insofar as Soviet accounts of world politics 
suffer from 'intellectual schizophrenia* regarding the respective claims 
to conceptual primacy of the 'international system' and the 'world 
historical process', they in fact reflect the contradictory reality 
of the contemporary era. In particular, I have suggested that the 
world political 'environment' of the contemporary states-system is 
more appropriately construed in terms of a constantly shifting 
'correlation of forces' than in terms of concepts - such as the more 
formal interdependence paradigm - which incline towards an assumption 
of the normality of 'homeostatic' equilibrium in world politics. But 
there remains the question of the Soviet picture the states-system 
itself - a picture which must be acknowledged to be a very rudimentary 
one. While the notion of a system of states is certainly not absent 
from Soviet commentary, the major emphasis, especially in high-level 
official pronouncements, falls upon dominant reality of the unceasing 
struggle between the opposed camps - or social systems - of capitalism 
and socialism.1 Since it has long been acknowledged that these systems 
are composed in turn of sovereign states, it is possible to interpret 
such Soviet assertions as a de facto recognition of a bipolar structure 
of great power relations. But to the extent that a broader notion of 
international system appears in the Soviet account, it still appears 
primarily as an addendum to the historical working theory of imperialism 
and the General Crisis of Capitalism.
However, this rudimentary Soviet conception, with its emphasis
upon basic aspects of structure, provides a better starting point than
the complex 'system of action' concept which informs much American
analysis. As has been argued, the states-system is most usefully thought
of merely as an unusually discrete and persistent system of practices
which is indeed an addendum to a wider historical process - in the
sense that the practices in question have not sprung fully-armed from
the 'functioning' of the system, but are rather the contingent product
of the lengthy adaptation of the techniques of mediaeval (and above all
papal) 'world government' to the very different structural requirements
2of the developing international anarchy of early modern Europe.
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Moreover, this initial process of adaptation is replicated in part by 
the momentous process of structural readjustment confronting 
international society today. Of the central institutional pillars of 
the European states-system, the compact on the legitimacy of war for 
reasons of state is no longer tenable in the dealings of the great and 
major powers; the hegemony of the great powers has become very 
difficult to avow openly and, in some crucial cases, to implement 
in practice; and the relevance of the classical doctrine of the multiple 
balance and of the positivist doctrine of international law is 
increasingly open to question. Given the additional factor of the 
unprecedented interpenetration today of states-system and world-economy, 
it becomes especially necessary to insist upon the contingent 
relationship between the material structures of contemporary world politics 
and the inherited practices of European international society.
This chapter will be concerned primarily with the structural logic 
of the contemporary situation, especially as regards the relationship 
of balance and deterrence between the great powers, rather than with 
their approach to the more formal 'rules' of international law. It will 
be taken for granted here that the Soviet and American positions on 
such questions as 'wars of national liberation' are widely divergent 
and that this divergence is the predictable outcome of very different 
historical experiences and current material interests on each side.
The basic question of this thesis is whether the great powers are also 
at loggerheads about the more basic rules of prudence which constitute 
the bedrock requirements for stable coexistence in the contemporary 
era.3 However, I will also be attempting in the last section of the 
chapter to relate the structural analysis of balance and deterrence to 
the broad question of international society; and it may be useful, 
before moving on to these structural concerns, to offer a brief defence 
of my earlier contention that the basic Soviet position on Peaceful 
Coexistence and detente does not involve a rejection of the notion of 
international society as such. The question may be divided into two 
parts. Does the Soviet Union accept the underlying 'theory of the game' 
of coexistence between sovereign states? Is Soviet behaviour generally 
supportive or subversive of a common practice of civilized intercourse 
within a society of states?
As regards the first, it seems undeniable that the Soviet regime
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officially recognizes the basic 'theory' of the modern states-system 
- cuius regio ejus religio. 'Our world today', Brezhnev recently 
declared, 'is socially heterogeneous ... This is an objective fact'.4 
That this fact is accepted only reluctantly, and only for the 'period 
of transition', is largely beside the point. 'In the light of all 
history', as Hinsley points out, 'we must accept the fact that men 
have usually regarded their own hegemony over their various worlds 
as the natural and logical solution to the international problem', 
with 'special circumstances, working massively in the opposite direction', 
being required before 'the more sophisticated notions of coexistence 
and a balance of power' could take root.5 Since 1956, the Soviet 
authorities have clearly and consistently stated their recognition both 
of the fact of coexistence and of the 'special circumstances' underpinning 
it: in the thermo-nuclear era, central war is 'inadmissible' as a means 
of solving the historic conflict between capitalism and socialism.
As against this, however, the Soviet Union's formal adherence to 
the principle of 'non-intervention' is substantially modified by its 
insistence upon the principles of Proletarian and Socialist Internationalism, 
which are asserted to be 'dialectically connected' with and, in the latter 
case,, 'higher' than that of Peaceful Coexistence. This issue opens the 
wide ranging dispute over international law mentioned above, but some 
brief comments may be made here. First, while it can fairly be argued 
that non-intervention in general represents a more practicable response 
to the problems of interstate coexistence than would any general principle 
of intervention (whether to defend 'legitimate' regimes, to promote 'just' 
change or whatever), it is by no means self-evident of states, as it is 
held by liberal theory to be of men, that they should, as far as possible, 
leave each other alone to pursue their separate ends.6 Rather non­
intervention should be seen merely as a vital part of the prudential 
compact by which states seek to simplify their general relations by 
'emptying out' historical complications - including domestic genocide, 
for instance - from the structure of the system. 'The underlying point 
... is that states have agreed, for the sake of convenience, to recognize 
one another's existence, to provide a minimum degree of non-intervention 
in one another's affairs, and in particular, to agree that what is done 
domestically is not normally brought to international account.'
Furthermore, the ordering of international society in terms of the 
notional equality of states, which non-intervention implies, inevitably 
conflicts at various points with the pattern of hierarchical ordering
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which reflects the real inequality of power in international politics.8 
This is most evident, on the one hand, in 'spheres of influence', where 
the great powers more or less openly acknowledge the respective 
hegemonies, and exclusive rights of intervention, of their counterparts, 
and, on the other, in perennial 'flashpoint' areas like the Middle 
East, whose special significance for their mutual relations produces, 
in addition to unilateral and competitive support for favoured 
contestants, joint 'managerial' intervention designed to prevent local 
conflicts from escalating to uncontrollable dimensions. But more 
generally, 'the sovereignty of the weak is held as it were under license 
from the strong', by virtue either of the latter's prudential concern 
for the countervailing power of their fellows, or of their more general 
respect for the settled norms of international society.9
The conditions favouring great power forbearance are eroded today 
by the enormous increase in the number of weak powers 'within' the system, 
by the great significance of a number of these powers as proprietors of 
natural resources, by their involvement in a radical transformation 
process in respect of which the great powers profess deeply conflicting 
ideological convictions, and by the chronic instability of regimes in 
these new nations, which makes the unequivocal identification of 
intervention against 'established' regimes next to impossible. Given 
these considerations, the most striking factor about great power 
intervention since 1945 is how limited, relative to earlier periods, the 
phenomenon has been!0 Of course, some instances of such intervention 
havejtjtragically costly; but this is mainly attributable to those enormous 
strides in military technology which have also provided one obvious 
deterrent to widespread intervention by virtue of the prospects of rapid 
escalation involved.
Finally, the Soviet authorities have generally seemed less comfortable 
with the cuius regio principle as the charter of the society of states 
than as the charter for the competitive coexistence of capitalist and 
socialist camps. But the same might be said of United States policymakers 
during the decades of containment; and despite the explicitly pluralist 
values of the latter, they have not been noticeably more flexible than 
their Soviet counterparts in adapting to the increasingly manifest 
reality of a state-centred pluralism over the last decade and a half.
This general issue has been confused not merely by the far reaching 
ideological claims of both great powers, but also by the tendency of many
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American theorists to extrapolate from the apparent conditions of 
the Cold War to the alleged solidarity enforcing dynamics of a 
bipolar world, and hence to assume a basic incompatibility between a 
bipolar structure of military power and a large measure of pluralism 
in the diplomatic and economic orientation of the members of international 
society.11 However, there is no obvious reason why a bipolar power 
structure should impose more fundamental restrictions upon the ability 
of smaller states to 'manoeuvre in the interstices of the balance' 
than a multipolar one. And if this much is accepted, it is possible 
to distinguish two aspects of this question which are relevant here: 
the attitude of the great powers to their respective spheres of 
influence, on the one hand, and their attitude to the 'nonaligned' or 
tenuously aligned states comprising the bulk of the Third World, on the 
other.
As regards the latter, I have already suggested that the scope, 
if not the intensity, of direct great power interventionism has been 
relatively limited in the post World War II era; and there is no 
persuasive evidence in Soviet practice - any more than in Soviet doctrine 
- of a belief that the official goal of world communism can be achieved 
by force of Soviet arms. It is true that the last decade has seen a 
relative increase in Soviet military assertiveness in the Afro-Asian 
region, together with a relative retrenchment on the part of the United 
States, and that the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan is in many 
respects analogous to the American intervention in Vietnam. But the 
Afghanistan involvement (which after two years remains substantially 
more limited than the United States' Vietnam involvement at a comparable 
stage) should not obscure the wider connection between the growing Soviet 
access to traditional levers of great power influence and the increasing 
Soviet emphasis upon the convention of sovereign equality as a weapon by 
which 'progressive' Third World regimes might emancipate themselves 
from the politico-economic domination of capitalism, even where this 
process carries no obvious promise of reliable direct gains to the 
socialist camp.
The question of the Soviet and American spheres of influence is 
a more specialized one. The basic reality for smaller states within such 
regions is that their geography imposes fundamental restrictions on their 
ability to manoeuvre in the interstices of the balance. But there is no
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logical reason, or invariant historical precedent, for supposing that 
their limited diplomatic freedom must necessarily be associated with 
a requirement to accept the 'religion' - or 'social system' - of the 
hegemonic great power. In practice, however, this extra requirement 
was imposed during the Cold War era, and by both great powers. Soviet 
actions in this respect have been a great deal more visible, of course.
But this was largely because the Soviet sphere lay in a region of much 
greater strategic significance than the American, and having far less 
margin for error in the 'management' of challenges to their authority, 
the Soviets have had periodic recourse to the massive use of military 
power. By contrast, the United States has had much greater opportunities 
for removing unwanted regimes by covert 'destabilization' or by limited 
military probes-techniques which have succeeded in a number of instances, 
but which, in the one instance in which they went spectacularly wrong, 
also produced the anomalous case of Cuba, which has contrived to protect 
its alternative social order only by attaching itself firmly to the 
opposite camp.
Over the last decade or so, the impact of pluralizing forces within 
the Soviet and American spheres of influence has become increasingly 
marked, yet neither power has clearly demonstrated a readiness to 
dissociate diplomatic from 'religious' hegemony in its dealings with 
the smaller states in question - though there was evidence of a serious 
attempt to revise American policy in this respect under the Carter 
administration. Today it would seem that both powers are at a crucial 
turning point on this issue, though because of the particular salience - 
strategic, historical and cultural - of the East European states in the 
relations of the great and major powers, a Soviet failure to break with 
past practices in this respect is likely to have much more momentous 
general consequences than an American one.
Turning now to the question of the Soviet impact upon the broad 
diplomatic-legal practice of international society, it must be reiterated 
that there are basic structural reasons, quite independent of the 
subjective approach of the Soviet regime, why that practice should be 
in a condition of intense flux. It does seem clear that the Soviet 
regime has, from its inception, made a substantial contribution to what 
Wight sees as the serious corruption of the European diplomatic system 
- 'the master institution of international relations'.13 But it is 
also clear that other leading powers have played an important role in
3 3 3 .
this process, which is perhaps most reasonably viewed as a general 
reflection of a revolutionary era in international politics. Moreover, 
some new developments evidently reflect the genuine requirements of a 
new situation. Thus the enormously increased importance of technological 
surprise has converted certain forms of externally conducted espionage, 
under the rubric of 'national-technical means of verification', into 
a linchpin of the process of strategic arms limitation; the crucial 
psychological dimensions of nuclear deterrence have promoted 'crisis 
management' techniques such as the Soviet-American 'hotline', and also, 
perhaps, the renewed prominence of 'summit conferences',14 and the 
desire of Third World states to offset their individual weakness by 
collective exploitation of the diplomatic resource of notional state 
equality has produced a great deal of generally anti-Western 'propaganda' 
in the United Nations and related forums.
In respect of the first two of these innovations, the Soviet Union 
has increasingly discovered an interest in cooperation with the United 
States; and while it has in some measure profited from, and endeavoured 
to exploit, the third, it has in general been a peripheral figure, and 
even, as with the Third World campaign for a New International Economic 
Order, an ambivalent one. Wight maintains that the primary focus of 
Soviet diplomacy has exhibited a secular evolution from espionage and 
subversion towards propaganda:15 but it is important to add that, with 
the development of 'parity' with the United States, this evolution has 
continued towards a 'great power' stance of traditional, if formalistic, 
kind.
Indeed, it is a basic paradox of the Soviet Union's present 
situation that at the very point at which it has unequivocally staked its 
claim to an equal great power role with the United States - and in part 
because of that very fact - the overriding significance of that 
traditional great power role has been partially eroded by the emergence 
of the 'North-South dialogue' on the reform of the world economy. The 
Third World use of UNCTAD and related forums for this purpose is one 
more aspect of the contemporary situation which recalls the original 
transition from the world society of mediaeval Europe to the 
international society of European states, and suggests, in a strictly 
limited sense, a replay of that transition in reverse. In that earlier 
period, as Wight points out, the General Councils of the Church 'were 
all concerned with political as well as doctrinal business', with the
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political aspect growing 'larger as time went on'.16 This conciliar 
movement petered out in the 15th century with the consolidation of national 
divisions and the decline of the 'world order consensus' of mediaeval 
Christendom, giving way to the pattern of secular congresses which 
reached its apogee in the first half of the nineteenth century. Thus, 
he suggests, the 'Wilsonian view' of contemporary world politics - 
with its aspiration for a movement from the balance of power via 
international organization and collective security to world government - 
'prescribes for the future a reversal of the historical development of 
the past', and in a general environment as conflict-ridden as any in the 
entire history of the states-system.17
However, if the prospects for true world government 'have never 
seemed more bleak',18 there is some prospect that the United Nations, 
originally envisaged primarily as an agency for the reform of the states- 
system, may yet provide the springboard for a substantial proliferation 
of institutions designed to regulate the world-economy. As was argued 
in the previous chapter, the world-economy has been intensely politicized 
throughout its history, in that its expansion was coeval with the 
expansion of the European states-system; and the minimalist institutional 
structures established during the generation of American political hegemony 
following 1945 have proved incapable of accommodating even the recovery 
of the advanced industrial powers, let alone the complex problems posed 
by the great colonial empires. The irony of this situation is most 
acute for the United States, which has seen its own favoured instrument 
of 'world order' deployed by the Third World states in support of very 
different visions from its own, first in regard to questions of violent 
'national liberation' and then in regard to the transformation of the 
world-economy. But the Soviet position also has its ironical aspect.
If the redistributive programme of the radical wing of the Group of 77 
should bear fruit, it would constitute a more comprehensive change in 
the capitalist world-economy than was ever effected by the emergence of 
the essentially inward-looking economies of the socialist states; and 
the institutional structures so established would constitute a venue in 
which the Soviet Union's traditional great power assets would carry 
relatively little weight. Of course, without the political framework 
established by the emergence of a Soviet-American balance, there would 
not even be such prospect as does exist for substantial institutional 
change forced upon the leading capitalist powers 'from below'. But
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granted this, and granted that the Soviet Union on balance benefits from 
the contest between the Third World and the West, it does so because, 
having neither an obvious colonial past nor a major 'neo-colonial' 
present, it is, in large measure, irrelevant to the issues involved. 19
This brings us to the central concern of this chapter, the military- 
political substructure of international order upon which elements of the 
larger edifice of a reformed world order - such as the putative 
institutional structures of a New International Economic Order - must 
be established, if they are to be established at all in the present 
context. The following will essentially be a development of themes 
broached in the earlier discussion of 'The States-System in Transition' 
with special reference to the great and major powers in the contemporary 
era. As before, I will attempt to focus on two basic issues: upon the 
political framework which these powers, by their interaction, establish 
for themselves and for the other members of international society; and 
upon these states as frameworks for the various communities within their 
own domestic societies.
At its most abstract level the framework of international order 
can usefully be thought of in terms of John Herz's concept of the 'security 
dilemma'. For the great powers in particular, international politics 
remain a 'self-help' situation, in which power must be balanced by power, 
and since states continue to define their 'interests' in ways which 
clash with the self-defined interests of their fellows, a central goal 
of many states must be the acquisition of those coercive capabilities 
which will permit the promotion of their more substantive goals in the 
face of opposition from other states. The essence of the security 
dilemma, therefore, is that the armaments by which one state seeks to 
defend itself against encroachments, and to shape the behaviour of other 
states in desired directions, must necessarily threaten the security 
and diplomatic freedom of the rest and encourage them to arm in their turn. 
Given the continued existence of separate states, this dilemma can 
partially be transcended only by a general recognition of the impossibility
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both of 'absolute security' and of absolute realization of goals, and 
by an implicit or explicit compact upon the need for 'legitimate' 
limits to conflict.
On the face of it, there is no fundamental incompatibility between 
this perspective upon great power relations and the Soviet acknowledgement 
of the necessity for Peaceful Coexistence in the 'socially heterogeneous' 
environment of contemporary world politics. However, American theorists 
have often argued that, although the avowed Soviet goal of the ultimate 
world-wide victory of Communism may be dismissed as cloudy rhetoric, 
the repeated invocation of this goal does signify a general absolutism 
in the Soviet (or Russian) world view which is incompatible with acceptance 
of 'legitimate' solutions to the security dilemma. In one way or 
another, such arguments appeal to the kind of distinction drawn by 
Morgenthau between traditional nationalism and 'nationalistic 
universalism'.21 The former, it is suggested, is undeniably the expression 
of group egoism and self-assertion; but precisely because its egoism is 
freely acknowledged, it can generate that 'essential reciprocity which 
saves the idea of the national interest from itself'.22 The latter,, 
by contrast, clothes its egoism in an appeal to allegedly universal 
moral values, and thus renders the achievement of a stable compact, 
based upon mutually recognized interests, virtually impossible.
I have already suggested that the weight attached to this nationalist/ 
universalist dichotomy by theorists such as Morgenthau and Kissinger 
depends upon an unduly selective reading of the history of the traditional 
system, and also that there are objective structural factors making it 
difficult for e'itheT great power to adhere to limited 'national interest' 
goals today. One major consideration (discussed further below) is that 
neither is a nation-state in the established European sense. The second 
is that, given the present interpenetration of states-system and world- 
economy, each must grapple with a transitional environment in which 
interests, in many cases, have no more obvious permanence than friends 
or enemies.
This latter point may be refined by reference to Arnold Wolfers'
• • 2 3distinction between 'possession goals' and 'milieu goals'. In the 
18th century, and for a good part of the 19th, the leading powers 
clashed primarily over possession goals, in respect of which the relative
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balance of interests could be calculated with some precision, while 
milieu goals - such as the preservation of an underlying international order 
were likely to command a good deal of common assent throughout international 
society, or at least among the polity of great powers. Today, the 
significance of direct possession has been much eroded both by the 
long-range destructive power of thermonuclear weapons and by the 
unprecedented ability of the leading powers to increase their capabilities 
by internal means. On the other hand, the radical transformation process 
within strategically placed states establishes the broad milieu or 
environment as a far more prominent, and far more fluid, arena of 
great power competition (which embraces the one area in which there 
has been a recent resurgence of interest in possession goals, namely 
security of supply for vital raw materials). Together with the near 
impossibility of justifying their nuclear policies solely in terms of 
reasons of state, these factors inevitably encourage the great powers 
to appeal also to the universalistic imperatives of their respective 
visions of a just world order.
At a more concrete level, the contemporary framework of international 
order is inseparable from the contemporary distribution of military 
power. On the surface, it might seem that the recent resurgence of 
'realist' approaches in the United States might make for a greater 
meeting of minds with the Soviets as regards the basic contours of 
the great power relationship. For, as Zimmerman noted over a decade 
ago, when the behaviouralist methodological assault on the 'state-centric 
paradigm' was in full flood and the substantive themes of transnationalism 
and interdependence were gathering force:
[Soviet] Marxist-Leninists have been more royalist 
than the King, more realist than the anthropomorphic 
realists. The distribution of power between the 
main protagonists constitutes the core element in 
the description of a given international situation.
2 4
Indeed, it seems probable that the new American assertiveness 
about national interests, and the associated themes of geopolitics and 
mercantilism, are more comprehensible to the Soviet leadership than the 
'human rights' globalism of the early Carter Administration (just as 
American critics find Soviet globalist rhetoric incomprehensible in 
its own terms). However, there remains the problem of an international 
environment which can no longer be adequately discussed purely in terms
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of stable national interests. In this regard, the crucial question 
is not the use or non-use of anthropomorphic language about the state 
or any other collective actor, but the number of 'overall structures' 
identified and the relationship envisaged between them. In this 
respect, the differences between the Soviet line and mainstream 
American approaches remain basic.
The Soviet perspective as it has emerged since 1956 broadly reflects 
the distinction between the structures of states-system and world- 
economy developed in Chapter 3, with a rudimentary conception of the 
former being 'soldered' onto the long standing Leninist conception of 
the latter. On the one hand, Soviet commentators insist that the 'basic 
contradiction' (or relationship of major tension) in contemporary 
international relations is that between the capitalist and socialist 
camps, and by inference between their two leading powers, the United 
States and the USSR. As Zimmerman notes, this formulation attracted 
strong criticism from the Chinese during the 1960s, for it indicated 
that the inter-imperialist contradictions had been effectively 
neutralized as a likely source of major war, and also implied that 
the Soviet Union's active commitment to the cause of world revolution 
must be slabordinated, in the last analysis, to the management requirements 
of its relationship with the United States.25 On the other hand, while 
not envisaging any short or middle term prospect of military clashes 
among the advanced capitalist powers, the Soviets have been very alert 
to growing conflicts of interest between them, and to the value of a 
climate of detente in allowing these divisions more opportunity to 
manifest themselves.26 The United States' hegemony in the capitalist 
camp has been definitively eroded, they argue, and American objectives 
are increasingly compromised by the emergence in Europe and Japan of 
capitalist powers 'which are capable of competing with the USA economically 
... [but] have not yet found a place appropriate to their new power in 
the political structure of international relations'.2 7
American leaders, for their part, have emphasized the one major 
aspect of the contemporary structure of military power which the Soviets 
prefer to play down - namely the rise of China to putative great power 
status. But they continue to treat the world-economy in functionalist 
rather than structuralist terms; and, at least in their public pronouncements 
on obviously political issues, they have welcomed the economic recovery
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of Europe and Japan as a major contribution to international stability.
Both these themes were brought together in Nixon's famous 1971
pronouncement on the advent of 'a safer world and a better world' based
upon the relationship of 'strong, healthy United States, Europe, Soviet
Union, China and Japan, each balancing the other, not playing one
2 8against the other, an even balance'.
As Alistair Buchan then noted, Nixon's claim that situations of
multiple balance had typically produced more peaceful conditions in
the past was 'historically untrue'.29 But more important, his description
of the emerging international power structure was, and remains, basically
inaccurate. Contemporary international relations can be construed in
this way only by counting different forms of power - above all economic
- in the central military balance; and in this sense the Nixon-Kissinger
asdoctrine of multipolarity might be seen^a kind of way station to the
full blown interdependence paradigm of the middle 1970s, in which the
structural significance of military power was drastically downgraded.
But, as has already been argued, this latter picture is quite implausible.
<aThere are no persuasive reasons for anticipating' the early demise of 
the deeply hierarchical order of the contemporary states-system; and 
though there are already multiple balances of great local and regional 
importance - above all in East Asia - their impact still falls well short 
of terminating the structural bipolarity of the system as a whole. For 
the next 10-15 years, the framework of world politics seems likely to 
be dominated by the central balance between two great powers which are 
also 'superpowers' in the only useful meaning of that term - in the 
possession of strategic and conventional capabilities, and a supporting 
level of economic development, resource base and technological
infrastructure, which lifts them quite out of the ranks of the other 
• 3 umajor powers.
In part, these differences in official Soviet and American 
perspectives may be attributed to the self-interested manipulation of 
important political symbols on both sides. The Soviets clearly have no 
interest in compromising their hard won equality with the United States 
by acknowledging a basically much weaker China as a full member of the great 
power club, while they do have an interest in encouraging a more 
independent policy orientation by the Europeans and Japanese, so long 
as this does not produce formidable new centres of military power on 
their immediate flanks. On the other hand, policies designed to bolster
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the diplomatic weight of new 'great powers' constitute one of several 
possible American strategies designed to exploit more effectively the 
capitalist world's economic superiority over the Soviet bloc; and it 
is noteworthy that recent American policy has swung back from the 
Carter administration's attempt to give priority to Trilateral 
partnership over the East-West struggle, to the Reagan administration's 
attempt to cajole its major allies into carrying a share of the joint 
defence burden more in keeping with their economic capacities, but 
within the framework of an anti-Soviet 'strategic consensus' fashioned 
after the American world-view. Thus developments in the 1970s have once 
again confirmed the general postwar pattern of oscillation in American 
policy between the 'uneasily reconciled' goals of American hegemony
o 1and an expansion of the great power ranks. Both goals, as Waltz 
argues, have been 'revolutionary', straining against the more obvious 
structure of power towards the containment of the Soviet Union. But
3 2both have characteristically been rationalized in the language of balance.
However, while the contrasting political objectives of American 
and Soviet pronouncements are clearly important - so too are the 
conceptual divisions underlying them - between a functionalist pluralism, 
emphasizing harmony of interests, on the one hand, and a structuralist 
emphasis on contradiction and revolutionary change, on the other. It 
must be emphasized that the real conceptual difference is not - as 
accusations traded back and forth would have it - that one side recognizes 
the complexity of power in the contemporary world, while the other 
concentrates narrowly on the balance of military force. Both sides clearly 
acknowledge the importance of economic and ideological factors, but 
because of their different approaches to underlying structures, they 
count them in different 'scenarios'. The Soviets purport to separate 
out the socio-economic struggle from the military struggle, and maintain 
that, within a continuous political framework of Peaceful Coexistence 
guaranteed by Soviet power, the world historical process will ultimately 
grant general victory to socialism. Western critics reject this division 
as arbitrary and self-serving, and have been increasingly explicit in 
turning the Soviet emphasis on socio-economic factors back on its authors. 
An elegant statement of this position, which reflects the arguments of 
Kissinger and others, has recently been offered by Bell, who distinguishes 
between the narrow balance of military forces and the true balance of
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power -  the latter encompassing the 'economic and political and 
diplomatic factors [which] have more bearing on the shape of long­
term relationships'. The likely asymmetry between 'the short-term 
balance of forces' (favourable to the Soviet Union) and 'the long­
term balance of power' (favourable to the West), she argues, may provide 
in the 1980s 'a sort of "launch window" for diplomatic enterprises of 
a "now or never" kind'.33 The same case has been argued in more concrete 
geopolitical terms by Colin Gray, who attributes to the Soviet leaders 
a perception of their situation strikingly reminiscent of the fears of 
German geopoliticans before World War I. Dismissing 'the (long-run) 
optimism of their political philosophy, in which they probably do 
not genuinely believe', he continues:
Any competent Soviet security analyst must 
recognize the bleakness of his country's long­
term future. As China modernizes, as Japan 
eventually rearms, and as the United States 
and NATO Europe mobilize their defence potential 
even modestly, the USSR becomes more and more 
genuinely encircled. The temptation to 
restructure the terms of this unequal competition, 
before it places the Soviet Union in an enduring 
condition of inferiority, has to be substantial.
3 4
The most important point about these latter arguments is that they 
tacitly assume that the social and economic changes necessary to shift 
the existing military balance so decisively against the Soviet Union 
could occur without commensurate shifts in the existing pattern of economic 
■_ and political alignments. This assumption flows naturally from the 
pluralist emphasis upon 'the conception of overall power and influence' - 
incorporating military, economic, political, ideological and diplomatic 
elements - as the indispensable 'common denominator in respect of which 
we say that there is balance or preponderance' in the system as a whole.35 
But I would argue that this is a mistaken emphasis. The 'schizophrenic* 
Soviet perspective seems likely to provide more clues to the pattern of 
world politics for the next 10-15 years, and the official Soviet 
optimism about the non-military correlation of forces would itself 
appear to warrant at least qualified endorsement.
There are two broad 'scenarios' to be considered here. The first 
assumes what I have suggested is the most likely result - that the major 
socio-economic changes of the next 10-15 years will continue to be
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contained within an essentially bipolar military framework, based upon 
a crude and dynamic parity between the Soviet Union and the United 
States in strategic power and global projection capability. In such a 
context, the non-military correlation of forces will almost certainly 
'run against' the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, will probably 
remain unfavourable to it, without necessarily deteriorating radically, 
in East Asia, and will probably run against the United States, on balance, 
in Western Europe, West Asia and Africa. Of course, these are extremely 
broad-brush predictions, and I certainly do not mean to deny the 
possibility of further serious reverses to Soviet positions in 
Afghanistan and elsewhere. The point is rather a negative one: that 
in a predominantly capitalist world-economy, the really big prizes are 
still to play for, and that the Soviets are likely to benefit indirectly 
from the intensification of that general erosion of American hegemony 
which has been under way since the late 1960s. As regards the Afro- 
Asian 'arc of crisis', the domestic transformation processes discussed 
in Chapter 3 seem likely to produce a growing array of statist barriers 
to the United States' ability to guarantee secure 'access' to vital 
regions, not merely for itself but also for its European and Japanese 
allies. As regards Western Europe (and perhaps even Japan), there is 
likely to be a growing confluence between neutralist and 'third force' 
sentiments on the political level and economic conflicts with the United 
States over markets and crucial resources. Moreover, there would seem 
to be a crucial nexus between the developed world and Third World 
challenges to the American position, above all in the special vulnerability 
of the Europeans and Japanese to the prospect of loss of access to
•j cMiddle East oil. The Soviet Union stands to gain from this nexus, 
both indirectly, because of the inhibitions it places on the allies' 
support of contentious American policies in the 'arc of crisis' area, 
and directly, because the desire to reduce dependence on the Arab oil 
states may encourage the Europeans, at least, towards more extensive, 
long-range cooperation in the exploitation of Soviet energy resources.
It must be emphasized that although the initial emergence of Soviet- 
American parity was essential to this scenario, it does not depend upon 
a major intensification of the Soviet military threat. An open-ended 
military buildup, or the aggressive exploitation of military power in 
Eastern Europe or the Third World, would very likely be counterproductive 
for the Soviets, encouraging the Europeans and Japanese either towards
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renewed attempts to strengthen an American-led alliance or towards 
major bids for military power in their own right. If, however, the 
Soviet Union complements its present formidable power with a relatively 
conciliatory approach on arms control and economic issues, the next 
10-15 years may well confirm 'a secular trend' towards the kind of 
partial neutralization of a still disunited Europe which, in the 
American hawk literature, goes under the extravagant title of 
'Finlandization'.37 Indeed, one index of the basic plausibility of 
Soviet claims about the non-military correlation of forces is the 
deep ambivalence on this question of the hawk school, which, on the 
one hand, is heavily dependent on the window of opportunity argument to 
justify its predictions of aggressive Soviet expansionism, and, on the 
other, is prone to persistent fears about the peaceful Finlandization 
of Europe and to intermittent alarms about the impending Soviet 
achievement, primarily through indirect means, of a 'Communist
O Qinternational system' on a global scale.
The second, and less likely, scenario is one in which the socio­
economic change is accompanied by a genuine movement towards a multipolar 
structure of global military power. It is important to note that this 
would remain an incomplete, transitional process during the maximum 
period considered here, through to the mid-1990s. Indeed, there would 
seem to be fundamental economic constraints upon the growth of Chinese 
military capacity in this period, such that if China did mount a 
qualitatively new military challenge to the USSR, it would be as a direct 
client of the Western powers, and any Soviet obsession with the prospect 
of encirclement would be grounded in observable facts. Of course the 
economic potential for a qualitiative leap in military capability, given 
a major change of political direction, does exist in Western Europe and 
Japan. But such a development, in turn, would probably betoken a 
qualitative deepending in the divisions within 'the West' itself.
In both cases a determined bid for great power status would probably 
be triggered only by a series of traumatic political shocks, in Western 
Europe to overcome the manifest centrifugal tendencies at both national 
and sub-national level, and in Japan to overcome the legacy of Hiroshima 
and the plainly unfavourable situational logic which would confront the 
nation - by virtue of its acute resource dependence, small physical 
size, and highly concentrated population and industrial base - in an
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intensifying competition among global nuclear powers. It seems most 
unlikely that the fait accompli of Soviet global power - which may 
in any case be vigorously contested by the United States in the 1980s 
- will provide an adequate incentive for such traumatic initiatives. 
Therefore, unless the Soviet Union does embark upon a campaign of 
unequivocal expansionism in the 1980s, it seems likely that any 
European or Japanese bids for great power status would be triggered 
by a general and rapid deterioration of existing frameworks of 'world 
order', in which economic conflict between the advanced capitalist 
powers would play a pivotal role. This case has been strongly argued 
by Mary Kaldor in regard to a united Europe - a more plausible protaganist 
than Japan for a truly global power relationship. To assume that an 
emerging European great power would remain faithful to its alleged 
Atlantic heritage, she argues,
is to misunderstand the nature of a European 
Union - something which is altogether different 
from the sum total of nine unstable European 
States. A future European government will be 
moulded as much by its immediate political 
environment as by European tradition. And that 
environment will encompass the various crises 
- about oil and dollars and food and conflicts 
in the Third World - through which Atlantic 
conflict will evolve. In its very creation, 
in other words, a European government will be 
anti-American.
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These considerations on the relationship between basic changes in the 
international power structure and basic changes in the domestic socio­
political structure of the great powers lead into the second major 
question mentioned above: the role of the leading states in the contemporary 
system as frameworks for their constituent communities. It is a common 
thesis of the hawk literature that the Soviet Union is not a viable 
framework in this sense, and that its consequent lack of domestic 
'legitimacy' provides an inbuilt motor for Soviet expansionism. In Gray's 
words:
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The USSR is not merely a country surrounded by 
potential enemies; it is an empire that virtually 
by definition can have no settled relations of 
relative influence with its neighbours. It is 
the geopolitical inheritance of the USSR to 
believe that 'boundaries are fighting places'.
4 o
This 'imperial thesis', he claims, 'is vital becuase it settles, 
persuasively, arguments about Soviet intentions'; and indeed, as was 
noted in Chapter 1, this thesis is vital to the hawk attempt to save 
the earlier argument deriving an inbuilt expansionist drive from the 
dynamics of Communist 'totalitarianism'. Although the emphasis upon 
the essential continuity of the Soviet order with its Tsarist 
predecessor provides a more plausible explanation for its persistence - 
almost thirty years after the dismantling of the apparatus of 
Stalinist terror - than the pure totalitarian argument, it makes it 
correspondingly difficult to represent Soviet Communism as an alien 
imposition on the Russian people, which must be enforced bv a mixture 
of direct repression and persistent appeals to the need to counter 
massive external threats. But if it is possible to represent Russian 
Communism as the latest variant of a traditional Great Russian messianism, 
and an alien imposition on a vast array of non-Russian peoples, a 
recycled version of the earlier thesis can be neatly meshed with those 
themes of geopolitics and the Soviet search for absolute security which 
figure prominently in the wider American debate. To quote Gray again:
As with all empires, the Great Russian has a core 
area (Muscovy, Byelorussia) and succeeding layers, 
each protecting the others ... The Soviet empire 
has to expand, in influence if not physically, or 
risk collapse. At home and abroad the entire 
structure rests on force, though generally latent 
force. Soviet leaders are more fearful than 
ambitious. They know they cannot govern a universal 
empire, even if they could establish one, but they 
are condemned by circumstance to try. The world 
beyond Moscow's control threatens, if only by its 
manifold attractions, the world Moscow does control.
4 1
However, if the imperial thesis is vital to the hawk case, it is 
also less than persuasive. The image of the Soviet Union as the great 
surviving 'prison house of nations', is fairly plausible in terms of an 
implicit contrast with, say, 19th century France or Britain. But the
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Contemporary international environment is structurally analogous not 
to that of 19th century Europe but to that of early modern Europe, 
in which even France and Britain had not fully emerged from their 
imperial phase. In evaluating the Soviet situation, one should 
therefore note the imperial past of the European nation-state (whose 
suppressed legacies may be re-emerging today) and the manifest imperial 
present of both contemporary great powers.
From this perspective, it seems possible to identify four different 
aspects - with very different structural connotations - of the growth 
of Gray's multi-layered 'Soviet empire'. First, there was the expansion 
of the Muscovite state from the 15th to 17th century, a process analogous 
to the earlier consolidation of the great West European states, though 
in a geopolitical environment less conducive to the establishment of a 
stable 'national' entity. Second, there was the eastward expansion 
into a sparsely populated Siberia, from the 17th to the 19th centuries, 
which was broadly analogous to the westward expansion of the United 
States. Third, there was the post-World War II consolidation of Soviet 
control over Eastern Europe. Except for some direct acquisition of 
territory-notably in the Baltic states - this process is not usefully 
described as an extension of empire. Rather, it represents, as in the 
United States approach to Central America, the combination of a 
traditional sphere influence claim with an attempt to enforce ideological 
conformity in the societies in question.
On this analysis, then, the Soviet Union's claim to be an unusually 
imperialist power rests primarily upon the territories acquired by 
conquest in the 19th century, above all the Islamic regions of Central 
Asia. And, indeed, as British statesmen argued in the early years of 
the de-colonization process, the fact that the Soviet Union largely 
escaped censure in this regard exemplified a 'blue-water fallacy' in 
which colonies were deemed to be genuine only if they were not held in 
territorial contiguity. However, this 'fallacy' accurately reflects 
the new structure of world politics, for the Afro-Asian states - the 
chief proponents of 'national-liberation* - are themselves in most cases 
engaged upon the attempt to consolidate 'empires' more obviously 
fragile than that of the Soviet Union. As Wight puts it:
The blue water fallacy has become orthodoxy, 
in the form of the right of territorial vicinity, 
and this is growing into a principle of continental 
solidarity ... In the sphere of legitimacy, if not 
yet in the sphere of strategy, land power has 
triumphed over sea power.
4 2
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There remains the question of whether such a huge and complex 
political entity may not be rendered unworkable by domestic centrifugal 
forces. As to the longer term, leading into early decades of the 
21st century, this is effectively an unanswerable question. This period 
will probably involve fundamental changes not just in the Soviet Union 
but throughout the existing world order; and whether the pattern of 
existing political units is likely to be influenced primarily by fission 
or by fusion, or by some 'neo-mediaevalist' combination of the two, 
would seem to be a matter for pure speculation. But for the period 
considered here, and leaving aside the question of central war, there 
is no persuasive reason for expecting the Soviet Union to break up 
under domestic pressures by 1994, to say nothing of 1984. And during 
this period, it will continue to confront an American adversary which 
- although it reached the destination by a very different route - is 
also a multi-racial empire in which the shift in the demographic 
balance against an already diverse European core is, in its own 
way, as striking as that in the Soviet Union itself. Moreover, if a 
united European great power should emerge in this period, it would 
be a third empire, bedevilled by a variety of peripheral conflicts which 
are already apparent in the constituent nation-states and which would 
not disappear merely because they were subsumed into the politics of 
a larger unit.
Although the Soviet Union seems destined for very considerable 
internal stresses in the coming decade, it is by no means clear that 
these will be of a qualitatively different order .than those which will 
confront the United States or a putative united Europe- Indeed it is 
arguable that one of the most popular scenarios for Soviet 'imperial' 
problems currently on offer in the West - namely major unrest in Central 
Asia - is one of the least plausible in the immediate future. I have 
suggested that the 'state-breaking' dimension of modern nationalism is 
best attributed to the coincidence of clear ethnic and cultural differentia 
with the material grievances deriving from uneven economic development.
The Soviet Central Asians certainly possess the ethnic and cultural 
differentia (together with a specific territorial base, which does not 
apply to the non-European populations in the United States). But they 
have also been, on balance, major beneficiaries of a redistributive 
central planning process which has directly countered the effects of 
uneven development.43 Whether they compare their conditions across 
generations in their own homelands, or across state boundaries to that 
of their co-religionists in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey, they
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can as yet have no compelling material reason to reject their involvement 
in the Soviet state.44
As for the Soviet Union's European populations, they may become 
increasingly exposed to challenging cross-national comparisons, 
especially if there are major deviations from the Soviet model among 
the East European states. But for the Russian majority of these 
populations, the deep roots of Soviet rule in the traditional 
political culture and its achievements in strengthening a Russian- 
dominated Soviet state will presumably remain important pluses; and 
broad cross-generational comparisons in regard to material living 
standards will presumably remain favourable for some time to come.
Indeed, it could be argued that a much more traumatic cross-generational 
judgement confronts the peoples of the United States, who must 
accommodate to a rapid and bewildering degeneration from what, even 
twenty years ago, appeared as a position of near omnicompetence in 
domestic and international affairs.
The last point is not meant to suggest that the United States 
is itself on the verge of fundamental internal disarray, but rather to 
suggest that the whole question of the link between 'legitimacy' and 
Soviet foreign policy is normally posed the wrong way round in the 
American debate. Any reversion to a much more confrontationist foreign 
policy is likely to exacerbate, rather than to contain, the substantial 
domestic problems faced by both great powers, and there is, at the 
moment, little evidence that the leaderships on either side seriously 
envisage a major role for such a foreign policy in the 'legitimation' 
of their domestic rule. But domestic divisions do provide both leaderships 
with a major problem in 'legitimating' foreign policies whose 'national 
interest' component is in practice an expression of the interests and 
traditional preoccupations of the respective Russian and Anglo-Saxon 
political elites.* This factor, along with the aspects of international 
structure discussed earlier, will lend a universalist 'world order' 
flavour to the Soviet-American confrontation, in the 1980s just as when 
it was first joined in earnest after World War II.
* Indeed, this problem may be more immediately acute for American 
governments than for the Soviets, given the disproportionate influence 
of the Jewish and East European 'diasporas' in the American political 
process. Certainly, this is one more factor suggesting growing foreign 
policy divisions between the United States and its West European allies 
in the next decade or so. Some forty years after World War II, the latter 
may be expected to favour pragmatic 'national interest' stances on European 
and Middle Eastern issues which may be strongly opposed by East European 
and Jewish opinion in the United States.
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However, although a substantial world order conflict is virtually 
a given of the Soviet-American relationship, there is room for dispute 
over the extent to which it can be kept separate from the management 
of the military confrontation between the two powers. Partly for 
ideological reasons, and partly because it has 'come from behind' in 
the military competition, the Soviet Union has tended to stress the 
desirability of keeping these two aspects separate. American leaders, 
by contrast, have tended to regard these elements as inseparable; and 
in the era of American preponderance they could draw upon a battery of 
concepts which suggested an instrumental role for military force and 
the threat of force in the promotion of American world order goals.
The implications of these concepts will be considered in the next two 
sections. Precisely because the United States was preponderant for the 
first post-war generation, they were influential in shaping the environment 
in which the Soviet-American competition developed; but I will be arguing 
that, on balance, they were not conducive to stability of expectations, 
and a sense of international society, between the two great powers.
Balance
The concept of balance has obvious mechanistic overtones. Moreover, 
these have been accentuated in the postwar American debate by the extensive 
attention given to the alleged differences between mutipolar and bipolar 
'international systems' and to the strategic arms race as an allegedly 
self-sustaining competition. Such approaches inevitably distract 
attention from the fundamentally politi-cal character of the military 
competition between the United States and the USSR, and from the wider 
geopolitical and economic issues with which it is inextricably associated. 
The following discussion will attempt, through a focus upon the structural 
logic of the situation, to accord such questions their due prominence.
Whether under a bipolar or multipolar power structure, the 
underlying logic of great power relations remains the same. It is the 
principle of competitive emulation or, as Raymond Aron puts it, 'the 
simple principle of equilibrium': oppose actors tending to assume a 
position of predominance in the system as a whole.45 As has been argued, 
this active concern with overall power structure is perforce a matter 
chiefly for the great and the near great, and there is no necessary
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incompatibility between bipolarity at the great power level and a 
plurality of political and social alignments among the lesser powers.
But, whereas a multipolar central balance can be influenced both by 
competitive improvements in capability and by changes in politico- 
military alignments among the great, only the former resource is 
fundamentally significant for the great in a bipolar power structure.46 
Arms racing, therefore, is the 'normal' condition of such a relationship. 
Moreover, an arms race protagonist which does not simply pursue the 
'absolute extension of its power, (but) seeks to limit it in relation 
to the power of the other', even if no formal measures of arms control 
are involved, is pursuing a simple policy of balance of power.47 
Until the 1970s, both the Soviet Union and the United States have 
characteristically insisted that a clear preponderance of power on 
their respective sides was vital to the preservation of peace; but both 
have, at various stages, exhibited elements of such a policy of contrived 
balance in their unilateral arms procurement decisions, as well as in their 
joint arms control initiatives.
It is in this context that the arms race as a political phenomenon 
should be placed. To say that arms race is the 'normal' balancing 
relationship in a system of only two great powers is not to suggest that 
either the intensity of the Soviet/American contest over the last three 
decades or the dimensions of the strategic and conventional arsenals 
now possessed by both powers are part of the ineluctable logic of the 
security dilemma. Both sides have acquired conventional capabilities 
which, on the one hand, have permitted the military promotion of goals 
well beyond the arena of their obvious security interests, and, on the 
other, have ensured that direct conflict between them in areas where the 
'balance of interests' is fluid and ambiguous can no longer be discounted. 
Both have pursued certain strategic policies which, given the special 
characteristics of nuclear weapons, can be characterized with reasonable 
confidence as particularly prejudicial to their mutual security. Since 
both have also exhibited a limited capacity for restraint, it is fair 
to ask why, in areas of relatively clear mutual interest, that restraint 
has not been greater. And a satisfactory answer to this question seems 
impossible without appealing, finally, to considerations of political 
judgement and political will.
Moreover, it is important to note the very different options before 
the two powers for much of this period - at least in regard to strategic
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arms and global projection capability. The chief opportunity for 
initiatives towards a common approach to a contrived balance lay with 
the United States, as the clear quantitative and qualitative arms 
race leader until the late 1960s. In the absence of such American 
initiatives, the choice before the Soviet Union was simple: it could 
pursue a balancing policy of trying to cut down the American lead, 
or it could resign itself to a modified American hegemony. The 
situation is, of course, far more ambiguous today. But one notable 
aspect of the contemporary relationship, which gives considerable point 
to Soviet suspicion of the American rhetoric of balance, is that 
statements heralding either the end of bipolarity or the emergence of 
Soviet preponderance have proliferated at the very time at which the 
overall power structure has finally become truly bipolar.*
Before developing this theme, it is necessary briefly to consider 
the chief arguments which in addition to interstate action-reaction, 
have often been adduced to explain the independent momentum of at least 
the strategic arms race. Perhaps the most persuasive of these 
relate to the enormous importance of the qualitative competition.
The supremely important qualitative change, of course, has been 
the original combination of thermonuclear weapons and near instantaneous 
means of delivery. But, more generally, the strategic environment is 
one of 'continuous innovation'.49 Therefore, given the phenomenon of 
long lead times in the conceptualization, development and procurement 
of new weapons systems, attempts to maintain the 'delicate balance of 
terror' solely by unilateral measures must involve 'reaction' not 
merely to those arms already deployed by the adversary, but to those 
which he might be expected to deploy within a 5-10 year period. These 
considerations lead to the view that the only reliable method of 
avoiding 'technological surprise' is to push forward as fast as 
possible with a continuous and broadly-based program of research 
and development. For a power which, like the United States for most 
of the postwar strategic competition, is generally much closer to 
technological frontiers, this can mean, paradoxically, that the 'real'
R & D race is not with the rival power, but between the developing 
potential of offensive and defensive systems on its own side.50
* See the discussion of this point in Chapter 3, pp.304-5.
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While development need not necessarily lead to deployment, an 
internal stimulus to this transition derives from the 'follow on' 
imperative, the need to provide continuity of employment to the 
specialized production lines which come to be regarded, like the 
research teams, as assets crucial to the security of the country.51 
Moreover, these groups, together with the armed forces which commission 
their services, can be expected to form a natural alliance - often 
referred to as the 'military-industrial [scientific] complex'- in the 
struggle to defend or expand the military proportion of total budgetary 
allocations.52 Finally, a great deal of attention has been paid in 
recent years to the apparent impact upon force postures of bureaucratic 
bargaining between the different armed services. While such 'bureaucratic 
politics' analyses are of little help in explaining the overall dimensions 
of a state's military endeavour, they may reveal elements of its 
composition which have important implications for arms control.
Some of these models - most notably those of 'bureaucratic 
politics' and the 'military-industrial complex' - have been adapted 
to the explanation of Soviet arms race behaviour. But they were 
developed primarily with reference to the United States; and they 
contributed in the late 1960s to the argument, supported in part by 
Secretary of Defense McNamara, that United States strategic developments, 
driven by their own internal dynamic and rationalized in terms of 
exaggerated projections for Soviet deployments, had provided the major 
driving force of an action-reaction arms race. However, with the 
Soviet deployment, first, of missile launch numbers well in excess 
of the long stationary American total and, second, of MIRVs upon 
its new generation of heavy ICBMs, this view was subjected in the 1970s 
to an increasingly powerful counter-attack. Perhaps the most effective 
statement of this case was by Albert Wohlstetter, who rejected the whole 
notion of an American-led arms race. 'Starting in the early 1960s', he 
argued, 'we systematically undere.stimated how much and how rapidly the 
Soviets would increase their strategic offense forces. Moreover, for an 
even longer time, our own spending on strategic forces has been "spiralling"
5 3down rather than up'.
Though Wohlstetter - along with hawk colleagues such as Pipes and 
Gray - seriously exaggerates the extent of the 1960s 'arms control' 
consensus and its impact on American policy before Salt I, and though
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his choice of statistical indicators has been challenged in detail,54 
he does effectively demonstrate that the arms race cannot be reduced 
to a simple mechanical model or models. However, he fails to dispose 
of it as a wider political phenomenon. In this regard, the most 
striking aspects of the strategic competition have been occasional 
dramatic surges which, on one side or the other, have transformed the 
'normal' process of weapons acquisition and improvement. The greatest 
of these expansions (with counterparts in the conventional field as 
well) were the massive American build-up during the Kennedy administration, 
and the equally massive Soviet response from the mid 1960s onward.
But the 1970s have been marked in their turn by a barely restrained 
qualitative surge on both sides, for which the introduction of MIRVs 
might reasonably be regarded as an essential trigger. The record 
suggests, indeed, that there are 'lead times' in the political as well 
as in the technological sphere - lengthy cycles of mistrust about the 
adversary's intentions and his very interpretation of the relationship, 
which seriously prejudice the prospects for substantial arms control 
understandings even in periods when the 'objective' conditions for such 
understandings appear favourable.
The notion might be clarified by considering the relevance for 
the Soviet-American strategic competition of four possible arms race 
'scenarios':
(i) Leading power with capability and will to outdistance 
second power. Second power accepts this. Modified 
hegemony.
(ii) Second power with capability and will to overtake 
leading power. High risk of war.
(iii) Leading power which both powers believe can maintain 
lead, but elects not to pursue hegemony, and sees 
appropriate opportunity for provisional halt. Strong 
foundation for arms control, if second power responds 
with restraint. Opportunity enhanced, if clear 
qualitative 'plateau' reached.
(iv) No clear leader. Indefinite race. Both powers able 
and willing to stay the course. Some heightened risk 
of ultimate war.
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The first scenario is roughly that proposed by several observers, 
including McNamara, in the middle 1960s. Indeed, Soviet strategic 
ccnd conventional power (with the exception of the immediate European 
balance) was quite eclipsed by the United States in those years, and 
a comprehensive 'catch-up' effort was clearly calculated to place 
considerable strain on the much weaker Soviet economy. But such an 
effort was indicated by the logic of the balance of power; and to 
assume that it would not be forthcoming was to assume that the Soviets 
would be content to entrust their interests, on the one hand, to the 
allegedly favourable trend of non-military forces, and on the other, 
to the unforced restraint of their 'imperialist' rival.
The second picture is inherently implausible for the very reason 
which allowed the first to be seriously entertained: the economic and 
technological superiority which the United States could, in principle, 
bring to bear in an unrestrained race. But it does not greatly exaggerate 
the picture recently offered by numerous right-wing critics of American 
military posture during the period of detente - of a weary and confused 
democracy in danger of donating a condition of military superiority to 
its totalitarian rival in a fit of absence of will. At a less polemical 
level, however, it seems most reasonable to describe the current situation 
in terms of the fourth alternative presented above. There are clearly 
major 'asymmetries' today, both in geographical concentrations of power 
and in the type of weapons deployed on either side, but the uncertainties 
of the present decade are, for the first time in the Soviet-American 
relationship, those of a rough overall balance of power.
It must be reiterated that a continuing arms competition is one 
side of the normal balancing process in such conditions, and that 
there is no convincing evidence to suggest that arms races lead 
inevitably to war.5j But general situations of heightened tension, in 
which each side comes to believe that its own 'legitimate' interests are 
being denied by the other, do appear to provide an environment in which 
specific major crises can trigger open conflict. Therefore, given the 
high level of tension currently associated with the extension of the 
qualitative competition in strategic arms, it is especially interesting 
to consider the extent to which conditions favouring the third alternative, 
of a calculated halt by the leading power, have obtained in the postwar 
period. Such conditions appear to have arisen twice, in the late 1950s, 
when the Soviet Union began to acquire a nuclear capability against the
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North American continent, and in the late 1960s, when the Soviet arsenal 
finally approached a form of parity, in numbers and 'survivability', 
with its American counterpart; and, on each occasion, the United 
States responded by lifting the competition onto a quite new plane.
In the first case, certain technical arms control considerations 
might be advanced as a partial, though far from adequate explanation 
of the Kennedy administration expansion: the inadequacy of 'national- 
technical means of verification', even on the American side; the 
confusion in regard to Soviet capabilities and intentions created 
by Khrushchev's verbally agressive 'Sputnik diplomacy'; and the 
contention of influential arms control theorists that deterrent 
'stability' required not merely invulnerable forces, but also substantial 
numbers of forces, on either side.56 In the second instance, none of 
these considerations was relevant, and the discussions which led to 
the formal SALT process were already in train. Yet actual American 
policy ran directly counter to the theoretical prescriptions of the 
minimum deterrence outlook which, in the hawk account, then constituted 
the dominant arms control orthodoxy. By initiating the deployment of 
MIRVs, the United States authorities altered the potential ICBM 
'exchange ratio' - in the first strike - from one favouring the defence 
to one favouring the attack, and thus created the basic preconditions 
for the significance of those auxiliary issues, such as accuracy 
and throw-weight, which bedevilled SALT prospects in the 1970s.
Therefore, without embracing the idea of a natural 'technological 
plateau' in the arms race, one may question why political action has 
worked against, rather than with, such limited opportunities as have 
arisen for stability in this regard. In particular, it is important 
to consider the adequacy of certain long-standing judgements about the 
political significance of nuclear weapons which have tended to militate 
against major restraints on the exploitation of American technological 
superiority. These judgements, whose continuing influence is readily 
apparent in the current orientation of the Reagan administration, are 
neatly encapsulated in a statement by Gray, himself a leading advocate
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of 'more energetic American arms race behaviour' in the 1970s and 1980s:57
Great geopolitical insight is not required to 
perceive that a status quo, ocean-empire 
superpower needs more raw strategic power than 
does a dissatisfied heartland superpower.
5 8
To begin with, then, there is the basic preference for superiority. 
This preference rests upon what Wight has called the 'bank balance' 
conception of the balance of power, which asserts the desirability 
of a favourable balance of power on one's own side, upon which to 
draw in situations of crisis.59 And indeed, the notion that the 
status quo will suffer least disturbance when the beneficiaries of the 
status quo are clearly predominant is, within its limits, perfectly 
true. This is demonstrated, as Geoffrey Blainey points out, by the 
relatively enduring periods of peace consequent upon decisive wars 
where one side is able to dictate, and subsequently to police, its own 
preferred terms of settlement.60 More generally, the operation of the 
principle can be observed in the absence of warfare among the small 
states within a great power's sphere of influence, even where, as in 
Eastern Europe, the region may be littered with potential irridentist 
conflicts. But the sphere of influence analogy also suggests why, in 
the wider system, such a condition of hegemonic 'peace and security' 
is likely to prove intolerable to rising or temporarily defeated major 
powers which possess the resources to back their revisionist ambitions.
In the pre-nuclear era, this was a likely prescription for an arms 
race, leading either to some form of accommodation or to ultimate war. 
However, the instantaneous destruction threatened by nuclear weapons 
would appear to short circuit this process. The achievement by the 
inferior power even of a small and vulnerable deterrent ought logically 
to encourage the superior power to consider arms restraint, since the 
greater the threat posed to the former's nuclear force, the greater 
its 'incentive to pre-empt' in an intense crisis. Indeed, in the specific 
geographical context of the US-Soviet conflict, this logic could be 
applied even to the period when the Soviet Union could threaten the 
United States only indirectly, through a conventional and/or nuclear 
threat to Western Europe. The demonstration of a maximum capacity for 
a lightning thrust against the latter in a crisis situation was a natural
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centrepiece of the Soviet effort to deter an American nuclear attack; 
and this in turn reinforced the case for complete Soviet domination of 
Eastern Europe. Yet in the era of American invulnerability, when the 
immediate rationale of the American nuclear capability lay in the 
area of 'extended deterrence', the mitigation of the Soviet threat to 
Europe was presumably among the foremost diplomatic objectives which 
the American arsenal was supposed to advance.
Finally, attempts to bypass the nuclear stalemate by greater 
emphasis upon conventional power are subject, in their turn, to the 
normal logic of the arms race. The build-up of American conventional 
forces under Kennedy, initiated after a period of substantial Soviet 
reductions in this sphere, was matched by a comparable Soviet expansion 
later in the decade, which has come to fruition in a period marked 
both by increased complexity in the strategic balance, and by post- 
Vietnam uncertainty in American foreign policy. The present situation, 
indeed, lends some credibility to Gray's suggestion that 'the most 
dangerous condition of the strategic balance [may be] one of a generally 
acknowledged parity', in that 'unless one party has a clearly marked 
stake in the issue under dispute ... neither side can be certain who 
ought to give most'.62 But, as noted earlier, the objective conditions 
for direct great power collisions in areas of major uncertainty are also 
of a quite different order today than might have obtained if a 
condition of parity had been secured without the original American 
build-up.
As regards the issue of geopolitics, I have already suggested 
that the resurgence of this theme in the recent American strategic debate 
has sometimes provided little more than a self-serving ideological code 
whereby the Soviet Union can be simultaneously portrayed as seriously 
challenging the stability of the states-system, yet also - in contrast 
to its own protestations of continued revolutionary elan - as an old 
fashioned imperialist power profoundly out of tune with the movement of 
history. But, seriously considered, as a structural perspective on the 
distribution of power, the geopolitical approach offers more ambiguous 
implications. The continued importance, despite nuclear weapons, of the 
geographical distribution of power is undeniable. Even leaving ideological 
conflicts aside, this in itself would probably make the Soviet Union 
the sole or primary target of the three existing 'independent' nuclear
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deterrents, as well as that of the United States, and require the 
extension of an American 'nuclear umbrella' to Western Europe and 
Japan. More generally, while Soviet authorities will tend to identify 
a permanent threat of diplomatic-military encirclement in their enormous 
land borders, their American counter-parts will generally be more 
impressed with the abundance of opportunities for low cost Soviet 
incursions into surrounding regions. In this sense, indeed, geopolitical 
contradictions are built into the Soviet-American relationship. But 
to cast that relationship in the supposedly traditional mould of land 
power-insular power conflict or to depict the overall American position 
as merely one of 'balancing' disproportionate Soviet power in Eurasia, 
is to enter far more questionable territory.
The notion that such a 'balancer' role had fallen to the United 
States does appear to have been influential in the Realist realignment 
in American perceptions after World War II. The historical referent 
was, of course, 18th and 19th century Britain, just as Wilhelmine Germany 
seems increasingly to be the implicit referent for the explanation of 
the arriviste 'imperialism' of the contemporary Soviet Union.63 However, 
the special significance of Britain (as, perhaps, of Venice in the 
Italian city-state context) was that, in a multi-polar power structure 
with a single ’core' and an extensive periphery, she disposed of a 
different kind of power than that of her peers. On the one hand, therefore, 
she was substantially exempt from the omnipresence of the security dilemma, 
being normally secure against invasion herself, yet unable to threaten 
the other powers with direct military hegemony. On the other, since 
her primary diplomatic objectives lay outside the core region, a 
balance in that area, giving her a free hand in the periphery, was her 
most enduring interest.
Even under these special conditions, the advantages conferred 
by Britain's 19th century 'balancer' role were so marked as to lead 
many historians to treat the period as 'the age of British predominance'.64 
In the present system, where nuclear weapons have established the 
general application of the security dilemma in its most absolute form, 
where the Far East has definitely joined Europe as a core region of 
the dominant balance, and where a 'within-system' periphery has become 
a primary arena for the great power contest over milieu goals, the 
notion of the insular power as balancer becomes quite untenable.
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Insofar as it influenced postwar American policy, helping to give 
concrete geographical and military expression to the concept of 
'containment', it functioned as a rationale for American hegemony, 
reaching its apogee with the Vietnam intervention - which Eugene 
Rostow, then at the State Department, justified by reference to 
North Vietnamese violation of 'the first and most basic rule of 
Peaceful Coexistence: 'that the frontiers of the two systems not be 
altered unilaterally or by military action'.65
The other side of the hawk argument from geopolitics - the implicit 
comparison of the contemporary Soviet Union with early 20th century 
Germany in terms of its incentive to forcibly 'restructure' a power 
environment which threatens to become increasingly unfavourable - is 
also basically implausible. The most important general point about 
the successive German bids for European hegemony was that they occurred 
at the height of a period of structural transition, in which German 
leaders had to look simultaneously to the logic of a relatively discrete 
European framework, within which Germany was potentially predominant, 
and an emerging global framework, within which Germany might be swamped 
by the world power of Britain, Russia and the United States. The 
Soviet Union's rise to global power status, on the other hand, occurred 
after the transition to a single global power structure was completed; 
and if the Soviet authorities face continuing problems in sustaining 
that status against the United States, these are not problems which 
can be mitigated by the control of more territory. On this more 
specific point, the challenge which the other great 'World Island' 
power, China, poses to the contemporary Soviet Union is not really 
comparable to that which the Soviet Union (or Russia) posed to Germany 
in the earlier period. The 'now or never' geopolitical arguments for 
German action against Russia were plausible because the latter, though 
backward, possessed major long-term advantages in area, natural resources 
and population. The Soviet Union's position in regard to the first 
two of these categories remains unparalleled, and its continuing need 
to improve the exploitation of its agricultural and mineral resources 
is a powerful incentive both towards greater concentration on domestic 
development efforts and towards closer cooperation with the advanced 
capitalist countries. And though China far surpasses it in population, 
it seems more reasonable - given the implications of nuclear weapons and
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the absolute size of the Soviet population - to regard this as a 
liability rather than an advantage for China in the foreseeable future.
In summary therefore, the geopolitical argument for an impending 
burst of Soviet expansionism rests on a poorly scrutinized analogy, 
rather than on a serious consideration of the structural contours of 
the contemporary situation. This leaves, finally, the appeal to the 
distinction between status quo and revisionist powers. This distinction 
(with its multiple variants such as satisfied, deterrer/dissatisfied, 
initiator, aggressor, revolutionary, imperialist, expansionist) has 
been one of the most prominent conceptual tools of American foreign 
policy analysis since 1945 - and one of the least adequate. The 
notion that the Soviet Union was unambiguously a power of the second 
type, driven, in Kennan's words, to fill 'every nook and cranny 
available to it in the basin of world power', was a central pillar 
of the rationale of containment.66 Similarly, one important assumption 
of 'second wave' deterrence theory was that challenges to the status quo 
would be readily identifiable as the conscious initiative of particular 
agents, and that, in terms of the dichotomy proposed by Thomas Schelling, 
deterrence would be an easier form of coercion than 'compellance', since 
it sought merely to preserve a status quo independently supported 
by custom and general political inertia.67 However, such distinctions 
are largely meaningless in the contemporary context unless considered 
in terms of both possession and milieu goals, or more broadly, of the 
structure of the states-system and its specific historical environment; 
and, in this light, much of their apparent clarity melts away.
In the sphere of possession goals, great power revisionism - which 
was such a crucial aspect of the nexus between the two world wars - has 
been of only minor significance in the post-1945 system. In regard to 
the basic territorial and political settlement emerging from World War II, 
both the United States and the Soviet Union were essentially satisfied 
powers, with the uneasy stalemate over the division of Germany 
constituting only a partial exception to this generalization. It is 
true that the Soviet Union was deeply revisionist, in the first postwar 
decade, in respect of the specific distribution of military power, 
bending all its efforts towards ending the American nuclear monopoly - 
a 'strategic transformation', Kissinger wrote in 1957, which would have 
inevitably resulted in war had it been attempted by territorial expansion
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but which, because it 'took place within sovereign territory ... 
produced an armaments race as a substitute for war'.69 However, as 
argued earlier, the Soviet approach was no more than normal 'balancing' 
behaviour, while United States efforts to evade the implications of 
a bipolar power structure militated against the possibility of a 
more general Soviet indentification with the status quo.
In the sphere of milieu goals, Soviet doctrine and Soviet practice 
both indicate that direct military assistance to favoured regimes 
and insurgencies is regarded as a legitimate part of the Soviet 
contribution to the world-wide struggle of 'progressive' against 
imperialist forces. But, as the last chapter attempted to demonstrate, 
Soviet claims that their actions are merely assisting an autonomously 
developing historical process are not wholly without content. Moreover, 
unless one rules the activities of American-based transnational actors 
out of the equation, it can fairly be argued that the United States' 
approach to Third World political and economic structures was substantially 
more dynamic and initiatory than that of the Soviet Union for much of 
the postwar period - especially since the achievement of the 
transnationals was closely dependent upon the framework of political 
and military order established in the 'free world' by the American 
government's determination to hold the line against the encroachments 
of Communism.* Although this factor has commonly been ruled out in 
Western discussions of challenges to the international 'status quo', 
such judgements may be said to reflect, once again, the application of 
criteria derived from an idealization of the 18th and 19th century 
states-system to a contemporary situation which more closely resembles 
that of early modern Europe.
Several conclusions about the contemporary relationship between 
great power 'parity' and increased Soviet activism are suggested by the 
above considerations. First, while it would undoubtedly be dangerous if 
a former American commitment to global containment were to give way to
* See the discussion of this point in Chapter 3, pp. 298-9.
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a virtual abdication of the field to Soviet adventurism, arguments 
which claim that the current situation reproduces that of the 1930s, 
with 'detente' serving merely as a cover term for the piecemeal 
'appeasement' of an insatiable Soviet imperialism, are a distinct 
hindrance to serious analysis. 'Containment' and 'appeasement' - if 
the notions have a genuine theoretical content - are not exclusive, 
but rather complementary, aspects of a single process of the co-option 
of rising or returning great powers to the existing system - the one 
seeking to demonstrate that absolute security and absolute diplomatic 
goals are unattainable, the other offering reassurance that, within a 
framework of mutual restraint, legitimate security and diplomatic goals 
will not be denied.
Whether such measures are sufficient to achieve adjustment without 
war depends in part on the actual distribution of power in the system. 
And from this standpoint, perhaps the chief lesson of the inter-war 
years is that a potentially dominant power - such as Germany was within 
the artificially limited European system of that period - can be neither 
appeased nor contained, because a dominant power cannot be co-opted to 
a status quo which does not reflect its own dominance. Despite its 
disproportionate weight in Europe, the Soviet Union cannot seriously be 
regarded as a dominant power in the present global system. Unless - 
as seems implausible on the historical record - Soviet expansionism is 
seen as driven by an inner dynamic which is insensible to external 
restraints, its future course would seem, in principle, susceptible to 
modification both by a growing Soviet stake in the international status 
quo, and by the combination of containment and appeasement implied in 
Kissinger's 1975 statement that 'the problem of our age is how to manage 
the emergence of the Soviet Union as a superpower'.70
Second, however, there are the special problems of bipolarity which 
Kissinger's formulation so clearly exemplifies. In earlier periods, the 
legitimate rights of an aspirant great power would have been the subject 
of negotiations with a committee of several of its prospective peers. 
Today, a new central balance of interests must be struck between one 
power, formerly a near hegemonist, which is conscious above all of the 
magnitude of its unforced concessions, and a second power which is 
inclined, both by ideology and experience, to regard its own military 
strength as the sole guarantee that its interests will be seriously 
regarded by the other side.
363.
Third, as Windsor points out, the co-option of the Soviet Union 
to an international (and world) order congenial to Western interests 
may be substantially complicated not by Soviet strength, but by 
Soviet weakness in great power accoutrements other than military 
force. The point, once again, is not that Soviet economic weakness 
itself constitutes an independent motor for expansionist drives. The 
point is that the structural asymmetries of the contemporary world- 
economy suggest, on the one hand, a continuing likelihood of autonomously 
generated instability in resource rich Third World nations, which will 
provide temptations for Soviet military assistance to 'progressive' 
factions, and, on the other, an inherent difference in the material 
interests of the Soviet Union and the major capitalist powers in preserving 
'stability' in such regions. Two factors, in particular, might weigh 
against the potential for conflict in this situation: the development 
to a high level of consciously cultivated East-West economic cooperation, 
and a mutual recognition by the great powers of a link between the 
stability of the strategic relationship and the observance of certain 
'rules of the game' in respect of their wider competition. The first 
issue, and the practical political problems raised by it in the 1970s, 
have been discussed in the previous chapter: the second requires an 
examination of the general implications of nuclear deterrence, to which 
we must now turn.
Deterrence
The concept of deterrence is not so obviously entwined with mechanistic 
analogies as is that of the balance of power. There are some indications 
in the American debate of reliance upon the notion of an abstract 
deterrence system, especially among the more 'theological' advocates of 
the Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) position. But a much more pervasive 
concern has been that of 'rationality' in nuclear decision-making. This 
is a natural emphasis in considering the impact upon the states-system 
of weapons which - once in the possession of more than one power - 
effectively negate their own utility as rational instruments for the 
pursuit of diplomatic goals and raise the 'reciprocal fear of surprise 
attack' to the first rank of threats to stable relations among the great 
powers. However, I would argue that the cluster of bargaining and game-
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playing metaphors which Robert Jervis refers to as second wave 
deterrence theory did not in practice constitute an attempt to apply 
assumptions of general rationality to a specific structural context 
but rather an attempt to elevate an American special rationality,
7 3based upon a 'mercantile' political culture, to universal status.
As has already been argued, the commitment to analyse a situation of 
large-scale political interaction primarily in strategic terms implies 
a belief in the over-riding importance of material structures in that 
situation. But in the a-historical confines of the American strategic 
debate, the concrete material structures of contemporary world politics 
were generally reduced to a set of simplistic axioms about geopolitics 
and 'modernization', and the empty space thus provided was filled, in 
the development of second wave deterrence theory, with a peculiarly 
American network of constituent meanings.
Although seminal 'second wave' thinkers such as Thomas Schelling 
and Glen Snyder made important contributions to the refinement of 
American analyses of the structural changes wrought by nuclear weapons, 
the central issues involved, including the crucial distinction between 
first and second stikes, were rapidly grasped by analysts like Bernard 
Brodie at the outset of the nuclear era.* But, in contrast to their 
'immensely popular' successors, these 'first wave' studies had little 
general impact - in part, Jervis argues, because they confined themselves 
to 'exploring the implications of nuclear weapons without also developing 
more explicit and deductive models and linking their arguments to the 
broader questions of bargaining'.74 This latter provided the primary 
focus of second wave theorists, who addressed themselves, more or less 
explicitly, to the question of how the threat of nuclear weapons could 
most effectively be manipulated to deter Soviet and/or Communist 
encroachments on American and 'Free World' interests, contributing 
significantly, in the process, to the general conceptual vocabulary in 
which - at both academic and governmental levels - American foreign 
policy came to be discussed. It seems fair to suggest that one important 
element of the second wave appeal to the positivist orthodoxy in American 
political science - which allowed its proponents successfully to ignore,
* And also, as Chapter Seven points out, by Soviet military theorists 
when they were allowed to address these issues after the death of Stalin.
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7 Srather than rebut, their early critics - was its general flavour 
of 'value free' inquiry and its illusory connection with the mathematical 
methodologies influential in more established social sciences such as 
economics. But the degree of genuinely scientific inquiry into the 
nature of international politics was in fact minimal - the theory 
remaining, as Alexander George and Richard Smoke point out, 'fundamentally 
normative-prescriptive not historical-explanatory' . 7 7
Of course, a theory of deterrence must, in one sense, inevitably 
remain a theory without a practice. As is often pointed out, one cannot 
demonstrate with certainty that the United States and the Soviet Union 
have ever, by tacit or explicit nuclear threats, 'deterred' each other 
from doing anything, nor that any particular force posture or 'declaratory 
policy has raised or lowered the 'probability' of nuclear war. But the 
postwar era has produced numerous crisis situations for which it seems 
reasonable to infer a heightened risk of direct great power conflict 
and/or nuclear weapons use, and several limited war situations in which 
coercive strategies reflecting similar bargaining assumptions have been 
attempted in practice. Until the late 1960s, however, the development 
of the theory was characterized by a 'startling ... lack of search for 
supporting evidence'; and when a more empirically based mainstream 
critique - Jervis's 'third wave' - finally did emerge, it was in general 
remarkable for a propensity to tinker with, rather than replace, the 
original conceptual categories.79 Moreover, since the early 1970s, when 
the emergence of a relatively settled Soviet-American parity in nuclear 
weapons rekindled the alarms about the effectiveness of American 
'extended deterrence' which had first surfaced in the late 1950s, the 
enduring concern with coercive bargaining strategies at the American 
governmental level has become increasingly important. Beginning with the 
1973 Schlesinger proposals for counterforce strategies 'to shore up 
deterrence across the entire spectrum of risk', this theme has never 
been far from the surface in official pronouncements on nuclear issues, 
and under the Reagan administration it has burst into full flower.
This point is important because the hawk school have characteristically 
presented their own approach as an emphasis upon concrete political 
issues, as opposed to the a-historical abstractions of the MAD orthodoxy 
which, they claim, has fixed the United States into a dangerously 
vulnerable 'mutual deterrence' posture which is openly rejected by the
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Soviet Union. However, I would argue that the theological approach 
to MAD and the theological approach to extended deterrence and limited 
war - which the hawk theorists themselves exemplify - are brothers 
under the skin, in that each involves the attempt to impose a technological 
solution on an intractable political problem. By contrast, mutual 
deterrence arguments have often been grounded less in the desire for a 
technological fix than in a recognition of the intractability of the 
problem; but their impact has always been weakened in the American 
context by the attractions of the extended deterrence approach, with 
its multiple resonances in the wider American political culture. In 
fact, as George and Smoke observe, this approach markedly failed to live 
up to its publicity as a scientific guide to practical policy making.
But while its productive impact upon American 
foreign policy was limited, it did have the 
negative effect of reinforcing the policy­
makers* tendency to rely too heavily on 
deterrence strategy and deterrent threats in 
lieu of the more flexible instruments of 
inter-nation influence associated with 
classical diplomacy.
80
Given the impact upon United States elite opinion of the non-convergence 
of Soviet nuclear doctrine upon American assumptions, the claim that 
certain of these assumptions are misguided clearly needs substantiation.
I will attempt to develop this argument in the ensuing sections, building 
on the earlier discussion of arms race dynamics and broad political 
tensions in the Soviet/American conflict, and laying the ground for the 
concluding discussion of prospects for contemporary international society.
In thus seeking to focus upon the problems of securing great power 
recognition of shared and individual 'legitimate' interests, I will, of 
course, be pursuing a central concern of second wave deterrence theory 
- the search for 'salient' solutions upon which the 'rational' protagonists 
of a military adversary relationship could be expected to agree. But,
I will seek to show that the more sophisticated bargaining theories - 
in their concern with the manipulation of threats to establish the salience 
of otherwise unpalatable solutions - have tended to obfuscate the central 
problem of the intrinsic balance of interests in conflict situations, 
and that, by contrast, the correlation of forces and related Soviet 
doctrines are rather more hospitable to such a notion than is normally 
acknowledged.
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Deterrence involves, in the broadest sense, the attempt to prevent 
unwanted actions by threatening that the implementation of such 
actions will involve 'unacceptable' costs for their initiators.
Deterrent threats in international relations need not, of course, be
related to nuclear weapons: nor need they be addressed to any specific
situation. The great significance of British naval power at its 19th
century peak was that - by virtue of the prospective costs with which
it confronted potential challengers - its actual employment against
rival great powers was not required.81 Similarly, the Soviet Union's
'policing' of its East European sphere of influence depends primarily
on the deterrent effect of the combination of massive Soviet capabilities
and a demonstrated willingness to use them to forestall unwanted developments;
and, if direct intervention were to be required on a regular, rather
than an occasional basis, the Soviet position would become a great deal
less tenable. The ability of decisive victors to ensure relatively
lengthy periods of peace may also be attributed, in large part, to their
successful deterrence of possible new challenges from their weakened
rivals.
Indeed, a large proportion of the military preparations of most 
states may be attributed to a concern with the 'general deterrence' of 
developments regarded as adverse to their interests. As Patrick Morgan 
suggests, generally satisfied powers practise general deterrence to avoid 
having to practise 'immediate deterrence' in situations where specific 
substantial interests are definitely threatened, just as they practice 
immediate deterrence to avoid facing the choice between armed conflict 
and a complete or partial surrender on specific issues. Moreover, 
though powers seeking to effect change may be constrained to place greater 
reliance on the use of force, they too will normally be concerned to 
extract as much advantage as possible from threats alone. Therefore the 
deterrence theorists' characteristic image of international politics as 
a bargaining situation is, in general, a very appropriate one. When 
the leading states are agreed on their 'relative bargaining power' - and, 
by inference, upon the kind of claims which each can realistically 
advance - peace is likely.83 When changes in relative military capability, 
or major shifts in other elements of the 'correlation of forces', produce 
deep divergences on these issues, a situation of crisis (or, from a 
status quo perspective, of immediate deterrence) will arise. If the
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more intensive bargaining of a crisis, or series of crises, does not 
produce a sufficient realignment in bargaining estimates, war - which 
alone provides for a relatively precise solution to such a 'dispute 
about the measurement of power' - is a likely result.84
In the prenuclear era, one can readily identify the phenomena 
both of a general compact among powers designed to promote the 
accommodation of conflicting interests, where possible, without resort 
to the costly tribunal of war, and of more specific conventions of 
crisis - from full-scale mobilization to the sending of gunboats to 
disputed colonial regions - by which the protagonists to a particular 
conflict attempted to 'signal' such factors as the intensity of their 
commitment, and their confidence of a favourable outcome in the event 
of actual war. However, as Geoffrey Blainey points out, a level of 
agreement on relative bargaining power sufficient to avert major war 
seldom obtained for more than a generation:85 and such peacetime 
bargaining techniques depended for their effectiveness precisely on the 
knowledge that, in the last analysis, the issue could and would be 
resolved by war. But this latter prospect, in contemporary great power 
relations, is effectively ruled out by the disproportionate damage 
threatened by nuclear weapons. On the one hand, therefore, the emphasis 
of second wave theorists on the unprecedented significance of peacetime 
bargaining in the nuclear era is perfectly justified. On the other hand, 
the range of bargaining strategies typically proposed, and the extent 
of the deterrence 'compact' with the Soviet Union implied in these 
strategies, is quite out of keeping with the fact that the underlying 
threat of military action is credible only in the most extreme exigencies.
The point is that actions such as mobilization or the movement of
a naval squadron actually increase a state's capability for military
action and their significance in this regard is a precondition of their
significance as signals of heightened risk.86 But today's nuclear
forces are unprecedented not merely in their destructive capacity, but
also in their state of combat readiness. Therefore, all actions short
of a significant strike are signals of intention pure and simple, and
no amount of sophistication in signalling can lessen the enormity of
87the gap between declaration and implementation in this context. Because 
of the magnitude of the risk involved, signals such as the 1973 
American 'Stage Three' alert, to say nothing of an actual 'demonstration 
strike', can of course be extremely potent. But their potency depends
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precisely upon a prospect of real, destructive violence which cannot 
securely be contained by any signalling convention. If it we're possible 
to devise a pure case of 'demonstration strike', and if this could be 
brought within a clear convention recognized by both sides, it would 
lose its effectiveness as a generator of risk. Indeed, this argument 
can be applied to the whole concept of a nuclear 'escalation ladder'.
There must be some point of the ladder at which genuine costs begin 
to be inflicted on each side. If the lower 'rungs' were covered by 
an accepted 'signalling' convention, then genuine signalling would 
begin only at that point, with all the incalculable consequences that 
would entail. 88
A related problem is the dubious manner in which prewar 'crisis 
management' and post-crisis 'limited war' are merged in doctrines 
proposing escalation as a basic bargaining technique. Both situations, 
it is assumed, could be marked by similar bargaining logic, combining 
restraint with competition in 'risk taking' and demonstration of 'resolve'. 
But the resolve which powers seek to demonstrate in non-nuclear contexts 
is above all resolve to fight, rather than merely to continue escalation 
in the intensity of their signals; and while the fighting may have its 
own limiting conventions, it remains in essence a trial of strength 
to determine issues which cannot be resolved by 'bargaining' alone. If 
two major nuclear powers were brought to actual warfare, the same 
imperative for a definitive solution would apply: but its pursuit would 
be self-defeating, since the extensive use by each side of its most 
efficient weapons, even in an ostensibly 'counterforce' mode, would 
inevitably threaten the virtual destruction of civil society on each 
side.* There would, therefore, be one supremely important bargaining 
issue in such a situation - the termination of hostilities without the 
use, or further use, of nuclear weapons.
Of course, any statements about this fortunately 'undiscovered 
country' must remain speculative, but it is intuitively difficult to 
credit the range of prospects envisaged in the American debate. These 
are usefully summarized in the 'representative taxonomy of limited 
nuclear conflict' suggested by Jack Snyder, in an examination of the 
prospects of Soviet acquiescence in the kind of limited nuclear exchanges
* This judgement on the effect of a major counterforce exchange 
would need qualification if both sides were to move completely to a 
SLBM based deterrent. But this does not seem likely within the 
period considered in this thesis.
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envisaged in recent American targeting doctrines: (1) strikes limited 
to a specific region or theatre; (2) demonstration shots aimed at 
enhancing credibility, showing resolve, and demonstrating a willingness 
to compete in risk taking; (3) graduated infliction of pain, such as 
slow motion city trading; (4) attritional counterforce attacks with 
city avoidance; and (5) massive, pre-emptive counterforce attacks with 
city avoidance.89 Snyder concludes that the Soviet 'strategic culture' 
strongly militates against cooperation in regard to limited options in 
general. But one might add that, in any event, only the first and last 
of these alternatives warrant consideration as serious possibilities.
The others, with their assumption of a further protracted process of 
intra-war bargaining aimed at resolving the conflict of interests which 
had originally caused the breakdown of pre-war bargaining, seem basically 
implausible.
In sum, therefore, the nuclear aspect of the great power relationship 
enormously upgrades their common interest in war avoidance and war 
termination. But it does nothing to remove those factors, such as the 
historical elasticity of the 'national interest', which have regularly 
produced great power warfare in the past. Agreed conventions on 
signalling and other techniques of crisis management are vital to the 
operation of a deterrence compact, but the compact itself depends upon 
the identification of a basic core of common interest, whose clarity 
diminishes noticeably as one moves along a spectrum from mutual 
deterrence, through questions of defence, warfighting and 'damage 
limitation', to those of 'extended deterrence', or the diplomatic dimension 
of nuclear weapons. Each of these areas will now be considered in turn.
Mutual deterrence is the heart of the Soviet-American nuclear 
relationship. If no other considerations were involved, two judgements 
could be made with substantial confidence. Objectively, conditions 
for stable deterrence would be optimal when each side's 'countervalue' 
capability was at a maximum, and its 'counterforce' capability at a 
minimum. Subjectively, it would be in each side's interest to convince
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the other that it would strike only in retaliation, but that, if 
subjected to a first strike from the other, it would inevitably retaliate.
One crucial proposition flowing from this is that each side has 
a direct interest in the security of the other's retaliatory capability, 
and should not pursue 'active' or 'passive' damage limiting policies 
(first strike counterforce, on the one hand, or ABM, air defence and 
civil defence, on the other) to an extent which threatens the other's 
ability to inflict 'unacceptable' damage in a second strike. This 
counter-intuitive and politically unpalatable doctrine was held by many 
American commentators to have been enshrined in the SALT I treaty banning 
nationwide ABM systems, and the exaggerated claims then made probably 
contributed substantially to the extent of the disillusionment produced 
by the growing evidence of a developing Soviet threat to the American 
ICBM force. However, the notion that American policies have themselves 
ever reflected a wholehearted endorsement of 'Mutual Assured Destruction' 
is a serious distortion of the historical record.
Assured Destruction undoubtedly dominated American declaratory policy 
through most of the 1960s, after McNamara's brief flirtation with a 
'No Cities' counter-force doctrine in 1961-62. But the United States' 
nuclear arsenal in this period greatly exceeded the levels required by its 
proclaimed Assured Destruction goals, and numerous authorities have 
testified that, at the level of action policy, the counterforce targeting 
initiated by McNamara remained unchanged.90 By the late 1960s, when the 
Soviet Union appears finally to have acquired an invulnerable second strike 
capability, the United States was already moving towards MIRV deployment, 
and since the 1974 unveiling of the Schlesinger doctrine, an American 
determination not to allow any significant Soviet counterforce advantage 
has been enshrined even in declaratory doctrine.91 In general, it can be 
said that both Soviet and American leaderships have really begun to come to 
terms with the mutual hostage relationship only in the last decade, and in 
conditions much less favourable than those which might have been obtained 
in an 'un-MIRVed' world.92
Second, it must be emphasized that the 'theory' of mutual deterrence 
rests on the commonsense proposition that potential agressors will be 
deterred by the prospect of 'a lot' of damage,93 and that American 
attempts to give precise operational significance to this basically crude 
notion have merely served to confuse the issue. The very high Assured 
Destruction targets proposed under McNamara (25-30% of the USSR's 
population, and two thirds of its industrial capacity) appear to have 
been determined primarily on technological, rather than political 
grounds; and because of the systematic employment of 'worst case' planning
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these criteria themselves had very little impact on the determination 
of the American force structure.94
With the emergence of a more formidable Soviet nuclear capability, 
the Nixon administration shifted to an emphasis upon destruction levels 
equal to anything the Soviets could inflict. J5 And this relative approach 
reached its logical culmination - in the context of the recent debate 
over the Soviet civil defence programme - in targeting programmes designed 
to ensure that the Soviet Union could not vecovev from a nuclear war 
more rapidly than the United States - a policy which, in Bernard Brodie's 
words, appears to lack 'any political input', and for which 'one would
9 6have to go back almost to the fate of Carthage to find a precedent'.
In general, it may be argued that the notion that stable deterrence 
somehow requires the preservation, in all circumstances, of such massive 
destructive capabilities, or that these requirements could actually 
increase in proportion as the Soviet Union's own capabilities increased, 
has had a corrupting and distorting influence upon a debate that is in 
any case highly charged with emotion.
These considerations provide the background against which the 
second complex of issues - concerning defence, damage limitation and war 
fighting - should be assessed. It is virtually impossible not to 
recognize the technological reality of the mutual hostage relationship 
between the great powers. 97 But it is only in terms of a strict MAD 
'theology', which attempts to impose a narrow and abstract notion of 
instrumental rationality upon a fundamentally intractable situation, 
that the preservation of this relationship can be said to demand total 
abstention from defensive measures against attacks on cities and populations. 
Even leaving aside the fundamental connection between the legitimacy of 
governments and their commitment directly to protect their societies 
against external threats, it is an insoluble paradox of nuclear deterrence 
that the very threats of massive retaliation which seem calculated to 
maximize deterrence are those whose implementation, if deterrence should 
fail, would be both morally abhorrent and tantamount to national suicide. 
Given the inherent credibility problem of such threats, it can be argued 
that deterrence will be most effective when a state can project the 
determination to fight a nuclear war, should one eventuate, in such a way 
as to minimize potential damage to itself. Soviet military doctrine, 
overwhelmingly shaped by professional military theorists and reflecting
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a history in which even ultimately victorious wars have involved 
great damage to the homeland, has traditionally adopted just such a 
stance; and there are indications, in the era of nuclear parity, of 
a significant and growing degree of 'convergence1 in American academic 
and governmental thinking upon this view.
In this respect, at least, the Soviet-American debate on the 
'rationality' of nuclear war, with accusations of continued adherence 
to Clausewitz being traded back and forth by commentators on both sides, 
would appear to be an essentially bogus one." The view that nuclear 
war is a 'rational' instrument of policy is indeed inimical to stable 
deterrence: but should nuclear war break out, a commitment on both 
sides to the subordination of military action to rational political 
control would be an essential precondition of its termination short of 
a general holocaust. Thus both the Soviet and American warfighting 
doctrines address a crucial weakness in the absolute deterrence/defence 
dichotomy promoted by the Assured Destruction concept, though neither 
of their radically different solutions - massive counterforce, linked 
to 'passive' damage limitation and all out conventional war, on the 
one hand, and limited counterforce, selective options, and 'intra-war 
deterrence' on the other, provides a nearly adequate solution of this 
fundamentally insoluble problem. Soviet prescriptions, if carried out 
to the letter, would be likely to produce a situation virtually 
indistinguishable from reciprocal massive retaliation.100 They thus 
seem calculated to preserve a high 'nuclear threshold', while at 
the same time removing any inbuilt commitment to massive counter city 
strikes for their own sake. However, if their goal of unilateral 
damage limitation is taken seriously, it must create a strong 'incentive 
to pre-empt* in situations of extreme crisis. The Schlesinger proposals 
(like their 'No Cities' predecessors) raise the vital question of 
cooperative damage limitation. But, by depicting, in effect, a single 
escalatory continuum between crisis and war, they contrive both to 
lower the nuclear threshold, and to confound cooperation for the single 
purpose of war termination with cooperation to sustain an indefinite and 
artifically limited process of coercive bargaining.101
As was argued earlier, the notion that some form of nuclear victory 
could pass to the power demonstrating a tougher bargaining stance, while 
the bulk of its opponent's arsenal remained unused, appears quite
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illusory. It seems far more likely that, if a great power nuclear 
engagement were not halted after the earliest exchanges, it would 
escalate rapidly to all out war. Success in the first alternative 
would undoubtedly require a belief on each side that the adversary 
possessed both the command and control facilities, and the political 
judgement and political will, to enable it to disengage from a situation 
of actual conflict. But sophisticated counterforce capabilities and 
sophisticated counterforce strategies would probably be quite irrelevant 
to the type of signalling required for this; and the prior establishment 
of an agreed set of bargaining conventions would merely encourage 'intra- 
war' escalation, just as it would render less momentous the original 
passage from crisis into war.102
These issues in turn merge with those of extended deterrence and 
nuclear diplomacy, which lie at the end of the spectrum of ambiguous 
interests mentioned above and in regard to which differences between
10 3Soviet and American approaches are most obvious and fundamental.
While there are obvious historical and institutional reasons for the 
Soviet adherence to traditionalist warfighting doctrines against the 
notion of extensive cooperation with a wartime adversary, their hostility 
to American limited war doctrines is also a realistic response to the 
ambiguous kind of cooperation which it suggests. Indeed, in this specific 
area, the Soviet Union would appear to have the better of the argument 
over Clausewitz. Pronouncements by the political leadership about the 
relation of Peaceful Coexistence and nuclear war, as distinct from 
military writings about how a war would be fought if it occurred, 
invariably emphasize that nuclear war cannot be an instrument of policy.
By contrast, Schlesinger's concern to 'shore up deterrence across the 
entire spectrum of risk' might be more accurately expressed in terms of 
the extension of the deterrent impact of nuclear weapons to a range 
of contingencies to which a nuclear response might normally seem 
incredible. Moreover, the concern to extract specific diplomatic 
advantages from the possession of nuclear weapons, first by tacit or 
explicit threats of 'massive retaliation', and later by a variety of 
'flexible response' strategies, has been a pervasive concern of academic 
and governmental thinking in the United States since at least 1953.
There is, of course, a major structural problem of nuclear deterrence 
involved here: the prospect that 'stalemate' at the nuclear level could
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allow the piecemeal achievement of substantial gains by actors prepared 
to take the initiative at lower levels of violence.104 Moreover there 
are inherent reasons why the two powers would be likely to assume clearly 
opposed positions on the 'extended deterrence' issue. Granted the 
ostensible Soviet perspective of a world revolutionary process and a 
shifting correlation of forces, the stability of Soviet-American 
deterrence would actually be endangered by the 'freezing' of historical 
change, which would merely create intolerable pressures and major 
conflagrations in the longer term. By contrast the American tendency 
to situate the deterrence relationship within a wider international (or 
world political) system encourages the view that deterrence stability is 
closely linked to stability in the latter context. More tangibly, the 
Soviets have been compelled to rely, for most of their history, primarily 
on indirect means for the long range pursuit of influence; while their 
most vital interests have been unambiguously 'given' by their geography 
and historical experience, and have been readily defensible, since World 
War II, by overwhelming conventional power.105 The United States, by 
contrast, enjoyed for at least a century an impressive real world 
approximation to 'absolute security', which was rudely shattered by the 
Soviet nuclear threat a mere decade after it had begun consistently to 
exercise its full weight in international affairs. Concerned from at 
least the mid-1950s with the problems of extending credible nuclear 
guarantees to Western Europe and Japan, and lacking any immediate 
compulsion to draw clear distinctions between vital and other interests, 
American policy makers naturally inclined towards concepts which 
promised that their still extensive strategic preponderance and 
conventional reach could be effectively deployed in defence of a favourable 
international milieu.
It must be acknowledged that the defence of West European and 
Japanese territorial integrity clearly constitutes a vital American 
interest. But, in a sense, it is precisely this consideration which 
has been obscured by the absolutization of the notion of 'credibility' 
in American deterrence theorizing. An American threat to 'commit 
national suicide' in defence of Western Europe, after all, is only 
relatively less credible than an American threat to commit national 
suicide in defence of the 'United States'; and it is arguable that there 
is a greater qualitative resemblance between these two threats than
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between such threats in respect of Western Europe and, for instance,
South Korea. The great intrinsic significance, economically, strategically 
and culturally, of Western Europe to the United States suggests a 
level of intrinsic risk in a Soviet attack which any prudent decision­
maker would reject: and Soviet military writings, in contrast to 
limited war theorizing in the United States, have characteristically 
discussed such an attack only in the context of all out war between the 
great powers.*
However, as George and Smoke point out, the question of intrinsic 
interests as the basis for commitment to third parties was largely 
ignored by second wave theorists, in favour of a concentration upon 
complicated strategies by which credibility could be imparted to guarantees 
which would otherwise lack it.106 The neglect of distinctions between 
vital and other interests was in fact a natural concomitant of the 
propensity to view the great power relationship as a vast ongoing game 
of bluff, strikingly exemplified in the following discursus by Schelling 
on the Chicken Game analogy:
What is at stake is not only the risk of being 
exploited by one's partner. There is also 
the risk that the other will genuinely misinterpret 
how far he is invited to go. If one yields on a 
series of issues, when the matters at stake are 
not crucial, it may be difficult to communicate 
to the other just when a vital issue has been 
reached ... It may be safer in the long run to 
hew to the centre of the road than to yield six 
inches on successive mights if one intends to 
stop yielding before he [sic] is pushed off the 
shoulder. It may save both parties a collision.
l o 7
The rationale for this insistence upon the importance of apparently 
trivial issues lay in Schelling*s definition of bargaining credibility as 
simply another term for the 'interdependence of a country's commitments'.108 
But in practice such conceptions of commitment, by reducing 'a complex 
political fact to a military or diplomatic process', actually obscured, 
in the United States' most crucial third party commitments, those very 
features most likely to impress an adversary claiming to ground all its 
actions in a careful analysis of the correlation of forces.109
Both the doctrine of closely interdependent commitments and the 
specific bargaining strategies emphasized by second wave theorists have 
received little support from the general record of direct Soviet- 
American crisis behaviour. Second wave arguments implied that statesmen
* The argument that this has begun to change in the last decade 
will be considered in Chapter 7.
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would attempt to exploit the appearance of 'irrational' commitment, 
that they would consciously foreclose options and initiate risk processes 
which they themselves could not fully control, and that they would 
be prepared to move towards the brink on relatively trivial issues 
rather than compromise their bargaining reputation by retreating under 
pressure. 110 But the plausibility of 'brinkmanship' as a general strategy 
varies inversely with the adversary's freedom to pursue the competition 
in risk taking on an equal basis. The concept thus assumed what Hermann 
Kahn called 'escalation dominance' on the American side, and was already 
being rendered obsolete by the developing Soviet nuclear capability by 
the time it began to receive this full theoretical exposition.111 While 
the nuclear era has indeed produced a lengthening of the escalation 
ladder, as Glen Snyder and Paul Deising suggest, it has been a 
lengthening downwards3 not upwards, facilitated by a considerable 
incentiveness in 'issue splitting' in the signalling behaviour of both 
sides. Overall, as Aron observes, great power interactions have 
observed the most basic rules of prudence, and 'have shown more signs 
of conforming to the crude, even primitive Russian doctrine than of 
drawing their inspiration from the subtleties of the American analysts'.114
This can hardly be surprising. Nuclear deterrence is not a subtle 
strategy, but a crude, even primitive threat to impose intolerable 
damage if certain limits are transgressed. The 'strategic man' of the 
deterrence theorists, equipped with a clearly defined costs/benefits 
calculus, does not exist, least of all in a situation of major crisis.115 
And if he did, and if he believed his opponent to be similarly equipped, 
he would not be deterred by threats whose credibility, in the last 
instance, rests upon the power of emotional values not reducible to 
such a calculus. The very idea of nuclear deterrence, as Morgan argues, 
involves the tacit assumption of 'sensible' (or, in the favoured Soviet 
terminology, 'realistic' or 'sober') decision-makers, aware that national 
suicide in defence of intensely held values is not an impossibility. 116 
This being so, nuclear crises are likely to be influenced far less by 
'histrionic talents' than by each side's 'estimates of the opponent's 
value system', and of the balance of 'legitimate' interests in the 
issue under dispute. 118
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The elusive notion of legitimacy raises in turn the question 
of the more general world view promoted by second wave deterrence theory. 
Ostensibly value free, it appears effectively to have operated, by 
virtue of its symbiotic relationship with the more simplistic variants 
of Cold War Realism and the ideology of containment, to promote an 
image of East-West relations in which an intense degree of conflict 
between two discrete actors, one of which could consistently be identified 
with attempts to overturn the legitimate status quo, could be taken as 
given. Later American critics have argued that this approach construed 
the situation of general deterrence in terms which are appropriate only 
to immediate deterrence.119 But this criticism is itself too weak, for 
it fails to take account of the importance of autonomous factors, over 
which neither actor has effective control, even in direct confrontations 
between the great powers. The neat, two actor, aggressor/deterror 
schema is questionable, for instance, even in the case of such superficially 
unambiguous Soviet initiatives as the 1948 and 1961 Berlin crises - to 
say nothing of the Indo-China crisis of 1953-54, whose 'structure' and 
'root causes', George and Smoke conclude, 'were such as to make it a 
ncm-deterrable -phenomenon'. 120
Even in some crisis situations, therefore, though far more obviously
in the wider Cold War context, American policy can be seen as concerned
not with deterring an identifiable adversary from doing something, but
with deterring 'something' (at the level of mass action) from happening.
This, of course, has by no means been an exclusively American preoccupation.
Soviet 'deterrence' in Eastern Europe is directed less against the
regimes in question than against those popular forces which might, if
given their head, impel the latter towards changes unacceptable to
the Soviet regime. Nor is such deterrence an impossible enterprise.
But as current developments in Poland graphically demonstrate, such
situations are far more problematic than domestic situations in which
a strong and determined regime has direct and consistent access to
established organs of repression, redistribution and indoctrination in
support of its campaign for a certain pattern of social development.
As Western observers very readily note in the East European case,
deterrence of this sort is really a holding operation which, unless
accompanied by a significant accommodation to the legitimacy of change,
1 2 1is likely merely to focus and intensify opposition to the status quo.
379.
While the interplay in American thinking between deterrence theory 
and the general containment ideology is most obvious in regard to 
the structure of international relations as such, a similar comment 
applies to the implicit picture offered of the domestic political 
structure of the opposing state. I have already emphasized the 
unreality of the abstract strategic man of the second wave theorists.
But in any case this abstract utility maximiser was not the adversary 
which their prescriptions for American policy (the evident concern 
behind the screen of their alleged ethical neutrality) demanded in 
practice. Rather the required adversary might be characterized as a 
'realistic totalitarian nationalist' - on the one hand endowed with a 
clear set of transitively ordered national goals and a tight control 
over potentially pluralist forces at both popular and bureaucratic level, 
and on the other capable of reordering specific priorities with great 
flexibility in the fact of an altered 'costs/benefits calculus', with 
scant regard either to the demands of entrenched domestic constituencies 
or to the conception of credibility as the interdependence of commitments. 
There was, in fact, a reasonable 'real-world' approximation of these 
traits in the chief regimes against which the United States directed 
deterrence-related strategies: the Soviets, above all, but also the 
Chinese and the Vietnamese; and the plausibility of such strategies seemed 
to receive special confirmation from the Soviet regime's readiness, 
at the Cuban Missile crisis, to restructure its immediate priorities 
and back down unceremoniously in the face of a sharply unfavourable 
correlation of forces.
However, the irony of this situation is that the very characteristics 
which have facilitated ruthless reappraisals of immediate objectives 
by Communist governments - their tight control of domestic politics, 
their strong sense of instrumental rationality and of the 'trade-offs' 
between the short and the long term - have also made them especially 
inclined to respond to the 'escalation dominance' of an adversary by 
determined efforts to overturn that situation in the long term. Whatever 
impact the Cuban fiasco may have had upon the ultimate fall of Khrushchev, 
there is little doubt that it caused a basic reappraisal by the Soviet 
elite of the stakes needed to fully enter the great power game - if 
indeed Cuba did not merely confirm a reappraisal already triggered by 
the Kennedy force expansions themselves. And while the North Vietnamese
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regime could never hope to overturn the American escalation dominance, 
they could, and did, reverse the American calculus of costs and benefits 
by a combination of endurance in the face of enormous casualties and an 
ultimate readiness to accept the formula of a negotiated settlement to 
remove the United States physically from the field of battle.
It was,indeed, in the Indo-China war that the anomalies of 
American conceptions of extended deterrence were most clearly exemplified. 
It must be emphasised that their influence there was primarily at the 
level of general ethos. The more specific deterrence-related strategies 
of 'coercive diplomacy', as William Simons argues, appear to have been 
confined to the bombing campaigns preceding the involvement of American 
ground troops in 1965.122 But a central thrust of American deterrence/ 
limited war theorizing was the concern to identify a meaningful political 
role for weapons of inordinate force. In Vietnam, a massive double 
asymmetry obtained, of potential force on the American side, and of 
motivation on the North Vietnamese side - and American decision-makers 
could draw upon theories which appeared to demonstrate how the former 
could be made to compensate for the latter.
One of the most revealing, and ugliest, paradoxes of second wave 
deterrence theory is that sophisticated bargaining strategies too 
perilous to implement in their prescribed environments could be applied 
with impunity in a situation to which they were even less appropriate, 
and that, as their prescriptions gave ground to more traditional military 
interpretations of warfighting, their 'value-free' terminology continued 
to provide a rationale for a brutal and increasingly meaningless campaign 
of bombing.123 Moreover, the Nixon administration, faced with the problem 
of 'decoupling' the United States' bargaining reputation from an 
otherwise peripheral conflict to which it has been persistently and 
consciously 'coupled', settled upon the crudest strategy of all: the 
'Vietnamisation' of the ground war, the intensification of the air war, 
and the definitive widening of the conflict throughout Indo-China, in 
order to facilitate a settlement allowing the maximum time between the 
American withdrawal and the probable collapse of the southern regime.124
The resultant debacle has had a deep impact not merely upon the 
American foreign policy outlook in general but upon the Soviet-American 
relationship in particular. At the simplest level, there has been the 
obvious temptation to employ a revamped Soviet threat as the central
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focus around which to refashion a post-Vietnam and post-Watergate 
consensus in American - and indeed in NATO - policy. But, in addition, 
the doctrine of credibility as the interdependence of commitments has 
demonstrated an impressive staying power, despite the less than 
impressive career of the intellectual structures erected upon it. One 
of the initial core premisses of the Nixon-Kissinger policy was that 
American interests should shape American commitments, rather than 
the other way around; yet in his attack on Congressional opponents 
after the fall of South Vietnam in 1975, Kissinger in his turn insisted 
that 'given our central role, a loss in our credibility invites 
international chaos'. This was already, as John Vincent observes, 
a notably 'dog-eared card'. But the conjunction of American indecision
and Soviet activism in the later 1970s has gone a long way toward 
restoring it to its former sovereignty in the American strategic debate.
In fact, it seems most unlikely that the failure of American 
guarantees in IndoChina has affected their credibility in Europe. But 
this presumably has very little to do with the efficacy of American 
'decoupling' strategies and everything to do with the refusal of 
either the Soviets or the West Europeans to accept American contentions 
that the separate guarantees were coupled in the first place. On the 
other hand, the Vietnam analogy has obvious implications for the United 
States' credibility as a counter-weight to the Soviet Union elsewhere 
in Asia and Africa. And not the least of the uncertainties surrounding 
the upsurge of Soviet military activity in these areas is the apparent 
inability of American policy makers - more than a decade after Kissinger 
first gave official expression to the problem - to establish a
12 7relatively consistent balance between commitments and interests.
International Society
As was noted at the outset, the chapter has concentrated on the more 
basic structural features of contemporary world politics, taking as 
given a large measure of great power conflict over legal norms which were 
much less subject to dispute in the classic era of European international 
society. In concluding the argument, it is worth emphasizing that this 
conflict over higher-level norms is not primarily attributable to the 
dictates of disembodied 'ideologies' on one or other side. Rather, the
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prominence of ideological conflict in the Soviet-American relationship 
itself reflects the struggle of elites on both sides - on the basis 
of very different historical legacies - to come to terms with the 
structural transformations and telescoping of international tempos 
characteristic of the contemporary era. I have already suggested 
that the dialectic of detente and competitive 'imperialism' in postwar 
Soviet-American relations is partly analogous, despite the absence of 
an open colonial 'frontier', to the process by which the European 
nation-states ultimately were brought to a general recognition of the 
'law of diminishing imperial returns' within Europe and to a conscious 
acceptance of coexistence and the 'rules' of a multiple balance of 
great powers. But the former process was spread over more than two 
centuries of endemic warfare; the periods of intense doctrinal conflict 
and untrammelled raison d'etat were fairly clearly separated in time; 
and the crucial conception of a Concert of Europe was established in 
embryo before the system was faced with the dual challenge of renewed 
ideological upheaval and military revolution unleashed by revolutionary 
and Napoleonic France. Today, by contrast, the great powers must adjust 
simultaneously to the logic of a bipolar balance and to the implications 
of the nuclear revolution; while the novel problems posed by their joint 
possession of extensive long range intervention capabilities are 
seriously exacerbated by an unstable international milieu which seems 
likely to keep the level of ideological tension between them relatively 
high for a good time to come.
It is, of course, often argued that it is precisely the incalculable 
risks associated with nuclear weapons that have averted a direct Soviet- 
American clash before now, and that the 'stability' of this relationship, 
barring an unforeseen technological breakthrough, can be expected to 
continue. However, the continuing manifest tensions of a detente 
grounded in strategic 'parity' testify to the vital importance of 
psychological, as well as technological, factors in this context. Perhaps 
the single most influential claim of those who have currently revived 
the question of an ingrained Soviet doctrinal hostility to the West has 
been the assertion that the Soviet authorities refuse to acknowledge 
the essential mutuality of nuclear deterrence - an issue which, as 
Alton Frye observes, 'has created a festering mistrust in the United 
States which is feeding back into increased military efforts to counter
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T O O  ,the Soviet Union'. This phenomenon, and its apparent counterpart
in the Soviet Union, seem increasingly to indicate that the prominence 
of the 'balance of terror' imposes very real limitations on the prospects 
for any comprehensive relaxation of international tensions. As Bull 
remarks:
The preservation of peace among the major powers 
by a system in which each threatens to destroy 
or cripple the civil society of the other, 
rightly seen as a contemporary form of security 
through the holding of hostages, reflects the 
weakness in international society of the sense 
of common interest, [and] obstructs the long­
term possibility of establishing international
order on some more positive basis.
1 2 9
However, the most credible goal for the foreseeable future would 
seem to be not an outright escape from the thrall of nuclear weapons, 
but the more successful management of 'an inventory of horrors which 
will not go away'.130 The most pressing problem - whose solution ought 
to be much facilitated by the stark quality of the nuclear necessity - 
therefore remains the identification of the essential structural features 
of international politics upon which both great powers might reasonably 
be expected to agree. The question is, first, whether they possess, 
at least potentially, a common conceptual language in which to discuss 
these issues; and, second, whether the apparent depth of their value 
conflict is such as to preclude a meaningful compact on the need for 
balance, moderation, and mutual recognition of legitimate interests.
All the preceding argument should make clear my view that value 
premisses cannot be completely isolated from more specifically analytical 
components in the respective 'world-views' of the Soviet and American 
elites, and that these elements are both in turn bound up with the 
respective perceptions of material interests fashioned by each state's 
geopolitical and developmental situation and its location in the global 
structure of military and economic power. It should also be clear that 
I regard the conflict between these two world-views as genuine and 
deep. However, the conflict of values and interests is not such as to 
suggest that either side could fix on nuclear war as a settled policy 
option for the resolution of their differences. More specifically, a 
basic argument of this chapter has been that the conceptual gulf 
between the Soviet combination of a political doctrine of Peaceful
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Coexistence with a military doctrine of nuclear warfighting, and those 
American versions of the mutual deterrence position which recognize 
the 'technological fact' of mutual deterrence as a bedrock constraint 
on the political competition of the great powers, is much less 
fundamental than the hawk school have asserted. There is, by contrast, 
a basic gulf between the Soviet position, on the one hand, and either the 
theological approach to MAD or the theological approach to extended 
deterrence and limited war, on the other. However, I would argue 
that the Soviet position is preferable to either of these latter approaches, 
each of which, in different ways, pursues a concern with technological 
solutions well beyond the bounds of political realism.
These specific questions of military doctrine will be taken up in 
detail in Chapter 7. However, it may be useful at this point to draw 
out more explicitly the implications for the foregoing argument of the 
political doctrine of the 'correlation of forces', which provides an 
important part of the general context against which the hawk school's 
hostile interpretation of Soviet military doctrine is fashioned. The 
basic point is that there is no reason to regard a propensity to think in 
terms of an historically shifting correlation of forces as intrinsically 
incompatible with the notion of balance in the military sphere. Like 'the 
balance of power', 'the correlation of forces' is capable of multiple 
meanings;13!and it can, as readily as the former notion, describe a 
distribution of power such that 'no one power ... is preponderant and 
can lay down the law to the others'.132 Of course, the Soviet term is 
typically used to refer to a wide range of 'forces', from military 
technology to general 'moral factors' and, in contrast to the mechanical 
or 'systemic' imagery of balance, it implies both constant motion and 
direction. However, I have attempted to argue that these are, in general, 
virtues rather than defects, of the concept, which contemporary Western 
theory has to some degree come to emulate. While the laying bare of the 
basic structure of the states-system, untrammelled by historical 
complexities, is a major function of international theory, the resulting 
picture must not - today least of all - be mistaken for the whole of 
reality.
This argument might initially seem less tenable in respect of the 
insistent Soviet claims that the world situation has been qualitatively 
altered by a decisive shift against American preponderance in the military
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realm, and that, this shift having already been achieved, the Soviet Union 
remains committed to 'ceaselessly strengthening' or 'perfecting' its 
armed forces. But the first type of proposition involves, in essence, 
a simple statement of fact; and the second (besides exemplifying a 
characteristic trick of Soviet expression, which appears in many non­
military contexts) offers a reasonably accurate picture of the 'balancing' 
behaviour required of any power involved, as the Soviet Union currently 
is, in a primarily qualitative arms race. The Soviet insistence that
dll elements of the correlation of forces are in continuous motion, and 
that the total trend is inexorably towards the definitive victory of 
socialism over capitalism, is thus quite compatible with the notion of an 
indefinite, though dynamic, 'parity' in the military field, by which 
imperialist aggression is kept in check while the socialist victory is 
consummated by the broader movement of historical forces; and this has 
in fact been the dominant theme of top level Soviet statements since the 
conclusion of the SALT I treaties.
I would therefore argue that the broad categories of Soviet doctrine 
are not incompatible with the reciprocal recognition of vital interests and 
a working compact on basic rules of the game in the great power relationship 
and that they are, if anything, more compatible with such agreement than 
the doctrines of containment and extended deterrence which dominated 
American international discourse during the period of American strategic 
preponderance. However, the last decade has witnessed not merely the 
ending of American preponderance over the Soviet Union but also an 
intensifying challenge to the collective hegemony of the great powers 
over the rest of international society. The sharpest uncertainties in 
the present Soviet-American relationship derive from the latter challenge, 
whose broad implications are briefly discussed below.
Looked at from below, the central issues here are those of transitional 
development and statemaking, with the destabilizing implications of these 
processes for the political orientation, and even the cohesion, of crucial 
collective actors in the Third World. Looked at from above, the central
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issue is the rapidly changing pattern of the Third World's 'incorporation' 
over the last century into the political and economic order of the 
developed world: the rise and subsequent demolition of the European 
colonial empires; the rise and substantial erosion of the 'informal 
empire' of the United States; the shaky beginnings of a Soviet 1counter- 
imperium'; the revitalization and expansion of old influence networks 
by the economically resurgent Europeans and Japanese; and the recent 
emergence of 'sub-imperial' patron states - such as Brazil, Saudi 
Arabia and Iran (under the Shah) - in the Third World itself. From 
either perspective, two important points may be made. First, these 
issues take the argument beyond the international society of states to 
a conflict-ridden 'world society' in which transnational and subnational 
actors also loom large. And, second, the broad dynamics of this world 
society cannot adequately be grasped in terms of economic determinist 
assumptions. Certainly the incorporation of the Third World states 
in an essentially capitalist world-economy continues to provide the bedrock
determinant of their material circumstances as a group. But the changes 
in the political dimension of their incorporation over the past decade 
or so may have a profound impact not merely upon the developmental 
possibilities of particular, strategically placed members of the group, 
but also upon the great power relationship and the prospects for war 
and peace in the world as a whole.
Therefore, although these issues lie quite outside the area illuminated 
by the classical paradigm of the states-system, they also require 
greater attention to political factors than is provided by the two broad 
approaches which, in Western international theory, currently emphasize 
the dimension of world society: the interdependence/developmental 
pluralism approach, on the one hand, and the structuralist/world-systems 
approach, on the other. Of the two, the latter - with its Marxist-
derived stress on structural contradictions - offers a superior insight 
into the relationship of Third World states to the modern world-economy.
But, as was argued in Chapter 2, it is compromised by a residual 
functionalism, and by a reification of the 'system' of world capitalism 
which implies that it must be transcended in toto or not at all. The 
importance of political hierarchies, and of breaches in these hierarchies, 
is better depicted in the concept of 'imperial' patronage networks 
proposed by John Girling, in an explicit attempt to overcome the
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inadequacies of the established pluralist and neo-Marxist approaches. 
(Though Girling's direct concern is with United States - Third World 
relations, he notes that 'the Soviet Union, of course, has its own, 
though less extensive patronage network').
In addition to the bilateral relationship between 
imperial power and individual regimes there is an 
entire hierarchy of patron-client relations 
spreading downward from international superpower 
to the indigenous power of local elites. Within 
the hierarchy there is an intermediate range of 
great and middle powers - patrons in their own 
right, with their subordinate following, but 
(at least in one essential respect: strategic 
or economic) clients in relation to the supreme 
patron. Similarly, every client, however lowly 
in international terms, is also the 'lord' of 
his own domestic hierarchy ... The profitable 
functioning of the international hierarchy of 
patron-client relations depends on the proper 
functioning of all these subordinate patronage 
systems.
1 3 4
However, even Girling's picture is unduly functionalist, conceding 
too much to the behavioural concept of system, on the one hand, and to
the political vision and competence of the imperial patrons, on the
other. Since his own detailed analysis clearly indicates that the 
American patronage 'system' has persistently failed to function 'properly'
over the last decade and a half, it seems better to insist that the
imperial patronage networks are networks only, patchworked together in 
ad hoc fashion according to time and circumstance, and vulnerable, in an
era of great power parity, to sudden massive rents caused by political 
action at the lower level.
In the first place, it cannot simply be assumed that each client 
is lord of its own domestic hierarchy. Both great powers — the 
United States in Vietnam and the Soviet Union currently in Afghanistan - have
been confronted with the prospect that even their direct, large scale, 
and lengthy involvement in a client regime's military struggle against 
its domestic opponents may be insufficient to ensure its reliable lordship 
at a cost which would be politically acceptable to their own various 
domestic and international constituencies. And this problem is 
correspondingly exacerbated with the imperial patron shifts to, or back
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to, an indirect strategy reliant on the independent management 
capacities of local clients, as the United States did in the wake of 
Vietnam. This point is nicely illustrated by Tom Farer's 1975 
proposal for an 'accowwodatioflist' American response to Third World 
pressures for a restructuring of the international economic order.135 
In what was, in effect, a 'management of interdependence' gloss on the 
basic text of the Nixon Doctrine, Farer argued that this challenge to 
the capitalist order could be diffused in the same way as class conflict 
Within the great capitalist states had been diffused by the 'creaming off 
and co-optation of the natural elite of the working class'. Indeed,
Farer argued that the process should actually be less complex in the 
international than in the domestic sphere, given the 'very small' 
number of states 'that have to be co-opted into senior decision making 
roles in the management structure of the international economy. In Africa 
only Nigeria ... In Latin America, Brazil and Venezuela, perhaps Mexico.
In the Middle East, Saudi Arabia and Iran. And in Asia, India and 
Indonesia'. And the very fact that the targets for co-optation were 
state managers rather than representatives of the more amorphous 
collectivities of domestic politics, Farer argued, simplified the 
process still further.
There is, moreover, no reason to doubt whether 
the negotiators can deliver their constituents 
... Our conflict is not with huge anonymous 
masses whose demands have to be aggregated through 
fairly uncertain representational arrangements.
For the most part, Third World elites are even 
less committed to human equality as a general 
condition than are we. They are talking about 
the equality of states. And in their largely 
authoritarian systems, the state is they.
1 36
A few years after this confident prognostication, the action of 
'huge, anonymous masses' in Iran had knocked out a linch-pin of the United 
States' indirect strategy (on both East-West and North-South issues); and 
the American government even found itself embroiled in a humiliating, 
year-long struggle to protect its own nationals, in which one of its 
basic problems was the difficulty of establishing whether it was dealing 
with one Iranian government, or several, or none.
In the Iranian case, the Soviet Union has in general been able to
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sit back and watch the American discomfiture (though it has suffered
the loss of profitable economic arrangements concluded with the Shah's
regime). But, in Poland, the Soviets in turn have been faced with
acute problems concerning the disintegrating lordship of a client
regime within the very heart of their own patronage network; and one of
the most crucial determinants of this situation is likely to be the
ability or inability of the Solidarity leadership to contain its own
'revolution in the revolution', and to present the working masses as a
reliably 'packaged' collectivity in their dealings with the Polish
government, and indirectly with its patrons in Moscow. Indeed, both
the Polish and Iranian examples indicate that the earlier observations
about the paradoxical 'suitability' of Communist regimes as targets for
American deterrence strategies may be extended to the general question
of great power 'management' of crises stemming from mass-based upheavals
in other countries. Both leaderships at times clearly act on the premise
that they do have conflicts of interest with 'huge, anonymous masses'.
But, whatever combination of coercion and accommodation they may attempt
in a particular case, they can implement an dndiveot strategy in such
situations only through a relatively clear hierarchy of collectivities
reaching down to the sub-national level. The paradox, therefore, is
that a counter-revolutionary great power seeking to contain such a
situation without direct intervention may find itself dependent in
the short-term on the cohesion and effectiveness of a revolutionary
movement, even though the success of the latter promises to radically
*reduce the great power's local influence in the longer term.
A second major weakness of the rival patronage networks is that, 
at least in the Third World, they are heavily dependent upon the great 
powers' readiness to supply their respective clients with arms. This 
point, of course, is insistently made in Western commentary about Soviet 
Third World policy; but, as Girling points out, the 'militarization of 
allies and "friends"' was an inherent part of the logic, and practice,
13 7of the American encouragement of 'self reliance' under the Nixon Doctrine.
At the domestic level, the result of this competition in military 
'assistance' has been to increase the repressive capabilities of Third 
World regimes, without necessarily ensuring their durability, as the 
Iranian experience demonstrates. At the international level, the medium 
and longer term result will probably be to enhance the military independence
"k This section, along with the rest of Chapters 3-7, was completed in late 
1981, before the military crackdown in Poland. The comments on Solidarity 
evidently require revision in the light of subsequent developments. But I 
would still hold to the wider argument about international 'management', and 
it seems best to leave specific judgements derived therefrom exposed to 
such 'falsification' as has occurred in the interim.
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of those 'client' states with intermediate 'patron' status - especially 
since the growing economic importance of arms sales ensures that not 
one but several alternative sources of supply will usually be available 
to those with the ability to pay. The prospect has been summed up 
well by Girling:
But the greater the build-up of regional patrons, 
the more these patrons are empowered to pursue 
policies of their own, which may either clash 
with one another (say between Saudi Arabia and 
Iran) or may no longer coincide with those of the 
imperial patron. Moreover the future leadership 
of such heavily armed states is, to say the least, 
problematic. Thus the long-term prospects of 
great powers, like Germany and Japan, and even 
of regional patrons, like Brazil and Iran, lie 
in ever greater autonomy of action ... Such 
divergence will eventually spell the end of the 
post-war American patronage system ...
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Since there has been little in the briefer career of the Soviet Union 
as a global patron to indicate that it will be notably more successful 
than the United States in this regard, the prospect is that the great 
powers' own actions will help to produce a substantial diffusion of 
centres of military decision-making in the world (though still within 
an essentially bipolar global power structure) . And whatever one
may think of this on general grounds of equity, it is difficult to avoid 
the conclusion that, other things being equal, it will increase the 
level of uncertainty, and the prospects for direct confrontation, between 
the great powers in crucial areas of the Third World.
Both these factors - the vulnerability of client regimes within 
Third World societies and the greater opportunities now open to such 
regimes for the independent pursuit of substantial military ventures - 
may constitute important 'puli' factors encouraging future great power 
involvement in Third World conflicts. As regards 'push' factors on the 
great power side of the equation, one consideration in particular seems 
likely to play a qualitatively new role in the next 10-15 years: namely, 
security of access to vital raw materials, and above all to the energy 
resources of the Persian Gulf region. And contrary to the recent 
rash of Western speculation about Soviet attempts to seize the Gulf 
oilfields, there seems little doubt that the greater 'objective' interest 
in possible interventions along these lines lies on the side of the United 
States.
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Two qualifications must be made here. First, the goal of security 
of access to raw materials does provide the most plausible candidate 
for an 'economic imperative' of American foreign policy in this century; 
but, as Stephen Krasner has demonstrated, it appears that the primary 
motive of American interventionism to date has been the pursuit of general 
political goals, which in the postwar era of American hegemony, has 
meant essentially the global containment of Communism.140 Second, 
although the United States is substantially more vulnerable than the 
Soviet Union to the threat of loss of access to foreign energy sources, 
it is substantially less vulnerable than the Europeans and the Japanese, 
so that the oil price rises of the early 1970s actually helped to 
protect American industry against the rising tide of competition from 
its major capitalist trading partners. However, these qualifications, 
though important, do not dispose of the larger argument. If, as 
Krasner himself argues, the American readiness to give priority to the 
containment of Communism, even in areas of low intrinsic interest such 
as Indochina, was the luxury of a state whose political and economic 
predominance was such that it did not need to concentrate directly on the 
defence of more obviously vital interests,141 it may fairly be expected 
that the general habit of intervention will carry across into a period 
in which vital interests seem, quite suddenly, to be very much at risk. 
Moreover, the threat to the vital economic interests of Europe and Japan, 
through the incentives it provides for the latter to seek a political 
accommodation with Arab oil producers and with the Soviet Union itself, 
can be read as an indirect threat to the vital political interest of 
the United States in the cohesion of an American-led Western alliance.
As Tucker puts it:
At issue are essentially the same security interests 
that were at issue in the years immediately following 
World War II. If the locus of the now most likely 
threat to those interests has shifted from Europe 
to the Persian Gulf, the vital interests at stake 
in the Gulf are unchanged from the vital interests 
that were earlier at stake in Europe ... No one 
seriously argues that the loss of Western access 
to the Gulf could eventuate in anything short of 




Tucker's argument on these grounds for a return to 'limited' or 
'moderate' containment is a rigorous and self-aware one, which is 
notably free of the recycled globalism which characterizes many of 
the 'realist' contributions to the post-Vietnam American debate. 143 
Since it also concentrates on the Persian Gulf region, in which the 
structure of great power interests is relatively clear, it may provide a useful 
yardstick against which to assess the prospects for a mutual recognition 
of legitimate interests in contested Third World areas. Tucker 
acknowledges that the Soviet Union has 'on balance' been 'quite cautious 
and tentative' in taking advantage of the declining Western position in 
the Gulf; that a 'direct Soviet armed intervention' in the area (which 
the United States could contest only with nuclear means) is 'only one' of 
many possible threats to Western access in the future; and that, 'more 
likely, a threat to access will derive primarily from developments 
indigenous to the Gulf'. However, he insists that the issue of Western 
access cannot be separated from the Soviet military capacity 'to inhibit 
and, it may be, openly challenge the attempted reassertion of Western 
power in this vital region'.144 The United States, in effect, cannot 
accept even an equal balance with the Soviet Union in this region, because 
it must build up an American military capacity for possible intervention 
'Lyl internal developments in Gulf states which threaten Western access.
In the Gulf, we are necessarily concerned with 
internal order because this issue cannot be 
separated from a vital interest in access to oil 
supplies. The same vital interest bids us oppose 
the extension of Soviet influence in that region.
Were it not for this interest we could view 
changes in the internal order and, for that 
matter, the extension of Soviet influence, with 
relative detachment.
1 4 5
There are several important reasons for assuming that the Soviet 
authorities could not accept this assessment of the balance of interests 
in the Persian Gulf, even if they were in general disposed towards the 
establishment of basic 'rules of the game' in respect of the competition 
in the Third World. First, while the Western countries may be said to 
have a disproportionate economic interest in access to Gulf oil, the 
Soviet Union may be said to have a disproportionate geopolitical 
interest in the political disposition of an unstable region close to its 
own borders. Second, Tucker's real concern is not merely with Western
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'access' as such, but with access 'on terms compatible with the 
substantial economic growth of the industrial democracies'.145 And 
while the Soviet authorities might fairly be expected not to collude 
in the outright 'strangulation' of the adanced capitalist powers, it 
is less obvious that they should accept the vital interest of those 
powers in the often wasteful use of other states' natural resources to 
support a living standard well in excess of that of the Soviet bloc 
countries themselves - especially when United States policy is directed 
at denying the Soviet Union access to Western technological cooperation 
in the further exploitation of its own natural resources. Third, the 
really crucial oil-related threat, as has been noted, is not to the 
United States, but to the West Europeans and the Japanese; and the 
alternatives before the latter are not simply Western control of the 
Gulf or economic strangulation. They can also attempt to manage their 
economic problems through increasing political accommodation with Arab 
oil states and the Soviet Union; and there is no reason why the Soviet 
authorities should share in American perceptions of this as an 
unacceptable deterioration in the foundations of the post-war international 
order. Finally, there is the question of direct American intervention 
in internal political developments. As Tucker acknowledges, and as I 
have argued at length above, such developments in themselves can bring 
about a major deterioration in the established American position, provided 
only that countervailing Soviet power in the region is sufficient to 
frustrate American (or Western) attempts to reverse them by force. If 
the Soviet Union did acquiesce in American policies directed towards 
this end, it would effectively be surrendering both its claim to global 
equality with the United States and its claim to be the chief bulwark 
against 'counter-revolution' in the contemporary world.
If these reservations may be lodged against Tucker's carefully 
delimited proposal for a revived containment policy, they apply with 
greater force to the 'global containment' policies proposed by some 
hawk theorists, and indeed to the public posture of the Reagan administration, 
which has, on the one hand, once more established Soviet expansionism 
as the over-riding threat to world peace and, on the other, already 
committed itself publicly to the defence of the Saudi regime - the new 
linch-pin of American strategy in the Gulf - against overthrow from 
within along the lines of Iran. A strong case can be made that the
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establishment of Soviet-American rules of the game on Third World issues 
will require, as a first step, an end to the uncertainty of American 
policy over the past decade and the establishment of relatively clear 
limits beyond which the direct extension of Soviet military influence 
will meet with a firm American response. 147 But though the short-term 
prescription might be for a rather more definite engagement of both 
sides in defence of their more prominent interests against the other's 
encroachment, the longer-term need is for them to disengage their 
relationship from internal developments in transitional states which 
neither side can effectively control. Any attempt to construct rules 
of the game which ignores the fundamental importance of autonomous 
domestic factors will be founded in quicksand.
Are there any metaphors which might assist in the comprehension of 
the complex dynamics of a states-system whose inner structure is only 
seldom - but is now - in transition, and whose world political environment 
is always - but is now more than ever - in transition? Stanley Hof fman 
has advanced the attractive notion of games on ' different chessboards'. 
But his later work, which accepts the proposition that interdependence 
promises 'a new kind of structure', emphasizes 'the fluidity of games, 
without any single minute of truth or clear cut boundaries, played by many 
players, over many issues allowCingD for multiple strategies'.148 As 
has been noted, such an emphasis upon the multiplicity of issue structures 
easily translates into a prescription for case-by-case empiricism, with 
'interdependence' reduced to a ritual assertion of ineffable connections 
between everything and everything else. Bull's delineation of nuclear, 
conventional military, economic, ideological and diplomatic chessboards, 
whose 'interrelatedness provides the conception of overall power and 
influence in international politics' is rather more useful. 149 But it 
too strains towards the interdependence of everything, and fails to 
address the distinction - which, I have attempted to argue is the 
distinction - between relatively static and relatively dynamic games.
As regards the great power relationship, at least, it seems best to 
collapse these five games into two: the politico-military states-system 
game, and the politico-economic game of world-economy.
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Moreover, if the basic Soviet accounts of Peaceful Coexistence 
were treated in this overtly metaphorical fashion, it might yield the 
interesting notion of games on different chessboards, in different time 
scales, with different rules. The states-system game would only partly 
resemble a single 'two person, zero sum' game of chess. Rather it would 
be a kind of indefinite tournament, characterized by a marked 
preponderance of draws, and the protagonists'ability to agree on its 
most basic rules would be a precondition of their access to the all 
important world-economy game. The latter would indeed be zero-sum, 
but in the 'long-term'. Run by a computer called History, it would 
actually be programmed to produce a victory for one specific side; but 
this would have no obvious effect upon either side's ability to enhance 
its 'short-term' position by skilful play. The games would be 
interdependent, victories or favourable positions in the one conferring 
advantages in the other, and would ultimately reach a joint conclusion.
The interesting point about this picture is that it stands on 
its head the characteristic American tendency to think of the military 
adversary relationship essentially in zero-sum terms and the economic 
relationship essentially in 'positive sum' terms. Moreover, it is the 
Soviet, rather than the American perspective, which seems closest to 
the perspective on these questions implicit in the practices of the 
traditional states-system. In that context, international economic 
relations were approached, for the most part, in mercantilist, zero-sum 
terms, and were, on occasion, determined by military conflicts fought 
out 'beyond the lines', where the norms of European international society 
did not apply. By contrast, the pressure upon the great powers to 
regulate their direct military interactions in the European core 
impelled them towards a general recognition of the positive value of 
a common framework of ipvocedural rules and practices, within which major 
changes in their substantive relations could be accommodated.
I certainly do not suggest that a general return to mercantilist 
approaches would be a desirable response to contemporary economic 
conflicts - whether East-West or North-South. But if a greater harmony 
of interest is to be achieved on these issues, it must come from 
conscious political action, involving, in particular, major substantive 
concessions on the Western side: the notion that harmony should obtain 
naturally, within existing economic structures, is seriously misleading.
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And, as regards the military competition, the notion of a set of 
basic regulative procedures, more or less insulated from the vagaries 
of a fluid historical environment, is today more important than ever.
But whereas the Soviet doctrine of the correlation of forces can be 
accommodated fairly readily to this schema, the second wave doctrine 
of extended deterrence, which evidently continues to exert a significant 
influence on official American thinking about the indirect military 
competition with the Soviet Union, presents a fascinating inversion of 
it. The various stages of the great power contest are set in the 
timeless environment of an unproblematic status quo; and the temporal 
dimension appears not in the emergence of new issues leading to 
new crises - for each crisis, in the chicken game analogy, is merely 
a different manifestation of the one great issue - but in the running 
'bank balance' of credibility which will determine the outcome of the 
entire struggle.
The implications of this approach have been pinpointed by 
Morgenthau, in an early critique of deterrence theory from a more genuine 
Realist perspective than that which informed the prescriptions of the 
second wave. A policy of bluff whose viability was overwhelmingly 
dependent upon the bluff's never being called, he argued, must ultimately 
prove self defeating:
Inherent in that dynamics [of deterrence] is a dual 
escalation, one feeding on the other: the ever 
diminishing plausibility of the nuclear threat 
and ever bolder challenges to make good on it.
The effects of deterrence are likely to decrease
with the frequency of use, to the point where,
as it were, the psychological capital of
deterrence has been nearly expended and the
policy of deterrence will be brought to bankruptcy.^5g
This prediction, which has been echoed by several other commentators in 
the era of Soviet-American parity, undoubtedly expresses the inner 
logic of second wave theorizing. For, in regard to credibility at least 
this did present the Soviet-American contest effectively in zero-sum 
terms, with crisis credits to each side's reputation for 'resolve' 
representing debits for its opponent. But the earlier discussion of the 
structure and environment of the contemporary states-system suggests an 
alternative approach which, though also an oversimplification, is more
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compatible with both traditonal notions of international society 
and the record of direct great power crises interaction since 1945.
On this account, crises may be seen as merely more intense 
manifestations of the general problem of international relations: how 
to resolve major conflicts of interest without resort to war. Especially 
in periods of great change in the structure and environment of the 
system, great power crises can be expected as normal manifestations of 
a changing balance of interests, quite apart from the aggressive 
initiatives of a dissatisfied power. Such situations, by virtue of their 
tendency to clarify the balance of interests, can actually facilitate 
the peaceful resolution of conflict; and in the nuclear era the significance 
of this aspect of crisis management is greatly enhanced. Therefore, 
even the resolution of a crisis by the unambiguous 'backing down' of one 
side might produce enhanced credibility all round, since credibility 
relates not merely to firmness and resolve, but also to moderation and 
to the capacity to judge the legitimate extent of the adversary's 
interests and the legitimate limits of one's own.
In the increasingly 'crowded' contemporary environment, it is hard 
to be optimistic about the ability of the great powers to extract a 
relationship of enhanced mutual understanding from their uncertain 
encounters in a volatile Third World. But I would argue that ’stability 
of expectations' in such a context would more likely be promoted by the 
doctrine of the correlation of forces, with its emphasis upon intrinsic 
material interests and the normality of radical social change, than 
by the American interpretations of balance and deterrence discussed in 
this chapter. There is a substantial element of paradox in this 
assertion; and it is clearly of great significance whether Soviet attention 
to the correlation of forces is associated with expectations of an 
impending massive crisis of capitalism/imperialism, or with a growing 
acceptance of the normality of the current 'transitional' era in world 
politics. The latter is the contention of this thesis: but this question 
has so far been considered only tangentially, because of the prior task 
of elucidating the criteria against which the basic Soviet categories 
might be assessed. It is now necessary to examine in detail the 
relationship between those categories and the evolving account of the 
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PART III
In the beginning there was Aristotle 
And objects at rest tended to remain at rest 
And objects in motion tended to come to rest 
And soon everything was at rest 
And God saw that it was boring.
Then God created Newton
And objects at rest tended to remain at rest 
But objects in motion tended to remain in motion 
And matter was conserved and momentum was conserved 
and energy was conserved 
And God saw that it was conservative.
Then God created Einstein 
And everything was relative
And short things became straight and fast things 
became curved
And the universe was filled with inertial frames 
And God saw that it was relatively general 
But that some parts were especially relative.
Then God created Bohr
And there was the principle
And the principle was Quantum
And all things were quantified, but some things 
remained relative
And God saw that it was confusing.
Then God was going to create Ferguson 
And Ferguson would have unified
And he would have fielded a theory, and all things 
would have been one
But it was the seventh day, and God rested 





THE EVOLUTION OF A 'PEACFUL COEXISTENCE1 
SYNTHESIS: LENIN TO KHRUSHCHEV
This part of the thesis deals with the Soviet Union's doctrinal 
accommodation to the protracted experience of coexistence with the 
major capitalist powers, as a state in a system of states. The 
argument so far has emphasized that the basic categories of the 
Soviet analysis are not, in themselves, incompatible with the 
recognition of the unique and relatively 'static' structural 
realities designated by the term 'states-system'. These concluding 
chapters will attempt to chart in Soviet 'doctrine' on international 
relations a substantial and ongoing declaratory adaptation to these 
realities, such that the 'Leninist' theme of the world revolutionary 
process - ’though by no means entirely repudiated - has been very 
significantly modified.
The treatment of Soviet doctrine in this part,and above all in 
this chapter, will inevitably be highly selective. In the light of 
the charge of arbitrary selectiveness earlier laid against the hawk 
interpretation of Soviet doctrine prominent in the current American 
debate, it is therefore necessary to establish at the outset the 
criteria employed here. However, I would argue that the critique of 
this interpretation, and the delineation of an alternative, involve 
essentially the same operation, since its adherents tend to invoke 
in theory the necessary selection criteria - which are those implied 
by the kind of hermeneutic and structuralist analysis discussed in 
the previous part - but effectively ignore them in practice.
Thus it is accepted here that, while the hawk picture of a 
dominant 'arms control' orthodoxy in the American debate regarding 
the Soviet Union's inevitable accommodation to the 'rules' of mutual 
deterrence and stable coexistence was always a polemical exaggeration, 
their basic argument that the Soviets' own self account should not 
be gratuitously ignored in favour of a concentration upon the 
supposedly universal 'rationality' of deterrence remains a valid 
and highly important one. No such abstract rationality exists: nor 
do states pursue stable coexistence as an end in itself, but rather 
as a condition which is normally more conducive to the pursuit of
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other primary goals than is a condition of endemic conflict.
Therefore, especially in regard to a state with such an individual 
historical experience, and with such an overt commitment to the 
primacy of domestic over foreign policy as the Soviet Union, it is 
essential to consider whether it has indicated in actions and in words 
a deep commitment to policies which are not compatible with stable 
coexistence.
However, as was argued in Chapter I, it is precisely the question 
of overall Soviet policy goals which is obscured in the arguments of 
the hawk school. The rationality ascribed to Soviet policy is a 
purely instrumental one, revealed in its pristine form in Soviet 
military doctrine, which is alleged to demonstrate a readiness to 
resort even to nuclear war, in favourable conditions, in the 
furtherance of Soviet interests. But the vital question of the concrete 
policy aims in support of which the Soviet regime would accept such 
enormous risks is simply ignored. Rather, it is assumed that there 
is no basic Soviet policy goal, other than the ultimate elimination 
- or at least the secure subordination - of all rival power centres, and 
that this is dictated not by any rational calculation but by the inner 
dynamics of the Soviet polity.1
This image of the Soviet Union as a special kind of actor to 
which normal international constraints do not apply is grounded, as 
has been noted earlier, in the identification of an unchanging Soviet 
essence which is strikingly similar to that first formulated - in the 
'Riga axioms' of Kennan and his associates - some forty years ago. The 
major instances of a strong Soviet inclination towards a 'forward' 
international policy - the abortive calls to world revolution and 
revolutionary war in the 1917-21 period, Stalin's political 
exploitation of the Red Army's World War II gains, and the current 
regime's activist exploration of the possibilities of a shifting 
correlation of forces - are regarded merely as different manifestations 
of the one underlying drive for world dominion. Similarly, the 
embattled revolutionary 'vanguard' of the War Communism years, the 
mature Stalinist police state, and the complex 'mono-organizational 
society' of today,2 are all subsumed under the single totalitarian 
classification. The result of this extreme application of the 'special 
approaches', which, as Stephen Cohen observes, 'are reserved for 
interpreting Soviet history',3 is to vitiate the original insistence 
upon the historical specificity of the Soviet Union, since the Soviet 
Union is presented, in effect, as impervious to historical change.
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The following discussion is based upon the judgement that the 
historical development of the Soviet polity is indeed of the utmost 
importance for the understanding of Soviet foreign policy. But it 
attempts to grasp the dialectic of continuity and change emphasised 
in Robert C. Tucker's plea to reconsider 'what we carelessly call 
the "Soviet political system" ... as an historical succession of 
political systems within a broadly continuous institutional framework'.4 
Moreover, instead of establishing the 'political system' as the sole 
'independent variable' in Soviet foreign policy, with external and 
internal (resource) constraints accorded only a contingent influence 
- able temporarily to check, but not genuinely to modify, its expansionist 
thrust - an intimate and dynamic interrelation between the structures 
of international politics, Soviet domestic politics, and the Soviet 
economy will be assumed. Indeed, it will be suggested that the 
'political system' itself - in its dominant Stalinist variant - was 
in substantial part the product of far-reaching decisions on economic 
policy which can scarcely be understood except by reference to the 
complex interplay of these various factors.
Similar considerations apply to the question of policy goals 
as such. It must be emphasized that world revolution, as the goal 
of an isolated Soviet state, was no more part of original Bolshevik 
policy than was the construction of socialism in one country. Without 
at least a substantial early instalment of the former, the Bolsheviks, 
by their own lights, ought not to have survived to contemplate the 
latter. Both policies were, in effect, the product of the 'anomalous' 
constellation of forces which confronted the Bolsheviks, by 1921, with 
the unforeseen task of building 'a socialist society ... coexistent 
rather than subsequent to capitalist society',5 and the approach to 
the one was very largely conditioned by the development of the other.
Finally, these considerations suggest that particular attention 
should be paid to the two periods which, in both domestic and foreign 
policy, appear most incompatible with the 'straight line', totalitarian 
interpretation of Soviet history - the NEP era, and the Malenkov-Khrushchev 
years.6 There is no need here to stress the importance of the latter, 
for the most obvious theoretical focus of the current debate is the 
question of whether 'de-Stalinization' did or did not constitute a major 
and lasting break with the Soviet past. But it is clearly of great 
significance whether the Soviet shift to a settled policy of ' Peaceful 
Coexistence' under Khrushchev is seen as essentially a response to the
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determined 'containment' policy of a strategically superior adversary, 
or whether it is regarded as a latter-day manifestation of an earlier 
conclusion that the pursuit of the Soviet Union's historic tasks 
could be best facilitated by an indefinite stabilization of relations 
with the capitalist world. And in this regard the interpretation 
of the 1920s, when the party fought out the great issues of economic 
development whose drastic resolution, in the great leap of 1929-33, 
in turn constituted the 'formative period of Stalinism as a system',7 is 
absolutely crucial.
The preceding discussion should indicate that the central subject 
of this chapter is not the evolution of a 'Peaceful Coexistence' 
doctrine of the full blown, legalistic kind which the Soviet Union 
has espoused since 1956. Despite all the efforts of Soviet 
apologists, this cannot be shown to have a Leninist pedigree. But 
the problem of what Lenin called 'existence side by side' with the 
capitalist powers imposed itself upon the Soviet leadership from its 
earliest years, and inevitably assumed central importance once the 
prospect of long term socialist construction 'in one country' began 
to be seriously entertained. In this and subsequent chapters, I will 
attempt to show that this has continued to be the essential meaning 
of the Soviet doctrine of coexistence, but that changing international 
conditions have encouraged a transition from the sense of an inevitably 
temporary condition - a breathing space for the consolidation of longer 
term objectives - towards the conscious incorporation of other aspects
of Soviet international theory 'within a broad concept of competitive
0coexistence as a dynamic system of international relations'.
It should also be stressed that the domestic referents of the 
Soviet coexistence synthesis are here regarded as extremely important - 
not merely the goal of the preservation of the established political 
order, but also the developmental tasks which, as has been suggested, 
have been so intimately related to the formation of that order from 
the outset. Given the special assumptions required to substantiate 
the 'mindless expansionism' thesis, there would seem to be no more 
justification for the selection of the 'meaningful' elements of Soviet 
international doctrine solely with reference to an assumed master goal 
of imperialist 'world revolution', than for relating everything to the 
'peaceful construction of Communism' in the USSR.
This is certainly not to suggest that all Soviet pronouncements 
should be accepted at face value. There are, clearly, special 
incentives for governments to avoid saying what they mean in many of
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their international dealings; and the Soviet regime, with its long­
standing devotion to the arts of ' agitprop', must be particularly 
suspect in this respect. Nor, on the other hand, can Soviet 
statements simply be dismissed as 'ideological' when they conflict 
with abstract, and in practice ethnocentric, conceptions of 'rationality' 
held by outside observers - the central weakness of much American 
thinking on arms control in the 1960s. As Alec Nove observes, in 
relation to the Soviet industrialization dilemma of the 1920s,
'there are a number of solutions ... which the Communists could not 
have chosen because they were Communists'.10 This judgement may be 
extended to the present day, though with due recognition of the 
intervening factors - above all Stalin's second revolution - which 
have substantially altered what it meant, in various historical periods, 
to be a Soviet Communist.
The central requirement, to repeat, is for a hermeneutic and 
structuralist analysis, which attempts to reconstruct the 'logic 
of the situation' as the Soviet authorities themselves might have been 
expected to see it. I will be assuming that 'rational action' (or 
action which appears as an intelligible or appropriate response to the 
most obvious structural constraints of a given situation) is its own 
explanation. in practice, of course, it will constantly be necessary 
to consider the 'special rationality' - both Communist and Russian - 
which inclined the Soviet leaders to define both ends and means in 
ways very different from the leaders of the major Western powers. But 
I will be assuming that interpretations which focus primarily on this 
dimension are not appropriate where Soviet actions are of the kind 
which 'anyone' might have been expected to take in similar circumstances. 
Moreover, the period since the revolution has produced an abundant, and 
impressively coherent, corpus of Soviet doctrine on the structural 
phenomena most obviously at issue here: the Soviet economic 'base', 
the Soviet political 'superstructure', the 'network of states', and 
the world-economy. It is towards this basic reference grid of concepts, 
rather than towards the 'schizophrenic' opposition between the central 
formal doctrines of Peaceful Coexistence and Proletarian Internationalism, 
that the following discussion is primarily directed.
The Environment of the Revolution
There are substantial reasons for approaching this subject 
initially through a consideration of the economic 'base' - not least 
because the Bolsheviks themselves did so. Of course, the Stalinist 
state, which did so much to determine the character of Soviet 
coexistence with the capitalist powers, was itself the supreme 
embodiment of the principle of the dominance of politics ovev 
economics, which, Lenin insisted, constituted in contemporary 
conditions, 'the ABC of Marxism'.11 But this principle, in turn, 
was a not unreasonable response to the great trends in the world- 
economy which facilitated the Bolshevik seizure of power. Of the 
two forms of 'substitutism' which reached their culmination under 
Stalin - of the 'vanguard' party (and ultimately a single leader) for 
the masses as the agent of political revolution, and of the modern 
state for market forces as the agent of industrialization - the second 
was no special creation of the Bolsheviks, but rather, as was argued 
in Chapter 3, a general phenomenon of the movement of the industrial 
revolution into regions in which the pre-established structures and 
culture of mercantile capitalism were almost wholly absent.
This is certainly not to argue that questions of ideology and 
political culture are unimportant in this context. They are clearly 
of fundamental importance to an understanding of the Soviet social 
order; and this is true not only of the Marxist legacy openly claimed 
by the Soviet regime, but also of those features of the indigenous 
political culture emphasized by critics such as Pipes: the 'patrimonial' 
tradition of Russian state power, and the conspiratorial 'Jacobin'
T Ostrand of the Russian revolutionary tradition. However, the
practical importance of such factors cannot be measured except by
reference to the specific historical context in which the Soviet
order took shape; and analyses which draw a straight line from the
organizational structure and ideology of early Bolshevism to mature
Stalinism, and from the latter to the unchanging 'expansionism' of
Soviet foreign policy, ignore what is arguably the most crucial
'situational' determinant of all. As Carr argues:
No doubt, the party owed much^in the form which 
it ultimately assumed, to the foundations laid 
in the conspiratorial period„before the 
revolution. But it owed more to the peculiar 
position in which the victory of the revolution
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placed it ... the hypertrophy of its power 
[was] a direct outcome of the isolated victory 
of the proletarian revolution in a country 
whose retarded economic and political development 
failed to provide the conditions postulated by 
Marx and early Marxists for such a victory.
1 3
Two vital questions are implied in this. Why did the 'proletarian* 
revolution break out in Russia? And why did it not break out in some 
or all of the advanced capitalist countries? Closely inter-related, 
they have profound implications for the analysis both of the Soviet 
system in general, and of the differential appeal of the Soviets' own 
self-interpretation in Western and Third World contexts.
The foundation of this self-interpretation was Lenin's 'absolute 
law' of the uneven development of capitalism in the era of imperialism.14 
On its 'briefest possible definition' Lenin asserted, 'imperialism is 
the monopoly stage of capitalism'. In this last, 'parasitic' stage 
of their development, the leading capitalist powers, by carving out 
new areas of political control for the investment of surplus capital, 
and by bribing the 'upper stratum' of the working class with a portion 
of the 'super profits' so derived, had contrived temporarily to export 
the basic contradictions of the capitalist system and to obtain a 
temporary period of 'class peace'.15 However, a stable system of 
imperialist exploitation - such as that suggested in Kautsky's concept 
of 'ultra-imperialism' - was impossible, because the uneven development 
of capitalism would ensure continuous changes in the relative 'strength 
of those participating', which was 'the only conceivable basis under 
capitalism for the division of spheres of influence, interests, 
colonies etc.' Thus, not only would the capitalist powers as a 
group prey on the rest of the world, but the strongest among them 
would prey upon the weaker. With the original division of the colonial 
spoils completed, a new era of inter-imperialist wars to redivide the 
globe was inevitable.15
The actual presentation of these views in the 1916 Imperialism 
pamphlet was clearly much influenced by the tactical requirement to 
identify World War I as an inter-imperialist war, and a potential 
Europe-wide revolutionary situation which the proletariat - in contrast 
to the 'defencist' line adopted by the major parties of the Second 
International - should exploit by a policy of 'revolutionary defeatism'. 
Lenin's theoretical analysis of the dynamics of imperialism, moreover, 
was highly derivative. But, on another level, the work merely drew
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together the threads of his impressively early recognition of the 
revolutionary potential of national movements in 'the East', whose 
political awakening, via the colonial expansion of the Western
1 7powers, marked the beginning of a 'new phase in world history'.
This recognition, together with the shift towards a strategy of worker- 
peasant alliance for Russia itself after the abortive bourgeois 
revolution in 1905, constituted a major de facto revision of the 
Marxian analysis. Although the doctrine that revolutionary advance 
would first occur at the 'weakest link' in the imperialist chain - 
later exploited by Stalin in the elaboration of the doctrine of 
Socialism in One Country - technically originated with Trotsky,
'the whole trend of Leninist thought from the beginning is in this 
direction'.18
On the other hand, the full explication of a 'dialectics of 
backwardness' was inhibited by the doctrine of the 'labour aristocracy', 
through which Lenin sought to save the original Marxian estimation of 
the revolutionary potential of the broad mass of the Western proletariat.
The Bolshevik experience under the Tsarist autocracy, indeed, made 
it extremely difficult to recognise that the reformist orientation 
of West European Social Democracy, far from being a betrayal of the 
workers by a corrupted leadership, constituted a genuine response
1 9to mass aspirations within a relatively settled parliamentary environment.
At the same time, however, Lenin had from the first sought to establish 
the Bolsheviks'own 'aristocratic' claims within the Russian workers1 
movement, arguing - with a specific appeal to the 'profoundly true 
and important words' of Kautsky - that the working class could 
'exclusively by its own effort ... develop only trade-union consciousness', 
and that a correct understanding of the political tasks of the 
revolution must be brought to them from without, by an elite of
non-proletarian professional revolutionaries armed with scientific 
2 0Marxist theory.
Despite these rather schizophrenic implications, Lenin's 
identification of monopoly capitalism as the characteristic form of 
the epoch of 'transition from capitalism to a higher social and economic 
system'21 retained a certain plausibility in the years 1914-20. But 
his serious 'underestimation of the economic and political potentialities 
of capitalism, and of the change in the position of the [western] 
proletariat', persisted into the new era of 'stabilization' and 
coexistence. Together with the increasing tendency to project the 
Bolshevik experience as the model for successful revolutionary action,
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it destroyed from the outset any prospect for fruitful collaboration 
between the Bolsheviks and the European democratic left. 'In fact', 
argues Marcuse, 'the refusal to draw the theoretical consequences from 
the new situation characterises the entire development of Leninism, 
and is one of the chief reasons for the gap between theory and 
practice in Soviet Marxism'.23
To understand the factors, other than World War I, which worked 
to implant these erroneous perceptions in the Bolshevik outlook, it 
is necessary to make a detour through the question of the uneven 
development of the Russian economy itself. This factor, a major 
structural influence not merely upon the original revolution, but 
upon the subsequent development of the goal of socialist construction, 
confronted the Bolsheviks with an exceptionally difficult theoretical 
problem. The 'anomalous' balance of class forces suggested indeed 
that a potential revolutionary situation did exist in Russia; but the 
upheaval portended could be identified neither as unambiguously 
bourgeois nor as unambiguously proletarian in character, nor yet 
as merely an 'elemental' peasant uprising in the Pugachev tradition, 
but rather as a complex mixture of all three.
The conditions for such a development were, in large part, created 
by the Tsarist regime itself, in the piecemeal programcof economic 
reforms initiated in the wake of its disturbing experience of the 
adverse military implications of uneven development during the Crimean 
war. These reforms, and above all the industrialization and railway­
building programme, were designed to consolidate the power of the 
-■ Russian state, and were initiated 'in the traditional Russian fashion 
as a "revolution from above"'. But, by the turn of the century,
Carr argues, they were 'for the first time creating some of the conditions 
for a "revolution from below"'.24
One crucial factor was the abolition of serfdom in and after 1861, 
which 'opened a new era in Russian social relations' and, together with 
the rapid increase in the rural population in the later 19th century, 
sharply increased the weight of subsistence peasant farming in the
o cRussian economy. This situation promised to perpetuate the 
inefficiency of Russian agriculture; and it ran directly counter to 
the logic of industrialization, which required an expanding and 
marketable agricultural surplus to accommodate the needs of a continuously 
growing urban population. Therefore the regime, which had already 
alienated the peasantry by imposing redemption dues upon their land
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in 1861, and by leaving much of the land in the hands of the landlords, 
adopted under Witte a conscious policy of taxing the peasantry to 
compel them to sell more - and therefore consume less - of their 
grain. This attempt to make the peasants bear an unequal share of 
'the material and financial costs of industrialization' Nove comments, 
had 'more than a purely superficial similarity [to] that adopted by
o cStalin over thirty years later'.
A complementary series of agricultural reforms was initiated 
by Stolypin in the years 1906-11. By finally allowing the peasants 
the right to withdraw from the village commune, and to buy and sell 
land, these measures were calculated to intensify the already 
existing process of economic differentiation among the peasantry.
Thus they provided a supply of landless labourers to the towns, and 
promoted the growth of a kulak class of efficient and prosperous 
peasant capitalists, who could be expected to increase the volume of 
marketable grain, and also, Stolypin argued, to constitute a secure 
political base for the regime. But the fundamental peasant land 
hunger remained unappeased, as the holdings of the large landowners 
were left untouched; class divisions within the peasantry were 
increased; and, whatever the long-term prospects for the political 
success of Stolypin's 'wager on the strong', they were finally cut 
off by World War I.27
In the industrial sphere, patterns which later became notorious 
were prefigured from the outset. Because of both the weakness of 
peasant purchasing power and the foreign policy motivation of the 
industrialization program, it was strongly biased towards heavy 
industry, and particularly towards the production of 'war potential'. 
Given the type of production involved in Russian industry, its late­
comer role in the European context, and its state promoted 'hot 
house' development, it 'skipped over' the gradual evolutionary stages 
by which West European industrialization had progressed from small 
scale, entrepreneurial workshops towards the 'giant agglomeration 
employing hundreds and thousands of workmen. Russian industry, the 
youngest in Europe and in other respects the most backward, was the
most advanced in respect of the concentration of production in large 
2 8scale units'.
In these circumstances, Carr argues, the Russian proletariat 
- which had in any case begun its career as an undifferentiated mass 
of landless peasants, who were subjected to a 'harsh and relentless
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discipline' in order to break them to the routine of the factories - 
readily developed the intensity and uniformity of class consciousness 
which Marx had mistakenly expected as the product of advanced 
capitalism. Moreover, the industrial bourgeoisie appeared 'from 
the first' in the guise of 'the administrator, the organiser, the 
bureaucrat', with none of the early Western entrepreneurial tradition 
of direct contact with the workers. The absence of an established 
mercantile culture, finally, meant that there were no indigenous 
roots for a strong liberal tradition in politics. From both the
2 9economic and political equations, 'the middle term was absent'.
These various factors helped to establish the limits upon 
Bolshevik maneouvre both before and after the 1917 Revolution. In 
common with all variants of Russian Marxism, the Bolsheviks were 
convinced that the road to socialism in Russia lay through 
industrialization. Thus they rejected outright the narodnik commitment 
(inherited by the later Socialist Revolutionaries) to a peasant 
based socialism growing out of the indigenous collectivist tradition 
of the village commune, even though this goal had received a tentative 
endorsement in Marx's own comments regarding the possibility that 
Russian socialism could bypass the capitalist stage exemplified by 
Western Europe.30 Conversely, they supported the Tsarist regime's 
own modernising policies, with Lenin insisting that 'the direct or 
indirect, conscious or unconscious supporters of the bourgeoisie [are] 
our temporary or partial allies in the struggle against the remnants 
of the serfowning system'.31
However, the 1905 revolution convinced Lenin that the bourgeoisie 
was too weak, and too fearful of more radical change, to consummate 
its own revolution. At the same time, he maintained that the proletariat 
had already shown itself to be a powerful 'third force', capable 
ultimately of defeating both the autocracy and the bourgeoisie, while 
the peasantry were 'at the present moment less interested in the 
unconditional defence of private property than in taking away the 
landowner's land, which is one of the chief forms of that property'.
Thus he proposed, in Two Tactics of Social democracy in the democratic 
Revolutiona major revision not merely of the proletariat's tactical 
alliance policy, but also of the very conception of the forthcoming 
revolution:
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The proletariat must carry the democratic 
revolution to completion, allying to itself 
the mass of the peasantry in order to crush 
the autocracy's resistance by force and 
paralyse the bourgeoisie's instability. The 
proletariat must accomplish the socialist 
revolution, allying to itself the mass of 
the semi-proletarian elements of the 
population, so as to crush the bourgeoisie's 
resistance by force and paralyse the 
instability of the peasantry and the petty 
bourgeoisie. 3 2
There can be little doubt that this change of line was a major 
factor in the Bolshevik?' success during the crucial period in 1917-18, 
leading up to and immediately following the fall of the Provisional 
Government. One implication of the patrimonial character of the 
Russian ancien regime was that genuine opposition to state power 
came not from any of the traditional social and economic groups, 
whose power might have provided the backbone of a liberal- 
constitutional alternative to Tsardom, but primarily from the 
revolutionary intelligentsia-.33 At the 'upper' level of the struggle 
for national power, therefore, the ultimate collapse of the Tsarist 
regime left 'the revolutionary socialist parties, would-be 
consolidators of alternative regimes ... to contend in a virtual 
power vacuum'.34 By contrast, at the 'lower' level of independent 
action by workers and peasants, 'Russia was rapidly developing an 
enormous network of popular institutions, leading, in fact, to a 
more thoroughly "structured" society than ever before in Russian 
history';35 and the Bolsheviks' success in outflanking their opponents 
in the 'upper' struggle is attributable not merely to their ruthlessness 
and superior organizational skill, but also to their populist
responsiveness to the demands emanating from below - including, above
3 6all, the peasantry's demand for the land.
However, in the longer term - and even leaving aside the harsh 
exigencies of War Communism - the need of the Bolsheviks was to 
re-establish a centralized political order on terms which did not 
irremediably compromise the vision of a socialist transformation of 
Russia. And from this perspective Lenin's concept of the 'revolutionary - 
democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry' was 
replete with contradictions. First, there was the problem of the 
time-scale of the transition envisaged, under the proletarian-peasant
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dictatorship, between the 'bourgeois' and 'socialist' revolutions.
Lenin had formally dissociated himself from Trotsky's thesis that 
the 'logic of the revolution itself' would compel an automatic 
transition from one to the other, but he 'adopted in 1917 what 
was virtually the same expedient of making the Bolshevik seizure 
of power do simultaneous duty as the last act of the bourgeois
q *7revolution and the first of the socialist revolution'. However, 
the proletariat's qualifications for the maintenance of a vanguard 
role in this latter process were extremely dubious. While it was 
indeed possessed of a potentially revolutionary class consciousness, 
it was anything but the 'immense majority of the population'; and 
it was also woefully lacking in that depth of political culture 
which, in the Marxian schema, was to have been a natural concomitant 
of its maturity as a revolutionary agent.
Second, the entire logic of the Bolsheviks' position required 
them to place industrial development at the centre of the tasks 
of the socialist revolution. Their belief in the feasibility of 
socialist industrialization in the backward Russian environment 
was, of course, directly dependent upon the conviction that the 
spark of the bourgeois revolution in Russia would ignite the socialist 
revolution in Europe, and that the subsequent assistance of the 
victorious European proletariat would make good the deficiencies 
of the Russian economic base, as well as the Russian proletariat's 
lack of political culture.38 In the event, the already war-torn 
country passed, with only a brief respite, into a further three years 
of civil war and foreign intervention. Together with the economic 
dislocation caused by the revolution itself, and the major resource 
losses occasioned by the Brest-Litovsk settlement, these strains 
ensured a situation in which, so far from socialist construction 
proceeding upon the basis of prior material abundance, 'only want 
[was] made general'.
Third, although an insistence upon tactical flexibility was one 
of Lenin's trademarks,39 the alliance with the peasantry was potentially 
an instance of the one type of compromise which he did regard as 
inadmissable - one which involved a surrender of the ultimate goals 
of the revolution. By acquiescing in the outright expropriation of 
the landlords in 1917, the Bolsheviks outflanked the Socialist 
Revolutionaries, and secured not merely the peasants' sufferance of
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the new regime, but also their indispensable military support in 
the struggle against the Whites.40 However, the peasantry were 
also deeply alienated by the institution of forcible grain 
requisitioning in the War Communism years; and as Lenin observed 
in 1921, the 'very simple, and even crude' basis of the wartime 
alliance with the peasantry could not be expected to persist into 
the new period, when the latter were likely to identify the 
regime's own socialist aspirations as the new threat to their 
control of the land.41
Moreover, the massive expansion of peasant land-holding in 
1917 had merely intensified the old problem of the checks imposed 
by subsistence agriculture on the development of industry, and 
confronted the regime with economic incentives to follow the Stolypin 
path. Already, in the disastrous winter of 1918-19, they had 
substantially diluted the avowed policy of splitting the peasantry 
by alliance with its semi-proletarian elements, disbanding the 
countryside committees of 'poor peasants' as part of a campaign to 
conciliate the 'middle peasants';42 and with the introduction of 
the New Economic Policy in 1921, they accepted an indefinite period 
of market relations in agriculture, and the inevitable strengthening 
of the kulak element. In the countryside, as Carr observes, 'the 
revolution [had] passed a sponge over the immediate past', and when 
the intra-party battle on the issue of Socialism in One Country was 
finally joined in 1924, 'the problem had once again to be faced 
from the beginning'.4 3
The Period of Transition
The Bolshevik acceptance of ad hoc solutions to these crucial 
problems must be related to the peculiar theoretical and practical 
'necessity' of the world revolution. 'Our salvation from all these 
difficulties', Lenin told the Seventh Party Congress in 1918, 'is in 
all European revolution ... regarded from the world-historical point 
of view, there would doubtlessly be no hope of the ultimate victory 
of our revolution, if it were to remain alone, if there were no 
revolutionary movement in other countries ... ,44 The very character
of the Russian proletariat's tasks, he argued,could not be calculated 
except in this context:
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We have only just taken the first steps 
towards shaking off capitalism altogether 
and beginning the transition to socialism.
We do not know and we cannot know how many 
stages of transition to socialism there 
will be. That depends on when the full-scale 
European socialist revolution begins and on 
whether it will deal with its enemies and 
enter upon the smooth path of socialist 
development easily and rapidly or whether it 
will do so slowly. We do not know this ...
4 5
This was to be a constantly reiterated theme. However, from 
the time of Lenin's victory over his opponents on the Brest-Litovsk 
issue, one task - that of national survival - inescapably assumed 
an identity of its own. Soviet Communists had been 'defencists' 
since 25 October 1917, Lenin insisted, when they had won the right 
to be 'defencists' of the socialist fatherland.46 From that 
moment of the emergence of a single socialist state, he argued, 
relations with imperialist powers must be judged not 'from the 
point of view of whether this or that imperialism is preferable, but 
exclusively from the point of view of the conditions which best 
make for the development and consolidation of the socialist revolution 
which has already begun.'47 In a party manifesto justifying Brest- 
Litovsk, this point was driven home in terms which clearly anticipate 
Stalin's doctrine of the supremacy of the Soviet 'base':
By upholding Soviet power we render the best 
and most powerful support to the proletariat 
of all countries in its unprecedently difficult 
and onerous struggle against its own bourgeoisie.
There can be no greater blow to the cause of 
socialism than the collapse of Soviet power in 
Russia.
4 8
The longer the isolation of the Soviet state continued, the greater 
became Lenin's concern for tactical flexibility and his reliance upon 
the 'two tendency' analysis long applied to the domestic class struggle. 
The war 'for the overthrow of the international bourgeoisie', he 
asserted in 1920, would be 'a hundred times more difficult, protracted 
and complex than the most stubborn of ordinary wars between states'. 
Therefore, to renounce in advance the prospect of compromises, or of 
shifts in policy to exploit the divisions in the enemy camp, however
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limited the likely gains, would be 'ridiculous in the extreme'.49 
This negative policy of 'utilizing the discord among the imperialist 
powers'50 - grounded both in the theoretical analysis of imperialism, 
and in Lenin's reading of the lessons of the Intervention - provided 
the dominant theme of his foreign policy statements in this period.
But the seeds of a more positive approach to the question of direct 
cooperation with the capitalist powers were contained in the very 
self definition of the revolution. If socialism (and, indeed, the 
consolidation of Soviet power) could not be secured without 
industrialization, and if the regime could not, for the moment, deal 
with socialist governments in the advanced countries, assistance in 
this enterprise must be sought from the capitalists themselves.
Indeed, in the period immediately after Brest-Litovsk - when, 
according to Lenin's later testimony, 'we expected a period in which 
peaceful construction would be possible'51- he became embroiled in 
a second major controversy with the Left over the issue of economic 
cooperation with big capital. Seizing upon his opponents1 warnings 
of a degeneration into 'state capitalism', Lenin argued that state 
capitalism would represent 'a step forward for us', for it constituted 
'a regime of centralization, integration, control, and socialization 
[which] is exactly what we lack'. As such, he insisted, it was 
nothing less than the 'threshold' to socialism:
Is it not clear that, from the material, 
economic and productive point of view we 
are not yet 'on the threshold' of socialism?
Is it not clear that we cannot pass through 
the door of socialism without crossing 'the 
threshold' which we have not yet reached?
52
The point is that the Bolsheviks had seized power primarily to 
effect a material and social transformation of their own society; and 
that, from their earliest days in power, the conditions were developing 
in which world revolution, no less than stable coexistence, could be 
viewed primarily in terms of its contribution to this domestic goal.
Of course, as so often with Lenin, this interpretation involves 
assigning particular weight to positions adopted, and sometimes later 
controverted, in the course of intermittent polemics with his various 
political opponents. But, to repeat, since selection of this kind is 
inescapable, it seems most reasonable to relate it to the more 
persistent structural features of the Soviet experience. In this
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regard, it is noteworthy that one of the most frequently quoted 
of Lenin's pronouncements on coexistence dates from the quite 
unrepresentative year of 1919, at the height of the allied Intervention, 
and was particularly related to the rebuttal of the charge, advanced 
by Kautsky, that the Bolsheviks were creating a militarist state:
We are living not merely in a state but 
in a system of states, and it is 
inconceivable for the Soviet republic 
to exist alongside of the imperialist 
states for any length of time ... ^nd 
before the end comes, there will have 
to be a series of frightful collisons 
between the Soviet republic and the 
bourgeois states.
5 3
With its formal 'states-system' language and its over-riding 
'inevitability of war' thesis, this almost selects itself as a 
representative Leninist assertion of the impossibility of inter­
state coexistence with the capitalist world (Pipes, for instance, 
describes it as 'an uncharacteristic outburst of candour' in which 
'Lenin articulated his vision of the future').54 However, the 
expectation of an inevitable capitalist-Soviet clash was not an 
application of Lenin's formal 'inevitability of war' thesis, which 
related specifically to the capitalist powers, with their conflicting 
imperialist drives towards the export of surplus capital.55 It was 
rather a practical judgement that the international bourgeoisie 
would not tolerate the continued existence of an independent socialist 
state; and in 1919, the year both of 'Soviet Russia's most complete 
isolation from the outside world', and of its 'most outspokenly 
revolutionary' foreign policy stance, this expectation must have seemed 
all too correct.56 By 1921, with both the Intervention and the failure 
of 'revolutionary war' in Poland behind them, the Soviet regime faced 
a situation whose basic structure was to persist well into the future, 
and Lenin offered an assessment of it which brought together in a 
striking way most of the major themes discussed above :
Without having gained an international victory, 
which we consider the only sure victory, we are 
in the position of having won conditions enabling 
us to exist side by side with the capitalist 
powers, who are compelled to enter into trade 
relations with us. In the course of this struggle 
we have won the right to an independent existence.
Thus a glance at our international position as 
a whole will show that we have achieved tremendous 
successes and have won, not only a breathing space
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but something more significant ... We have 
entered a new period, in which we have won 
our right to our fundamental international 
existence in the network of capitalist states 
... Today we can speak, not merely of a 
breathing space, but of a real chance of a 
new and lengthy period of development.
Until now we have actually had no basis in 
the international sense. We now have this 
basis.
5 7
Lenin made no further advance upon this still limited conception 
of interstate coexistence. But in his last years he did establish, 
through his elaboration upon the themes of uneven development and 
the national liberation movement; much of the foundations of the 
current Soviet 'working theory' of world history in the transition 
period - the General Crisis of Capitalism.58 The West European 
countries, he argued in 1923, were not completing their development 
towards socialism 'as we formerly expected. They are not consummating 
it through gradual "maturing" of socialism, but through the 
exploitation of the first of the countries vanquished in the 
imperialist war [i.e. Germany] combined with the exploitation of the 
whole of the East'. This permitted 'some semblance of "class truce"' 
within the imperialist nations, but at the cost of irrevocably drawing 
'the East ... into the general maelstrom of the world revolutionary 
movement'- a 'process of development that must lead to a crisis in
c qthe whole world of capitalism'.
Elsewhere, Lenin specifically situated Russia on 'the borderline' 
between the civilized countries and the colonial world, suggesting 
that her revolutionary process, while still 'in keeping with the 
general line of world developments', must 'introduce certain partial 
innovations as the revolution moves on to the countries of the East'.60 
Admittedly, Lenin's argument retained the notion that the class truce 
in the West was a temporary aberration. But in practice, as Tucker 
points out, it transferred 'the epicentre of world revolutionary 
development ... to the backward, agrarian, colonial, but increasingly 
rebellious East', and presented 'the world revolutionary process not 
as an all-European proletarian revolt on Marx's model, but as a long 
drawn out revolt of the colonial East against European hegemony on the 
model of the revolution in semi-Asiatic Russia'.61
However, the shift in strategy implied here in no sense modified
Lenin's concern with stable coexistence. In the first place -
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and in a pattern which would become common in Soviet political 
discourse - it mobilized an optimistic appraisal of the broad sweep 
of history in support of an indefinite accommodation to unpleasant 
political realities. In the long-term, the Soviet Union could 
aspire to a definitive erosion of the colonial underpinnings of the 
capitalist stabilization. It could also hope that developing colonial 
unrest, together with the interimperialist contradictions, would 
secure for it an extended 'respite' from concerted imperialist attack. 
But, for the present, the fact that 'the imperialists have succeeded 
in splitting the world into two camps', was a 'disadvantage' under
c pwhich 'we are labouring'.
Second, the new doctrine may be seen as a direct reflection of 
Lenin's preoccupation with the Soviet Union's pressing domestic 
problems, and above all the very factor most conducive to the parallel 
with 'the East' - the confirmation by the revolution of the dominance ~ 
of peasant agriculture in the national economy. 'We, too, lack 
enough civilization to enable us to pass straight into socialism',
r qLenin admitted, 'although we do have the political requisites for it'.
In fact, even the latter were gravely threatened. The Russian 
proletariat had been deeply affected by 'a long process of quantitative 
and qualitative deterioration'. Through its physical losses in the 
Civil War, the co-option of its upper ranks into the party and 
administrative hierarchy, and the re-absorption of large numbers into 
the peasantry as a result of the collapse of heavy industry and the 
famine conditions in the cities, 'it seemed', in 1923 'to have touched 
the nadir of its prestige and influence'.64 Despite the substantial 
levies on the proletariat, moreover, the regime was compelled to rely 
heavily on pre-revolutionary 'experts' in all areas of administration; 
and their Tsarist ' bureaucratic culture', for want of any genuine 
competition, was an increasingly pervasive force in the government.65 
Finally, the very economic success of the NEP was creating, in the 
growth of rural and urban small capitalist strata, an alternative ally 
for the mass of the peasantry. The Communists themselves, Lenin 
acknowledged in 1922, were but 'a drop in the ocean of the people'66 
and the soz-dzsant dictatorship of the proletariat was now left
6 7'suspended in the void'.
The over-riding issue was the 'link' with the peasantry. 'So long 
as there is no revolution in other countries', Lenin maintained, 'only
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agreement with the peasantry can save the socialist revolution in 
Russia'.68 Indeed, in some later-published notes, he explicitly 
reversed the earlier priorities of revolutionary advance. 'Ten or 
twenty years of regular relations with the peasantry', he observed,
'and victory is assured on a world scale (even if there is a delay 
in the proletarian revolutions, which are maturing); otherwise 20-40 
years of tormenting whiteguard terror'.69 As Moshe Lewin points 
out, Lenin's now envisaged 'building not socialism at once, but a 
society in transition' - a programme which could, indeed, be directly
7 0related to the needs of the wider national liberation movement.
His concern was now to effect 'the radical modification in our whole 
outlook on socialism' necessary in a country which lacked the 
material base envisaged by Marx, and in which 'the political and social 
revolution preceded the cultural revolution'. The Communists' whole 
emphasis should be shifted from revolutionary political struggle, 
towards 'peaceful organizational, "cultural" [and] educational work', 
though this must inevitably be circumscribed by 'our international 
relations, [by] the fact that we have to fight for our position on 
a world scale'.71
It is true that Lenin himself raised the fateful prospect that 
the Soviet state, by its own resources, could first acquire the 
necessary level of culture, and then 'proceed to overtake the other 
nations', and that he asserted that proletarian state power, state 
control of large scale industry, and the voluntary acceptance of 
cooperatives by the mass of the peasantry, was 'all that is necessary 
to build a complete socialist society'. But the realization of
the last goal would itself require 'an entire historical epoch'; and 
the industrial expansion which was essential both to avoid a 'reign 
of peasant limitations' and to assure the long-term security of the 
Soviet state, was to be financed essentially by the 'greatest possible 
thrift in the economic life of our state', within the context of the 
voluntary link with the peasantry.74 In this conception of the 
transition period, therefore,coexistence, and indeed cooperation with 
the capitalist world, was little short of an objective requirement of 
Soviet foreign policy.
Socialism in One Country
The 'subtle and undeclared' rapprochement between 'the cause of
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Russia and the cause of Bolshevism', of which Lenin's last writings 
were one instance, reached its culmination in Stalin's doctrine of 
Socialism in One Country.75 More than anything else, this 
represented the supremacy of domestic tasks - with their associated 
implications for coexistence - in the party's mind.
This is illustrated by Stalin's employment of the ostensibly 
militant doctrine of the 'weakest link'. Under conditions of 
imperialism and uneven capitalist development, he argued in 1924,
'individual countries and individual national economies have ceased 
to be self sufficient units, have become links in a single chain 
called world economy ... ' Formerly 'the proletarian revolution
was regarded exclusively as the result of the internal development 
of a given country'. Now, it must be seen 'primarily as a result of 
the development of the contradictions within the world system of 
imperialism, as the result of the breaking of the chain of the world
7 6imperialist front in one country or another'.
This ought logically to have implied both a strategic orientation 
towards the national liberation movement, and a recognition of the 
drastic limitations on the prospects for socialist development - as 
Marxists had so far understood it - in Russia. But Stalin showed 
little interest in consistency in his speculations about the future 
course of world revolution,77 being primarily concerned to establish 
the so cza Z zst credentials of the October Revolution. Indeed, his 
full 'Socialism in One Country' synthesis offered a 'building block' 
theory of the world revolution, which effectively denied the reality 
of the unified world-economy upon which the 'weakest link' doctrine
7 ftwas predicated.
The essential point, on Stalin's account, was to distinguish 
between two sets of contradictions: those between the proletariat and 
the peasantry in the Soviet Union, which could 'be overcome entirely 
by the efforts of one country'; and those represented by the capitalist 
encirclement, 'the solution of which requires the efforts of the 
proletarians of several countries'. Given the distinction, he asserted, 
the Soviet Union could achieve unaided the comipZete construction of 
socialism within its boundaries, though its fznaZ victory, in the 
sense of security against an enforced capitalist restoration, would
• 7 9require the general victory of the international proletariat.
Moreover, the prospects for further defections from 'the system of 
imperialist states' were directly dependent upon the achievements of
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the Soviet 'advanced base' itself:
... there can also be no doubt that 
the very development of the world 
revolution, the very process of the 
breaking away from imperialism of a 
number of new countries will be more 
rapid and thorough, the more thoroughly 
socialism becomes consolidated in the 
first victorious country, the faster 
this country is transformed into a base 
for the further unfolding of the world 
revolution, into a lever for the further 
disintegration of imperialism.
80
As Carr points out, the significance of this doctrine lay not in 
the arcane theoretical distinctions regarding the 'final' victory of 
socialism, but in the psychological impact of its expression of faith 
in the Soviet future even despite the now generally acknowledged
o nstabilization of capitalism. In May 1925, pointing to the impressive
economic recovery under NEP, Stalin maintained that 'we have two 
stabilizations: the temporary stabilization of capitalism, and the 
stabilization of the Soviet system'. In contrast to Trotsky, whom he 
successfully saddled with the stigma of excessive reliance upon 'world 
revolution', and of defeatist underestimation of the independent 
resources of the Soviet worker-peasant alliance, Stalin insisted that 
the condition of dual stabilization could provide the foundation for 
successful socialist construction in the Soviet Union. And at 
the Fourteenth Party Congress in December 1925, when he had effectively 
established his supremacy over both Trotsky and his former colleagues 
of the Politburo majority, he explicitly drew the connection between 
Soviet development and coexistence:
The basic new feature, the decisive feature 
... in the sphere of foreign relations 
during this period, is the fact that a 
certain temporary equilibrium of forces has 
been established between our country, which 
is building socialism, and the countries of 
the capitalist world, an equilibrium which 
has determined the present period of 'peaceful 
coexistence' ... What we at one time regarded 
as a brief respite after the war has become a 
whole period of respite.
8 3
The question of the changing meaning of Socialism in One Country 
in Soviet political discourse is thus a vital one for any attempt to
433.
chart the evolution of the Soviet approach to 'existence side by 
side' with the capitalist states. As Kubalkova and Cruickshank 
point out, Stalin, through his codification of the hints in Lenin's 
later pronouncements about the indefinite continuance of such a 
situation, became 'the first marxist writer to formulate a theory 
of international relations that would not explicitly incorporate 
a theory of the end of international relations' in world revolution 
and the establishment of a socialist world order. Moreover, by 
attaching the doctrine of Socialism in One Country to that of uneven 
development and the 'weakest link' - thereby reconciling it, however 
ambiguously, with the Leninist theory of imperialism - Stalin 
'established a point of departure in Soviet theory that leads directly 
to contemporary thinking on the subject of international relations'.85 
Although the classic Stalinist perspective was modified after World 
War II by a de facto concept of 'socialism in one sphere', which in 
turn gave way , with Khrushchev's reformulation of Peaceful Coexistence, 
to a doctrine more attuned to the growing importance of international 
relations at large to the developing Soviet great power, it is 
nonetheless true that, in its basic categories, the contemporary 
Soviet perspective clearly betrays its Stalinist heritage.
On the other hand, the doctrine of Socialism in One Country should 
not be interpreted solely by reference to developments in Soviet 
domestic and foreign policy in the Stalin era proper. At the time 
of its emergence in the mid-1920s, it must be emphasized, the majority 
(and Stalinist) line on 'building socialism' was a direct continuation 
of the peasant-oriented NEP strategy outlined in Lenin's last statements. 
Bukharin, then Stalin's ally and the chief economic theorist of 
Socialism in One Country, insisted that the party must advance 'at the
o rpace of a tortoise', and ride 'towards socialism on a peasant nag'.
Even Trotsky, Preobrazhensky, and the 'super-industrialization' left 
- whose political handicap was their denial that Russia could achieve 
socialism merely on its own economic base - expected the indefinite 
continuation of market relations in the countryside, and agreed that 
collectivization must be gradual and voluntary.87 Moreover, a 
limited synthesis of Right and Left viewpoints appeared to have been 
achieved at the Fifteenth Party Congress in December 1927; and 
'when Stalin abandoned this programme a year later he abandoned 
mainstream Bolshevik thinking about economic change'.89 As has been 
suggested earlier, the transformation in the meaning of Socialism in
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One Country led in turn to a transformation of the Soviet system 
and, in large part, of its relationship with the outside world; 
and the complex mix of objective and subjective factors involved 
in the decisions of the late 1920s is crucial to the assessment 
of that relationship.
First, the period of postwar recovery in industry, with 
dramatic productivity increases from relatively modest capital 
investments, was reaching its end. The need now was for a major 
expansion of the industrial base; and, especially in the absence 
of extensive foreign loans, this required an associated expansion 
of marketable agricultural surpluses.90 But the Bukharinite recipe 
of according priority to consumer goods, as an incentive to the peasants 
to sell more, clashed directly with the priority to heavy industry 
which was dictated by the concern with longer-term self sufficiency. 
Moreover, since a modern heavy industry sector was one of the most 
important legacies from Tsarist Russia, the Bukharinite approach 
would have involved dissipating a crucial existing asset which, the 
Right freely admitted, would in any case need to be expanded at a 
later date.91
Second, there was the international situation, in which, Stalin 
pronounced at the Fifteenth Party Congress, ’the period of "peaceful 
coexistence" [was] receding into the past^ giving place to a period 
of imperialist assaults and preparation for intervention against the 
USSR'. The major war scare of 1927 certainly appears to have been
seriously exaggerated for the purpose of creating a siege mentality 
conducive to a massive new development effort; and, if Stalin had 
really believed that the country faced an early invasion, 'the policy 
of the First Five Year Plan would look very much like suicide prompted 
by a fear of death'.93 But it seems likely that the party in general 
did regard war as inevitable in the longer term, and, as Nove points 
out, this perception dictated both a heavy industry priority and 
rapid development tempos, each inimical to the NEP strategy.94
Third, the regime already faced a 'goods famine' in the consumer 
sector; and by the end of the 1920s the market system had produced 
a 'chronic and irremediable crisis of grain collections'. This situation, 
exacerbated by politically inspired and self defeating pricing policies,95 
mobilized behind collectivization 'the same empirical argument once 
used to justify NEP - the dire need for grain to feed the towns 
and factories'.96
435.
Finally, there was the political requirement for a 'Communist' 
solution. Even if the immediate crisis could be transcended, a longer 
term developmental success on the Bukharinite model could only be 
purchased at the cost of a major expansion of kulak power and 
influence. As Nove observes, 'a strong group of independent, rich 
peasants was Stolypin's dream [but] the Bolsheviks' nightmare, as 
totally inconsistent in the long run with their rule or with a 
socialist transformation of petty bourgeois Russa'.97 Furthermore, 
the War Communism years had already provided a highly centralized 
and collectivist model of 'socialist construction' which fitted well 
with the potentialities of Stalin's political base. The ideology 
generated by this militant and 'heroic' period, Tucker argues, retained 
its power over important sections of the party even at the height 
of NEP, and again assumed a dominant role in the crisis atmosphere 
of 1928-29.98
In sum, therefore, the change in the Bolshevik approach to 'building 
socialism' in one country is most readily explicable as an intelligible, 
though extremely drastic, response to the logic of an unprecedented 
situation. Ideology was undoubtedly important in narrowing still 
further the party's range of 'available' alternatives. But there is 
no persuasive reason to invoke the notion of an ideological 'blueprint', 
partially implemented in War Communism and now given full scope under 
Stalin. Rather, the party's definition of Soviet Communism was 
itself being improvised, 'on the run', throughout the first decade of 
its rule; and by the late 1920s the combination of factors enumerated 
above had created a situation in which, given the emerging terms of 
reference supplied by that definition, there appeared no real alternative 
to the brutal Stalinist 'breakthrough':
This amalgam of fears, hopes and revolutionary 
faith had begun to dominate Soviet policy in 
the summer of 1929. If industrialization was 
a condition of collectivization, collectivization 
was a condition of industrialization. ... In the 
two preceding years disaster had been narrowly 
averted. Gradualism was not enough. The position 
could, and must, be taken by assault. It was in 
this mood of mingled desperation and optimism ... 
that the fateful decision was taken, suddenly and 
with little apparent debate, to collectivize the 
mass of the peasantry by force and to liquidate 
the kulaks as a class. l o o
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Capitalist Encirclement
Collectivization was thus a political choice^ which a different 
regime might successfully have avoided. But it was a choice within 
an extremely limited range of options. And the same parameters which 
shaped the original decisions helped to push their implementation 
into disastrous channels which, it is reasonable to suppose, the 
decision-makers cannot wholly have foreseen. Especially in its 
earliest stages, Lewin emphasizes, the industrialization drive 'was 
accompanied by an astonishingly inadequate development of theory 
... There is no doubt that the whole process was an immense 
improvization, guided by the rule of thumb, hunch, and all too often 
by despotic whims'.101
There were several immediately disastrous results: massive 
disinvestment in agriculture, through the peasants' slaughter of 
their livestock, so that for many years new mechanized inputs were 
merely repairing the deficiencies created at the outset; extensive 
waste of new capital equipment (itself financed by the sale of 
expropriated grain) in industry; a decline even from existing levels 
of consumer goods production; widespread famine, confined chiefly to 
the countryside by the regime's requisitioning policies; and the 
loss, through the 'liquidation' of the kulaksj of the most efficient 
agricultural producers in the country. In the long term the
ongoing malaise in agriculture was perhaps the most pressing economic 
problem bequeathed by Stalin to his successors. And, most crucial 
of all, the methods employed to enforce collectivization - originally 
something of an ancillary issue to that of industrialization - marked 
the real beginning of the Stalinist system.
The consummation of that system came with the Great Purge of 
1937-39, when Stalin turned the police terror above all on the leading 
state and economic functionaries, and upon the party aktiv which had 
loyally enforced the policies of the First Five Year Plan. The link 
between collectivization and the terror is an extremely complex one. 
Each can be presented as a 'political necessity' in the context of 
evolving Soviet Communism. But whereas, in the first instance, the 
necessity was for a 'Communist' solution to the problem of Russian 
backwardness, in the second, it was for the preservation of the 
Stalinist system (and Stalin himself) against all effective opposition, 
in the party and elsewhere.103 A central paradox of Stalin's rule,
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indeed, is that in driving the country through a great 'modernizing' 
revolution from above, he also contributed directly to the 'archaization' 
of the Soviet state, reaching back to the tradition of earlier 
modernizing Tsars to establish a 'neo-Tsarist version of the compulsory 
service-state'.10 4
Two conclusions, foreshadowed earlier, must be emphasized here. 
First, while Stalinism still casts a large shadow over Soviet relations 
with the outside world, it was not simply the logical culmination of 
Bolshevism, but a specific historical phenomenon susceptible to 
change as its underlying conditions changed. Second, although 
Soviet doctrine throughout the Stalinist period was strikingly 
consistent in its 'zero-sum' depiction of both international and 
domestic politics, this phenomenon itself appears to reflect primarily 
an extreme introversion in Stalinist politics. Peaceful Coexistence 
was indeed presented throughout in tactical terms, never challenging 
the over-riding expectation of a violent denou&rtesft to the capitalist- 
Soviet conflict. But, for the t v  ansz td o n period, the master concept 
was neither Peaceful Coexistence nor world revolution, but the 
'capitalist encirclement' of a vulnerable Soviet Union.
Throughout its history, the 'capitalist encirclement' retained 
a direct connection with the possibility of a capitalist restoration 
in the USSR. Stalin initially advanced the concept as a kind of 
by-product to Socialism in One Country, to emphasize that this was 
the sole obstacle to the final victory of socialism which the Soviet 
Union could not overcome by its own resources.105 However, it soon 
acquired the character of an all purpose justification for Stalin's 
revision of fundamental Marxist tenets concerning the revolution. In 
1936, Stalin declared that the Soviet Union had competed the building 
of socialism, and at the 18th Party Congress in 1939, he claimed that 
'we are moving ahead, to Communism'.106 But he had already announced, 
in his justification of the purges, that the class struggle would 
intensify, not die down, with the closer advance of Communism; and in 
his 1939 report, he undertook to revise 'Engels' formula' of the 
withering away of the state. 'Unless the capitalist encirclement is 
liquidated and unless the danger of foreign military attack has been 
eliminated,' Stalin argued, the state would remain even under Communism.
Indeed, Stalin clearly found it advantageous to retain the sanction 
of the 'capitalist encirclement' even as external circumstances 
increasingly challenged the simplicities of the doctrine. In 1937,
l o 7
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after a brief period of restraint in Soviet discussions of the 
Western democracies during the 'collective security' offensive, he 
returned emphatically to 'the real and unpleasant phenomenon' of 
capitalist encirclement. The bourgeois states continued to surround 
the Soviet Union, waiting for an 'opportunity to attack it, to crush 
it, or in any event to weaken or undermine it', and 'no economic
10 8successes, however great', could annul this fact and its consequences. 
Moreover, he had already, in 1930, established the claim that 'capitalist 
encirclement' must not be regarded simply as a geographic concept 
but rather as signifying the links between hostile foreign forces and 
class enemies within the USSR.109 And as late as 1950, after the 
addition of the East European countries and 500 million Chinese to 
the 'socialist camp', the party journal Bolshevik reiterated this 
caution.110
However, while the manipulative elements of the doctrine are 
readily apparent, it seems probable that it expressed a broad analytical 
perspective as well. Stalin's personal attraction towards a strongly 
dichotomous world view was already evident in 1919, in his argument that 
the world was now 'definitely and irrevocably split into two camps' 
of imperialism and socialism, whose struggle 'constitutes the hub of 
present day affairs ...'111 Moreover, though he accepted the theoretical 
possibility that the colonial regions - now a 'reserve' of imperialism - 
could ultimately be brought into the socialist camp, Stalin was 
substantially more non-committal about this than was Lenin, while 
caution about the prospects for European revolution was one of his 
distinguishing features. Theoretically, he argued in a 1925 speech on 
the link with the peasantry, the Soviet revolution had three foreign 
'allies': the inter-imperialist contradictions, the Western proletariat, 
and the colonies. But, whatever their great importance for the future, 
these were of little relevance to the immediate problem. Only from 
the peasantry could the proletariat obtain assistance 1 at this very 
m o m e n t 113 Given that the next decade produced a condition of virtual 
civil war, first against the peasantry, and then against the 
'proletarian' party itself, it is entirely plausible that the threat 
of the capitalist encirclement, and not the opportunities for breaching 
it, should have governed Stalin's outlook.
Indeed, Marcuse has persuasively argued that the Soviet outlook 
throughout the entire Stalin period was primarily defensive, being
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dominated by the perception of a long-term capitalist stabilization, 
a major cause of which was the 'neutralization' of the inter-imperialist 
conflicts by the effects of a shared antipathy to the Soviet Union.
On this Soviet analysis, Marcuse points out, the rise of Facism 
constituted merely a heightened phase of the national and international 
class struggle, and the wartime Grand Alliance represented merely 
a temporary triumph of the inter-imperialist over the capitalist- 
Soviet contradictions, being forced on the democracies by the failure 
of their strategy of turning Nazi aggression solely against the Soviet 
Union.114
One apparent objection to Marcuse's thesis stems from the 
ostensibly revolutionary goals of the Comintern, especially in the 
great 'left turn' of 1929-34, when the campaign against the 'Social 
Fascists' of the democratic left contributed directly to the success 
of Hitler in Germany. But as Franz Borkenau points out, the Comintern 
had long since lost any real rationale as an engine of world revolution. 
Indeed, 'when the Comintern was born the revolution in the West was 
already at an end ... As an organization under the sway of Moscow ...
|itI was itself a product of defeat' - that very defeat which itself 
shaped the anomalous character of the Bolshevik revolution.115 In 
his notorious 1927 definition of proletarian internationalism Stalin 
emphatically drew the moral from this situation:
An internationalist is one who is ready to 
defend the USSR, without reservation, 
without wavering, unconditionally; for the 
USSR is the base of the world revolutionary 
movement, and this revolutionary movement 
cannot be defended and promoted unless the 
USSR is defended. For whoever thinks of 
defending the world revolutionary movement 
apart from, or against, the USSR, goes 
against the revolution, and must inevitably 
slide into the camp of the enemies of the 
revolution.
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In addition to their role as tools of Soviet foreign policy, the 
foreign Communist parties were also significant as pawns in the factional 
struggle within the Soviet elite; and the great Comintern 'left turn' 
was clearly influenced by the exigencies of Stalin's struggle with the 
Bukharinite Right. More generally, however, it was simply an extreme 
instance of the pattern of militant, but essentially defensive,
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reactions to the perceived danger that the continuation of 'Rightist'
strategies might lead to the effective merging of Communist cadres
117with the forces of Social Democracy.
Even Soviet policy in the immediate postwar period appears 
to have been primarily a holding operation - though in respect of the 
much more extensive assets acquired during World War II. Stalin may 
have been attracted towards the wider prospects of 'world revolution': 
but he seems, in retrospect, to have adopted a generally conservative 
approach to the cause of Communist movements in Western Europe, the 
Balkans, and Asia. Moreover his attitude to Eastern Europe appears 
to have been substantially shaped by two interlocking 'defensive' 
concerns: the protection against perceived Western encroachments of 
the glads recently established by Soviet arms; and the protection 
against the challenge of Titoist revisionism of his own brand of 
Communist orthodoxy.
Finally, the emerging American role in this period lent a good 
deal of plausibility to what Soviet analyses presented as the 
logical further development of the General Crisis of Capitalism: the 
political, military and economic consolidation of the capitalist world, 
for the better prosecution of the struggle against Communism, under 
the leadership of its major economic power. At the time of its
promulgation in 1947, the Zhdanov doctrine was regarded in the West 
as an a^ tjffessive declaration of Cold War. But Marcuse argues that - 
with its implicit allocation of the Western proletariat to the 
imperialist camp, its denial of the possibility of a middle road for 
independent Third World regimes, and its reiteration of the Soviet 
recognition of the 'fact of coexistence for a long time of the two 
social systems' - it came closer than any other major Soviet pronouncement 
to 'the open recognition of international capitalist unification, and 
thus to discarding the traditional notion of the iriterimperialist 
contradictions'.119
As against all this, it must be noted that Stalin, in his last 
published article, himself attacked the belief of 'some comrades' in 
the prospect of a long-term capitalist stabilization, and insisted 
that the interimperialist contradictions 'had proved in practice to 
be stronger than the contradictions between the capitalist camp and 
the socialist camp'.120 Also, as Marshal Shulman has emphasized,
Soviet foreign policy in Stalin's final years, and especially the line 
laid down at the Nineteenth Party Congress in October 1952, indicated
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a greater capacity for flexibility and manoeuvre, in an attempt to 
minimize the impact of American leadership of the West and of the 
developing policy of containment. However, even Shulman is
concerned primarily to emphasize the continuity in Soviet foreign 
policy, to demonstrate that the transitional stage exhibited under 
Malenkov did have roots in the late Stalin period, and not to suggest
that this period produced any major change on the general question of
12 2coexistence with the West.
Overall, the legacy of the Stalin era was a deeply ambivalent 
one. On the one hand, it had established some of the most enduring 
themes of both domestic and foreign policy: the fundamental Soviet 
statism, both practical and theoretical; the obsessive need to catch 
up, economically and militarily, with the capitalist powers; the deeply 
Russian character of the orientation towards 'world revolution'.
Moreover, the politico-economic base created under Stalin brought the 
Soviet Union through both the tremendous test of World War II and 
its period of maximum vulnerability in the immediate postwar years, so 
that in the 1950s it could begin to confront the West on the basis of 
at least notional nuclear equality.
On the other hand, the economy was plagued by the inefficiency 
of the collectivized agriculture, by the quantitative and qualitative 
weakness of the consumer sector, and also (though this was not fully 
recognized till the 1960s) by a general slowdown in productivity growth. 
The Stalinist political order was also grossly out of tune with the 
emerging needs of the complex industrial society which was, in large 
part, its own creation.124 Stalin's reaction, at the end, had been 
to prepare the ground for a new bout of terror: but under his successors 
the powers of the police were drastically cut back, while the party 
again assumed its central role. Both to combat the growing malaise 
in the economy, and to shore up the legitimacy of Communist rule tin 
Eastern Europe as well as in the USSR), it was now essential to provide 
positive incentives to the population. And this meant, above all, 
some relaxation of internal tension, and the long-delayed shift of 
resources away from the heavy industry and military sectors of the
1 2 5economy.
At the same time, however, the Soviet leaders were faced with 
the existence of a NATO grouping which might soon include West Germany, 
and a rearmed, and militantly containment oriented United States. In 
the longer term, the introduction of nuclear weapons - at present a 
serious liability for Soviet policy - could be expected to yield
1 2 3
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positive dividends as well: for the prospect of a nuclear stalemate 
might both allow some reduction in the conventional military burden, 
and lend itself to the exploitation of a Leninist 'indirect approach' 
in foreign policy. But this latter was precisely what had
stagnated in the Stalin era, and the process of Soviet accommodation 
to the new tempo of anti-colonial ferment in the Third World - a 
crucial venue in the struggle for influence at a fime of impressive 
economic advance by the capitalist powers - had barely begun. In 
sum, the Soviet Union at the end of the Stalin period might be seen 
as emerging from a long tunnel; and its leaders, having ruthlessly 
driven the society through a tremendous metamorphosis, found themselves 
grappling with an array of contradictions wiiich in part reproduced,
'on a higher level', those which had largely triggered the great 
experiment some twenty years earlier.
Peaceful Coexistence
Stalin's immediate successor, Malenkov, is noteworthy for 
the initiation of moves to increase the weight of the consumer goods 
sector, and for his brief espousal of the claim that general nuclear 
war would mean 'the destruction of world civilization'.127 He also 
expanded upon Stalin's return to the theme of the inter-imperialist 
contradictions, pointing out the tactical advantages to the Soviet 
Union of a period of detente:
... if today in a strained international 
relationship, the North Atlantic bloc is 
rent with internal strife and contradictions, 
a lessening of this tension might lead to 
its disintegration. 1 2 8
In the event, of course, Malenkov proved to be only an interim leader; 
and, as Malcolm Mackintosh notes, his overall role was limited to 
the elaboration of Stalin's postwar foreign policy, together 'with the 
modifications introduced in the autumn of 1952', rather than initiating 
a major break with the past.129
However, the whole period 1950-56 might be viewed in terms of 
the gradual maturation of the sea change finally undertaken at the
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Twentieth Party Congress; and the importance of the objective factors, 
foreign and domestic, behind this change is suggested by the fact 
that it was executed by Khrushchev, who had presumably been made 
well aware of the need for reform by his dealings with agriculture, 
but who had also come to power with evident debts to the heavy 
industry/military lobby. Over the period 1955-63, Khrushchev 
secured substantial reductions in the size of the conventional armed 
forces - while simultaneously improving their mobility and firepower 
- and initiated the definitive nuclearization of the overall Soviet 
military posture. He also launched a vigorous, if erratic, campaign 
for arms control agreements with the Western powers, and came to 
accept, in all but name, Malenkov's destruction of civilization thesis. 
Finally, he sponsored an extensive, and in some respects creative, 
adaptation of Soviet doctrine to the constraints and opportunities of 
the nuclear age.
The centrepiece of this revision was the new strategic conception 
of Peaceful Coexistence as the 'fundamental line' of Soviet foreign 
policy. 'Either Peaceful Coexistence', Khrushchev declared, 'or the 
most destructive war in history. There is no third way.'130 But 
together with this negative sanction, he also placed an optimistic 
stress upon the potential for socialist/progressive gains under such 
a strategy. 'The correlation of forces', he declared, was 'shifting 
all the time in favour of socialism', allowing the anti-imperialist 
forces increasingly to determine the general direction of world 
development, so that 'there will arise a real possibility of excluding 
world war from the life of society ... even with capitalism still 
existing in a part of the world'.131
This ostentatious revision of the 'inevitability of war' thesis 
was a central feature of the attempt to establish the credibility of 
the Khrushchevian coexistence doctrine in the West. A second element, 
introduced at the Twentieth Congress, was the prospect of different 
roads, and indeed of a peaceful transition, to socialism in various 
countries. In terms which recalled the discussion by the later Marx 
and Engels of the same question, Khrushchev sought to distinguish 
situations which might and might not demand a revolutionary solution, 
arguing that the role of violence in the transition to socialism 
would depend less on the proletariat than on the relative predilection 
to violent resistance of the bourgeoisie in different countries:
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The winning of a stable parliamentary majority, 
backed by a mass movement of the proletariat 
and of all the toiling people could create 
for the working class of many capitalist countries 
and for former colonial countries conditions 
needed to secure fundamental changes ... In 
the countries where capitalism is still strong 
and has a huge military and police apparatus 
at its disposal, the reactionary forces will, 
of course, offer serious resistance. There 
the transition to socialism will be attended 
by a sharp revolutionary struggle.
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This argument was linked to the rosy predictions now offered 
about the Soviet Union's own development. In 1959, Khrushchev 
announced that the capitalist encirclement, and with it the possibility 
of a capitalist restoration in the USSR, had finally been liquidated; 
and the 1961 Party Program declared that the dictatorship of the 
proletariat was transformed into a 'state of the whole people'. 
Khrushchev now rashly predicted that the Soviet Union would outstrip 
the United States in per capita production within a decade, and 
establish, 'in the main', the basis for a Communist society by the 
early 1980s.133
This last claim was probably provoked by the Chinese Great Leap 
Forward, when prophecies were offered of a direct transition to 
Communism, despite the relative backwardness of the Chinese economy, 
through the commune system. But it also lay squarely within the Lenin- 
Stalin tradition of 'catching up' with the West, and the basic optimism 
which it reflected would seem to have been genuine. Moreover, it was 
desirable to stress that the Soviet Union's contribution to the class 
struggle in the West would be primarily catalytic - through the impact 
of its gains in peaceful economic competition - because the notion 
of economic go operation with the capitalist powers was once again, as 
in Lenin's day, a major element in Soviet thinking on coexistence.
Perhaps the most far-reaching revisions were those in respect 
of the non-aligned nations of the Third World, which at the Twentieth 
Congress had been formally accepted (along with the colonies themselves) 
into the Soviet led 'zone of peace'. As these new states grew in 
number, they seemed increasingly to provide a more important focus 
for Soviet strategy in regard to the national liberation movement 
than did the revolutionary movements in the surviving colonial and 
quasi-colonial regions. On the one hand, they could be expected to 
adopt a generally 'anti-imperialist' diplomatic stance in the United
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Nations and elsewhere. On the other, the widespread acceptance by 
such regimes of the 'non-capitalist path' of development would not 
merely increase Soviet prestige, but would progressively undermine 
the out-reaches of the imperialist world economy, and with it the 
whole foundation of the long-term capitalist stabilization.
As Tucker points out, this 'basic conception ... of long-range 
economic competition' was thoroughly Leninist, being 'a novelty 
only in relation to later Stalinism'.134 Even the acceptance of a 
progressive role for bourgeois nationalist movements after political 
independence could be partially justified in terms of Lenin's 
concessions on this issue in the 1920 Comintern Theses on the National 
and Colonial Questions. These had allowed the possibility that - 
with the achievement of 'full, that is economic independence', and 
the support of the proletariat of the advanced countries - newly 
independent nations could circumvent the normal two-stage revolutionary 
process and proceed 'through definite stages of development to 
Communism without going through a capitalist stage'. Of course,
just as in the Soviet Union's own case, the foundation of a truly 
advanced socialist proletariat was conspicuously lacking in these 
countries. But the non-capitalist option was nonetheless held out 
to those Third World regimes which maintained close links with the 
socialist camp, resolutely rejected all forms of political, military 
and economic dependence upon imperialism, and pursued a progressive, 
socialist oriented regime of state capitalism. For the place of the 
international dictatorship of the proletariat was now supplied by 
the world socialist system,136 which was becoming an ever more 
'reliable shield, protecting not only the peoples of the socialist 
countries but all mankind as well, from the military adventures of 
imperialism'.137
However, the Soviet Union's own Stalinist development experience 
was reflected in the new concept of National Democracy evolved to 
describe the type of state capable of making this transition.138 
This owed far more to Stalin's extraordinary upgrading of the superstructure 
as the protagonist of revolution from above than to any notable class 
analysis of the societies in question. The 'national bourgeoisie' - 
normally envisaged as the main indigenous agent of development on 
the non-capitalist path - possessed indeed a certain identity in 
contrast to the imperialist oriented 'big' or 'comprador' bourgeoisie.
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But it appeared in general to be a catch-all category which, as the 
editor of World Marxist Review put it,'can include all sections 
of the bourgeoisie, industrial and commercial. What counts is its 
attitude to imperialism'.139
National Democratic status was accorded only to a small number 
of economically backward countries (all, with the exception of Burma, 
in the Arab world or in Sub-Saharan Africa). And Soviet expectations 
for the non-capitalist path appear to have been highest in regard to 
the latter region precisely because - with virtually no bourgeoisie 
or extant capitalist formations - such societies seemed to offer 
unique opportunities for the unchecked implementation of state 
capitalism by a Soviet oriented 'progressive intelligentsia'.140 
But such societies also had virtually no proletariat; and it was 
now suggested that the proletariat's leading role in such situations 
could pass to the 'revolutionary democrats, who have assumed the 
historical mission of breaking with capitalism, [and often] carry 
out the same basic social and economic transformations that have 
been advocated for decades by Communists'.141
These heights of optimism were reached only in the period 1963-64 
- during which the UAR, Algeria and Mali were actually depicted as 
having 'embarked on the path of socialist construction' - and did not 
long survive Khrushchev's ouster. Aside from the general movement 
towards greater doctrinal conservatism under Khrushchev's successors, 
1965 produced the phenomenon, devastating for a doctrine that laid 
such great stress on the subjective element, of the overthrow, in 
quick succession, of three leading revolutionary-democratic regimes - 
in Indonesia, Algeria, and Ghana. Together with the developing American 
role in Indochina and the now open conflict with China for influence 
in the Third World, this raised most serious questions not merely 
about the viability of the non-capitalist path, but about the basic 
'working theory' of history behind the Khrushchevian coexistence 
synthesis.
Strains in the Coexistence Synthesis
The central issue here was that of the significance of the Third 
Stage of the General Crisis of Capitalism, which was held to have 
originated in the middle or late 1950s.142 This Third Stage could
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not be linked to any major historical upheaval resulting in major 
revolutionary advance (as the First Stage had been initiated by 
World War I and the breaching of the imperialist world system by 
the Bolshevik Revolution, and the Second by World War II and the 
consequent great extension of the socialist camp). Instead, it was 
identified with a decisive qualitative transformation of the 
international environment, evidently resulting from the ending of 
American strategic invulnerability, the ever-growing strength 
(economic, political and military) of the socialist camp, and the 
effective secession from the imperialist camp of a large number of 
independent, non-aligned states.
This changed assessment of the 'nature of the epoch' was central 
to Khrushchev's attempt to reconcile a policy of detente towards the 
West with the Soviet claim to continued leadership of the world 
revolutionary movement - now openly challenged by the Chinese. The 
latter adhered to the traditional formulation of 'an era of imperialism, 
wars and proletarian revolutions'. But Khrushchev maintained that the 
world had 'fundamentally changed' since Lenin's time; and he was able 
to offer his own plausibly Leninist 'package deal' whereby Peaceful 
Coexistence would be combined with steady revolutionary advance on three 
fronts: socialist construction within the USSR and the socialist bloc; 
the non-capitalist path in the Third World; and (partly as a consequence 
of this erosion of the imperialist world-economy) the deepening class 
struggle in the capitalist world. Moreover, this was an objectively 
determined process which imperialism - short of a suicidal resort to 
all out war - could no longer contain, for not imperialism but 
socialism was now 'determining the main trend of world development'.143
However, there were two major weaknesses in this scenario. First, 
given the excessive optimism of certain key assumptions, its very 
integration was destined to work against it. The commitment of the 
'revolutionary' and 'national democrats' to Soviet-style socialism, 
to say nothing of their hold on power, proved disappointingly ephemeral, 
while the economic burden of aid to the Third World was an uncomfortable 
present reality. As for the Soviet economy, it remained, in the mid- 
1960s, subject to severe structural imbalances, and the problem of 
slowing productivity growth was now inescapably plain. Moreover, 
the dialectic of 'modernization' confronted the Soviet and East 
European regimes not merely with growing consumer demands, but also
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with the kind of fundamental socio-political strains which Khrushchev 
had anticipated in the West. Substantially outflanked by China as 
a model for revolution in predominantly peasant societies, the Soviet 
system was increasingly challenged within the immediate bloc by 
pressures for a more democratic socialist order, culminating in 
proposals for political and economic reform in Czechoslovakia - 
the only East European state, other than the GDR, with an advanced 
industrial base befove its 'revolution' - which effectively repudiated 
the whole concept of democratic centralism. Finally, the comprehensive 
force expansions of the Kennedy era and the effective extension of 
American 'flexible response' strategies to the Third World sharply 
increased the objective military costs of any Soviet attempt to exert 
a major determining influence on international developments.
This raises the second major weakness of the Khrushchev approach: 
its tacit reliance on the cooperation of the United States. Though 
he formally insisted that not imperialism, but the world situation, 
had changed, Khrushchev had in practice indulged in a significant 
'prettification' of imperialism - most notably in his treatment of 
the United States, in regard to which he laid implicit claim to a 
joint, and potentially harmonious, 'management' role in international 
affairs. 'History', he maintained, 'has imposed on our two countries 
a great responsibility for the destiny of the world. Our interests do 
not clash directly anywhere, either territorially or economically'.144
As Paul Marantz notes, the rationale of this conciliatory approach 
to the capitalist powers, while ostensibly grounded in Lenin's 'two 
tendency' analysis of contradictions in their attitudes to the Soviet 
state, was distinctly revisionist in the sense that it placed much 
greater stress upon political divisions within Western 'ruling circles'. 
Indeed, he argues, the Khrushchev regime's elaboration on this theme, 
and on its implications for the question of disarmament prospects and 
the causes and consequences of international tension, constituted a 
doctrinal revision 'even more important', though less spectacular, than 
the pronouncements on the 'non-inevitability' of war and the ending 
of the capitalist encirclement during the period of the Twentieth and 
Twenty-First Congresses.146 For the new treatment of Western ruling 
circles struck directly at the basic assumption which had precluded 
the possibility of meaningful disarmament agreements or 'irreversible 
detente' with the capitalist powers: the assumption of an essentially
1 4 5
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unified 'monopolistic bourgeoisie' with a direct material interest 
in an imperialist and militarist foreign and defence policy. From 
1960 onwards, after a major Khrushchev speech on military policy 
signalling the change of line, a succession of Soviet articles 
argued that a substantial proportion, and perhaps even a majority, 
of the monopoly bourgeoisie in the leading capitalist countries 
was losing its economic interest in 'the arms drive'; and drawing 
the obvious political lesson from this analysis, some commentaries of 
the late Khrushchev era came as close as possible, within the confines 
of Marxism-Leninism, to acknowledging the desirability of Soviet 
restraint in promoting the influence of this segment of the bourgeois 
elites vis-a-vis their 'adventurist' counterparts. As one prominent 
analyst asserted:
Communists, and all progressive forces are 
interested in an intensification of the moderate- 
sober tendency in bourgeois policy dictated by 
an understanding of the hopelessness of 
thermo-nuclear war ... Communists take into 
account Lenin's teaching about the need for 
flexibility of tactics in order to attract 
to the side of peace not only the broad masses 
but also certain bourgeois circles not directly 
interested in the arms race and preparation for 
war. 1 4 7
As will be argued in the next chapter, this strand of Soviet analysis 
has reappeared in the post-Khrushchev era; and in the 1970s, when it 
could plausibly be maintained that the Soviet Union had achieved an 
overall military equality with the United States, the theme of the 
divisions in capitalist ruling circles over the economic impact of 
the arms race was given more systematic and detailed exposition by the 
new corps of specialist analysts of American politics. However, in the 
wake of the dramatic military build-up by the Kennedy adminstration, 
equality in this field is precisely what the Khrushchev regime could 
not plausibly claim; and in this situation the contradictions involved 
in Khrushchev's attempt to establish Peaceful Coexistence as a reliable 
vehicle for revolutionary advance were soon made uncomfortably plain.
Given the argument that great power involvement in local conflicts 
was extremely likely to result in escalation to general nuclear war, 
the Soviet strategic capability was supposed to deter not merely direct 
attacks upon the USSR and the socialist bloc, but also the general run
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of imperialist counter-revolutionary activities in the Third World.
But the same logic of escalation gave the Soviet Union an equal (or, 
if Soviet military capabilities remained inferior, a greater) interest 
in the restraint of local conflicts which might ultimately imperil 
Soviet security. After the Cuban Missile Crisis - a graphic reminder 
of the continuing asymmetry of the great power relationship - Gromyko
1 U ftreturned emphatically to the theme of joint Soviet-American management.
But perhaps the most striking comment on this subject was advanced, 
under the important pseudonym 'Sovetov', some two years earlier, at the 
height of Khrushchev's ostensible optimism about the Soviet Union's 
relative power:
In the atmosphere of rapid social development 
characteristic of the present era, peaceful 
coexistence, while not retarding social change 
in countries where these changes are ripe, must 
at the same time ensure a situation in which 
the internal processes in particular countries 
do not lead to military clashes of the antipodal 
social systems.
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In fact, assertions of Soviet military superiority by the political 
and military leadership were typically much more circumscribed than 
was commonly recognized in the West, while Soviet 'academic' commentary 
was more cautious still. Pronouncements on the correlation of forces, 
Zimmerman points out, had always been carefully framed - in terms of 
changing distribution of power and an emerging balance in favour of 
socialism - to acknowledge that, while things were getting better all 
the time, the existing distribution of power still favoured the capitalist 
camp. After the Cuban crisis, the suggestion of a favourable trend was 
itself tacitly abandoned by a switch to a formula depicting a temporary 
stabilization, and by a renewed emphasis on the meaninglessness of 
estimates of the correlation of forces based solely on military indicators.
The commentary of the immediate post-Khrushchev period, Zimmerman 
argues, indicated an awareness that even the notion of stabilization 
had been too optimistic; and Khrushchev was obliquely attacked for 
the folly of a passive reliance on 'the automatic action of a 
preponderance in the distribution of power'. 'The enhancement of the 
might [of socialism] in and of itself, and the change in the distribution 
of the economic forces in the world arena in favour of socialism' , one 
1966 MEMO editorial observed, 'does not decide automatically in which 
direction, peace or war, international relations will develop.'151
l 5 o
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Moreover, though the argument that Soviet and American interests 
did 'not collide either globally or anywhere regionally' was repeated 
in a major IMEMO study signed to press a month after the initiation of 
concerted American bombing in Vietnam,152 the 'modernist' interpretation 
of imperialism thereafter gave way rapidly to a renewed emphasis on 
more traditional themes. A new military 'debate' about the possibility 
of victory in nuclear war evidently resulted in a repudiation of the 
Khrushchev line;* and Peaceful Coexistence itself - designated as the 
'fundamental line' of Soviet policy under Khrushchev - 'quickly sank 
to fourth position behind the goals of building Communism, consolidating 
the socialist camp, and supporting the national liberation movement'.153 
The change in rhetoric was supported by a stepping up of existing 
programs of military procurement - a move which could, indeed, reasonably 
be seen as an essential prerequisite for either the promotion of 'world 
revolution' or the pursuit of a detente with the United States on 
equal terms.
The new regime also seemed disposed to a more disenchanted and 
self-centred approach to the potentials and costs of world revolution.
The initial post-Khrushchev reappraisal produced attacks on the 'petty 
bourgeois, nationalistic theory of the decisive role of the national- 
liberation movement in the world revolutionary process', a 'widespread 
ideological trend' which sought to deny the obvious fact ' that the 
socialist states, as before, are shouldering the principal burden in 
combating imperialism'154 And this was linked with a conscious diminution 
of direct Soviet responsibility to the national liberation struggle:
It is first of all the peoples of the young 
national states who can put an end to all forms 
of colonialism and raise the economy and culture 
of these countries ... the socialist countries 
... cannot take the place of the peoples of the 
young national states in solving the tasks of 
the national liberation movement.
1 5 5
Discussion of the non-capitalist path now tended to concentrate on 
its length and its difficulty, rather than on its ultimate destination - 
and especially upon the continuing danger of 'regressive phenomena in 
social development' in countries where the leadership was in the hands
1 c rnot of the proletariat but of the 'revolutionary democrats'.
* See the discussion of this in Chapter 7.
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This was in effect to deny the doctrinal basis of the 'National 
Democracy' concept; and the practice of identifying individual 
regimes as national or revolutionary democracies in the May Day and 
October slogans was finally discontinued in 1968.157
The significance of this development was enhanced by the apparent 
resolution, in 1966, of a lengthy controversy over whether or not 
newly independent states which failed 'to come out against imperialism' 
remained in a state of effective colonial dependence - the conclusion 
being that their condition should be defined 'not as a transitional 
form of state dependence but as a transitional form of state independence' 
Thus all Third World regimes (and even semi-colonies) were placed in 
one broad tvansdtdonal category; and all alike were faced with the 
fundamental tasks of raising the productive capacity of their economies 
and closing off all remaining avenues of imperialist control - 'two 
indivisible tasks [which] together ... determine the main direction 
of the present day national liberation movement - the road to full 
economic independence'.159 This 'new, long range perspective of 
revolutionary transition', as Raymond Yellon observes, was well suited 
to the increasingly 'pragmatic' orientation of Soviet aid policies, 
in that it 'considerably fore-shortened' the distance between progressive 
and other Afro-Asian regimes, and hence significantly lessened the 
immediate priority attaching to the development of closer ties with the 
former at the expense of wider ties with the latter.160
At the same time - as part of the metamorphosis of China into a 
'military-bureaucratic state' animated by a petty bourgeois ideology 
of 'Great Han chauvinism' - it was emphasized that even nominally 
Marxist-Leninist Third World regimes could not successfully pursue a 
course of scientific socialism in opposition to the Soviet camp. As 
one Pravda article declared:
In such a backward country as China, with its 
mediaeval survivals, socialism cannot be built 
without relying on the support of the world 
proletariat and its chief achievement - the 
socialist commonwealth - without making use of 
the creative experience of states that are 
economically, politically, and culturally more 
advanced. For an under-developed country, 
rejection of co-operation with the Socialist 
countries means rejection of advance along the 
path of social and economic progress, 




In large part, of course, this was a purely manipulative response 
to the phenomenon of 'polycentrism* - a more sophisticated reassertion 
of what Wight has called the 'neo-dynastic' Soviet principle of 
Communist legitimacy.162 But it also accorded with the 'industrial 
society' commitment of Soviet Marxism and the catching-up motif so 
dramatically emphasized amid the euphoria of the Twenty-Second Congress. 
And though Khrushchev's successors carefully retreated from his 
incautious predictions about the date of the Soviet Union's achievement 
of Communism, they did not repudiate his depiction of the road it would 
follow to that goal.
Further, one aspect of their more hardheaded approach to this issue 
was the unambiguous priority accorded to socialist construction within 
the Soviet Union. Khrushchev's hymn to the coming era of Soviet 
affluence had at least been qualified by the perfunctory suggestion 
that - with adequate assistance from the advanced to the less advanced 
- all members of the Socialist Commonwealth could 'attain communism' 
virtually simultaneously.163 Even by 1963, however, Pravda was 
pointing out that Soviet aid to under-developed nations was not drawn 
from 'a surplus of funds for which there is no application within our 
country, [since] in a socialist society ... there can be no surpluses 
that require export overseas'.164 And a 1965 editorial on 'The Supreme 
Internationalist Duty of a Socialist Country' declared outright that 
'the best way to fulfill our internationalist duty to the working 
people of the entire world is the successful construction of socialism 
and communism in the socialist countries'.165
A particularly authoritative pronouncement on the nature of this 
task appeared in a 1968 speech by Suslov on the Karl Marx Se?<£u«Gsn tenary:
Socialism is not a short stage, but a whole 
historical phase in the development of a 
communist society. The economic rules of 
socialism and its superiority show themselves 
at their best in the mature socialist society.
The full and all embracing realization of the 
social and economic possibilities and 
requirements of socialism assures the regular, 
gradual and natural transition to communism.
The road to communism lies through the complete 
victory of socialism. There is no other way.
l 6 6
Though all pilgrims must tread the same path, Suslov emphasized, their 
rates of progress must necessarily differ: and 'countries starting
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socialist relations with under-developed material and technical bases 
will have to travel a longer historical path and solve more problems'.
And since a major thrust of Suslov's speech was presumably to disabuse 
the industrially advanced Czechs of the notion that they could find 
a Marxian route to Communism ahead of the Soviet Union, the utopian 
prospects for Third World Communist regimes were clearly less than 
bright, while mere non-capitalist roaders seemed destined to wander 
for an indefinite period in the outer darkness.
The inescapable inference is that the Soviet leadership had 
'explicitly elongated [its] revolutionary-time-perspectives' - and 
in such a way as to make the time scale of Socialism in One Country 
seem brief by comparison. One writer even took comfort in the fact
that the 'replacement of feudalism by capitalism occupied an epoch 
which embraced several centuries', asserting that, by comparison, the 
transition to socialism was 'taking place at a significantly more rapid 
tempo, spreading simultaneously over an immeasurably larger [geographical] 
zone'. 168 Or as another formulation, even less theoretically precise, 
had it:
Ultimate victory on a world scale belongs to 
socialism as the most progressive social system 
. . . The operative word there is ultimate. 
Meanwhile, it is the ups and downs of the 
struggle that constitute the main content of 
international affairs. 1 6 9
The central importance of the 'interaction between Western and 
Soviet developments', not just in the narrowly defined area of foreign 
policy but in shaping the whole of 'Soviet Marxism as well as the reality 
expressed by Soviet Marxism', has been impressively stated by Marcuse:
From the beginning, the specific international 
dynamic released by the transformation of 
'classical' into organized capitalism (in 
Marxist terms, monopoly capitalism) defines 
Soviet Marxism - in Lenin's doctrine of the 
avant gavde, in the notion of 'socialism 
in one country', in the triumph of Stalinism 
over Trotskyism and over the eld Bolsheviks, 
in the sustained priority of heavy industry, 
in the continuation of a repressive totalitarian
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centralization. They are in a strict sense 
responses to the (in Marxian terms, 'anomalous' ) 
growth and readjustment of Western industrial 
society and to the decline in the revolutionary 
potential of the Western world resulting from 
this adjustment.
170
This 1958 judgement retained its broad validity a decade later.
There is no denying the important component of 'self moved' expansionism 
in Soviet foreign policy, nor the significance, in this respect, of the 
peculiar synthesis of Russian and Marxist elements in the official 
Soviet ideology. But, I would argue that the Soviet approach must be 
understood primarily in terms of a 'situational' determinant: the 
central problem - constant, yet continually changing in its historical 
aspect - of building a 'socialist' society in a country where most 
of the objective requirements were lacking, while the other advanced 
industrial states remained - in reality only somewhat less than in 
Soviet perceptions - distinctly hostile to the enterprise.
In the mid to late 1960s, both the 'Soviet system' and its 
international relationships were again in transition, while the great, 
central 'period of transition' had indeed assumed the character of an 
'entire historical epoch'. However, certain vital structural changes 
had taken place. History had so far developed that the idea of a 
monolithic Communist bloc (to say nothing of a monolithic world 
revolutionary movement) was revealed as quite illusory. Furthermore, the 
Soviet regime was becoming aware of a technological revolution in the 
advanced industrial societies, which threatened to add a new dimension 
to the perennial task of catching up with the West. On the other hand, 
partly through its own efforts (and at the cost of reinforcing the 
distortions in its economy), and partly through the impact of changing 
American world order preoccupations, the Soviet Union was for the 
first time within striking distance of a crude parity with the United 
States in the overall indices of military power. The Soviet leadership's 
apparent assessment of this changed correlation of forces - the 
concomitant of a renewed, but different, detente offensive - will be 
considered in the next chapter.
Such arguments have been considered at some length in Chapter 1.
A particularly clear example is Pipes' insistence on the absence 
of any 'discernible pattern' in Soviet foreign policy and the 
irrelevance to it of either 'Communist theory' or the concept 
of national interest. 'Russian expansion', he argues, 'is 
motivated less by needs than by opportunities, less by what its 
elite wants than by what it can get ..., and is in large part 
determined by internal rather than external factors, above all, 
by the tragic relationship of the government to its people'.
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CHAPTER 6
POST-KHRUSHCHEV REASSESSMENTS OF THE 'CORRELATION OF FORCES'
The Concept of the 'Correlation of Forces'
It seems fair to say that the concept of the correlation of forces 
- important though it undeniably still is in Soviet commentary on 
international relations - has actually lost some ground in comparison with 
its position in the Khrushchev period, as Soviet analysts expound upon the 
application of the much enhanced resources of the Soviet state to the 
management and 'restructuring' of its international environment. As 
Vernon Aspaturian puts it: 'Soviet writers have been focusing on the 
changing "correlation of forces" for decades, but only recently have 
they been discussing the transformational processes at work in the 
international system'.1 On the other hand, Western attention to this 
trait of Soviet analysis has undoubtedly increased in the last decade, 
with emphasis often being laid not merely on the distinctiveness of 
the concept, but also on its alleged incompatibility with basic Western 
assumptions. It may therefore be appropriate to preface this chapter 
by expanding upon the discussion in earlier chapters of the type of 
conceptual orientation which might reasonably be inferred from the 
correlation of forces doctrine.
The first major point is a negative one. The doctrine does not 
signify a unique Soviet propensity - among the governments of modern 
industrial powers - to impose a single revealed truth upon the inescapably 
plural phenomena of world politics. Of course, Soviet commentary still 
implies that there ought theoretically to be one single correct reading 
of the correlation of forces in any given historical situation; and if 
one starts from a characterization of Marxism as a latter-day millenarian 
theology, whose totalitarian essence merely received full expression in 
Stalinism, it is easy to insist that nothing has really changed in this 
respect in the post-Stalin period. However, as I attempted to indicate 
in Chapter 2, the evolution of Soviet-style 'scientific Marxism-Leninism' 
has been more complex than this. It is undoubtedly true that the Marxist 
inheritance contained a large infusion of 19th century positivism; and
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that under Stalin this was combined, in the crudest fashion, with 
Lenin's doctrine of the vanguard to establish historical truth as 
the monopoly of the party, and indeed of Stalin himself. It is also 
true that Khrushchev's fitful, and often contradictory, appeals to 
the sense of unfolding mass consciousness in Marx and Lenin have been 
largely abandoned by his successors; and that the 'scientific' social 
analysis to which they officially aspire is overwhelmingly positivist in 
orientation. But with the passage of time Brezhnevian positivism 
increasingly seems to be evolving away from Stalin's version of 'historical 
materialism' and towards the positivism of mainstream American social 
science.2 Indeed, the Brezhnev regime appears to be elaborating its own 
brand of 'Leninism', which is as distinct from the Leninism of Stalin 
as it is from that of Lenin himself. A key indication of this process, 
as Hough pointed out in 1976, is the changing use of the word 'scientific':
In the last decade the word has increasingly 
assumed a different meaning in political 
discourse: the making of decisions through 
a balanced weighing of evidence rather than 
on the basis of a priori values and insights 
of the decision maker (regardless of the source 
of these values).3
Nor has this change been confined to the level of rhetoric. One 
impressive feature of the post-Stalin era has been the reorganisation and 
expansion of the quasi-academic apparatus in a wide range of policy related 
areas, in an effort to rectify those deficiencies in Soviet scholarship 
which were candidly acknowledged at the Twentieth Congress.4 In some 
areas, such as economics - which, Nove comments, has been 'rapidly 
transformed from dreary scholasticism to the status of a real and even 
exciting discipline'5- the progress has been more striking than in others. 
But even in the general international relations/world-economy area, the 
'expert' advice available to the regime - to judge solely on the 
evidence of published materials - has become increasingly complex and 
sophisticated.6 Therefore, to the extent that the regime attempts to 
live up to Brezhnev's equation of Leninist style with the 'realistic 
evaluation of existing possibilities' - based upon an 'all sided deep 
analysis' which carefully weighs the 'objective processes and phenomena
7of socio-economic life and their inter-connection and inter-relationships'
- its assessments of particular situations are unlikely to be characterized 
by dogmatic certainty, while the predicates of its 'grand strategy', as
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a recent characteristic formulation acknowledges, must be regarded 
as still more impressionistic in character:
Incomparably more complex is the overall 
correlation of forces in the world. It is 
difficult to give a calculation of the 
number of factors partaking in its formation.
Some of them have changing significance and 
are capable of behaving in an unpredictable 
manner.
8
On the other hand, it does not follow that the whole doctrine has 
become nothing more than a grandiloquent camouflage for a wholly 
a-theoretical, 'pragmatic' pursuit of 'national interest'. Such a 
judgement, indeed, is really the obverse of the argument that the 
Soviets still insist upon forcing the facts into a rigid ideological 
strait-jacket: both alike stem from the rejection of the attempt to 
say anything systematic about patterns of historical change as the 
most dangerous form of the monist fallacy. But, to repeat the argument 
of Chapter 2, an organizational or critical monism is an essential 
prerequisite for constructive long-term thought on any international 
issue, including the 'national interest'; and despite the continuing 
extravagance of its formal claims, it is essentially this to which the 
current regime appears to lay claim in practice. 'Naturally', Brezhnev 
conceded, in a 1970 speech on the essence of 'Leninism':
Nobody can foretell in detail the course of 
events at any moment of future development.
But if we approach the problem not from the 
standpoint of details or fortuitous occurfArttAS 
which are always possible, if, as Lenin put 
it, the matter is taken on a broad scale, then 
particular and trifling details recede into 
the background and the chief motive forces of 
world history become apparent.
9
This apparent readiness to separate 'particular and trifling details'
- which may, indeed, largely dominate the formulation of 'short term' 
policy - from the general strategic line might be attributed to the 
Soviet regime's instinctive aversion to 'cognitive dissonance', to its 
largely unreflecting attachment to an inherited 'operational code', or 
to its need to defend a crucial legitimating ideology from the uncomfortable 
complexities of real life. There is clearly some truth in all of these
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interpretations. But a more illuminating comparison, which indicates 
that considerable tactical flexibility on cognitive issues may in fact 
be the natural concomitant of a settled strategic orientation, is with 
the Kuhnian notion of a scientific paradigm. In the schizophrenic 
environment of contemporary world politics, a systematic overview 
of the 'nature of the epoch' is no less essential than a systematic 
overview of the 'dynamics of the system': indeed, I have argued that 
the states-system itself should be considered as one dimension of a 
great historical episode. Moreover, the Marxist-Leninist theory of 
the process of world revolution is of comparable historical and 
sociological sweep to the classical theory of the states-system; and 
caution in regard to the general implications of specific contrary 
evidence is, in principle, as reasonable for the adherents of the one 
as for the adherents of the other.
Turning now to the positive implications of the correlation of 
forces concept, it remains true to say that change, and not stability, 
provides the dominant theme of the official Soviet account of international 
politics. Although the process of doctrinal adaptation to the phenomenon 
of the states-system has continued in the post-Khrushchev era, there has 
been no wholesale convergence upon Western assumptions (Realist or other); 
and Soviet doctrine still assigns a major place to Lenin's expectation 
of a sustained, if long term, revolt against existing political and 
economic structures in the underdeveloped world.
Moreover, there is no reason to attribute this persistence of 
Leninist themes solely to their importance as legitimating symbols for 
Soviet power. First, despite the considerable efforts of Soviet 
apologists in this direction, the highly diverse phenomena of the 
contemporary 'national-liberation movement' cannot be fitted comfortably 
into a simple two-camp view of the world, and the efficacy of 'national 
liberation' as a legitimating symbol (as opposed, say, to Stalin's 
'capitalist encirclement') is open to serious question. Second, one must 
take note of the concerted effort to achieve a more direct and positive 
legitimation of the Soviet political structure in terms of the party's 
developmental achievements and its central role in the 'scientific 
management' of society. These claims, it will be argued below, have 
become the dominant motif of the new 'Leninism' in the domestic sphere, 
and - as might be expected of an established great power - are assuming
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increasing prominence in Soviet commentary on international relations 
as well. That the Leninism of Lenin has held much of its ground in 
this situation may be attributed largely to its ability to explain 
important forces in world politics which the Soviet regime, in the 
great power competition within the United States, cannot afford to 
ignore. Conversely, insofar as the international turmoil of the past 
fifteen years has prompted a quest for new grand 'paradigms' in the 
American debate, and insofar as the two major contenders - interdependence 
and geopolitics/mercantilism - are neither new, nor mutually compatible, 
nor capable of accommodating the phenomenon of radical socio-political 
change within states, it might be argued that the Soviets still retain 
an analytical advantage in this respect.
If one accepts that, in principle, it is equally valid to abstract 
from history for patterns of change as for patterns of continuity, the 
notion of the correlation of forces - mediating between the grand Soviet 
theory of the transition and specific, 'practically unique', historical 
situations - can be seen as fulfilling a role analogous to that proposed 
for 'middle range theories' by American systems theorists. In practice 
however, the Soviet approach grapples with a dimension of historical 
change which is largely ignored in the synchronic approach of systems 
theory; and this Soviet attempt to freeze a dynamic historical process 
at especially important points, or to extract the long-term significance 
of specific historical 'conjunctures', has several distinctive implications.
In the first place, such 'readings' of the correlation of forces, 
if they are to be analytically useful, must provide the dominant strategic 
perspective for a lengthy period: even the 'short term' may normally 
be regarded as a matter of years rather than of months. Second, the 
degree of detached deliberation suggested in the Soviet self-account is 
highly unlikely. Rather, new 'readings' may be expected, in large part, 
to impose themseives - like Kuhnian paradigm shifts writ small - as the 
accumulation of previously disregarded contradictions suddenly produces 
a qualitative change in perceptions. Third, although major shifts of 
this kind need not entail the jettisoning of the overarching grand theory, 
they may well involve significant alterations in emphasis among the 
different explanatory elements within it. Finally, such periods of flux 
in the area of formal theory would seem to offer special opportunities 
for the advance of powerful, though less articulated, traditional
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ideologies - especially if, as is likely, these ideologies already hold 
substantial bridgeheads within the grand theory itself.
All of these phenomena, I believe, may be observed in the Soviet 
experience. Lenin has been presented by some Western scholars as the 
epitome of 'pragmatic' communist opportunism. But, in fact, the policies 
implemented and advocated by him were deeply influenced by two major 
'middle range' theoretical reorientations: in the early 1900s towards 
a worker-peasant strategy for the revolution in Russia, and in the 
early 1920s towards a reappraisal of the whole concept of socialist 
revolution in the light of the failure of the revolution in the West.
This reappraisal, of course, remained incomplete at Lenin's death; and, 
if the argument of the previous chapter is valid, the displacement 
over the period 1926-29 of the originally favoured gradualist strategy 
for industrialization and collectivization by the ultimate Stalinist 
solution provides a particularly striking instance of the interplay of 
'scientific' and inarticulate elements in the formulation of a new line, 
as also of the sudden qualitative leap from one set of perceptions to 
another. Similar factors evidently operated in the years before the 
Twentieth Congress, though in this case exacerbated by the exceptional 
immobility enforced by Stalin in the post-war period. The original 
great Stalin revision helped to fix the basic assessment of the 'nature 
of the epoch' for over two decades; that of Khrushchev, perhaps more 
arguably, did the same. Finally, with Lenin's compromises on the 
peasant question and, still more strikingly, with Stalin's appeal to 
Tsarist precedents for his revolution from above,the deeprooted traditions 
of Russian history can be clearly seen consolidating their claims on the 
Soviet self-interpretation of the revolution and its place in world 
history.
After an initial period of transition, the Brezhnev regime has 
produced its own new reading of the correlation of forces. Less momentous 
than those discussed above, but highly significant nonetheless, this 
combines the basic Khrushchevian perception of the central importance of 
domestic and international detente with some important shifts of emphasis 
among the elements of what was earlier called Khrushchev's Peaceful 
Coexistence 'package deal'. Here, too, the maturation of the new line 
may be traced to a relatively discrete period - roughly the years 1969-72, 
with the 1971 Twenty-Fourth Party Congress as their centrepiece. Here,
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too, the new line, once established, has exerted an impressively uniform 
sway. Whereas the Twenty-Fourth Congress produced important innovations 
in both domestic and foreign policy, the Twenty-Fifth Congress, in 1976, 
was chiefly remarkable for the 'businesslike' continuation of the line 
laid down at its predecessor; and the 1981 Twenty-Sixth Congress, despite 
a markedly more 'subdued and conciliatory tone' in regard to international 
issues, also demonstrated a striking continuity in general approach as 
compared, for instance, with the fluctuations of American policy in this 
period.10 Here, too, the influence of traditional ideologies was evident. 
Indeed, if the Brezhnev regime represented the mature face of post-Stalin 
Soviet Communism, it seemed to portend a more distinctively Russian 
approach, in style if not in formal ideological claims, than had been 
indicated under Khrushchev; and its international posture suggested a 
deeply held belief in the leading role rightfully due to Russia after 
fifty years - and five centuries - of 'catching up' with the West.
The selection of Soviet materials in this chapter is substantially 
influenced by the considerations sketched above. As regards time scale3 
most pronouncements cited date from the earlier part of the 1970s, and 
especially from the period bounded by the Twenty-Fourth and Twenty-Fifth 
Congresses, when the new line was consolidated. This is certainly not 
to suggest that there have been no changes in the last five years.
Indeed, there have been numerous high level suggestions of serious 
dissatisfaction with both the Carter and Reagan administrations; and it 
may well be that the general souring of detente, the sharp conflicts 
within the Soviet bloc, and the growing turmoil in the Third World are 
prompting a substantial reappraisal of the opportunities and costs of 
the Brezhnev policy. But there is, as yet, no persuasive doctvinal 
evidence of such a change. Moreover, if the analytical confusion currently 
prevailing in the West is any indication, it seems likely that the Soviet 
leadership itself - especially a generally ageing leadership nearing the 
end of its collective career - may find it far from easy to stand back 
from the welter of events and formulate a coherent reappraisal of their 
'broad scales'.
As regards general themes3 I have concentrated on the 'broad scales' 
of the coexistence issue; the general problem of the balance of forces 
in the world, on the one hand, and the particular fronts of anticipated 
revolutionary advance - the socialist camp, the capitalist system, and
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the Third World - on the other. However, I have also attempted to 
highlight the tendency to view the problems and prospects of world 
revolution more and more from the perspective of the great power 
interests of the Soviet Union, as a state in a world of states. Finally, 
this emphasis on Soviet 'national interests' may be related to the 
above suggestion that earlier periods of political flux have witnessed 
the advance of traditional over 'scientific' elements in Soviet Marxism- 
Leninism. Therefore, given the growing consensus in the West on the 
importance of atavistic elements in current Soviet policy, it seemed 
desirable to include, in the concluding section, a brief discussion of 
the possible relationship between such elements and the official 
Brezhnevian world view.
The Nature of the Epoch
'The relaxation of international tensions', Brezhnev declared in
1975
was made possible because a new balance of 
forces was established in the world arena.
The leaders of the bourgeois world can no 
longer expect in earnest to decide the 
historic dispute between capitalism and 
socialism by force of arms. The absurdity 
and extreme danger of any further heating 
up of the atmosphere, when both sides 
possess weapons of colossal destructive 
power, are becoming all the more obvious.
11
This equation of detente with an enforced Western adjustment to altered 
international realities is perhaps the most pervasive theme of Soviet 
commentary on international affairs in the last decade. It is true, of 
course, that the 'Peace Program' of the Twenty-Fourth Congress has been 
strongly promoted as a major Soviet initiative in the international arena, 
and that Brezhnev has explicitly linked this new Soviet diplomatic 
offensive to the conclusion, allegedly derived from the evaluation of 
'the overall balance of forces in the world ... that there was a real 
possibility for bringing about a fundamental change in the international 
situation'. But whereas the Peace Program is portrayed merely as an
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important new dimension of the persistent Soviet campaign in support of 
Peaceful Coexistence, the readiness of the imperialist powers (and 
above all the United States) to change 'from a policy of confrontation 
to one of negotiation with the USSR and the other socialist states', is 
presented as a wholly new departure involving a profound (and agonizing) 
'reappraisal of values'.13
The most crucial element of this change, for Soviet commentators, 
has been a new 'awareness by the USA of its limited possibilities to 
influence diverse events in the world by means of military force', 14 
and the most crucial determinant of this change the Soviet achievement 
of a broad 'parity' in the military field. This does not mean that the 
Soviets formally accord a special priority to military power. In fact, 
one distinctive feature of their treatment of the correlation of forces 
is their emphasis on the determining role of non-military forces. But 
there has been, under Brezhnev, a renewed insistence that the military 
containment of imperialism is essential if these other forces are to do 
their work. Moreover, a new, selfconsciously 'great power' note entered 
Soviet discussion of this issue around 1969-70, when the leadership 
was still professing deep scepticism about the prospects for a genuine 
reappraisal by American policy makers. Soviet policy, Brezhnev then 
argued, was predicated on the belief 'that we will win also in peaceful 
competition'. But it also recognized that 'imperialism, which has 
reached its highest stage, has become more reactionary and aggressive ... 
[and] still possesses great strength'. It was therefore critically 
important to the forces of progress that a counterweight to this strength 
now existed in the Soviet Union - that 'at the present time no question 
of any importance in the world can be solved without our participation, 
without taking into account our economic and military might'.15
A still more far-reaching statement of this theme (which has 
attracted considerable adverse comment in the West) is Gromyko's assertion 
that the progressive forces now have 'the opportunity of laying down the 
direction' of world developments.16 But it must be emphasized, first, 
that such statements are nothing new, being merely a reassertion of the 
Khrushchev line in a new context; and second, that the present leadership 
has not suggested that the Soviet Union could or would 'lay down the law' 
to individual states on the basis of preponderant military power. 
Initially, the approach to this question was primarily an indirect one.
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After the Twenty-Fourth Congress the political leadership (and, more 
gradually, the top military leadership) simply stopped talking about 
the need for Soviet military superiority. But the upsurge in 1976 of 
American debate about Soviet intentions evidently prompted the decision 
to address the question more positively, for the next five years 
produced a succession of high level statements which explicitly 
characterized the existing military balance as one of 'approximate 
equilibrium', and which explicitly expressed a Soviet desire not to
1 7upset this situation.
This focus upon the supreme politico-strategic importance of Soviet- 
American military parity has been accompanied by a denial of the validity 
of an interpretation of the balance of forces toyed with in American 
circles - namely the notion of an emerging multipolar world. This notion 
- which one commentator attributed both to 'some bourgeois theoreticians', 
and to the 'Peking leaders' - was characterized as merely a more sophisticated 
variant of the traditional ideologies of the status quo, which ignored 
the fact that 'the principal tendencies of socio-political development 
are determined not by the contradictions and interrelations between 
individual states, but by the development of the basic class antagonism 
of our epoch - between world socialism and world capitalism'.18
Of course, the Soviets have been very ready to point to new evidence 
of exacerbated inter-imperialist contradictions. 'By the early 1970s', 
Brezhnev declared at the Twenty-Fourth Congress, the USA, Western Europe 
and Japan had emerged as the 'clearly defined ... main centres of 
imperialist rivalry', and 'the economic and political competitive struggle 
between them [was] growing ever more acute'.19 Moreover, it was argued 
that movements towards economic integration in the capitalist world could 
solve none of the 'basic vices' of the capitalist system - such as the 
'anarchy and disorderly development of capitalist production, and the 
struggle ... for the division of markets and spheres of influence' - which 
merely reappear 'on a new scale and in different forms'.20 However, there 
has been no serious suggestion that this economic conflict could assume 
a military dimension, or that there might be a major challenge to the 
United States' position as the leading imperialist power, within the 
foreseeable future.
As regards China, which American policy makers allegedly seek to 
establish as 'a structural element in the "balance of power" system',21
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the Soviet position is emphatic. They have signalled, by a number of 
ostentatious proposals for a normalization of relations on the basis of 
Peaceful Coexistence, that China cannot be regarded as a 'normal' 
socialist state (while still declining to officially read it out of the 
socialist camp). Of more practical significance perhaps, they have 
refused to accept that it is now a non-aligned actor genuinely independent 
of imperialism. This view was expressed with special force by Brezhnev 
at the Twenty-Fifth Congress:
Relations with C h i n a of course, are a special 
and separate question. The policy of its present 
leaders is openly directed against the majority 
of the socialist states. More, it merges directly 
with the position of the world's most extreme 
reactionaries ... This policy is not only entirely 
alien to socialist principles and ideals, but has 
also, in effect, become an important aid to 
imperialism in its struggle with socialism.
2 3
Soviet statements have implied that the capabilities of China alone 
are no great source of worry: but they have also emphasized - most notably 
in a major 1978 interview with Arbatov designed for the Western press - 
the dangers involved in China's becoming 'some sort of military ally to 
the West, even an informal ally'. If this occurred, Arbatov claimed,
'the whole situation would look different to us. We would have to re-analyse 
our relationship with the West. If such an axis is built on an anti-Soviet 
basis then there is no place for detente, even in a narrow sense'.24
The complementary tack of stressing Soviet options was adopted by 
Brezhnev in his speech on the sixtieth anniversary of the October Revolution. 
Observing that 'some leaders of capitalist countries' now obviously counted 
on continuing, and even worsening, Sino-Soviet conflict, he suggested 
that this was 'a shortsighted policy', and that 'those who pursue it may 
miscalculate'. But he also concluded (somewhat lamely for a practitioner 
of Marxist-Leninist science) that 'there is no point trying to guess how 
Soviet-Chinese relations will shape up in the future. I would merely
o  crlike to say that our repeated proposals to normalise them still hold good'.
At the Twenty-Sixth Congress, he similarly observed that it was too soon 
to tell the 'true meaning' of the changes taking place in the domestic 
policies of China, but conceded that, 'unfortunately, as yet one cannot 
speak of any changes for the better in Peking's foreign policy. As
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before, it is aimed at exacerbating the international situation and 
at making common cause with imperialist policy'.26
Aside from the transformation of the strategic balance, pride of 
place in the Soviet assessment of the nature of the epoch has almost 
inevitably been accorded to capitalism's ever popular General Crisis.
At the Twenty-Fourth Congress, Brezhnev conceded some success to 'the 
bourgeoisie's striving to use more camouflaged forms of exploitation 
and oppression of the working people', and to the monopolies' 'extensive 
use of scientific and technical progress to strengthen their positions, 
to enhance the efficiency and accelerate the pace of production ... '
But 'adaptation to new conditions', he insisted, 'does not mean that 
capitalism has been stablized as a system. The general crisis of capitalism 
has continued to deepen'.2 7
The next three years, of course, provided abundant ammunition for 
arguments depicting an ever greater interpenetration of Western resource 
and monetary problems, conflicts with the Third World, and the general 
post-Vietnam 'crisis of US alliance systems'. The result, Brezhnev 
asserted in 1974, was a new level of 'crisis of bourgeois democracy, 
accelerating the disintegration of the political machinery of capitalist 
rule . ,.'?8 The same year also produced major pronouncements on the subject 
by Suslov and Ponomaryev, the party's leading ideologues; and the latter, 
in particular, portrayed a truly comprehensive 'combination of crises 
unique in the history of post-war capitalism':
Never before have the crisis processes in the economy 
and the factors that deepen the political crisis in 
individual imperialist countries been so closely 
inter-related, and never have they so powerfully 
affected each other. And if we examine these 
sharpening crisis processes in their aggregate, we 
shall find that what we have is not merely the 
further deepening, but a definite qualitative change 
in the development of the general crisis of capitalism 
within the framework of its Third Stage.
29
This broad line was widely echoed at the time. But a major 1975 debate 
on the question by the MEMO and USA institutes produced the conclusion 
that the crisis remained 'cyclical, and therefore transient', and that, 
though the capitalist world's withdrawal from the recession would prove 
exceptionally prolonged, its deepest point had now been reached and
o nleft behind. And this interpretation was endorsed by Brezhnev at the
480.
Twenty-Fifth Congress. Recent developments, he maintained, 'forcefully 
confirm that capitalism is a society without a future'. But he added 
that 'Communists are far from predicting an "automatic collapse" of 
capitalism. It still has important reserves'.
Soviet awareness of the reserves of capitalism is perhaps most 
clearly evident in the treatment of the third great feature of the 
contemporary epoch: the 'scientific-technological revolution', with 
its associated implications for what is now referred to, in terms of 
approbation, as the international division of labour. 'The notion of 
the STR', Paul Cocks observes, 'has become the buzzword of the Brezhnev 
regime in the 1970s':32but it also appears, unlike the preoccupations 
with the strategic balance and the global fortunes of imperialism, rather 
to have crept up on the regime's consciousness in the preceding decade.
Of course, the Soviet self definition had always involved a strongly 
technocratic strand, and the expectation of major scientific-technological 
advance had figured prominently in Khrushchev's Twenty-Second Congress 
predictions. But, as Philip Hanson points out, the official perspective 
then involved a 'burst of once-for-all catching up in certain previously 
neglected sectors, to be followed quite quickly by a general "over-taking" 
of the West'. Beginning in Khrushchev's last years, and gathering 
momentum under his successors, a different perspective evidently emerged:
that there was a continuous and extensive process 
of technical,! change going on in the Western
world ... that 'catching up' meant aiming at a 
moving target, that'catching up‘was extremely 
difficult and would take time,and that it could 
best be done by large scale Soviet participation 
in many of the international commercial practices 
by which Western countries normally acquire new 
technology from each other, rather than by other, 
more 'arms length' approaches. 3 3
This question clearly bears directly on those problems of Soviet 
economic development which have led many Western observers to conclude 
that the superiority of . Western technology could be translated into a 
source of major leverage upon the present regime, on the grounds that 
the Soviets have been forced into the pursuit of greatly expanded economic 
contacts as a preferred alternative to major political and economic 
reforms which would otherwise be necessary.* Indeed, the Soviet leadership
* These arguments have been reviewed in Chapter 1.
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has openly acknowledged the fact - emphasized, for instance, in the 
1977 CIA report on the Soviet economy - that the era of unchecked 
'extensive' growth is over. Increasingly, regime statements have 
focussed on the key factors of 'intensive' growth: modern technology 
and modern management (which in turn implies a computerized planning 
process).34 A major turning point here, Cocks suggests, was the 1969 
Central Committee plenum, where Brezhnev insisted that 'intensification 
becomes not only the main way but the only way of developing our economy 
and solving such fundamental socio-political tasks as building the 
material technical base of communism, raising living standards, and 
achieving victory in the economic competition between the two world 
systems'.3 5
Moreover, there was an evident recognition that the challenge of 
contemporary science - now recognized as a direct productive force, and 
therefore part of the economic base - could not be adequately met merely 
by ritual assertions of the inherent superiority of socialist forms of 
organization. At the more explicitly ideological level, admittedly, such 
assertions remained the rule, as the following pronouncement by 
Ponomaryev indicates:
The scientific-technological revolution is 
a powerful ally of socialism, [but] under 
capitalist conditions the collectivization 
of its production erodes further and further 
the foundations of the existing order, and 
gives birth to new forms of antagonisms.
3 6
However a much more complex perception of the problem was suggested not 
merely by the extensive specialist literature on it,37 but also in 
Brezhnev's own statement at the Twenty-Fourth Congress establishing the 
conquest of the STR as one of the central tasks of future Soviet development
Before us, comrades, is a task of historical 
importance: organically to fuse the achievements 
of the scientific and technical revolution with 
the advantages of the socialist economic system 
to unfold more broadly our own, intrinsically 
socialist, forms of fusing science with production.
3 8
The international implications of recognizing the STR as a major 
historical force substantially autonomous from socialism were further
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developed in the explicit revision by N.Inozemtsev (the head of IMEMO) 
of the Stalinist doctrine of the two parallel world-economies of 
socialism and capitalism. The two were now inevitably becoming joined 
by a 'conglomeration [of] economic ties', Inozemtsev argued, since under 
the conditions of the STR 'no single country ... can develop the 
production of all types of output with the same effectiveness'.39 This 
basic message was also promoted in Brezhnev's televised address during 
his 1973 visit to the United States. Observing that 'the Soviet Union 
and the United States are self sufficient countries, so to speak',
Brezhnev went on to say that the rejection of economic, scientific, 
technological and cultural ties would deprive both sides of important 
additional benefits, and 'would be an absolutely purposeless rejection, 
which could not be justified on any sensible grounds'.40 More strikingly, 
the Soviet leader chose an earlier meeting with American business leaders 
to deliver an unprecedented acknowledgement of his side's contribution 
to the Cold War ethos. After vehemently answering in the negative his 
own rhetorical question as to whether the Cold War was a 'good period' 
which served 'the interests of our peoples, of all the peoples of the 
world', he continued:
In the past, in the field of ... economic ties, 
we adapted ourselves to one system of relations, 
and we stopped short right there, and for some 
time refused to move onward to new forms ...
We have ... been prisoners of ... old tendencies, 
old trends, and to this day we have not been able 
fully to break those fetters and to come out into 
the open air.
4 l
Of course, one must not attach too great weight to such a directly 
political appeal to a Western audience (which was, incidentally, 
rendered in a less compromising paraphrase in published Soviet versions 
of this speech).42 However, it remains fair to say that the Soviet 
leadership has clearly established as an official line its support for 
the 'participation of every state in the international division of labour 
on an equitable basis and under conditions that are advantageous for all 
and that do not permit violation of sovereignty and interference in 
internal affairs'.43 Moreover, while on the one hand vehemently rejecting 
the notion that economic exigencies render the Soviet Union peculiarly 
susceptible to the 'linkage' of international economic and political issues,41
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Soviet spokesmen have, on the other, themselves depicted a general 
connection between economic cooperation and political detente which 
resembles that proposed in the Nixon-Kissinger strategy. 'Stable 
economic ties', Kosygin told the Supreme Soviet in 1971, 'are exceedingly 
important ... from the point of view of creating favourable conditions 
for the solution of ... international problems'.45
Three comments may be made about this basic Soviet account of the 
nature of the epoch. In the first place, although patently self-serving 
and selective, it is not - so far as it goes - unrealistic. That the 
1970s have witnessed an unprecedented state of economic and political 
disarray within the Western alliance has been a standard theme of much 
Western commentary, which often, indeed, contrives to outdo the Soviets 
themselves in this respect. That the emergence of a broad Soviet-American 
military parity constitutes the greatest transformation of the world 
strategic environment since World War II is a simple fact, which few 
would bother to deny. That on balance, the major changes of policy 
behind the late detente lay on the Western side - in a retreat from 
earlier commitments to the military/political containment and economic 
isolation of the Soviet Union - is a more contentious proposition: but, 
as I have attempted to indicate in previous chapters, it is the most 
reasonable reading of the historical record.46
This is not to deny the existence of powerful strategic and economic 
imperatives for a more cooperative stance on the part of the Soviet 
Union. As regards the former, it seems obvious that one central aim of 
Soviet detente policy has been to inhibit too close an American rapprochement 
with China; and there is no reason why the United States should surrender 
its flexibility in this area merely to accommodate Soviet objections.
But, as was argued in Chapter 4, the 'emergence' of China has not genuinely 
altered the bipolar structure of world military power and its determining 
impact upon the prospects for more general detente. Nor can extensive 
American-Chinese military collaboration be justified in terms of a 
policy of 'balance', unless one proceeds from the untenable assumption 
that the United States - and still less the United States with its NATO 
and Japanese allies - is now inferior to the Soviet Union in respect of 
the global balance.47
Similarly, it is distorting to attribute the Soviet interest in 
detente primarily to an urgent need for Western assistance to 'bail out'
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the Soviet economy and system. The more sweeping Western predictions 
of irremediable Soviet productivity problems appear to rest upon 
culture determined, and as yet largely untestable, assumptions about 
the inability of predominantly planned economies to surmount the 
challenge of the 'post-industrial' era. The CIA's specific prediction 
of an absolute decline in Soviet oil production after 1980 - a keystone 
of the complex and inter-related economic crisis depicted in its 1977 
report- has now been retracted. As for the question of Western 
technology, Hanson argues that on the available evidence, the Soviet 
leadership itself, as well as its Western critics, may well have 
substantially over-estimated the gains which it would bring; and, 
indeed, Brezhnev's Report to the Twenty-Sixth Congress laid a new emphasis 
on the need for internal reforms to allow for the effective diffusion 
of Soviet technological achievements, which in themselves allegedly were 
fully equal to those of the West, throughout the Soviet economy. In 
sum, it seems fair to assume that 'the Soviet economic interest in detente 
[is] strong and less qualified by the most obvious strategic considerations 
than the corresponding Western interest';5°and that a significant 
loosening of centralized controls might be necessary to allow a truly 
effective participation in the processes of technological exchange 
characteristic of the rest of the developed world. But the image of a 
Soviet economy critically dependent on Western technology - whether 
the implication is that the West possesses important new sources of 
leverage in favour of major changes in Soviet foreign and domestic 
policy, or that existing economic contacts constitute a major indirect 
subsidy for the Soviet war machine - appears to be a misleading one.
A second important point concerns the likely 'audience' of Soviet 
pronouncements with an evidently manipulative content. It is indeed 
reasonable to discount the insistence upon the USSR's unswerving devotion 
to Peaceful Coexistence and detente as propaganda directed primarily at 
Western and Third World audiences. But it is also reasonable to assume 
that the equally insistent linking of the Western interest in detente 
with an altered correlation of forces is at least partly designed to 
neutralise the objections of elements within the Soviet elite who 
consider (as did some of Khrushchev's early opponents) that a detente 
policy threatens to weaken the Soviet international position.
This would seem to be especially true of the 'objective factors' 
adduced to explain the United States' enforced abandonment of a 'positions
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of strength' policy. As Morton Schwartz points out, the specialist 
Amerikanisty of the USA and MEMO institutes - the most consistent 
advocates of detente within the published literature - have also 
been in the forefront of this argument from objective factors.51 
Essentially, their argument is an elaboration of Khrushchev's defence of 
the Peaceful Coexistence line on the grounds that not imperialism, but 
the world situation, had changed. And though Khrushchev's alleged 
tendency towards an excessive reliance upon the 'automatic' movement 
of the correlation of forces is now studiously avoided by all parties, 
with due recognition being accorded to the pivotal role of Soviet 
military power,52 it must be reiterated that military parity, not Soviet 
superiority, is now presented as the Soviet objective in this area.
Similar considerations, moreover, would seem to apply to Soviet discussions 
of the economic aspects of detente. It may be surmised that the Soviet 
authorities did not require the predictions of Western convergence 
theorists to alert them to the challenge posed to the Soviet social 
order by extensive economic interaction with the capitalist powers; and 
much contemporary Soviet discussion of this issue - and especially of 
the scientific-technological revolution - appears designed, in part, to
c qdemonstrate that such risks can be kept within acceptable limits.
Third, if the chief objection to this overall account of the 
correlation of forces is not its inaccuracy, but its arbitrary selectiveness, 
this latter objection is partially met by the more specific Soviet 
discussion of historical processes in the socialist, capitalist and 
'Third' worlds. As was noted in Chapter 5, the expectation of steady 
advance on these three fronts was an integral feature of Khrushchev's 
Peaceful Coexistence 'package deal', which in turn had its theoretical 
roots in Lenin's sketch of the developing 'crisis of world capitalism'.
The importance officially assigned to this expectation has not diminshed 
under the present regime, as evidenced in Brezhnev's statement to the 
1969 Moscow conference of Communist and Worker's Parties, at the onset 
of the period under review:
The rising might of socialism, the liquidation 
of colonial regimes, and the pressure of the 
worker's movement increasingly influence the 
internal processes and policies of imperialism.
Many important features of modem imperialism 
are to be explained by the fact that it is 
compelled to adapt itself to new conditions -
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to the conditions of the struggle of the 
two systems.
54
However, the Soviet authorities have also clearly acknowledged the 
inadequacy of several Khrushchev era predictions; and despite their 
continued insistence on the existence of objective limits to detente with 
the Western powers - above all in regard to the competition in the Third 
World - Soviet pronouncements during the detente era did provide 
evidence of a significant reappraisal of the broad concept of the anti­
imperialist struggle. In the remaining two sections, I will attempt 
to outline the main features of this reappraisal, which evidently 
reflects an increasingly complex and differentiated approach to the 
problems and prospects not merely of contemporary imperialism but 
of 'actual, existing' Soviet-style socialism as well.
OfDetente and the Correlation^Forces
I have already argued, in Chapter 3, that 'detente' is an essentially 
vacuous or tautological concept, and that since an international detente 
is a relaxation of tensions between s t a t e s the bedrock determinant of the 
prospects for such a development is the distribution of power among the 
leading protagonists of the states-system. However, although there are 
no persuasive logical or historical reasons for the positive assumption 
that a genuine Soviet-American detente must be associated with some form 
of convergence between the respective 'social systems', one might still 
hold the negative position that idiosyncratic foreign policy perceptions, 
grounded essentially in domestic political factors, would make it 
impossible for one or other side to participate in a genuine relaxation 
of tensions, however favourable the external 'correlation of forces' 
might appear. This section will consider the evidence in the Soviet self­
account for two separate but related assertions along these lines by the 
American hawk school: that the Soviet regime is directly impelled towards 
open-ended expansionism by its own lack (and perceived lack) of internal 
legitimacy; and that it is indirectly impelled towards the same practical 
result by a demand for absolute security based upon the conviction that 
the internal dynamics of tmpevi-atist states make stable coexistence with 
them impossible.
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The discussion of the first issue will involve a considerable 
digression into the 'nuts and bolts' of Soviet domestic policy in the 
Brezhnev era. However, as was emphasized in the previous chapter, 
arguments about the dynamics of the 'Soviet system' are apt to be 
seriously misleading if they are excessively divorced from the changing 
logic of those major political issues - such as resource allocation and 
consumer expectations - which have done so much to shape the development 
of political structures in the period of Soviet rule.
This point is particularly important in regard to the drawing of 
inferences about the 'inner dynamics' of Soviet foreign policy from 
Soviet moves - directly in Afghanistan and indirectly, so far, in Poland 
- to buttress by military force the position of Communist regimes faced 
with imminent dissolution from within. Indeed, developments in the 
Polish crisis testify eloquently to the deep vulnerability of 'real, 
existing socialism' in Eastern Europe, and also to the deep Soviet 
distrust of the internal correlation of forces in this respect. But 
even in regard to Poland, and still more in regard to Afghanistan, 
it remains essential to distinguish between the weaknesses of the wider 
'world socialist system' and those of the Soviet Union itself; and I 
would argue that interpretations of these examples of direct or indirect 
Soviet interventionism in terms of the Soviet regime's own lack of 
domestic legitimacy are less than persuasive. In particular, the 
explicit or implicit assumption of several hawk critics that there has 
been no significant move towards a more settled basis for domestic 
legitimacy in the post-Stalin era is simply untenable.55 The domestic 
record of the Brezhnev regime (as, indeed, of the Khrushchev regime) 
has been nothing if not complex and contradictory. But despite the heavy 
burden of military expenditure, and a more systematic crackdown on 
dissent after the vagaries of the Khrushchev era, the present regime 
has presided over a period of substantial gains not merely in living 
standards but also in the fields of social equality and, more arguably, 
of individual freedom.56
The most obvious area of advance has been in the general improvement 
of, and greater equality in, material living standards (an advance 
checked, but not yet reversed, by the serious economic problems which 
have plagued the Soviet Union, along with other major industrial societies, 
since the mid-1970s). The Brezhnev era has seen a particularly marked
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levelling tendency in income distribution, in which field, Peter 
Wiles concludes, the overall 'statistical record since Stalin has been 
very good indeed. I doubt if any other country can show a more rapid 
progress towards equality'.57 Various explanations might be offered for 
this policy, which inter alia, has eroded the comparative material 
advantages of the more privileged strata of the intelligentsia. It does 
not seem unreasonable to assume a genuine regime conviction (evident, 
for example, in Khrushchev's memoirs, as well as in his and Brezhnev's 
speeches) that mature socialism ought to provide improved living standards 
for the mass of the population. But a more hard headed motivation is 
also discernible. In the Brezhnev era, Eastern Europe has again provided 
evidence of the dangers posed by massive disaffection with the system 
on the part of pivotal social groups: the intellectuals, above all, 
in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and the workers in Poland in 1970, 1976 and, 
most fundamentally, in 1980-1. The possibility of concerted 'class 
conscious' action by either group in the Soviet context - let alone 
their coalescence in such action - may still be remote. But, Archie 
Brown suggests, that possibility appears to have encouraged a leadership 
attempt 'to form a closer alliance with workers against possibly dangerous 
heterodox ideas emanating from the intelligentsia . ..'58
Even more than the industrial workers, however, the greatest 
beneficiaries of income equalization policies have been the peasantry, 
who also benefited from their belated acquisition of internal passports, 
and from the extension of the old age pension to members of collective 
farms (a reform foreshadowed by Khrushchev). Like Khrushchev, Brezhnev 
at an early stage established agriculture as a key area of personal 
responsibility. But he has tended to eschew the 'hare-brained schemes' 
and constant interventions of his predecessor, relying instead upon the 
systematic reorientation of resources towards heavy investment in inputs 
like fertilisers and mechanization, on the one hand, and towards the 
provision of greater material incentives for the agricultural workforce, 
on the other. Of course, the rise in peasant incomes since Stalin has 
been from a very low base: but by the early 1970s, as Alec Nove points 
out, the results were quite striking:
Indeed, if one adds income (in cash and kind) 
from private plots, there is now only a 
quite small difference between rural and urban 
incomes. From this a very important 
conclusion follows: that the long period of 




In fact, Nove argues that agriculture has now become 'a burden 
on the rest of the economy', especially when account is taken of items 
like the heavy support for retail meat prices. The latter may, of 
course, be regarded as a more general subsidy of the consumer; and 
the campaign to expand agricultural output must be related to the 
need to redress decades of neglect in the consumer sector as a whole, 
without which mere increases in money wages would be meaningless. One 
major long-term Brezhnev promise has been to raise Soviet per capita meat 
consumption to 'Western' levels (a major cause of the new Soviet 
dependence on grain imports in poor harvest years). And in 1971, in 
the wake of the Polish riots, the regime unveiled for the first time 
a Five Year Plan in which 'Group B' (consumer) industries were scheduled 
to grow more rapidly than heavy industry. Brezhnev's report designated 
the improvement of living standards as 'the main task of the Five Year 
Plan', declaring that the party aimed at an economy capable of 'saturating 
the market with articles of consumption', and explicitly stating that 
the establishment of conditions for the expansion of agriculture, 
light industry, housing and services was 'precisely the ultimate function 
of heavy industry'.61
However, promise has continued to exceed performance. Despite the 
major gains in the Brezhnev era, Soviet agriculture remains notably 
inefficient compared to that of other developed nations, both because 
of the failure to grapple with such organizational problems as the 
excessive size of farms, and because of intractable climatic conditions, 
which produced disastrous harvests in 1972 and 1975 (the latter constituting, 
in Gregory Grossman's estimation, perhaps 'the largest single blow suffered
. c oby the Soviet economy since the German invasion of 1941'/„ In part 
because of these harvest failures, the Ninth Five Year Plan was not 
fulfilled and the consumer sector once again grew more slowly than heavy 
industry. Moreover, the Tenth Five Year Plan not only projected lower 
overall growth rates, but also reinstated the traditional priority of 
heavy industry. In Brezhnev's words :
The pivot of the Party's economic strategy both 
for the Tenth Five Year Plan and for long-term 
development is a further build up of the country's 
economic might3 the expansion and basic renewal 
of production assets, and the maintenance of 
stable, balanced growth for heavy industry -  the 
foundation of the economy.
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This Tenth plan, which Brezhnev dubbed a 'plan of efficiency and 
quality' was in turn much underfulfilled; and with its successor, 
which proposed more modest official targets again, the regime returned 
to the promise of an expansion of the consumer goods sector greater 
than that of heavy industry.64 The uncomfortable example of events 
in Poland may well have provided a spur in this regard. But already at 
the November 1978 Central Committee Plenum, Brezhnev had returned, in 
tones of considerable urgency, to the problems of the consumer sector. 
Attacking the alleged tendency of some planners 'to regard Group "B" 
as a sort of balancing wheel', whose allocations could be cut 'to 
overcome disproportions in the plan', he insisted that 'the entire course 
of economic development confirms again and again that Group "B" industries 
... constitute an important factor without which the economy as a whole 
cannot function effectively and material incentives cannot be improved'.65
A similar pattern has prevailed in regard to agriculture. At 
the Twenty-Fifth Congress, Brezhnev defended with particular force the 
basic 'inter-related aims' of agricultural policy - the expansion of 
output and the 'levelling up' of living conditions in the countryside.56 
At the same time, he closely associated himself with proposals for 
massive land reclamation and irrigation (based upon river diversion) in 
Central Asia - proposals which, together with those for Siberian development, 
are perhaps the most expensive of all the measures envisaged to enhance 
'the country's economic might'.67 The massive direct and indirect claim 
of agriculture upon resources (estimated by Nove at 33 per cent of all 
investments) continued in the Eleventh Five Year Plan;68 and in November 
1981, in response to the third poor grain harvest in a row, Brezhnev 
announced an alteration to the plan to allocate 1 somewhat more resources1 
to agriculture to counter what he frankly acknowledged were significant 
food shortages.69 On this occasion, he blamed the influence of 'factors 
which are entirely or partially beyond our control'. But at the 1978 
Plenum he had also attacked as 'intolerable' the continuing agricultural 
losses due to inadequate storage and distribution facilities, adding 
revealingly:
Soviet people can understand difficulties.
But they cannot and do not want to accept 
mismanagement, irresponsibility and 
negligence as the explanation of existing 
difficulties. This is why we now say with
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full reason that the question of losses ... 
is not only an economic matter. It is also 
an important political matter which directly 
effects the mood and labour activity of the 
Soviet people.
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Overall, therefore, there are abundant indications that the present
regime recognizes the existence of major economic problems which cannot
adequately be addressed by Stalinist methods, and that its interest in
conciliating the consumer has if anything increased in the face of the
domestic reverses and rising international tensions of the past six
years. However, it also seems clear that a basic concern with social
stability and bureaucratic compromise has now become a major barrier
to flexibility on domestic issues, and that what Brezhnev characterized
in 1976 as the 'urgent' and 'unpostponable' task of management reform,
to 'fundamentally improve' an 'economic mechanism [which] has become
too tight for the developing economy', will not be realised during his 
7 1tenure of office.
On the issues of political participation, and political and 
intellectual freedom, the record of the Brezhnev regime is far more mixed. 
But it is mixed, and some positive trends should be recognized. Above 
all, the phenomenon of mass terror, and the concomitant large scale use 
of slave labour, have now been absent from Soviet life for over two 
decades. If only for their own protection against a repetition of the 
great purges, Stalin's successors have dismantled, and kept dismantled, 
the separate empire of the secret police. In one sense, this abolition 
of totally arbitrary arrest can be regarded as an essential prerequisite 
for the emergence of dissent as a politically meaningful act. More 
generally, as Peter Reddaway points out, the subjection of the KGB to 
more or less defined bureaucratic norms has created inhibitions on its 
freedom of action which the various dissenting groups have been able 
to exploit even in the face of the general hardening of regime attitudes 
since the late 1960s.72
Of course, this is far from providing that genuine 'stability of 
expectations' for the general population which, as noted in Chapter 2, 
has begun to figure in the regime's own rhetoric. But, again, the top 
leadership's requirements in this respect do appear to have filtered 
down to the general environment of the political elite. There is now
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an established precedent for non-violent leadership succession and, 
despite the evident power of Brezhnev, a genuinely operational pattern 
of collective leadership. For many Western observers, this stabilization 
has been purchased only at the cost of the emergence of an immobilized 
'gerontocracy' in the Politburo and the Central Committee which has, 
indeed, barely been disturbed even by the Twenty-Sixth Congress. But 
as Hough, in particular, points out, mobility has been much greater at 
the middle levels of the state and party apparatus, from which the 
next major leadership generation might be expected to emerge. Moreover, 
some greater stability in cadre policy was a necessary antidote not 
merely to the traumas of the Stalin era, but also the arbitrary actions 
of Khrushchev in this area; and, more lately, Brezhnev has taken pains 
to emphasize that the established policy of 'trust in cadres' provides 
no warrant for the retention of leading posts by 'those who fail to 
pull their weight ... who display irresponsibility and live on their 
old merits'.74
In the field of party membership, a similar concern to balance 
mobility and stability has been evident. The party has continued to grow 
absolutely, to a total membership of over 18 million, even though its 
rate of growth has slowed noticeably since the Khrushchev years; and 
the latter phenomenon seems attributable primarily to a regime desire 
to control more strictly the quality of those seeking to enter the party 
as an adjunct to their careers. The result, despite a conscious policy 
of attempting to provide a balancing intake of genuinely 'proletarian' 
elements, is a party which is more highly educated than ever before, and 
which presumably offers the intelligentsia channels for influence upon 
policy which reinforce the effects of the regime's growing predilection 
towards reliance on expertise in management. 'The old dichotomy between 
"Red" and "expert" becomes meaningless', Hough argues, 'as the elite 
becomes Red and expert, with its expertise being established before
n cmembership in the party is admitted'.
If these developments have provided important benefits to the upper 
intelligentsia, to balance the decline in their relative material position, 
those not involved in active dissent have also benefited from a continuing 
trend towards greater intellectual freedom in some areas. It is 
undoubtedly true that repression of open dissent has increased under 
the present regime, especially since the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and 
that literary and cultural freedom have generally declined since the
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Khrushchev period. But the current leaders also appear to have 
accepted more systematically that greater intellectual freedom in 
many areas is essential to the efficient functioning of a complex 
modern society. In Brown's words:
They have attempted to make a much clearer 
dividing line than was ever made under 
Khrushchev between what kind of intellectual 
activity is essential for the economic progress 
of the Soviet Union and what is not, and between 
what is essential for the existing structure of 
power within the Soviet Union (as well, of course, 
a$ Soviet power in an international context) 
and what might threaten this. It can be argued, 
and indeed has been argued by some Soviet 
dissidents, that intellectual freedom is indivisible.
The fact is that the present Soviet leaders have 
divided it.
76
A formal framework for the discussion of these various issues has 
been established in the significant ideological innovation mentioned in 
Chapter 2: the doctrine of developed socialism. In a sense, this 
represents merely the codification of a number of elements (including the 
notion of a 'mature' or 'developed' socialist society) advanced in ad hoc 
fashion in the late 1960s. But from its first actual appearance in 1971, 
developed socialism as a distinct 'stage' within the wider 'phase' of 
socialism has been accorded an intensive, officially sponsored exposition.
It quickly became a major leitmotif of Brezhnev's own speeches, while 
Suslov designated as the 'main guidelines ... set for our social scientists' 
by the Twenty-Fourth Congress, 'the theoretical elaboration of the 
fundamental problems of a developed socialist society and the scientific 
substantiation of the ways and means of its gradual development into 
Communism'. Such issues have become part of the staple fare in 
Kommumstf the Party theoretical organ; 79they have been the subject of 
important monographs and 'theoretical conferences'; they have been directly 
addressed in the new (1977) Soviet Constitution, and in related 
pronouncements by Brezhnev;80and they have formed a backdrop for discussion 
in all major policy areas, not excluding the military.
Certain key themes, all exemplifying the trend towards a more 
developmentalist and technocratic ideology which was discussed in Chapter 
2, should be mentioned here. First, it is made clear that the period of
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developed socialism will be long. Some authors have suggested several 
decades, while Brezhnev has even implied (speaking before the new 
term had been introduced) that the construction of Communism might 
take 50 years. More generally, it is simply asserted that the stage is 
a 'relatively long period of development on the road from capitalism 
to communism'.82 Varying the image, Brezhnev declared in 1977 that the 
Soviet Union had everything necessary to advance to 'our cherished goal 
of Communism' (whose appearance, on Khrushchev's timetable, should 
already have been imminent) and 'to attain ever new summits of progress'* 
'But comrades', he added, 'these are indeed summits. And the paths 
leading to them may be steep and difficult'.83
Second, the transition to Communism, however difficult, will be 
smooth and gradual, growing out of roots established in the present 
stage. The era of qualitative leaps in Soviet development is past. In 
the economic field, the pattern is to be one of 'complex, harmonious 
economic development', with continuous improvement of the general welfare 
of the population.84 Class differences will continue, but are no longer 
a source of conflict; and Khrushchev's previously neglected doctrine of 
the 'all people's state' has been effectively resurrected with the formal 
inclusion of the 'people's intelligentsia' in the 'unbreakable alliance' 
of workers and peasants. Despite calls for a deepening of 'socialist 
democracy' and for more participatory patterns of decision making, neither 
state nor party are about to wither away. The party aims at 'further 
strengthening the Soviet state and perfecting the entire political 
organization of our society',86 though the primary justificiation for 
this time - honoured policy is no longer the threat of class conflict 
or of capitalist encirclement, but the complex 'management' problems 
created by the new stage of socialist advance.
Third, the most important single determinant of the new stage is 
'the economy's entirely new magnitude',87which creates both greater 
possibilities (for meeting the population's material and cultural needs) 
and new problems (of scientific economic management). Its possibilities 
emerge only where both a modern, planned industrial sector and 'large 
scale, highly mechanized agriculture built on collectivist principles' 
have been established; and, indeed, one shorthand definition of its 
essence is 'the combination of the scientific and technological revolution
o owith the advantages of the socialist organization of society'. Such
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claims are clearly meant to establish the exemplary status of the 
USSR, where developed socialism has already 'been built', as opposed 
to the 'several other countries of the socialist community', which are 
merely successfully embarked upon its construction.89 Moreover, although 
such economic criteria provide directly for the rejection only of 
Chinese-style 'barracks socialism', the doctrine is also clearly 
designed for use against 'market socialism' heresies among the more 
developed states of Eastern Europe. 'Countries which have taken the 
path of socialism with an underdeveloped or moderately developed economy', 
Brezhnev argues, 'will evidently have to follow the same road' as the 
Soviet Union. But even already developed aspirants to socialism must 
master
the difficult science of organizing all social life 
on socialist principles, including the science of planning 
and managing the national economy, the bringing together 
of all classes and social groups on the basis of 
socialist interests and communist ideals ... We are 
profoundly convinced that no matter what the specific 
conditions in the countries building socialism may 
be, the stage of its perfection on its own basis, 
the stage of mature, developed socialism, is the 
essential link between social transformations, a 
relatively long period of development on the road 
from capitalism to communism.
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A final related issue (also with ramifications for the Soviet 
relationship to the rest of the 'Socialist Commonwealth') is the 'national 
question', which, Brezhnev announced in 1972, 'has been solved completely, 
solved finally and for good'.91 The essence of this alleged achievement, 
which he asserted, 'may rightly be ranked with such victories ... as 
industrialization, collectivization and the cultural revolution', had 
been proclaimed at the Twenty-Fourth Congress:
A new historical community of people, the Soviet 
people, took shape in our country during the years 
of socialist construction. New harmonious relations 
of friendship and co-operation were formed between 
classes and social groups, nations and nationalities, 
in the struggle for socialism and in the battles 
fought in defence of socialism.
92
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This is clearly a significant ideological innovation: but it would 
seem, none-the-less, to fall within the wider pattern of a consistent 
elongation of the perspective on socialist transformation in the USSR. 
Soviet theorists have long maintained that the constituent nations of 
the Union would proceed from a stage of independent 'flourishing', through 
one of 'rapprochement' or 'drawing-together', to an ultimate condition 
of 'merging'. In his presentation of the optimistic CPSU Programme 
in 1961, Khrushchev claimed that the Soviet nationalities had already 
entered the 'rapprochement' stage, and that 'complete unity of nations 
will be achieved as the full-scale building of communism proceeds. But 
even after communism will have been built in the main', he cautioned, 'it 
will be premature to speak of a fusion of nations'.93 Brezhnev has 
continued in much the same vein. In particular, his speech on the new 
Constitution rejected the 'incorrect conclusions' of some comrades that 
the document should include 'the concept of an integrated Soviet nation', 
and that it should proclaim an avowedly unitary Republic, or at least 
remove from the Union Republics such formal trappings of independence 
as the right to secede from the USSR.94 The appropriate formula, he 
made clear, was still that of rapprochement:
The Soviet people's social and political unity does 
not at all imply the disappearance of national 
distinctions ... The friendship of the Soviet peoples 
is indissoluble, and in the process of building 
communism they are steadily drawing ever closer 
together and their spiritual life is being mutually 
enriched. But we would be taking a dangerous path 
if we were artificially to step up this objective 
process of national integration. This is something 
Lenin persistently warned against, and we shall not 
depart from his view.
9 5
As several Western analysts have pointed out, these formulations, 
developed in respect of the domestic 'national question', have been 
explicitly extended to the problem of relations between members of the 
'Socialist Commonwealth'.96 A crucial trigger of this development (as 
indeed of the wider 'developed socialism' doctrine) would appear to have 
been the Czech crisis: for this confronted Soviet theorists with the 
uncomfortable fact that the greatest successes of revisionist ideology 
had been scored in a nation which had typically been acknowledged as
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second only to the USSR itself in its level of attained socialist 
development.
A variety of reasons, including the harmful influence of chauvinist 
nationalism, were produced in theoretical glosses on the Brezhnev Doctrine 
to account for the potential Czech defection. But, as R.Judson Mitchell 
points out, these failed to conceal a most embarrassing dilemma. Either 
socialist nations were somehow more vulnerable to erosion from within 
the higher their level of socialist development, or else an increasingly 
defensive imperialism was now more capable of negating the gains of 
socialism - through tactics of 'creeping counter-revolution' - than it 
had been with its earlier tactics of direct frontal assault.97 Thus the 
determining significance of 'objective' historical factors, so important 
in Khrushchev's depictions of the struggle between the two systems, was 
effectively devalued; and such subjective factors as 'organizational 
cohesion and ideological dynamism [became] the crucial variables of 
historical development'.9 8
At the practical level, it seems clear that the Soviet response to 
this situation involved a systematic effort to strengthen and refine 
the processes of economic, political and military coordination within 
the Warsaw Pact/CMEA bloc. And this has been accompanied by a persistent 
doctrinal campaign - beginning with the 1969 Moscow World Conference of 
Communist parties, and gathering momentum after the Twenty-Fourth Congress 
- aimed at establishing the 'objective' and 'law-governed' necessity 
for foreign policy unity within the bloc. By 1973-74, Teresa RakowSka- 
Harmstone argues, this had produced a 'coherent theory of relations 
between socialist states', which depicted the bloc nations as embarked 
on the same movement towards eventual merger as that proposed for the 
Soviet nationalities, and which asserted that the stage of rapprochement 
was already manifest in existing patterns of Eastern European integration.100
However, by the end of the decade the Polish crisis had provided 
abundant confirmation - if any were really needed - of the vast gap between 
Soviet propaganda in this regard and the internal correlation of forces 
within the East European states. And Brezhnev's pronouncement on this 
question at the Twenty-Sixth Congress, while relatively moderate as regards 
implied threats of Soviet intervention, combined a grossly inadequate 
description of the social forces involved in the Polish workers'movement 
with a further de facto acknowledgement of the innate vulnerability of
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Soviet-style socialism in the smaller bloc countries. As with the Czech 
case, he emphasized that 'the imperialists and their accomplices 
systematically conduct campaigns of hostility against the socialist 
countries' - campaigns which grew increasingly 'sophisticated and insidious' 
as the imperialists learned 'from their defeats'. But Polish developments 
also demonstrated that in 'strengthening ... its leading role' the Party 
must 'pay close attention to the voice of the masses', avoid 'red tape and 
voluntarism, actively develop socialist democracy' and pursue 'realistic' 
economic goals:
Wherever imperialism's subversive activity is 
compounded by mistakes and miscalculations in 
domestic policy, conditions arise for the 
activation of elements hostile to socialism. 
That is what has happened in fraternal Poland, 
where opponents of socialism, with the support 
of outside forces, are creating anarchy and 
seeking to turn the development of events into 
a counter-revolutionary course. l o l
In sum, therefore, the Brezhnev regime has evolved a considerable 
body of related doctrine with two apparent ends: to provide 'a more 
adequate theory of political change, one that would allow for both 
development and decay in not only capitalist but non-capitalist (including 
socialist) systems'; and 'to delineate more clearly the limits of permissible 
change not only in the Soviet Union but in the socialist bloc as a whole'.102 
As regards Eastern Europe, one may say that the theory of change remains 
basically inadequate and that, the 'legitimating' doctrine of developed 
socialism notwithstanding, the most obvious factor operating to contain 
change with 'permissible' limits is the continuing threat of Soviet 
intervention 'in the last resort*. It is not merely that Soviet-style 
social systems are imposed on these societies from outside. There is also 
the availability to them of 'imagined alternatives' to the Soviet model 
both in their own history and in their substantial and growing contacts 
with Western Europe. This latter comment would seem applicable primarily 
to the more developed 'Northern Tier' of the Soviet bloc - Poland 
Czechoslovakia, the GDR and perhaps Hungary.* But it is also these
* One might argue that Poland, with an orientation towards Latin Christendoi 
reaching back to the Middle Ages, and a 'national' struggle with Russia reachi 
back almost as far, is a special case even among the Northern tier. But 
Czechoslovakia, which before 1948 was probably the most favourably disposed 
to both Russia and communism, has the strongest indigenous democratic traditio 
and the GDR, though without any substantial democratic legacy, presumably
inherits some of the historic German contempt for the leading Slav power, and 
is also most directly exposed to the example of German Federal Republic.
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nations whose potential defection must presumably arouse the greatest 
alarms on broad security grounds within the Soviet leadership.
The situation, however, appears quite different in regard to the 
Soviet Union itself, which (insofar as this slippery concept may be 
used with any degree of precision) may fairly be regarded as a 'substantially 
legitimate society'.103 In the first place, the Soviet order is in this 
case an indigenous creation, and after almost sixty-five years of rule 
the regime can draw upon quite obvious and straightforward sources of 
legitimacy, not merely from the very fact of its longevity but also from 
its achievements in both the domestic and the international sphere 
(achievements which are presumably a considerable source of Russian and, 
to a lesser extent, 'Soviet' national pride). However, there is also 
the factor - obscured in much Western commentary by the residual 
tendency to regard pluralist and individualist values as natural concomitants 
of genuine 'modernity' - of the 'very considerable degree of accord which 
appears to exist between the political system of the USSR and its 
political culture'.104 This is not to say that the Soviet population have 
taken to their hearts the full panoply of official Marxism-Leninism: as 
Stephen White observes, the regime's achievements in this regard, in 
comparison to the effort expended, have been distinctly modest. However, 
the traditional (Russian) political culture would appear to combine a high 
valuation of social order with an essentially 'collectivist and welfarist' 
approach to social issues; and the emerging ideology of developed socialism, 
with its own combination of 'welfare authoritarianism' and a technocratic 
emphasis upon the 'scientific management of society' appears to be a 
fairly shrewd response to these basic values.105 Of course, the 1980s 
seem likely to confront the regime with the need for major political 
decisions on structural change for which neither its evolutionary, 
determinist ideology nor its practical inclination towards piecemeal 
reformism constitute an adequate response. But as Sewryn Bialer, having 
acknowledged the importance of these challenges, puts it: 'Time is not 
running out on the Soviet system. The regime still possesses enormous reserves 
of stability ... '.105
If these arguments are valid (and they are broadly supported by many 
leading students of Soviet society),107 they suggest that, for the next 
decade at least, there will be no direct imperative for the Soviet regime 
to intervene in other societies to protect its own social order from the 
corrosive example of 'socialist renewal' along Czech or even Polish lines,
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and still less from that of Islamic revolution of the sort presaged in 
Afghanistan and Iran. I have also suggested, in Chapter 4, that the 
Soviet 'strategic culture' does not sedm to incorporate a concept of 
international credibility as the blanket interdependence of commitments 
analogous to the notion developed in American strategic thinking in the 
nuclear era. However, there is strongrevidence that the Soviet authorities 
do believe in the interdependence of commitments within their Eastern 
European sphere of influence; and the'.example of Afghanistan, like that 
of Cuba, does suggest a belief that Soviet credibility is substantially 
involved where officially proclaimed Communist regimes are threatened 
with imminent overthrow, even if the ' iarritial establishment of such regimes 
had little obvious connection with direct Soviet action. In Eastern 
Europe, moreover, there is also the faetor of an established habit 
of intervention, based upon an extensive definition of Soviet national 
security which seems, on an 'objective' reading of the situation, both 
excessively conservative and increasingly unrealistic. As Brown remarks, 
the 1968 Czech crisis has already provided one great potential European 
turning point 'at which history (in the shape of the Soviet Union) refused 
to turn'; and a continuing Soviet refusal in the 1980s to disengage its 
security demands upon the East European states from its demand to restrict 
their domestic evolution seems likely to impose a burden on Soviet relations 
with the West much greater than it has in the preceding decade. 108
The second major question of this section concerns the ostensible 
Soviet perceptions of the policies and intentions of the leading capitalist 
powers, and above all the United States. At the most general level, a 
'potted history' of such perceptions over the last decade might be 
assembled from the keynote phrases of Brezhnev's pronouncements on this 
question to the last three Congresses of the CPSU.
At the Twenty-Fourth Congress, despite the fanfare over the new Soviet 
'Peace Programme', the current state of East-West relations was treated in 
generally negative terms. The issue was addressed under the headings 
Imperialism> Enemy of the Peoples and Social Progress> The Peoples Against 
Imperialism3 and The Soviet Union’s Struggle for Peace and the Security 
of Peoples. Rebuff to the Imperialist Policy of Aggression. Brezhnev 
acknowledged that 'positive changes had recently taken place in Europe' 
without, as yet, fully resolving 'the problems Europe inherited from the 
Second World War'; and he emphasized the Soviet 'assumption that it is
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possible to improve relations between the USSR and the USA' upon the 
basis of Peaceful Coexistence and 'mutually advantageous ties ... making 
our relations ... as stable as possible'. But he also expressed 
suspicions about a continued American desire 'to conduct a "positions of 
strength" policy', and to 'revive the "Soviet menace" myth' to justify 
interventionism in Vietnam and elsewhere. 'In the past five-year period', 
he asserted,
imperialist foreign policy has provided fresh 
evidence that imperialism has not ceased to be 
reactionary and aggressive. In this context 
one must deal above all with US imperialism, 
which in the last few years has reasserted its 
urge to act as a kind of guarantor and protector 
of the international system of exploitation and 
oppression.
At the Twenty-Fifth Congress, East-West relations appeared under 
the neutral and 'businesslike' heading Development of Relations with 
Capitalist States; and Brezhnev noted that the preceeding five years had 
produced 'considerable progress' in the struggle for Peaceful Coexistence, 
which remained 'the main element of our policy towards the capitalist 
states'. These 'changes towards detente and a more durable peace' were, 
he maintained, 'especially tangible' in Europe. But he also emphasized 
that 'the turn for the better in our relations with the United States of 
America, the biggest power of the capitalist world, has, of course, been 
decisive in reducing the danger of another world war and consolidating 
peace'. 110 And although he noted that the 'essentially positive development 
of Soviet-US relations' was marred by the anti-detente activities of 
'influential forces' within the American polity, the speech in general, as 
Paul Marantz observes, was 'rather extraordinary' in tone and style (if 
'rather unexceptional' in substance) for the fact that 'Brezhnev went 
out of his way to avoid using the term "American imperialism"'. 1 1 1
At the Twenty-Sixth Congress, Brezhnev employed a rubric for his 
discussion which effectively 'split the difference' between those employed 
on the two earlier occasions: Relations With the Capitalist States. 
Countering the Forces of Aggression. The Policy of Peace and Cooperation.
He left little doubt that the 'stormy and complicated' international 
environment of the period since 1976 could not be laid to the charge of
502.
the Soviet Union, which had 'persistently continued the struggle to 
eliminate the threat of war and to preserve and deepen detente'; and 
he claimed that 'adventurism and readiness to gamble with the vital 
interests of mankind in the name of narrow, selfish goals' had once 
again 'become especially evident in the policy of the most aggressive 
circles of imperialism. The speech also directly blamed both the 
Carter and Reagan administrations - respectively for 'trying to put 
pressure on us [and] to destroy the positive elements that had been 
created, with considerable difficulty, in Soviet-American relations in 
preceding years', and for 'openly bellicose appeals and statements, 
specially designed, as it were, to poison the atmosphere of relations 
between our countries'. And it involved an unusually clear distinction
between relations with the United States and those with Western Europe, 
where 'despite the efforts of the enemies of detente, peaceful cooperation 
between countries of the two systems is, generally speaking>developing 
rather well', with 'broader and more meaningful' political contacts, and 
the emergence of 'a common language on a number of major problems of 
foreign policy'.112
On the other hand, however, Brezhnev expressed the hope that American 
policy makers would 'ultimately be able to see things more realistically' 
and effectively reversed the earlier Soviet refusal to renegotiate the 
stalled SALT II treaty, as well as pressing for arms limitation talks in 
Europe (to contain what he depicted as a distinctly 'action-reaction' 
arms race) and a substantial extension of 'confidence building measures' 
in the European theatre. In general, the speech emphasized the Soviet 
commitment to peace and 'de-emphasized the anti-imperialist struggle and 
the USSR's role in it', while the 'world revolutionary process', which 
had figured prominently in the Twenty-Fifth Congress address, was not 
directly mentioned at all. 114 And despite the considerable nuances in 
his treatment of the capitalist powers, Brezhnev directly acknowledged 
the bedrock importance of an understanding with the United States:
It is generally recognized that the international 
situation depends in large part on the policies of 
the USSR and the US. In our opinion, the state of 
relations between the two at present and the crucial 
nature of the international problems dictate the 
need for active dialogue on all levels. We are ready 
for such a dialogue ... The USSR wants normal 
relations with the US. From the standpoint of the
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interests of the peoples of both our countries 
and of mankind as a whole, there is simply no 
other sensible way.
1 1 5
At one level, these quotations merely indicate the readiness of the 
Soviet leadership to manipulate major symbolic elements of Soviet discourse 
- such as 'imperialism'- in order to communicate specific political 
messages about their perceptions of relations with the capitalist powers. 
However, Soviet leaders are also, in general, careful not to allow too 
great a divergence between doctrine and policy (which is one reason 
for the visibility of the manipulative element in Soviet political 
discourse, as compared with its more loosely structured Western counterpart); 
and if the present regime is able to be rather cavalier in its use of 
terms such as imperialism, it is because there have already been major 
adjustments in the theoretical significance accorded such terms, dating 
back, for the most part, to the first major detente offensive in the 
Khrushchev era. A brief consideration of this theoretical underpinning, 
therefore, may provide a less ephemeral focus for examining the Brezhnev 
regime's response to the fluctuating fortunes of detente in the 1970s.
First, leading Soviet theorists of imperialism had, by the mid-60s, 
effectively dropped the idea of a necessary drive towards imperialist 
expansion grounded in the economic structure of the advanced capitalist 
states, suggesting that imperialism, in any of its concrete historical 
manifestations, need not involve such phenomena as the possession of 
colonies, or even the export of capital. 116 As James Roberts observes, 
the term has now become little more than a conventional description.
The term 'theory of imperialism' is no more than 
the operational equivalent of 'the theory of 
modem capitalism '3 or 'the correct view of modern 
capitalism'. Imperialism is not something the 
Western countries do: it is a state of being, it 
is what they are. They have reached the stage of 
state-monopoly capitalism, this by definition, 
is imperialism.
1 1 7
However, if the concept of imperialism has been emasculated in this 
fashion, the associated notion of 'state-monopoly capitalism' has been 
'infused with new meaning' much along the line of the analyses of Western 
'structural Marxists', in specialist analyses, the state is now presented
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not as the passive instrument of an essentially cohesive elite of 
monopoly capitalists, but as a relatively autonomous political actor 
which 'performs the function' of coordinating, reconciling and at times 
over-ruling the demands of an internally divided business elite in 'the 
prevailing - either immediate or long run - general interests of state- 
monopoly capital as a whole'.118 Once again, the development of this 
perspective stretches back to the Khrushchev era, and indeed to the 
arguments on these lines unsuccessfully advanced by the economist Varga 
in the late Stalin era (arguments which were in turn justified by a 
revival of Lenin's 'two tendency' analysis of divisions within the 
capitalist camp). But, as Schwartz points out, the existence of such a 
doctrinal rationale provides the basis upon which the new corps of 
Amerikanisty in the Brezhnev era have established an increasingly 
sophisticated understanding of the political processes of the leading 
capitalist power.119
Second, the emphasis upon the relative autonomy of the political 
superstructure has led Soviet analysts, in practice, to accord surprising 
weight to subjective factors - such as the general influence of political 
culture and the weight of the Cold War ethos - in accounting for the 
'imperialist' dimension of American foreign policy, while the material 
interests of a large section of the American ruling class are increasingly 
presented as factors dictating a more moderate posture in an era in which 
American military power is checkmated by its Soviet counterpart. Of 
course the 'military-industrial complex' is still viewed as a potent 
political force with a direct material interest in the exacerbation of 
international tension; but the majority of the monopoly bourgeoisie, Soviet 
Americanists argue, not only derive no direct benefit from the military 
economy, but are actively penalized by its growth 'from a relatively 
small sector, which the ruling class even regarded as a useful "balance 
wheel" ... into an enormous unproductive part of the economy, disturbing 
the normal operation of the economic mechanism'.120 This factor, along 
with the multiple external crises faced by the United States from the 
late 1960s onwards, could not plausibly be attributed to an all embracing 
Soviet threat by 'even the most thick-witted representatives of U.S. 
imperialist circles'. 'Needless to sayArbatov continues,
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this does not mean that the American monopolies 
revised their attitude towards socialism and 
communist ideas . . . But the stubborn facts of 
life taught the U.S. ruling class to realize 
that, in basing its policy wholly on a platform 
of bellicose anti-communism, the American 
bourgeoisie not only does not protect itself 
against other, quite real threats, but can also 
do substantial damage to its own class interests.
12 l
A crucial aspect of this complex of American crises was, of course, 
Vietnam, which the Soviet analysts have tended to present (in a manner 
reminiscent of 'statist' American theorists such as Krasner) as a prime 
instance of ideological commitment overcoming the rational pursuit of 
American material interests. Moreover, in analysing the impact of the 
Vietnam involvement on American society, they have concede a significant 
role to the impact of public opinion, mobilized both outside and within 
the parliamentary process, in forcing a change of direction upon the 
American leadership. Once again, sections of the business community are 
said to have been particularly alert to the need for such a change. 'In 
a stunning reversal of form\ as Schwartz observes,'the social stability 
of "monopoly capitalism" in the United States - as well as its economic 
well being - is now believed to require a tranquil international 
environment'.122
Third, the obverse side of the argument that the arms race has become 
a burden on the American economy is a substantial departure from the Stalin- 
era orthodoxy regarding the inevitable shrinkage and collapse of capitalism, 
which was alleged to be one of the prime internal forces driving capitalist 
regimes in an imperialist and militarist direction. As has been noted, 
the specialist Amevikanisty, in their exploration of the 'considerable 
reserves' of capitalism alluded to by Brezhnev at the Twenty-Fifth 
Congress, have laid particular emphasis upon the efficacy of 'state-monopoly 
regulation of the economy' in the interests of monopoly capitalism as a 
whole. In addition, as Schwartz points out, their treatment of the 
Ameidcan economy has accorded considerably less importance to the problem 
of impending raw materials shortages than have many Western analysts.
Soviet spokesmen have certainly been alert to the raw materials issue, 
especially as a factor capable of undermining the international cohesion 
of the major capitalist powers. But the Amerikanzsty 3 besides emphasizing
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the great reserves of most crucial natural resources still in American 
hands, also appear persuaded by their own reverence for the scientific- 
technological revolution 'that problems [of resource substitution] which 
would strain the economy of a lesser nation are soluble for the United 
States'. Finally, alon<g with this general perception of the resilience
of American capitalism goes a correspondingly 'dim view of the revolutionary 
potential of the American people'124- a view which, it may be noted, is 
continuous with Stalin's practical attitude to the Western working class 
in the heyday of official Soviet certainty about the inevitable inner 
decay of capitalism, if rather less continuous with the visions entertained 
by Khrushchev in the heyday of official Soviet optimism about an early 
Soviet victory in the peaceful competition of the two social systems.
I would argue that this partial reappraisal of the potentialities 
of capitalism lends credibility to the broad political message of a 
strategic commitment to detente set forth in major Soviet pronouncements 
on the fluctuating fortunes of East—West relations over the past decade. 
Taken together with the current regime's general inclinations towards 
indefinite elongation of the transition period and its markedly more 
sober, but still optimistic, assessment of the prospects of Soviet 
socialism, the reappraisal of capitalism does suggest the expectation of 
an indefinite period of state-to—state relations with the leading capitalist 
powers in which a limited relaxation of tensions would hold greater promise 
of Soviet gains than would a more confrontationist relationship.
What is particularly important about the revisionist treatment of 
capitalism and imperialism is that it does not insist that the only way to 
contain the aggressive tendencies of the Western powers (and in particular 
the United States) is to render them impotent. During the mid 1970s, at 
the height of the innovative trend, the analyses of the Soviet Amevikccnisty 
generally presented the United States as 'a declining threat to the basic 
security interests of the USSR', without also presenting it as 'weak, 
passive, or isolationist'. Rather, the image was 'of a still powerful, 
more restrained, more circumspect, less menacing United States, a nation 
with which one [could] do business, but one not to be regarded lightly'.125 
Of course, the possibility that American policymakers might respond to 
their more circumscribed situation by a resort to more flagrantly 
'adventurist' methods was by no means excluded. But it was presented 
as a possibility rather than, as in the Stalin era, a certainty, and a 
possibility, moreover, which the Soviet Union could combat with policies 
calculated to strengthen the position of moderate-sober elements on the
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other side. There was no open repudiation of the received doctrine 
on imperialism. But, in Bhabani Sen Gupta's words, 'Soviet analysts now 
[made] a clear distinction between the United States as a capitalist and 
as an imperialist power. Detente with the capitalist America, struggle 
against the imperialist America' . 1/6
The other vital component of this scenario was, of course, the 
expressed confidence in the present and future strength of the USSR.
Even the most innovative of the specialist studies insisted that the 
new realism making the United States an 'acceptable partner' for a detente 
relationship was a response to a new correlation of forces, which had 
compelled the American leaders finally to abandon both their direct 
'positions of strength' policy and their indirect 'bridge building' 
strategies aimed at promoting internal unrest within the Soviet Union 
and the Eastern bloc. Just as Lenin had spoken fifty years earlier of 
having 'won our right to our fundamental international existence in 
the network of capitalist states', so now the Soviet Union - which, 
according to Arbatov had often been regarded in the United States as 
'a kind of illegitimate child of history ... a "historical misunderstanding" 
which has to be ended in one way or another as quickly as possible' - 
had now established its right to treat on equal terms with the greatest 
capitalist power over the broad range of global issues. 128
Even in this respect, however, the perception of American strength 
and staying power is crucial, and it must be reiterated that it is 
equality with, not superiority over, the United States upon which the 
Soviet regime has insisted over the previous decade. Moreover, the 
Soviets evidently desire American recognition not merely of their equality 
in raw military terms but also, as Arbatov's comment clearly indicates, 
of their 'legitimate' great power status - a concern which reflects in 
turn the ambivalences of the deeply-ingrained 'catching-up' motif in 
Soviet (and Russian) history. In the 'long term', the Soviets may hope 
and expect to decisively supplant the United States as the primary great 
power influence upon the contemporary world order; and their most immediate 
and concrete interests in detente may lie in the desire for economic 
assistance and for limits on the burden of the arms race. But, as 
Bialer observes, there is also a 'more fundamental' psychological source 
'of the Soviets' overwhelming preoccupation and concern with US-Soviet 
relations', which seems likely to hold good for some time to come. 'They
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see in the United States the prime measuring rod of their own developments
12 9and achievements'.
Finally, as noted above, the consideration of this theoretical 
background provides for a more satisfactory assessment of the shifts 
in the official line sketched in the earlier quotations from Brezhnev's 
successive Congress addresses. There would seem to have been two basic 
watershed periods in Soviet assessments of American attitudes and policies 
during the 1970s, the first leading to a 'strikingly positive' picture 
during the years 1973-5, and the second leading to deep disillusionment 
in the last 18 months or so of the Carter administration.130
As Schwartz points out, the specialist Amerzkanisty3 no less than 
the political leadership itself, took a sceptical, view of the advertised 
changes in American policies under the Nixon administration until the 
Moscow summit of 1972. Before that landmark, even the most optimistic 
of them had refused to acknowledge a clear-cut victory for the forces 
of moderation in the United States, and it was only in retrospective
1 j 1commentary on the 1972 achievements that 'a distinct change of tone emerged' 
Moreover, Soviet commentators characteristically emphasized not merely the 
concrete achievement of SALT I but also the 'Basic Principles' Agreement, 
with its formal recognition of the Peaceful Coexistence concept and the 
commitment to 'equal security' in US-USSR relations that it was supposed 
to enshrine. They persistently looked back to these agreements as the 
relationship began to deteriorate again in the middle 1970s, with the 
furore over the Soviet role in Angola, the Ford administration's 
abandonment of the very word detente, and the 'human rights' campaign of 
the incoming Carter administration. Those original agreements, Arbatov 
argued in early 1978, had given 'Soviet-American relations a stability 
that is not easy to shatter, even for the most inveterate enemies of detente', 
and even though the movement of the detente process from 'generalized
principles ... to their implementation in concrete deeds requires the
1 3 2accomplishment of increasingly complex tasks'.
However, there was a distinct narrowing in the immediate scope of 
the detente envisaged in Soviet pronouncements from 1976 onwards. And 
though Brezhnev made an early public offer, in January 1977, 'to cooperate 
with the new [Carter] Administration ... in order to take a major step
1 j 3forward with regard to relations between our two countries', the early
conclusion of a SALT II agreement based essentially on the long-stalled
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Vladivostok accords seemed to be regarded increasingly as the touchstone 
of American readiness to continue on the path of equal security. Towards 
the end of 1977, when the SALT talks had been reopened within such a 
general framework - following the hostile Soviet response to the Carter 
administration's first proposals for a radically new approach - Brezhnev 
stated the Soviet perspective in terms which were widely echoed throughout 
Soviet commentary :
International relations are now at the crossroads, 
as it were, which could lead either to a growth 
of trust and co-operation, or to a growth of 
mutual fears, suspicion, and arms stockpiles, 
a crossroads leading, ultimately, either to 
lasting peace or, at best, to balancing on the 
brink of war. Detente offers the opportunity of 
choosing the road of peace. To miss this 
opportunity would be a crime.
1 34
Several months later, writing in the context of a further American 
outcry over Soviet actions (and alleged actions) in Africa and new 
American overtures towards China, Arbatov linked this motif with the 'equal 
security' theme. The SALT II negotiations could constitute 'a real turning 
point on the path to military detente', he maintained. But they had now 
'reached a kind of frontier'; and the major issue was not a technical 
one but a 'fundamental political decision by the US government on whether 
or not to conclude an agreement at this time at all'.135 By late 1979 
a SALT II treaty had been concluded, but ratification by the US Senate was 
emerging as a further major barrier which the Carter administration 
seemed ambivalent about attacking. Moreover, as Legvold points out, the 
whole issue was intensifying American debate not merely about Soviet 
actions in Africa but also about 'non events' such as the alleged presence 
of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba. In this context, with the growing
evidence of a distinct American tilt towards China, and sharply upgraded 
US arms procurement in the 1980s, Levgold suggests that even a ratified 
SALT treaty may have looked an excessively costly achievement in Soviet 
eyes. The United States,it was concluded, had effectively made its 
choices regarding the early prospects for American-Soviet relations, and 
when the question of intervention in Afghanistan had to be considered, the 
impact upon detente of such a move was no longer a substantial consideration.1;
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This interpretation of Soviet perceptions, to reiterate, does 
involve taking seriously those specialist Soviet analyses of American 
capabilities and internal dynamics which suggest that the goal of equal 
security would seem a logical one for the Soviets to pursue. At the same 
time it must be acknowledged that this question of Soviet perceptions of 
the United States does pose special difficulties for the attempt in this 
thesis to refute the hawk argument that Soviet doctrine itself demonstrates 
a rejection of the concept of stable coexistence. The argument that the 
Soviets are impelled towards an imperialist course by the perceived 
weakness of their oim position goes directly against the basic tenets 
of Soviet doctcj/Kd, and can be sustained only by assuming that the Soviets 
do not in practice believe in the optimism of their official historical 
perspective. By contrast, the argument that they are impelled to seek 
'absolute security' by their conception of Western imperialism can be 
supported by references to basic doctrinal tenets, at least as those 
were codified and rigidified in the Stalin era. The revisionist 
perspectives on imperialism and state-monopoly capitalism have not, in 
general, been openly publicized by the leadership, either under Khrushchev 
or under his successors. Rather, the traditional rhetoric has been 
maintained while the theoretical arguments supporting it have been 
unobtrusively dropped, and the traditional rhetoric has been fairly
consistently exploited by groups in the Soviet elite which insist that 
the 'aggressive essence' of imperialism remains unchanged despite the 
new restrictions on its more flagrantly militarist tendencies. By 
focussing primarily on this latter group, hawk analysts are able to depict 
Soviet claims about the changed correlation of forces in a highly 
threatening light. As Gibert puts it, in a relatively moderate statement 
of this position, the Soviet insistence on the link between American 
interest in detente and the changed correlation of forces is 'especially 
damaging to viable Soviet-American peaceful coexistence'.
Thus Soviet leaders do not perceive the attempts of 
the American government to negotiate issues, to 
ameliorate the arms race, to encourage trade and so 
on as indicating any genuine desire for peace. On 
the contrary, those are involuntary acts forced on 
a still hostile and aggressive America. Accordingly, 
indications that the United States really would like 
to improve superpower relations do not induce 
reciprocal feelings on the part of Soviet leaders.
l 3 a
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Two comments may be made about this and similar hawk analyses.
First, they discount the arguments advanced by specialist Soviet analysts 
of the Western powers and concentrate instead upon the arguments of 
those whose expertise lies elsewhere, such as the military and the party's 
ideological watchdogs. This pattern of selection flows naturally from 
the hawk emphasis upon the legitimating role of Soviet ideology, and 
on the centrality of a 'perceptual process' in which aspects of reality 
which contradict the core propositions of the Soviet 'belief system' 
are allegedly screened out of Soviet analyses of domestic and international 
politics.139 However, I have attempted to argue that the Soviet ' belief 
system' has been much more fluid than is acknowledged in Western accounts 
which emphasize its peculiarly 'ideological' character, and that - with 
the major exception of the high Stalin period - the relationship between 
grand theoretical propositions and piecemeal analytical bviooZage has 
been a dynamic and reciprocal one.
Second, by postulating an essentially static dichotomy between 
genuine and propagandists elements in Soviet pronouncements, the hawk 
analysts have glossed over the extent to which the Soviet line i-n genevaX 
(including that of detente-oriented groups such as the Amevbkanbsty) has 
shifted over time in response to changing international conditions and, 
in particular, to the changing posture of the United States. As was 
noted earlier, the writings of the specialist Amevbkanbsty have conformed 
quite closely to the general movement of the official line, including 
the shift back to a much harder line in recent years. Equally important, 
the position espoused by the military itself has shifted during the detente 
era; and, in particular, their support for the preservation of an 
established military 'equilibrium' has continued in the most recent 
commentary on the policies of the Reagan administration.139 ^
In conclusion, then, the real distinction is not between distinct 
'hard' and 'soft' lines in different areas of Soviet commentary, but rather 
between an interpretation of the one broad line which sees Soviet 
hostility to the West as fundamentally insensitive to questions of 
structural change in world politics, and an interpretation which 
takes seriously the evidence of sensitivity to such change in Soviet 
commentary itself. Even on the latter interpretation, the official 
Soviet perspective on American policy over the past seven to eight years,
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when set against the currently dominant American perspective on Soviet 
policy over the same period, does not augur well for an early resumption 
of detente between the two great powers. The scepticism about such a 
prospect is most obvious on the American side, where a series of largely 
incoherent approaches have replaced the original Nixon-Kissinger detente 
strategy, which had begun to unravel well before the latter's final 
exit from office in 1976. However, as Legvold observed in late 1980:
What is seldom noticed is that Soviet policy 
towards America has also disintegrated. It 
happened later; indeed, the disintegration has 
been under way for only a year or two. And it 
shares none of the domestic features that have 
played so prominent a role in the unraveling 
of U.S. policy towards the USSR. But the loss 
of direction, the narrowing of perspective, 
and the consternation that follows when the 
premises of a policy begin to collapse are all 
severe.
1 4 0
To point to this disintegration is not to repudiate the claim made 
earlier that the Soviet authorities still appear to hold to the same 
overall reading of the correlation of forces as lay behind the original 
'Peace Programme' of the Twenty-Fourth Congress. Rather, it is 
precisely because of their apparent belief in the essential continuity of 
the 'objective' parameters of the great power relationship that such 
factors as a renewed American interest in military superiority must seem 
especially ominous to them. For, given Soviet assumptions about the 
implausibility of such a goal, an American drive in this direction 
must be read either as an indirect attempt to exacerbate Soviet internal 
problems by intensifying the already unequal economic burden of the arms 
race, or else, more simply, as the instinctive recidivism of a power which, 
having enjoyed the experience of largely unchallenged security and 
influence, ultimately proves incapable of sharing its eminence with a 
major competitor. On either reading current American policy-makers are 
cast in a directly opposite light to the sober realism which Soviet 
commentators held in such high regard in the treatment of the Nixon 
administration.
On the other hand, the Soviets continue to insist that detente 
remains their core objective in dealing with the capitalist powers; and
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their objections to recent American policy have focussed not just on
its renewed assertiveness - for an extensive Soviet-American value
conflict is allegedly taken as given - but on its inconsistency and its
failure to treat the Soviet Union seriously as an equal negotiating
partner. Indeed, when Soviet leaders began to directly articulate their
approach to detente (as distinct from Peaceful Coexistence) they did so
in strikingly traditional terms. Detente, Brezhnev asserted in early
1977, meant an end to the cold war and 'a transition to normal, stable
relations among states', involving a commitment to the negotiated
settlement of differences and 'a certain degree of trust and willingness
l 4 o (a ) e • • i -|to take into account each other's legitimate interests'. similarly,
Gromyko, in justifying the Soviet rejection of the initial Carter 
administration SALT proposals, emphasized that the new leadership had 
abandoned an established basis for agreement in pursuit of its own 
unilateral advantage. 'In this particular case', he asked rhetorically, 
'what kind of stability can one talk about in relations between the 
US and the USSR?’141 Statements along these lines continued throughout 
the Carter administration, culminating in the response to the American 
sanctions over the invasion of Afghanistan. 'The sum total' of American 
measures, Brezhnev maintained, constituted an attempt 'to talk to us in 
the language of the cold war'. The Soviet Union could do without the 
suspended ties, and had 'never begged for them', regarding them as 
mutually advantageous. But the U.S. had proved itself 'an absolutely 
unreliable partner', capable of 'violating its international agreements' 
in a fashion which must have 'a dangerous destabilizing influence on the 
entire international situation'. Moreover,
Washington's arbitrary arrogation to itself 
of some kind of 'right' to 'reward' or 'punish' 
independent sovereign states poses a question 
of principle. In fact, these actions of the 
US government strike a major blow at the system 
of relations among states regulated by 
international law.
1 H 2
Despite the tendentiousness of such language in regard to the 
Afghanistan issue, the broader Soviet objection to the pattern of American 
behaviour does have a valid point, at least as regards the chequered 
history of the SALT II treaty. And if this reading of the basis of
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Soviet discontent with American policy is valid, it is possible that more 
normal, if not yet cordial, great power relations could be restored by 
an American approach which was both more assertive in respect of defined 
American interests and more consistent in defining those interests and 
the limits of them. However, some of the deepest tensions between the 
great powers derive not from their direct interaction but from their 
interaction with strategically placed third parties; and Afghanistan 
and Poland have demonstrated anew that the internal correlation of forces 
in such societies places important restrictions upon the great powers' 
ability to ensure a stable context for their own relations. The Soviet 
approach to these third party limitations on detente will be considered 
in the final section.
The Limits of Detente
There are at least three major issues in regard to which Soviet 
spokesmen have attempted to specify limits to the process of detente with 
the Western powers. The first is the matter of Western relations with 
China. This has been discussed already, and little need be added at this 
point. The Soviet concern appears to have little to do with the maintenance 
of ideological hegemony over China, which - insofar as it ever existed - 
is now long gone, and a great deal to do with traditional security issues, 
overlaid by a deep historical residue of animus against 'Asian hordes'.
There is no reason why the Western powers should allow Soviet phobias 
'about China to impede the normalization of their relations with that 
country. But a formal or informal military alliance could not be justified 
as an attempt to preserve the balance of world power, and would inevitably 
evoke well-founded Soviet fears of geopolitical encirclement.
The second issue concerns the alleged Western attempts to interfere 
in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union and the rest of the Warsaw 
Pact. As regards the smaller bloc countries, it may once again be 
sufficient to reiterate the conclusions drawn earlier. Direct security 
concerns and demands for ideological hegemony have been closely intertwined 
in the Soviet approach to these countries since at least 1948, and there 
is as yet no clear evidence that the Soviets are prepared to redefine 
their demands upon this region in more limited ’sphere of influence' 
terms. At the same time, the impact upon the more advanced East European
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States of economic and cultural links with the West is growing, and 
is almost certain to continue growing in any context of detente. The 
Soviet concern about this prospect is well founded, in terms of their 
own preoccupations. But the explanation of adverse trends in Eastern 
Europe primarily in terms of externally-'inspired 'creeping counter­
revolution' involves a gross misrepresentation of the mass forces 
involved, and the prospects over the next decade for containing these 
mass forces within the old framework seem highly dubious.
The Soviet social order itself, if the earlier arguments on this 
point are valid, should be much less vulnerable to the impact of Western 
pluralist values over this same period. Yet Western attempts to 'interfere' 
in Soviet internal politics, such as the Jackson-Vanik amendment and the 
Carter administration's 'human rights' campaign, have produced an 
extremely hostile Soviet response, exemplified by Brezhnev's statement 
in March 1977, at the height of the human rights controversy:
Washington's pretensions to teach others how 
to live are, I am sure, unacceptable to any 
sovereign state ... I repeat: we will not 
tolerate interference in our internal affairs 
by anyone, no matter what the pretext. Any 
normal development of relations on such a 
basis is, of course, unthinkable.
1 4 3
There seems little doubt that the Soviet response reflected a genuine 
sense of affronted national dignity, and a suspicion that the United 
States was turning away from its early-1970s acceptance of equal state-to- 
state dealings and back towards an approach to the Soviet Union as an 
'illegitimate child of history'. But it also reflected a basic 
contradiction in the official Soviet position that Peaceful Coexistence 
and detente were fully consistent with intense ideological struggle - 
a contradiction which was not resolved by tendentious Soviet attempts to 
distinguish between legitimate (Soviet) forms of ideological struggle and 
illegitimate practices of distortion and 'psychological warfare' employed 
by the other side. Moreover, this contradiction was highlighted by the 
Soviet line on the Helsinki CSCE Final Act. 'The main conclusion' of the 
Final Act, Brezhnev asserted, was that 'no one should try, on the basis 
of foreign policy considerations of one kind or another, to dictate to 
other people how they should manage their internal affairs ... A different
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approach is a flimsy and perilous ground for the cause of international 
co-operation'.144 But while this did provide for a rhetorical defence 
against Western criticisms of Soviet internal policies in terms of the 
Helsinki agreement, it also added to the case against Soviet pretensions 
to regulate the internal affairs of the other members of the 'socialist 
commonwealth'.
The third issue - and the primary focus of this section - concerns 
the relationship between great power detente and the shifting correlation 
of forces in the Third World. The Soviet position on this question 
involves two important claims which, if not directly contradictory, are 
certainly in substantial tension. On the one hand, there is the long­
standing distinction between class struggle and state-to-state relations, 
given a vintage expression by Brezhnev at the Twenty-Fifth Congress. 
Attributing Western objections to Soviet support of the 'world revolutionary 
process' to 'outright naivetyf or more likely a deliberate clouding of 
minds', he continued:
It could not be clearer, after all^that detente 
and peaceful coexistence have to do with 
interstate relations ... Detente does not in 
the slightest abolish, nor can it abolish or 
alter, the laws of the class struggle. No one 
should expect that because of the detente 
Communists will reconcile themselves with 
capitalist exploitation or that monopolists 
will become followers of the revolution. [But] 
strict observance of the principle of non­
interference in the affairs of other states 
and respect for their independence and 
sovereignty is one of the essential conditions 
of detente.
1 4 5
On the other hand, there is the more recent insistence on the great 
power rights of the Soviet Union, which implies a commitment not to the 
status quo in general but at least to the orderly 'management' of 
challenges to the existing framework of international relationships. 
Admittedly, the question of joint management is raised directly only 
in one of the two main strands of this theme: namely, the proposition 
that today 'no question of any importance in the world can be solved 
without [Soviet] participation'. The other - the proposition that the 
Soviet Union 'cannot remain indifferent' even to territorially remote
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events that 'affect our security and the security of our friends' -
might be interpreted as a prescription for unilateral action, and for
action in support of friends whose objectives and modus operandi place
them outside the pale of international society (which is precisely the
charge which the Reagan administration has been trying to pin on the
Soviet Union in its campaign to associate the latter with 'international
terrorism'). But even this Soviet claim is in itself a very traditional
one, and the Soviets would appear, in general, to define the term
'friends' in the traditional sense of 'licensed international actors',
applying it primarily to established regimes and 'registered' national
liberation movements such as the PLO and SWAPO. There is, indeed, a
rhetorical reconciliation of this broad position with the Soviet Union's
self advertised stance as the guardian of world revolution, in the
argument (mounted against 'ultra-leftist assertions that peaceful
coexistence is the next thing to "helping capitalism" and "freezing the
socio-political status quo"') that 'every revolution is above all a
natural result of a given society's internal development'. But at the
146level of Dolitical practice the tension remains considerable.
I wish to argue that the Soviet oscillation between 'great power' 
and 'revolutionary power' approaches, while undoubtedly self-serving, is 
also in part a direct reflection of the contradictory character of 
contemporary world politics: the phenomenon which Khrushchev sometimes 
called the 'dynamic status quo', or which I have conceptualized as a 
relatively stable structure of world power (though one resting on a 
dynamic balance among the great) and a process of massive socio-economic 
change among Third World countries held within this structure. This 
contradictory situation provides an 'objective' basis for both conflict 
and cooperation among the great powers, for the pursuit of detente and 
the recognition of limits to detente, and for the basic tension observable 
in Soviet policy.
Before developing this argument, however, it may be useful to consider 
the hawk claim that no such great power/revolutionary power tension 
exists in Soviet policy, because the former theme is clearly predominant 
over the latter. There is nothing new about this assessment of Soviet 
priorities: indeed, the argument for the reverse ordering has never 
really been taken seriously throughout the post-war debate. But it is 
worth reiterating that in the 1960s and early 1970s the Soviet Union's 
great power preoccupations were widely expected to make it a more 'normal'
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international actor, with a major stake in the status quo. Thus, the 
hawk achievement has been to revive and refine the earlier tradition 
which saw the Soviet Union's ostensibly revolutionary political 
doctrine as rationalizing and intensifying an ingrained Russian messianism 
which was itself incompatible with normal international reations based 
upon the recognition of limited and definable 'national interests'.
Of course, for some leading hawks, such as Pipes, Soviet ipo'l'Lt'LcaZ 
doctrine is largely irrelevant, and Soviet intentions are laid bare by 
military doctrine alone, when interpreted with due reference to 
considerations of geopolitics and Russian political culture. But there 
have also been arguments, drawing upon precisely the sort of 'scientific 
management' themes which I have emphasized here as the rhetorical trademark 
of the Brezhnev regime, that the goal of empire is explicitly stated in 
Soviet political doctrine. Thus Mitchell argues that 'it is largely 
irrelevant whether or not the Soviet Union remains a "revolutionary" 
society or whether it has lost its "revolutionary dynamism". The exclusive 
conceptual framework of all Soviet thought on politics and society dictates 
the ultimate domination of the world by a single social structure'.147 
Pointing to the undoubted emphasis on the role of the super-structure in 
Soviet treatments of both domestic and international politics, and to 
the recent extension of arguments about the 'rapprochement' of nationalities 
within the USSR to the rapprochement of nations in Eastern Europe, he 
argues that Soviet theorists have now extended this concept to the world 
as a whole, through their insistence on the 'organic' links between 
Peaceful Coexistence and Proletarian Internationalism and on the prospects 
created by the altered correlation of forces for a decisive 'restructuring 
of international relations'. The latter concept, he argues, is nothing 
less than 'a new Brezhnev doctrine', to the effect that
rational action by both capitalists and 
revolutionists will lead to Soviet world 
dominance, provided the cohesion of the 
socialist center is maintained ... Western 
apologists for detente may wishfully indulge 
in the assumption of a Soviet desire for 
parity with the United States; the new 
Brezhnev doctrine explicitly refutes that 
assumption. In their reconceptualization 
of doctrine, the Soviets have proclaimed 
the imminence of world hegemony - usually 
with clarity, always in resounding tones.
1 4 8
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This highly formalistic argument distorts both the 'text' and 
the context of Soviet pronouncements on international politics over 
the past decade. To begin with the matter of formal claims. Soviet 
spokesmen have not claimed, or claimed to seek, military superiority 
over the United States, let alone over all the other major powers 
together, which would be the minimum requirement for an attempt on their 
part to enforce from above the desired 'restructuring' of their international 
environment. Moreover, when confronted by the Afghanistan crisis with 
the need to rationalize their first unequivocal intervention outside their 
established sphere of influence, they have not had official recourse 
even to the 'first' Brezhnev doctrine, although Afghanistan was already 
ruled by a self-proclaimed Communist regime and the sphere of influence 
question was itself somewhat ambiguous. Rather, they invoked the very 
traditional defence of 'counter-intervention'. As Brezhnev put it at 
the Twenty-Sixth Congress:
Imperialism unleashed a real undeclared war 
against the Afghan revolution. This created 
a direct threat to the security of our southern 
borders. The situation compelled us to provide 
the military assistance that this friendly 
country asked for.
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Even on the most permissive definition of imperialism, this was a patently 
dishonest account of the circumstances surrounding the Soviet invasion.
But it was the kind of dishonesty upon which great powers have traditionally 
relied to rationalize actions of this type in the past.
As regards practical issues bearing more directly on the apparent 
Soviet reading of the contemporary correlation of forces, it is slighting 
the well attested realism of the Soviet leadership to suggest that they 
expect to secure, in the forseeable future, even the kind of modified 
global hegemony which the United States enjoyed for most of the 1950s 
and 1960s, unless the latter effectively withdrew from the great power 
contest. It is also slighting that realism to suggest a Soviet belief 
that, in conditions anywhere approaching military parity, the non-nril'Ltai’y 
correlation of forces would deliver even the 'arc of crisis' region 
securely to Soviet hegemony. Even in Eastern Europe, where the Soviet 
Union does possess overwhelming military preponderance, plus highly
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developed military and political patronage networks and very considerable 
economic leverage, the insistent claims of the last decade about the 
'unshakeable' and 'law-governed' unity of the socialist bloc look 
increasingly like whistling against the wind. To expect a goal 
unattainable there to be attainable on a world scale would be ridiculous, 
and the extensive Soviet literature on Third World development plainly 
acknowledges this fact. Such literal and forced readings of selected 
aspects of Soviet doctrine as that quoted above, I would argue, are 
tantamount to treating Soviet doctrine in general as meaningless. It 
is much more reasonable (in the sense of economical) to assume that the 
'restructuring' theme is 'management' rhetoric translated into a 
peculiarly Soviet idiom, and infused with a 'new' global power hubris 
analogous to that so evident in American management rhetoric in the 1960s.
If one adopts this position, it is also reasonable to view the 
contemporary Soviet Union primarily as a great power and in many respects 
a conservative great power, but one which - by virtue both of its present 
disadvantaged position in the world-economy and the historically 
conditioned self-image of its regime - retains a long term commitment to 
radical socio-economic change at least in certain crucial regions of the 
Third World. The anomalies of this position may be considered under 
three broad headings.
First, there is the general politico-diplomatic campaign to expand 
Soviet great power influence in the Afro-Asian region. The most visible 
manifestation of this campaign has been the establishment of a major 
naval presence in the Mediterranean and the Indian and Pacific oceans, 
a development partly rationalized, in the writings of Admiral Gorshkov 
and others, in terms of the traditional role of navies in the peace-time 
building of 'influence'. In addition, the Soviet Union has, over the 
last decade or so, established an extensive network of bilateral treaties 
in West Asia and Africa, and this has been accompanied by a major 
expansion in the role of Soviet and allied 'advisers', both military and 
non-military, in this region, even leaving aside the more spectacular
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Soviet demarches in Angola, Ethiopia and Afghanistan.
However, the policy of close bilateral ties has its own serious 
problems. In addition to those specific instances, such as Egypt and 
Somalia, where an effective reversal of alliances has taken place, 
the tortuous character of West Asian politics in general has created 
ongoing dilemmas for the Soviets in the reconciliation of their 
commitments to their various clients. And throughout the 1970s, Soviet 
spokesmen have devoted a great deal of rhetorical energy to collective 
initiatives, in Brezhnev's ill-fated proposal for an Asian collective 
security pact, in their support for an Indian Ocean 'zone of peace', and 
in their insistence on the need for collective solutions to the security 
problems of the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. There is obviously 
a large element of straight propaganda in this latter approach, and it 
clearly fits into a general strategy aimed at containing and 'rolling 
back', American and Chinese influence in the regions to the south of the 
USSR. But the penchant for collective and legalistic solutions also 
accords with Soviet diplomatic style in Europe, in regard to which the 
regime's satisfaction with the recognition of Soviet great power status 
seems most evident. Moreover, the emphasis upon collective solutions 
does not necessarily imply the rejection of an associated role for joint 
great power management. Indeed, in regard to the pivotal Middle Eastern 
problem, the basic Soviet objection to American policy since the 1973 
war is that it has turned aside both from collective considerations and 
from the acceptance of an equal great power contribution on the Soviet 
side, attempting to establish a unilateral role in this area. Thus, at 
the Twenty-Sixth Congress, Brezhnev asserted the need to return to 'honest, 
collective searches for a comprehensive settlement on a just and realistic 
basis', including possible contributions from the European states and 
the UN. But he also emphasized that 'we are prepared for such a search 
in conjunction with the US - may I remind you that we had a certain 
amount of experience in this respect some years ago'.150
The second broad question concerns Soviet judgements on the position 
of Third World states in the contemporary world-economy. One major 
consideration here is the Group of 77 campaign for a New International 
Economic Order, which received a notably perfunctory endorsement in 
Brezhnev's Twenty-Sixth Congress speech. As was noted in Chapter 4, 
this development has proved in some respects an embarrassment for the 
Soviet regime, in that its desirable anti-Western aspects are substantially
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offset by the rationale it has provided to both Western and Third 
World spokesmen for subsuming the Soviet bloc countries into the rich 
'North', thus placing them in a similar position to the Western 
countries as regards the alleged systemic exploitation of the South. 
Moreover, this is one area in which the Soviet predilection for multi­
lateral approaches has been less marked, as evidenced by the failure 
even to attend the recent 'North-South summit' at Cancun.
The basic Soviet position has been that the blanket North-South 
distinction on economic issues distorts the reality of the global class 
struggle; that the Soviet Union, which has not exploited the Third 
World as the 'imperialist' powers have done, does not have the same 
moral responsibility to make restitution; and that a 'restructuring' of 
international economic arrangements which remained within an essentially 
capitalist framework would be an illusory solution. However, the 
Soviet notion of 'mutually advantageous ties' within the 'international 
division of labour' - counterposed to the Western notion of interdependence 
- has been strongly criticized by Third World (and, of course, Chinese) 
spokesmen; and in their lukewarm approach to issues such as the Common 
Fund, and their direct resistance on issues such as a debt relief and 
increased multilateral aid, the Soviets have found it difficult W  
practice to distinguish their position from that of the Western nations. 
Therefore, suggests Toby Gati, the inclination is still to keep a 
relatively low profile in a debate which the Soviet Union did not initiate 
and cannot reshape to its liking:
It is, in turn, an enthusiastic proponent 
of economic redistribution [from West to 
South], a grudging supporter of continuing 
dialogue, and an unyielding defender of its 
own interests ... On balance, the Soviet 
Union is participating in the NIEO discussions 
more but enjoying it less.
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In the specialist literature, indeed, there are trends towards 
the justification of the Soviet position in less orthodox terms, which 
draw upon the revisionist approach to imperialism and the notion of a 
unified world economy discussed earlier in this chapter. Moreover, the 
influence of these concepts is evident in the current Soviet approach 
to another major aspect of the Third World's economic situation: namely
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the non-capitalist path of development. In the 1970s, this goal 
appears to have been downgraded in Soviet prescription for 'progressive' 
or 'socialist oriented' countries. In keeping with the altered perspective 
on the tempo of the advance towards Communism in the d eve lo p ed socialist 
societies, 'current Soviet development theory ... stresses the sequential 
nature of growth as well as the material prerequisites essential for 
steady and genuine progress'. And though the Soviet Union's own experience 
is still held out as a basic reference point for socialist oriented 
states, the recommendation is not for rapid, autarkic industrialization 
along Stalinist lines but rather for an indefinite resort to NEP-style 
strategies, with 'the utilization of foreign capital and the market 
mechanism'.15 2
Already, by the late 1960s, Soviet theorists were acknowledging 
the 'objective basis' of the orientation towards the 'world capitalist 
market' on the part of the majority of former colonies; and they emphasized 
not merely the inability of the socialist countries to replace the West 
as a primary source of investment and markets, but also the inaccuracy of 
the assumption that capitalist investment in developing economies necessarily
n c oyielded 'super-profits' to its originators. With the internal resources 
of state-monopoly capitalism and the ongoing trend towards greater 
transnational investment among the capitalist powers now acknowledged, 
the implied policy prescription was that progressive states might need, 
in certain situations, actively to court foreign capital while at the 
same time carefully expoiting their own political resources to ensure 
that investments served their own long term requirements. Moreover, 
the emergence during the 1970s of a number of new, self-styled Marxist- 
Leninist regimes does not seem to have altered this basic perspective, 
with Cuban troops actually guarding the installations of Gulf Oil in 
Angola.
A final point on the question of Third World economic relationships 
is the increasing attention paid in the last decade to economic ties 
with states in the South, Central and West Asian regions, whether or 
not these could be convicted of any kind of socialist orientation.
Thus at the Twenty-Fourth Congress Kosygin named Afghanistan, Iran and 
Pakistan, along with India and a clutch of progressive Arab states, as 
states with which the Soviet Union now enjoyed 'firmly established 
mutually advantageous economic ties'.
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Our co-operation with these countries, 
based upon the principles of equality 
and respect for mutual interests, is 
acquiring the nature of a stable division 
of labour, counterposed to the system of 
imperialist exploitation in the sphere of 
international economic relations. At the 
same time through the expansion of trade 
with the developing countries, the SU will 
receive the opportunity to satisfy the 
requirements of our economy more fully.
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Lowenthal has coined the term 'counter-imperialism' for this 
strategy, though the notion of imperialism seems even less applicable 
in this context than in regard to the politico-economic expansion of 
the United States during the 1950s and 1960s, in that the Soviet Union 
is most unlikely to be able to support its alleged bid for reserved 'zones 
of political and economic influence' along its southern borders with the 
kind of preponderance in global projection capability which the United 
States then enjoyed. However, Lowenthal's argument does highlight 
two important new trends in Soviet policy towards the developing countries: 
the much more open interest in profiting from the exploitation of their 
resources of valuable raw materials and cheap labour; and the more 
positive estimate of the prospects for foreign policy independence on 
the part of substantial state capitalist societies, provided that their 
regimes could be offered a reliable alternative to complete economic 
dependence on the West. And though Lowenthal is himself sceptical 
about the prospects for any exclusive Soviet sphere in this region, he 
does suggest that the policy has proved 'more realistic and more successful' 
than earlier approaches in eroding Western influence there. In particular, 
he suggests that the Soviet approach enhanced the room for manoeuvre of 
the OPEC countries in the crucial years 1971-73 (though the success of 
OPEC, of course, has meant in turn that the room for manoeuvre of the oil 
rich states and their clients has been enhanced against both great powers).15* 
The third broad issue is that of the political development of Third 
World states - the issue on which Soviet policy in the 1970s seems, on 
the face of it, most at variance with the essentially gradualist 
perspectives and strategies sketched above. One reason for Western 
surprise at Soviet action in Angola in 1975 (leaving aside the simplistic 
assumption that it violated established 'rules'of detente) was the view
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of many Western analysts that sub-Saharan Africa lay outside the basic 
Soviet 'target area' and that the Soviets had become thoroughly 
disillusioned with the prospects of the 'non-capitalist path', which 
had provided the chief rationale for their involvement in that region 
in the late Khrushchev period. The first part of this judgement was 
probably true (for the United States as well as the USSR) for the years 
1964-74, though it was presumably anticipated that Portugal's African 
empire must be liquidated some time, and the Soviets had maintained ties 
with liberation movements in the Portuguese territories even during 
this 'low profile' period. But the second part, insofar as it equated 
the more hard-headed approach to the cause of Third World revolution with 
a propensity towards 'disengagement', was much more questionable, and 
glossed over important elements of the Soviets' own treatment of this 
issue. Thus, the basic line at the Twenty-Fourth Congress explicitly 
combined two major elements: the campaign for better relations in direct 
dealings with the capitalist powers; and continued assistance to the anti­
imperialist struggle, buttressed by the Soviet Union's new credibility as 
a global military power. Moreover, Soviet statements emphasized not 
merely the struggle of established Third World regimes for national 
independence, but the deepening class struggle within Third World societies 
and the links between these two dimensions. 'The main thing', Brezhnev 
asserted at the Twenty-Fourth Congress, 'is that the struggle for 
national liberation in many countries has in practical terms begun to grow 
into a struggle against exploitative relations, both feudal and capitalist** 
The major lessons which Soviet analysts appear to have drawn from 
the fate of national and revolutionary democracies in the 1960s, and 
latterly from the Chilean experience, concern not the hopelessness of 
socialist revolution in the Third World, but the need for a strong party 
organization under secure Communist influence, on the one hand, and for 
effective assistance from the socialist bloc against the 'importation of 
counter revolution', on the other.158 As regards internal factors, 
developments in Chile indicated 'the extreme difficulty of radical 
revolution ... where capitalist relations are firmly established and a 
strong middle class exists'. But the record of the much less advanced 
national democracies also indicated the dangers of excessive reliance 
upon individual charismatic leaders, while the need to exert close 
political control over the army was a lesson common to both. The result,
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Bialer argues, is a special concern in Soviet analysis with the 
political and organizational possibilities of early 'basically anti- 
feudal revolutions'. The concept of 'growing over', as an 'uninterrupted 
though gradual transformation of non-socialist revolutionary developments 
into a socialist revolutionary phase', has become a major theme in the 
1970s, which 'sensitizes Soviet policy makers to the ultimate potential 
of movements and regimes whose immediate goals and socio-economic 
orientation have little to do with socialist reconstruction but whose
15 9political orientation can outpace their socio-economic environment'.
This certainly does not imply a blanket Soviet endorsement of the 
prospects of such situations. Another key theme of the specialist 
literature is that of 'multi-dimensionality' - referring to the fluidity 
of class structure and the specificity of cultural and ideological 
factors in Third World countries.160 This militates against excessive, 
generalized optimism, and is presumably of special concern by virtue 
of the upsurge of 'political Islam' throughout the major regions of 
Soviet concern. However, it does seem clear that the concept of 
'politics in command' remains an essential component of Soviet perspectives 
on revolution, and that, together with the preoccupation with the export 
of counter-revolution, this may dispose Soviet leaders towards decisive 
action in particular situations in which the prospects for establishing 
the political prerequisite for long term advance towards socialism seem 
unusually favourable.
In summary, this 'complex and contradictory' picture of contemporary 
Soviet attitudes to the Third World inevitably has contradictory
implications for the prospects for Soviet-American accommodation in this
itregard. On the one hand, j is excessively simplistic to argue, as several 
Western analysts have done, that the 'resurgence' in the 1970s of Soviet 
optimism on Third World issues can be attributed essentially to the 
Soviet acquisition of global military capabilities and the perceived 
lack of will on the part of the Western powers to seriously contest the 
employment of those capabilities.161 Such an interpretation underestimates 
both the broad continuity of Soviet assessments of Third World prospects 
(within a deeply ingrained tradition of thinking in both the short and 
the long term) and also the specificity of the historical conjuncture 
(namely, the simultaneous collapse of the Portuguese empire and of the 
exceptional 'feudal' and 'imperial' old regime in Ethiopia) which
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transformed the political face of Africa during the mid-1970s.
Similarly, there seems little reason to invoke the notion of a 
geopolitical 'grand design' in regard to Soviet military activism in the 
1970s, except in the obvious sense of a long-term project to expand 
the Soviet Union's influence in the area directly to its south. Perhaps 
the most unsatisfactory aspect of the 'arc of crisis' notion (aside from 
its tendency to rule out generalized analysis of the internal dynamics 
of the states in question) is that it effectively subsumes situations such 
as Afghanistan, where the Soviet Union had established interests 
stretching back to the mid-1950s, and Angola, where Soviet and Cuban 
action exploited a specific, newly created opportunity in an area where 
no clear markers of great power influence existed, into one general category 
of geopolitical expansionism. Finally, there is no evidence, either 
in Soviet pronouncements or in Soviet conduct to date, of a desire to 
orchestrate a campaign by producers of key raw materials to hold the 
advanced capitalist nations to ransom,even in the highly unlikely event 
of the Soviet Union obtaining sufficient influence on crucial Third World 
'clients' to put such a goal into action.
On the other hand, Soviet policy is evidently directed to encouraging 
the conflictual dimension of the relationship between Third World state 
capitalism and the advanced capitalist powers; and in particular cases 
where the overall correlation forces seemed particularly favourable 
the Soviets have not hesitated to throw extensive military and political 
resources behind avowedly revolutionary regimes, which are allegedly 
regarded as an important 'vanguard' of the anti-imperialist struggle in 
the major regions of Soviet interest.162 Furthermore, the restoration 
of southern Africa to an important role in the calculations of both great 
powers appears likely to persist throughout the next decade, with a major 
political and economic issue - the future of South Africa - being at stake 
in the longer term. Lastly, whereas Soviet options in the Middle East and 
Persian Gulf are circumscribed both by the complex international politics 
of the regional states themselves and by the long-standing knowledge 
that the clash of major power interests in this region always carries 
with it the possibility of general war, Soviet interests in supporting 
liberation movements against South Africa are fairly unequivocal, and the 
countervailing considerations regarding great power management are 
correspondingly fuzzy.163
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Once again, therefore, we are brought back to the question of 
rules of the game in regard to the struggle in the Third World - or 
rather to the absence of them. Bialer has argued that the Soviet Union 
approaches the great power conflict in terms of a 'series of concentric 
rings', spreading outwards from the NATO and Warsaw pact territories.
The closer the ring of conflict is to the 
center, the more it impinges on the vital 
interests of the adversaries and the greater 
is the potential for an all out war ...[But] 
the outer rings of conflict are legitimate 
areas for the competition of the superpowers 
and, by definition, of progress and reaction, 
as long as no direct military confrontation 
between the two superpowers takes place.
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If this characterization is correct, the Soviet approach involves a 
modified version of a very traditional practice of great power management; 
the insulation of conflict 'beyond the lines' from relations within the 
core of the system. Moreover, the current Soviet position is a less 
extreme one than that of the United States during the era of global 
containment, which effectively sought to reserve the area beyond the lines 
to itself and its Western allies, and fought a major 'limited war' in 
Indochina in an apparent attempt to demonstrate just where the lines were 
to be drawn. Thus it is quite misleading to attribute the deep tensions 
which have recently developed between the great powers on Third World 
issues solely to the conflict between an American commitment to the status 
quo and a Soviet desire to profit from instability. The problem is as 
much that the two have been 'out of phase with one another' in regard to 
current political climate and assessments of the correlation of forces.165 
Thus, while the Soviet regime undoubtedly sought to use detente to minimize 
the risks attendant on the exploitation of its newly enhanced power, the 
American government, struggling with the international and domestic costs 
of its earlier over-extension, was 'looking for a new form of containment 
more within its means'.166
It is possible that short-term American and Soviet approaches to the 
Third World will become more in phase in the 1980s, as the one side begins 
to reassert itself and the other experiences in its turn the costs of 
extended commitments. It is also at least conceivable that the two sides
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may acquire a more stable perception of each other's interests in 
currently uncertain areas, and a more realistic sense of the objective 
limits on their joint and unilateral 'management' possibilities. 
Admittedly, it is difficult to discern any prospects for mutual 
understanding in the fog of rhetoric currently emanating from both Moscow 
and Washington. However, as was argued in Chapter 4, the Soviet doctrine 
of the correlation of forces should not be regarded as an insuperable 
barrier to such recognition of mutual interests, and it might in fact be 
an aid to it. At any rate, it cannot plausibly be argued that an 
American attempt under detente to establish rules of the game in regard 
to the Third World was undermined by Soviet intransigence. The attempt 
has simply not been made, on either side.
I have attempted, in this and the preceding chapter, to trace an 
extensive and ongoing adaptation in Soviet doctrine to the experience of 
protracted coexistence with the major capitalist states, though an 
adaptation which, since 1956, has involved an impressive consistency with 
the fundamental categories of the Khrushchevian Peaceful Coexistence 
synthesis. The discussion has indicated that substantial differences 
still exist between the ostensible perspectives on contemporary world 
politics of the Soviet leadership and their American counterparts, and 
that these differences seem likely to exacerbate the effects of objective 
'puli' factors tending to encourage Soviet-American confrontation in the 
Third World. But I have argued against the view that Soviet ideology 
constitutes a uniquely important 'push' factor in this regard. Neither 
in the general attempts of Stalin's successors to promote the ideological 
legitimation of the Soviet social order nor in their portrayal of contemporary 
imperialism are there persuasive grounds for asserting that the Soviets 
themselves openly reject the goal of stable inter-state coexistence.
This broad assessment of the significance of Soviet 'political 
doctrine' and of current Soviet pronouncements on the short and medium 
term correlation of forces will provide the context for the discussion 
of the last major topic of this thesis, and the centrepiece of the hawk
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interpretation of Soviet policy - Soviet military doctrine. However, 
it might be argued that by concentrating, in this chapter, so much upon 
the process of piecemeal analytical bricolage within the framework of 
official Marxist-Leninist categories, I have ignored the possibility 
of a pervasive structural crisis in the 1980s, to which neither analytical 
bricolage nor 'muddling through' policies will constitute a nearly 
adequate response. In addition, there is the point made at the outset 
about the apparent links between earlier structural crises and the 
covert advance of traditional Russian elements within the official 
belief system. Therefore, given the importance attached to such atavistic 
elements in the hawk reading of Soviet doctrine, it seems desirable to 
conclude this chapter with a brief consideration of the prospects for 
their further advance during the next decade.
There would seem to be two basic premises upon which an argument 
to this effect could be grounded. On the one hand, it is clear that there 
will be major problems of structural readjustment for the Soviet economy 
in the 1980s, even if one discounts the more apocalyptic Western predictions 
on this score. There will be sharp constraints on new 'extensive' inputs 
- especially of energy and labour - and correspondingly sharp pressures 
for a serious attack on the problems of low productivity, over-manning, 
excessive centralization and 'diseconomies of scale'. There will be 
major sectoral competition for resources; and since the most recent 
expedient of pruning new industrial investment to meet the needs of the 
agriculture and consumer sectors is fraught with peril in the longer term, 
there must be very serious questions about the privileged position of the 
military. There will also be major regional competition on the resources 
issue, with the traditional claims of the European heartland being 
powerfully challenged by those of Siberia, whose development must be a 
major goal on both economic and security grounds, and of Central Asia, 
the one region where demographic trends promise a substantial growth in 
the potential labour force. The policy of expanding capital infrastructure 
in Central Asia itself may seem more attractive than the alternative of 
trying to bring Central Asian labour to the European regions: but either
alternative is likely to be very expensive, and to promote an
16 7intensification of social and ethnic tensions.
On the other hand, there is the imminent prospect of a 'succession crisis 
whether this takes the form of an interim succession to Brezhnev from
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among his current peers, followed by a more extensive change at a later 
date, or - if Brezhnev continues in power for several more years - an 
immediate and far reaching change of political 'generations', for which 
no clear 'front runners' are currently in evidence. As T.H.Rigby has 
argued, some degree of crisis is indicated in this context by the apparent 
dynamics of the 'mono-organizational' Soviet system, which objectively 
requires strong direction from the top, but which has no clearly established 
leadership position and which, since the dismantling of the foundations 
of Stalin's personal dictatorship, militates against the rapid 
accumulation of power by one leader. To date, he suggests, there have 
been two broad patterns of leadership succession: the slow emergence of 
Brezhnev, based upon bureaucratic compromise, conciliation of interests, 
and piecemeal policy changes; and the more polarizing style, based upon 
the divisive use of patronage and the mobilization of supporting coalitions 
around far-reaching and contentious new policies, exemplified in their 
different ways by both Stalin and Khrushchev. There are prime facie 
grounds for believing that the Soviet Union, confronted with a complex of 
fundamental problems in the 1980s, cannot afford a repetition of theBrezhnevian 
pattern, which for several years during the 1960s would appear to have 
left the country without a leader whose individual power was comparable 
to that even of a Western prime minister or president. Thus 'there might 
be strong backing for an emergent leader with a more assertive, imaginative 
and dominant approach'.168
This leaves open the question of whether the "policy orientation of 
such a leader would be towards structural reform, linked with a bid for 
greater economic co-operation with the West, or towards a more traditional, 
autarkic and security-oriented approach which might be labelled 'neo- 
Stalinist' . The case for the latter possibility has been strongly argued 
by the exiled Soviet dissident Alexander Yanov, in terms which provide 
a more tangible reference point for the ideological 'absences' assumed 
in the hawk reading of Soviet doctrine. He maintains that the current 
centre-right coalition (with Brezhnev the supreme representative of the 
'aristocratic' or 'new class' centrist bloc) cannot cope with the 
structural problems of the system. The alternatives, therefore, are a 
centre-left coalition, in which the centre would safeguard its aristocratic 
privileges, but the policy and ideological thrust would come from the 
leftist 'technostructure', or for a triumph of the right, in which the
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neo-Stalinist contingent in the current Soviet establishment would be 
reinforced by an alliance with the orthodox, Russian nationalist 'New 
Right' within the dissident movement. In this latter alternative, the 
moribund Marxist-Leninist ideology would finally wither away, and an 
exclusivist, messianic doctrine of Russian manifest destiny would provide 
the spiritual force behind the practical return to Stalinist techniques 
of coercive mobilization.159
These considerations provide an important counter to 'business as 
usual' assumptions in regard to Soviet domestic and foreign policy in the 
1980s. But, I would argue that they fall well short of a justification 
of the hawk case considered in this thesis, for several important reasons.
First, it must be emphasized that the hawk theorists themselves have 
neglected to 'display the mechanism' which would account for the formation 
of quasi-Stalinist/Russian nationalist alliance at the pinnacle of power 
in the Soviet Union. Though sometimes making perfunctory gestures towards 
the notion of an impending economic or geopolitical crisis for Soviet 
policy, they seem in practice to assume that such an alliance, which 
even Yanov depicts only as one future possibility, already exists and 
was at most briefly disrupted during the Khrushchev era. This is a position 
which has virtually no support among serious students of Soviet domestic 
politics. Moreover, Yanov, by forthrightly displaying the mechanism of 
his own argument, has indicated more clearly the extent of the assumptions 
required to substantiate a 'radical right' scenario for the future. For 
his argument rests heavily upon appeal to analogies from earlier 
'succession crises' in Russian history, and assigns a strongly determining 
role to spiritual and cultural factors which virtually discounts the 
impact of a material transformation in the Soviet era which must surely 
be rated as unprecedented.
Second, even as regards future developments, Yanov is virtually alone 
among students of Soviet domestic politics in predicting such a radical 
shift to the 'right'. A much more common view is that, in terms of 
organizational structure, balance of interests and ideology, the present 
social order could accommodate quite substantial shifts in either a 
reformist or an authoritarian direction without the necessity for a total 
redefinition of Soviet reality.170 Moreover, though suggestions of an 
imminent transformation of the Soviet system along Western-style pluralist 
lines have effectively disappeared, there is no need to resort to 
unjustifiable assumptions about 'convergence' and the imperatives of
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'modernization' to support a prediction of a substantial reformist 
movement within the basic parameters of the established Soviet order.
On the one hand, there are the objective structural problems mentioned
above, and the powerful situational logic they may generate for a
move against the privileged position of the 'military-industrial complex'.
On the other, there is the likely subjective orientation of the next 
major generation of Soviet leaders. Speculation about individual members 
of this group must be extremely chancy. But it seems fair to assume that 
as a group they will be the most educated leadership generation yet, that 
they will have spent most of their adult lives in the post-Stalin era 
and most of their higher political careers in the professional, administrative 
ethos of the Brezhnev era, and that, having built their careers in domestic 
politics and in peacetime they are not likely to have close, pre-established 
links with the military.171 There is thus a. prima facie case for 
expecting that they would be more responsive than the present leadership 
to the more differentiated perspectives on the West, the Third World and 
the Soviet economy itself advanced by specialist advisers in these various 
areas.
Third, there are no persuasive grounds for assuming, as the hawk 
analysts appear to do, a connection between a quasi-Stalinist/Russian 
nationalist social order and a policy of military activism in uncommitted 
areas. Rather, the overall record of the Stalin period suggests that a 
sectarian political stance would involve a seige mentality directed 
towards autarkic development, combined with a ruthless determination to 
hold existing positions in Eastern Europe and perhaps a more openly 
confrontationist attitude towards China.172 By contrast, the combination 
of detente with the West and activism in the Third World has been in evidence 
in both the Brezhnev and the Khrushchev eras (and embryonically in the 
early 1920s), and the tensions between these two elements would seem to 
be basic to the more 'open' periods of Soviet policy.
An associated point is that the hawk analysis may have the character 
of a self-fulfilling prophecy. Since it indicates that the Soviet Union 
is already comprehensively alienated from the existing international 
order, the implicit or explicit policy prescription is for a renewed 
containment drive, based upon American military superiority and perhaps 
the de facto addition of China to the 'Western alliance'. However, the 
argument here is that the future direction of Soviet politics is very much
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open; and all Soviet history suggests that an attempt to reduce the Soviet 
Union once more to the status of a 'second rate' great power would 
ensure a Soviet commitment to stay in the race whatever the cost, and 
thus be most calculated to bring the radical right alternative to 
fruition. (Indeed, Yanov is himself emphatic on this point.)
Finally, and most crucially for the specific concerns of this thesis, 
the argument for the present or future triumph of the radical right 
entails repudiating completely the Soviet regime's own self-account and 
concentrating almost totally upon the 'absences' from that account which 
are presumed to lie in the traditional Russian political culture. As 
I have attempted to demonstrate, the official account of Soviet reality 
(as opposed to international politics) is a very unsatisfactory one, 
which is much more obviously concerned with legitimation than with 
explanation, and which indicates a campaign to de-politicize issues which 
are of their nature intensely political. But it seeks to legitimate the 
Soviet order in terms of an evolutionary, technocratic determinism which 
is distinctly reminiscent of mainstream behavioural social science in 
the United States, and it provides no support for arguments about the 
hegemony of atavistic beliefs among the Soviet elite.
Of course, this is in no sense an objection to Yanov's analysis, 
since he makes no pretence to take official Soviet ideology seriously.
But the hawk argument is pre-eminently a 'horse's mouth' argument, which 
asserts that the evidence of a Soviet goal of world hegemony is available 
in the Soviet authorities' own pronouncements, if only the West will 
abandon the illusions of detente and take Soviet pronouncements seriously 
As regards the broad sweep of Soviet 'political doctrine' and current 
Soviet pronouncements on the short and medium term correlation of forces 
this 'horse's mouth' argument will not stand. If the hawk thesis is to be 
substantiated, therefore, it must be by reference to the far reaching 
implications of Soviet military doctrine. This topic will be considered 
in the final chapter.
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The Context of Soviet Military Doctrine
I have attempted so far to establish two propositions: that the 
Soviet Union's 'Leninist* account of the world historical process provides, 
in several important respects, a more adequate treatment of the forces 
for change in contemporary world politics than is offered by more 
'systemic' perspectives' and that, within this wider context, the 
Soviet doctrine of Peaceful Coexistence (and latterly detente) represents 
a substantial and ongoing declaratory adaptation to the unique and 
persistent structural realities of international relations. This 
final chapter will examine those aspects of Soviet military doctrine adduced 
as evidence for the hawk argument that no meaningful adaptation has in 
fact occurred. The basic claims at issue here have been stated with 
particular force by Pipes: that the Soviet leadership regards nuclear 
war as in some meaningful sense winnable; that it is not prepared to 
exclude nuclear war as a potential policy instrument in the all out 
struggle with 'imperialism', and that it remains, in the SALT era as 
before, deeply committed to the pursuit of strategic superiority over 
the United States. Given these factors - allegedly deducible 'with a 
high degree of confidence' from Soviet military doctrine - Pipes 
concludes that 'mutual deterrence does not really exist. And unilateral 
deterrence is feasible only if we understand the Soviet war winning 
strategy and make it impossible for them to succeed'.1
This chapter, like the earlier, more general discussion of Soviet 
doctrine on international relations, will focus not on the search for 
subtle doctrinal nuances, but on the criteria by which the realism, or 
appropriateness to context, of the major Soviet propositions might be 
evaluated. One justification for this lies in the striking consistency 
- especially in comparison with the vagaries of American 'declaratory 
policy' - with which the basic themes of nuclear warfighting, unilateral 
damage limitation, and 'combined arms' strategy have been handled in 
Soviet military writings since their assimilation of the implications of 
the 'nuclear revolution' more than two decades ago. But a second
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justification lies in the character of the contemporary American 
debate. For despite the recent dramatic success of their campaign to 
'take Soviet doctrine seriously', the hawk school have added little 
to the early work of pioneering analysts such as Garthoff, Dinerstein 
and Wolfe; and they have rejected as irrelevant the indications, 
admittedly scattered and ambiguous, of a greater accommodation to 
mainstream American notions of deterrence in the 1970s.
Behind both these points lies the basic issue of context. The 
simplest, or most economical starting assumption for a 'serious' 
examination of Soviet military doctrine is that it is pr-imarily indicative 
of a military viewpoint on essentially military matters. To deduce 
from Soviet military doctrine a general Soviet rejection of the prospect 
of stable coexistence with the Western powers, one must at least 
demonstrate that it is incompatible with the explicit rejection of direct 
military conflict with the West so prominent in the wider Peaceful 
Coexistence doctrine, and with the basic situational logic of nuclear-era 
international relations to which the Peaceful Coexistence doctrine so 
explicitly refers. But in the -heavy emphasis in the hawk argument on 
the idiosyncracy of Soviet world views and on the need for clear distinctions 
between doctrine and propaganda several crucial contextual issues are 
either glossed over or actively obfuscated.
First, there is the question of the basic material structure - the 
underlying 'grid' or 'skeleton' of contemporary world politics. There 
is no doubt that the Soviet-American nuclear relationship, by virtue of 
its potential for the effective 'destruction of civilization', is the 
most fundamental aspect of this structure, and that a clear Soviet 
denial of the mutuality of nuclear deterrence would constitute a clear 
rejection of the prospect of stable coexistence. However, as was 
argued at length in Part II, there are objective contradictions in the 
geopolitical and economic situation of the two great powers; and the 
whole history of interstate relations indicates that it would be 
unrealistic to expect the mere fact of a shared interest in the avoidance 
of mutual nuclear destruction to completely neutralize the very
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substantial conflicts of interest between them on other issues. Rather, 
the enormously heightened risks of central war in the nuclear era 
might work in either of two contradictory directions. On the one hand, 
there must always be an implicit 'linkage' between the nuclear 
relationship and conflict on other issues, which would normally impel 
each side towards greater moderation than it might show in a non-nuclear 
context. But on the other hand, if one or other side were perceived to 
be making explicit and excessive use of such linkage to deny the 
'legitimacy' of rival interests, the tendency towards mutual paranoia 
inherent in the security dilemma would be exacerbated in proportion to 
the qualitative change in the nature of the threat involved.
A related point applies to the political structure of the great 
powers themselves. There is a basic link between stable international 
coexistence and the persistence of 'hardshelled' states making effective 
claims on the political loyalties of their citizens which is fudged by 
the obsessive attention paid in hawk arguments to Soviet damage limitation 
claims, and in particular by the failure to discriminate between civil 
defence proposals for the protection of populations and proposals which 
suggest a serious expectation of preserving a functioning military- 
industrial base for the aftermath of nuclear war. The threat posed by 
nuclear weapons merely gives heightened emphasis to the most fundamental 
of all claims that a regime can make on the loyalty of its citizens: 
namely, to protect them from the wholesale destruction of their life and 
property. Moreover, as was argued in Chapter 4, it is only in terms of 
a strictly 'theological' interpretation of MAD (which the hawk analysts 
themselves claim to reject) that stable mutual deterrence can be said 
to require the abandonment of all measures designed to protect one's 
own society if deterrence should fail. When one adds the Russian 
historical experience of endemic invasion at the hands of a veritable 
'Who's Who of military aggress [ors] ' 2, the often noted paucity of Soviet 
claims to constitutional legitimacy on either representative or traditional 
grounds, and the novel problems (shared in large measure with the United 
States) of legitimating an 'imperial' system of rule in an age of 'mass 
society', the pressure for the regime to highlight its 'vigilance' in 
this substantive area is all the more compelling.
Indeed, the continuing erosion of the simple MAD orthodoxy by 
warfighting doctrines in American 'declaratory' policy over the past 
seven years - and it must be reiterated that it was only at the
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declaratory level that a MAD orthodoxy ever obtained - would appear to 
confirm the intensity of the psychological obstacles to a declaratory 
defence posture based upon the abdication of the traditional aspirations 
of defence. It seems likely that the pure MAD doctrine was the 
intellectual luxury of a power enjoying a temporary period of overwhelming 
strategic superiority,3 just as Dulles' resort to massive retaliation threats 
for extended deterrence purposes was the product of a period of almost 
total American invulnerability. Thus a degree of American 'convergence' 
upon Soviet damage limitation assumptions may be a natural concomitant 
of the emergence of nuclear parity, and the United States' belated 
exposure to the sense of nuclear vulnerability with which its Soviet 
rival has been required to live for a good three decades already.
Moreover, since the leading Cassandras of the debate on Soviet military 
doctrine have also been in the forefront of the demand for an American 
warfighting posture, they can scarcely cite the mere fact of Soviet 
non-adherence to the full MAD theology as evidence of anything more than 
an excessively 'prudent' concern with the fragility of a deterrent 
relationship in which even a single breakdown would be likely to involve 
unprecedented disaster.
This raises the second issue, of the wider doctrinal context in which 
Soviet military writings are to be placed. The central point is that 
nuclear strategy in the Soviet Union has remained, with some modification 
in the 1970s, overwhelmingly the province of the professional military 
establishment, and that the overall result, as Pipes himself notes, has 
been very much what the American military - given similar institutional 
freedom and a comparable historical and geopolitical environment - might 
themselves be expected to produce.4 The absence of a powerful civilian 
influence upon the development of Soviet strategy has indeed meant that 
the traditional military propensity to regard all weapons as potentially 
employable has experienced little constraint even in the nuclear era.
But it is equally true that Soviet military writers have typically 
confined themselves to a traditional, narrow range of military concerns 
associated with the deterrence and possible conduct of war, and have 
generally avoided the complex issues of the political exploitation of 
military force which have been such a major preoccupation of the 
American strategic community.5
Conversely, the political leadership has discussed warfighting only
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in the most general of terms; and from the very outset of the 'nuclear 
revolution' in Soviet military doctrine the political doctrine of 
Peaceful Coexistence, with its absolute priority on the avoidance of 
nuclear war, has been consistently advanced as the 'fundamental line' 
of Soviet foreign policy. Moreover, the basic Peaceful Coexistence 
schema of conflict and cooperation with the capitalist world has 
increasingly been fleshed out with a mass of detailed and relatively 
sophisticated specialist analysis both of the capitalist powers themselves 
and the Third World. Thus, the key question for the hawk argument remains. 
Upon what grounds is a body of military doctrine which can be recognized 
as a natural, if not exactly appropriate, military response to an essentially 
insoluble problem, to be interpreted as either conclusive or presumptive 
evidence of Soviet political intentions radically at variance with those 
indicated by official Soviet political doctrine - to say nothing of the 
dictates of simple prudence in the face of the nuclear revolution.
This issue is commonly handled by the assumption that the open 
military literature faithfully reflects Soviet intentions in a way in which 
many pronouncements of the political leadership, plus the bulk of the 
output of quasi-academic institutes like IUSA and IMEMO, do not. First, 
it is asserted that the military's own viewpoint can reasonably be 
inferred from the military literature, because it would be quite impossible 
to indoctrinate and inform the massive Soviet officer corps solely 
through non-public channels of communication.6 And, second, the 
congruence of the military viewpoint with that of the political elite is
7deduced by reference to the powers of the party's censorship apparatus, 
and to the Soviet military's own pronouncements on the status of military 
doctrine. Defined by Sokolovskiy as 'the system of officially approved,
oscientifically based views on the basic fundamental problems of war',
doctrine is elevated to the apex of a formal structure of military theory,
incorporating at its lower levels the elements of 'military science' and
'military art' to which the imprimatur of Marxism-Leninism does not apply,
0and about which, therefore, active debate remains appropriate.
Thus it is argued that Soviet military doctrine reflects, in Pipes' 
words, that 'Soviet military planning [which] is carried out under the 
close supervision of the country's highest political body, the Politburo 
... [and] is regarded as an intrinsic element of "grand strategy", whose 
arsenal includes a variety of non-military instrumentalities'.10
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But adherents of this viewpoint typically fail to address the complexity 
of the Marxist-Leninist historical analysis in terms of which the 'grand 
strategy' amalgam of militant struggle and 'objectively' determined 
cooperation, designated as Peaceful Coexistence, is officially explained.
Rather, Leninism figures somewhat peripherally, along with the traditional 
sources of Great Russian chauvinism, as the essentially irrational determinant 
of an 'extreme social-Darwinist outlook'.11 Given the prior assumption 
of a basic Soviet alienation from the established international order, 
the characteristic militancy of Soviet military literature is confirmed 
as the touchstone by which genuine statements of political intent - which 
reflect that militancy - can be distinguished from the propaganda and 
misinformation involved in formulations reflecting a readiness to 
explore the prospect of an open-ended modus V'ivend'i with the capitalist 
world.12
Some such hard/soft, doctrine/propaganda correlation is, indeed, 
essential to the kind of argument advanced by Pipes and his colleagues.
For if the entire corpus of Soviet pronouncements on international 
affairs does constitute a monolithic unity, carefully orchestrated from 
on high, there is no effective way to dispose of the complications created 
by the substantial 'detentist' strand in the political and quasi-academic 
literature, other than by the flat claim to know propaganda when one 
sees it. However, I have attempted to demonstrate that if one must choose 
between stereotypes in this field, simple dichotomies of this kind are 
in fact a good deal less plausible than the Soviets' own claim to a 
dialectically unified world view. That the Soviet literature contains 
major incoherencies, and important manipulative elements, seems undeniable.
But more striking is the fundamental consistency of categories, the 
attention paid to the basic elements of conflict and cooperation in all 
contexts, and the extent of the endeavour to bring the complexities of 
contemporary international relations within the purview of an attenuated, 
but still identifiable, Leninist framework of analysis.
Thus there is no obvious reason why, for instance, the reflections 
of Admiral Gorshkov on the role of naval power in peacetime 'grand strategy'
- which, on the formal criteria for doctrine mentioned above, must be 
relegated to the 'soft' domain of military science, if not of inter-service 
propaganda - should be regarded as intrinsically more revealing than 
specialist studies on the prospects for Third World non-capitalist development, 
in which the military instrument is considered only indirectly if at all.
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More generally, the arguments regarding the regime's need for public 
channels of information and direction (and, indeed, debate) in respect 
of the military, can surely be applied to the vast Soviet bureaucracy 
as a whole. Soviet dealings with the capitalist world today inevitably 
involve the management of a shifting balance of interests in domestic 
development, 'great power' claims, support for 'progressive' forces, 
etc; and the capacity of the regime systematically to manipulate the media 
for the purpose of shaping Western perceptions must be correspondingly 
circumscribed.
A third major contextual issue, again closely related, concerns the 
distribution of power within the Soviet elite. This issue has attracted 
considerable attention from American analysts. Indeed, within the more 
narrowly defined strategic debate, the chief opposition to the hawk 
viewpoint has come from those who regard the current Soviet arsenal not 
as the product of a determined drive for meaningful strategic superiority, 
disclosed in Soviet military doctrine, but as the largely fortuitous outcome 
of such 'institutional factors as program momentum, bureaucratic politics, 
technological determinism, and reactions to perceived external threats, 
factors which, by and large, shape the defense policies of all modern 
industrial powers, the United States not excluded'.13 Arguments of this 
sort, together with the identification of the tension between the resource 
demands of the heavy industry and military sectors, on the one hand, and 
those of the agricultural and consumer goods sectors, on the other, as 
perhaps the central issue of intra-elite politics, are clearly extremely 
important. But it is a striking anomaly of the current American debate 
- and an index of its essential ethnocentricity - that such arguments 
have typically become associated with the application to Soviet conditions 
of some variant of the fashionable 'bureaucratic politics paradigm' . 
Formally, at least, the primacy of domestic over foreign politics and the 
supreme importance of internal economic development are among the most 
fundamental tenets of Soviet Marxism-Leninism. But because the 
existence of major domestic constraints upon unrestricted Soviet arms 
race behaviour has been identified, not with the rational Soviet pursuit 
of long terms goals of 'socialist construction', but with the unintended 
outcomes dictated by bureaucratic infighting, and because such theories 
have been associated, at least in a general sense, with the wider doctrines 
of convergence and industrial society, the claim to a 'rational actor' 
interpretation of Soviet conduct, which pays due regard both to the
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Soviets' individuality and to their own self interpretation, has passed 
by default to the partisans of the refurbished 'totalitarian' model 
articulated by Pipes.
As has been argued earlier, the pretensions of the bureaucratic 
politics approach to self-sufficient explanatory status must be regarded 
as highly dubious even in the United States context; and its application 
to the far more closed world of Soviet decision making has inevitably 
proved inconclusive. In addition, the more specific thesis of a 
fundamental tension between party and military, as the two great organized 
entities in Soviet politics, has tended to lose ground in the 1970s,14 
partly because the relatively abundant indications of conflict - doctrinal 
and other - which characterized the Khrushchev era have been less 
noticeable under his successors, and partly because, with the onset of 
parity and the emergence of a Soviet military capability more congruent 
with the long-standing warfighting doctrine, it has become increasingly 
plausible to identify 'a remarkable consistency between what we see the 
Soviets doing militarily and what they say they are doing'.15
Thus the adherents ofy_totalitarian model have been able, with 
considerable force, to attack the uncritical 'mirror-imaging' of 
essentially bureaucratic explanations of Soviet strategic policy. But 
it must be added that their own claims to the avoidance of ethnocentricity 
are highly suspect. First, the rationality which they ascribe to the 
Soviet leadership is a narrowly instrumental one: and that leadership's 
goats are regarded as deriving not from reasoned responses to changing 
historical circumstances, but from an essentially unchanging xenophobia 
dictated by the one party structure of Soviet politics, and the atavistic 
survivals of centuries of Russian history.16 Second, by absolutizing the 
pluralist/totalitarian dichotomy, they have ignored the middle ground 
of 'controlled pluralism' - a notion which recognizes the undoubted
complexity of modern Soviet society without succumbing to unrealistic
1 7expectations of massive break with Soviet and Russian traditions.
In particular, it seems possible that the very significance of 
expanding military capabilities in the Soviet Union's accession to an 
undisputed world power role - which provides the most obvious referent 
of Western arguments for the emergence of a unified 'political-military 
amalgam' under the current regime18 - may also be promoting the gradual 
erosion of the 'military's virtual monopoly of strategic throught and 
substantive analysis'. In the past, Wolfe argues,
5 5 5 .
it would appear that the relationship between 
the political leadership and the military 
command has involved essentially what amounts 
to a division of labour, with the former tending 
to leave the professional details of security 
policy, as Kosygin once put it, 'to the 
marshals', while reserving to itself the right 
of final decision, especially on matters 
involving large resources and on issues of war 
and peace.
1 9
However, as the regime seeks, on the one hand, to explore the dimensions 
of the novel opportunities now presented for the wide-ranging 
exploitation of military influence, and, on the other, to come to 
terms with American attitudes to the strategic balance and their 
implications for strategic arms limitation, it faces a growing range 
of military-related issues to which the specialized expertise of 'the 
marshals' has only limited relevance. Thus the increasing prominence 
of 'academic' commentary upon strategic issues in the 1970s, and the 
limited emergence - in such commentary and in the pronouncements of the 
political leadership - of formulations reflecting a greater acceptance of 
the mutuality of deterrence, might reasonably be attributed primarily to 
the leadership's genuine need for a wider basis of advice, in the 'task 
of sorting out and reformulating the meaning of the physical changes that 
have taken place in the Soviet Union's power position' over the last 
decade.2 0
Fourth, and finally, the significance of the more obviously 
'operational' aspects of Soviet doctrine, as distinct from its broad 
analytical categories, cannot meaningfully be assessed without reference 
to the changing context of the strategic balance. As the current 
upsurge in the American debate testifies, the central strategic environment 
of each great power is provided, not merely by the mutual deterrence 
relationship in the abstract, but also by the relative capability, and 
apparent doctrine regarding the exploitation of that capability, of the 
adversary power. Moreover, since the basic operational propositions of 
Soviet nuclear doctrine were formulated when the United States not only 
enjoyed a great strategic preponderence, but was openly committed to 
the military containment of Soviet/Communist 'expansionism', attempts to 
derive current Soviet intentions from these propositions must pay regard 
to the novelty of the present strategic environment.
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In particular it must be recognized that the new significance 
of the long-established Soviet warfighting doctrine derives not merely 
from the belated Soviet acquisition of an overall nuclear capability 
roughly comparable with that of the United States, but also from the 
emergence of new - and, initially, American dominated - technologies 
which substantially increase the potential advantage of the offensive 
in an exchange between the ICBM forces. It seems inherently implausible 
to suppose that Soviet doctrine was originally formulated in the 
expectation that the Soviet Union would one day enjoy even the very 
limited first strike advantage - applying solely to the ICBM forces 
- currently postulated for a part of the 1980s, let alone a truly 
comprehensive and enduring strategic 'superiority' over a
technologically superior rival. A more plausible view is that a 'natural' 
military response to the perceived fragility of deterrence acquired new 
significance through a largely fortuitous combination of technological 
advance, differential procurement patterns, and limited American 
restraint. And, in this light, there were two really striking changes 
in the Soviet strategic environment by the early 1970s: first, the 
acquisition of a clearly invulnerable retaliatory capability, and second, 
the formal acceptance by the United States of the principle of 'equal 
security' in Soviet-American relations. From the Soviet viewpoint, 
indeed, it could be argued that the preconditions for 'stable deterrence' 
have only just arrived; and the doctrinal evidence that the military is 
inclined to lag behind the political leadership in accommodating to 
this phenomenon, and is generally more suspicious about American attempts 
to reverse the situation, can hardly be surprising.
It is precisely this issue of the changing 'operational' context of 
Soviet military doctrine which is glossed over by the hawk tendency to 
treat it as an abstract, monolithic statement of the Soviet position.
On crucial questions such as 'preemption' in crisis situations and 
the goal of 'superiority', Soviet statements from the 1960s are 
effectively taken as equally valid for the 1970s and beyond, 
despite the basic change of context which occurred from around 1969. 
Indeed, this tendency has been exacerbated by the recent declassification 
of the CIA translations for the 1960s of the confidential General Staff 
journal, Military Thought. Since this is not merely a military source 
but a restricted military source, it has naturally been taken, on hawk 
selection criteria, as an important 'new' source which confirms the gap
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between the Soviet leadership's detentist public pronouncements and 
its internal deliberations.21 But from the point of view of context, 
it is an old source, which on the one hand merely confirms Soviet 
consistency in the handling of basic categories, and on the other 
presents evidence on the preemption and superiority issues which, I 
will attempt to show, may reasonably be viewed as outdated in the 
light of developments in the 1970s. Thus on the specific question of the 
evolving Soviet-American nuclear relationship, as on the wider question 
of the broad structural context of contemporary world politics, the 
hawk approach to Soviet doctrine may be characterized as a basically 
a-historical one, exhibiting the same sort of 'technical' preoccupations 
as the American 'arms control' orthodoxy which it claims to repudiate.
Given all these considerations, it may be useful to think in terms
of 'strong' and 'weak' variants - which indeed appear to coexist in
much of the cautionary American literature - of the argument that Soviet
doctrine reveals an aggressive, instrumentalist conception of military
power, which bodes ill for the stability of coexistence under the new
strategic balance. The strong thesis rests upon the assertion that, from
the Bolshevik revolution onward, 'nearly all communist expectations -
2 2except the reliance on the mailed fist - have been disappointed'. 
Similarly, the 'phenomenal' and 'relentless' military buildup of the 
1960s and the 1970s is interpreted as the conscious decision of a 
leadership which possesses virtually no genuine non-military assets to 
support its profound commitment to world hegemony:
The Soviet leadership seems to strive to obtain 
a marked superiority in all branches of the 
military, in order to secure powerful forward- 
moving shields behind which the politicians 
could do their work. To reach this objective, 
the Soviet Union must have open to it all the 
options - to be able to fight general and 
limited conventional wars near its borders 
and away from them, as well as nuclear wars 
employing tactical and/or strategic weapons.
2 3
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The weak thesis similarly emphasizes the 'flawed' nature of the emerging 
Soviet world power, and its disproportionate dependence upon military 
influence.24 But it acknowledges a substantial overlap - if only an 
'adventitious and often fortuitous' one - between Soviet and radical 
Third World interests in certain crucial areas, 25and is also prone to 
fri-ssons over such primarily non-military scenarios as the long-term 
'Finlandization' of Europe. In this view the true significance of 
Soviet doctrine is not that it presents central war as a meaningful 
policy option, but that it indicates a basic disposition to interpret 
the great power relationship in terms of 'zero-sum' conflict. It is 
further assumed that, given the perception of a major shift in the 
correlation of force against a demoralized and disorganized West, the 
Soviet leadership may be encouraged into a far more activist pursuit 
of what are essentially old-fashioned imperialist goals, that miscalculations 
of Western tolerance may ultimately produce a situation of intense crisis, 
and that a rejection of the notion of mutual 'crisis stability' may then 
encourage a Soviet resort to a pre-emptive strike.
The first argument depends on a number of highly ethnocentric 
assumptions about the constituents of 'success' and 'legitimacy' in the 
Soviet context, on an arbitrary reading of the Soviet historical record 
in regard to the use of the military instrument, and on the selective 
employment of Soviet military doctrine to substantiate propositions 
which, as I will attempt to argue below, it simply will not support. The 
second is a good deal more plausible: but in its pristine form, it 
also sits ill with the widespread consensus among students of the Soviet 
Union (including Pipes) about the basic conservatism of Soviet 
decisionmaking as manifested to date.26
Adjusted to accommodate several of the issues discussed in earlier 
chapters - such as the apparent depth of the forces for instability in 
the Third World politics, the questionable nature of influential American 
assumptions regarding political stability and extended deterrence, and the 
wider doctrinal evidence of the Soviet regime's sensitivity to the complex 
balance of constraints and opportunities now confronting them - such a 
thesis does indeed address some of the more threatening problems of 
contemporary power politics. But it also becomes a vastly more complex 
proposition, concerned not merely with unilateral Soviet exploitation of 
a shifting strategic balance, but with the responses of both great powers 
to crucial aspects of 'transitional' development in both world politics
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in general and the structure of the states-system in particular.
The remainder of the chapter will seek to deal, in the light of 
these considerations, with some of the more detailed themes commonly 
advanced in the discussion of Soviet military doctrine. As before, 
the emphasis will be upon a rational analysis of the Soviet account.
But this will involve the rejection of each of two modes of 
doctrinal analysis prominent in the American strategic debate: the 
comparison of Soviet statements with a static checklist of propositions 
derived from the allegedly value-free rationality of American deterrence 
theory;27and the attribution to the Soviets of a vulgar-Machiavellian 
instrumental rationality, in the pursuit of unchanging and implausible 
goals which must be taken, in the last analysis, as a kind of revealed 
truth.28 Rather it will be assumed that the primary task of analysis 
is to 'make sense' of Soviet behaviour in terms of the best available 
evidence of existing opportunities and constraints, and of Soviet 
perceptions of these; and that, where developments in doctrine and 
procurement can be understood as 'realistic' or 'appropriate' responses 
to their environment, there is no reason to have recourse to the kind 
of special assumptions regarding Soviet motivation which characterize 
much of the present debate.
War and Politics
Two different kinds of issue are addressed in Soviet discussions 
of nuclear war: the essentially military questions of defence against 
surprise nuclear attack, and the prosecution of nuclear war if one should 
occur; and a range of primarily political considerations on the relation 
of the nuclear threat to the ongoing struggle between socialism and 
imperialism2.9 In the first area, it seems possible to identify the 
evolutionary development of a comprehensive doctrine of deterrence and 
warfighting, which, given its own basic assumptions, has adapted quite 
logically to the progressive development of Soviet and American nuclear 
capabilities. In the second, by contrast, the pattern is of the intermittent 
recurrence of essentially the same debate, which is characterized by a 
general, though by no means rigid, civilian/military division of opinion, 
and which, though ostensibly concerned with high theory, appears rather
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to be a 'political argument with considerable potential importance 
for military programs if not policy'.
This distinction, like the earlier-mentioned distinction between 
basic categories and operational propositions, is certainly not an 
absolute one (a point which will be resumed later in the chapter). But 
it does offer a useful starting point for an attempt to place Soviet 
doctrine in its specific historical context; and it seems best to begin 
with the second, more general question of the relationship between war 
and politics.
The over-arching theoretical question of this latter debate concerns 
the contemporary status of the Clausewitzian definition, adopted by Lenin, 
of war as the continuation of politics by other means. This proposition 
- placed by Pipes and likeminded commentators at the 'centre of the 
strategic debate'31- is assumed by them necessarily to imply an 
instrumentalist approach to nuclear war; and a great deal of energy is 
therefore devoted to demonstrating the incontestable fact that it 
constitutes an officially endorsed tenet of Soviet military doctrine. 
However, analyses of this kind seriously distort the character of the 
Soviet debate. As Raymond Garthoff points out, both the general character 
of war as a political act, and the unacceptibility of nuclear war as an 
instrument of policy, are accepted by all participants. 'The real 
underlying debate', with 'profound implications for military requirements', 
is over the question 'whether war is recognized as so unpromising and 
dangerous that it can never occur'.32
It must be acknowledged that the Soviet insistence that individual
wars must be judged not merely on 'technical' grounds, but by reference
to the reactionary or progressive character of the general policies pursued
by their participants, does indeed have implications for mutual
deterrence, in the sense that it upholds the 'justice' of national
liberation wars even in the nuclear era. However, the link is an indirect
one, through questions of extended deterrence which will be discussed
in the final section. By contrast, the corollary proposition that
justice would inevitably reside on the side of socialism in any central
nuclear war can have little practical significance other than its
putative value in the 'moral-political' indoctrination of the Soviet
armed forces. For the Soviets insist that such a war would be fought
for 'decisive' aims - with each side committed to the final destruction
3 4of the adversary's social system - and with 'decisive' weapons; and
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it is straining credulity to suggest that the Soviet leadership would 
be encouraged to initiate such a conflagration merely by the reflection 
that it would, on its own criteria, be in the right.
As regards the second, more specifically Clausewitzian, proposition 
that political control cannot stop short even at boundaries of nuclear 
war, its acceptance is an essential prerequisite for the ending of such 
a conflict, should one occur, short of a general holocaust. Of course, 
insofar as the only political aims officially envisaged for such a 
conflict involve the decisive destruction of the opposing social system, 
the opportunities for a limited solution may appear little better 
than under a simple doctrine of Assured Destruction. However, as was 
argued in Chapter 4, any prospects for such a solution would probably 
depend less on preconceived 'limited options', than on the existence 
of the political will to improvise under extreme pressure; and, as 
William Van Cleave justly notes, the fundamentals of Soviet doctrine 
'connote selectivity of targeting, although not necessarily limited 
strategic options, and an appreciation of stvategi-c goals as opposed to 
indiscriminate mass destruction'.35
Both these meanings of the link between war and politics are 
accepted throughout the Soviet literature: and these meanings are the 
only ones so accepted. Soviet acceptance of nuclear war as a rational 
policy instrument can be inferred only by abstracting these other 
arguments from their context, and by.ignoring clear Soviet pronouncements 
on this issue, such as the following statement in a work cited extensively 
by Pipes, Goure and others, and described by Harriet Fast-Scott as 'the
3 6Communist Party's latest word on the official views of contemporary war':
Marxist-Leninists do not confuse the problem of 
the essence, the class content and character of 
war, and the forms of its links with politics 
with another close, but not identical problem 
of the admissibility or inadmissibility of a 
given, specific war as a means of policy.
Communists resolutely condemn nuclear war, view 
it as the greatest crime against mankind, and 
are in favour of total prohibition and destruction 
of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as 
well as securing a solid, durable peace.
3 7
Approving references to the CPSU Progr&W*?*'*rejection of central war ‘as
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a means of solving international disputes' are common, even in the most 
hawkish military literature; and where Soviet commentators insist 
that nuclear war is not abolished, but only 'limited as a weapon of 
politics', the reference is clearly to the danger that it might be 
so employed by imperialism, and the question of a Soviet struggle for
3 8nuclear victory is discussed only in this context.
It may be objected that, since the Soviet Union is by definition 
peaceloving, the truly important argument is that concerning the 
winnability of nuclear war, and not the sophistries over which side 
would initiate it. But the kind of nuclear 'victory' implied by such 
Soviet commentators, as distinct from the 'best possible case' scenarios 
constructed for them by their American counterparts, remains the most 
incredible of all policy options. As the standard Soviet text, 
Sokolovskiy's Military Strategy3 put it in the 1960s:
The losses in a world nuclear war will not only 
be suffered by the USA and their NATO allies, 
but by the socialist countries. The logic of a 
world nuclear war is such that in the sphere of 
its effect would fall an overwhelming majority of 
the world's states. As a result of a war many 
hundreds of millions of people would perish, and 
most of the remaining alive, (sic) in one respect 
or another, would be subject to radioactive 
contamination. This is why we are talking of the
unacceptability of a world nuclear war ...
39
This basic line has repeatedly been endorsed, most recently in a major 
article by Marshal N. Ogarkov, Chief of the General Staff and First 
Deputy Minister of Defence, who asserts that 'the very character of modern 
weapons is such that, if [a new world war] is set in motion, the future 
of all mankind would be placed at hazard'.40 On any normal criteria of 
political judgement, therefore, the Soviets' own account clearly suggests 
that the concern is not with the preservation of a 'nuclear option', but 
with the kind of military posture most appropriate to a situation in 
which nuclear war is considered unlikely but not impossible.
The first aspect of this question is the 'moral-political' one. Of 
course, for the Soviet leadership to admit outright the impossibility of 
victory in a nuclear war would be to acknowledge that the historically 
inevitable triumph of socialism could be prevented by purely technical 
means. But perhaps more immediately significant, from the military
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viewpoint, is the consideration that to tell the population, let alone 
the armed forces themselves, that there could be no meaningful defence 
against nuclear attack, would lead 'to moral disarmament, to disbelief 
in victory, to fatalism and passivity'.41 Thus, as a Deputy Commandant 
of the General Staff Academy argued in the confidential journal Military 
T h o u g h t it was only by inculcating in the masses an understanding 
both of the 'criminality' of imperialism in launching a nuclear war, 
and 'the justice of the corresponding retribution against the aggressor', 
that the problem 'can be posed and solved from the view of defending 
the socialist homeland and the interests of international communism and 
all progressive mankind'.42
This writer also expresses very clearly the more tangible military 
concern that, without the recognition of the prospect of military victory, 
the theoretical basis of the Soviet military posture would be eroded.
In other words, the armed forces of the socialist 
states at the present time, in principle, will not 
be able to set for themselves the goal of defeating 
imperialism and the global nuclear war which it 
unleashes and the mission of attaining victory in 
it, and our military science should not even work 
out a strategy for the conduct of war since the 
latter has lost its meaning and significance ...
In this case, the very call to raise the combat 
readiness of our armed forces and improve their 
capability to defeat any aggressor is senseless.
4 3
This statement indicates, more clearly than is usual in the open 
military literature, the 'profound implications for military requirements' 
of this debate. Though one might legitimately question the argument 
that American strategic programs were in practice significantly restrained 
by the prominence of the Assured Destruction doctrine during the 1960s, 
the argument that 'stable deterrence' is possible, and should be pursued 
through such a posture, does in theory lend itself to the establishment 
of finite limits for strategic force requirements. By contrast, an 
insistence upon the fragility of deterrence, and upon comprehensive 
goals of damage limitation, constitutes a perfect rationale for the 
characteristic military demand for 'superiority'. In this sense, Wolfe
argues,
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the Soviet strategic philosophy would appear 
functionally incompatible with finding any 
clear stopping points and striking an equilibrium.
Given the woeful 'softness' of populations, a 
doctrine that seeks substantial survival levels 
for one's own society in addition to assured 
destruction of the opponent places before itself 
seemingly impossible force requirements. As 
long as this should remain the operational goal, 
therefore, Soviet doctrine would seem to 
represent a mandate for endless competition without 
defined standards of what constitutes enough. 4 4
If the inevitability of war/destruction of civilization debate is 
a 'largely instrumental' one45 concerned primarily with the military's 
desire to protect such a satisfactory rationale for its claims upon 
Soviet resources, its persistent recurrence in various guises would 
appear to testify to the depth of intra-elite tension on this issue.
There have, indeed, been three major 'debates' around this theme: the 
first, conducted directly by the political leadership itself, in which 
Khrushchev, after ousting Malenkov with apparent military/heavy industry 
support, effectively took over the latter's 'destruction of civilization' 
line, and established the non-inevitability of war as a linchpin of the 
general reorientation of Soviet foreign policy doctrine;46 the second, 
in 1965-6, in which the participants on both sides were military, and 
which resulted in the repudiation of the direct attack by General Talensky, 
a leading military theorist of the Khrushchev era, on the notion of war 
as the continuation of politics;47 and the third, in 1973-4, when the 
same basic theme was reopened, this time with the military defending 
the 'winnability of nuclear war' thesis against the criticisms of 
several prominent civilian commentators.48
Insofar as it was conducted between different sections of the elite, 
this third 'debate' may be regarded as inconclusive in itself. But, 
while the present political leadership has generally continued to express 
a less sanguine view of the possibility of war than had been characteristic 
of Khrushchev, the last decade has seen the re-emergence of formulations 
which express the substance of the 'destruction of civilization' 
proposition without completely adopting its politically compromising 
terminology.49 And on the 'operational' question of superiority, the 
issue is even clearer. In the SALT era, the political leadership ceased
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to talk of military superiority,50 and with the upsurge of the American 
debate over SALT II, shifted towards increasingly deliberate disavowals 
that this constitutes a Soviet goal. The pattern was set by Brezhnev's 
statement - in a speech in February 1977, on the morrow of the Carter 
administration's inauguration - that the Soviet Union aimed not at 
superiority, but at a reduction in armaments consonant with a 'defence 
potential ... sufficient to deter anyone from disturbing our peaceful 
life'.51 This formulation was widely echoed, notably by Defence 
Minister Ustinov, in a 1978 Army Day speech; and Brezhnev, in the 
major speech on the Sixtieth Anniversary of the October Revolution, 
undertook to 'reiterate as clearly as possible' his earlier pronouncement:
The Soviet Union is effectively seeing to its own 
defence, but it is not striving for and will not 
strive for military superiority over the other 
side. We do not want to upset the approximate 
equilibrium of military strength that now exists 
But in return we demand that no one else 
seek to upset it in his favour.
5 3
The military press has of course been particularly insistent that 
the arms race initiative comes from the attempt of aggressive Western 
circles to 'repudiate the principle of parity of strategic forces which 
has become a reality, and on which relations between the Soviet Union 
and the United States have been based in recent years'.54 But despite 
the polemics, such overt defence of an existing 'parity' is a significant 
development, which has become as characteristic of major military 
pronouncements - such as the £>garkov article cited above - as of the 
pronouncements of the political leadership. One noteworthy military 
'convert' to the new line has been Colonel Ye. Rybkin, a leading hard-line 
protagonist of the 1965-6 and 1973-4 debates. Rybkin similarly emphasizes 
the existence of 'an acknowledged equilibrium of forces, which was 
officially recognized in the Soviet-American negotiations of 1972-74, 
along with mutual agreement not to destroy it'. Furthermore, he explicitly 
argues that 'nuclear weapons have reached a level at which further 
deployment of them in practice changes nothing' - citing Brezhnev's 
comment that existing stockpiles could 'destroy every living thing on 
earth several times over' - and concludes that 'rejection of nuclear
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war therefore is not some kind of free choice of political leaders [but] 
is dictated by the new realities of the epoch'.55
It may be objected that such generalities do not dispose of the 
formidable reality of observable Soviet military capabilities. But 
it is precisely such generalities - of a more militant kind - which have 
been adduced by the hawk school as convincing evidence that existing 
Soviet capabilities are merely the entering wedge of a determined drive 
for superiority. Moreover, an attention to context would suggest 
that the shift is a perfectly logical one. As has been noted, Khrushchev's 
claims for Soviet military power were quite unrealistic even before 
the Kennedy administration force expansions; and if the 'finite deterrence' 
strategy to which he seemed inclined had then prevailed, it would have 
constituted the acceptance of a position of comprehensive inferiority in 
the great power relationship. In the 1970s, a credible balance had 
been established for the first time; and given the major technological 
advantages likely to accrue to the American side in a race for the 
Chimera of a meaningful counterforce advantage, it is entirely plausible 
that the Soviet leadership should regard the espousal of parity as the 
most realistic response to the prevailing correlation of forces.
In a very general sense, this emphasis over the past five years on 
the preservation of the existing equilibrium might be regarded as a 
Soviet movement towards a concept of 'sufficiency' or 'arms race stability'; 
though such broad statements of political intent carry little credence 
in the conceptual context of the American strategic debate, and have 
simply been ignored by some hawk commentators.56 A much more recent 
development has been the apparent decision to address American complaints 
on the issue of 'crisis stability', again through the medium of general 
statements by Brezhnev and others on the 'thoroughly defensive orientation' 
of Soviet military doctrine. This leads into the more plainly 
operational questions of the deterrence and conduct of nuclear war, which 
are discussed in the next section.
The Problem of Nuclear War
The question of impact of an 'acknowledged equilibrium'of forces on 
Soviet doctrine concerning the mechanics of deterrence and ' crisis
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stability' is a more complex one, which is further confused by the 
very real problem of the lack of a common Soviet-American conceptual 
vocabulary. First, as P.H.Vigor points out, the Russian language 
simply does not possess a word which adequately translates the English 
'deter', and the Soviet 'strategic community' has only gradually 
progressed through a condition of reliance on various 'clumsy paraphrases'
C Qto an agreed neologism for the specific concept of 'nuclear deterrence'. 
Second, there is the above mentioned fact that the institutional environment 
of Soviet military doctrine is basically inhospitable to the conception 
of deterrence as a separate phenomenon. Third and perhaps most important 
of all, there are basic ideological inhibitions to the open acceptance 
of a 'neutral' concept of deterrence which implies 'that the Soviet Union 
[is] a potential aggressor and thus needs to be deterred' . 59
Consequently, the term 'deterrence' continues to be used rather 
sparingly in the Soviet literature;60 and its employment in contexts 
which closely parallel American usage appears to be confined to naval 
officers, whose service capabilities would naturally incline them 
towards a clear emphasis on second strike retaliation.61 However, it 
is the Strategic Rocket Troops which are officially designated as 'the 
most important means for restraining the imperialist forces' aggressive 
aspirations and routing the aggressor in the event of his attacking our 
country'; and descriptions of the Soviet deterrent capability still 
tend, in general, to involve a short paragraph incorporating a reference 
to the 'combined arms' character of the proposed response:
The high combat readiness of the armed forces 
in its contemporary significance must be understood 
as their state which insures the fulfilment of 
tasks in repulsing strikes at any moment and 
under the most complex conditions, the rapid 
delivery of retaliatory strikes against the 
enemy, and the successful performance of 
subsequent operations.
6 3
Some Western analysts, dutifully applying the procrustean categories 
of 'deterrence' and#warfighting' to such pronouncements, profess to find 
them disturbingly ambivalent. 64 However, while it is true that the 
Soviets appear to think primarily of deterrence through 'denial' rather
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than through 'punishment65 their vision of the warfighting process 
- as is shown in the following authoritative pronouncement by former 
Defence Minister Grechko - implies a level of ancillary punishment 
such that the putative nuclear threshold would seem little different 
from that involved in an Assured Destruction posture.
The Strategic Missile Troops, which comprise 
the basis of the military might of our Armed 
Forces, have the mission of destroying the 
enemy nuclear attack means, large groupings 
of enemy troops and military bases, destroying 
the military installations, disorganizing 
state and military administration, and the 
work of the rear services and transport of the 
aggressor. 66
Moreover, the message conveyed by such positive descriptions of the 
Soviet conception of counterforce operations is strengthened by the 
uniformly negative treatment of 'limited' or 'flexible' options in 
regard to nuclear war. Both on the political grounds that decisive 
goals must be expected to be at issue in any major war, and on the 
military grounds that withholding attacks on the opponent's nuclear
6 7forces - where these can be acquired - is 'absolutely inadmissable',
Soviet sources insist that American conceptions of intra-war restraint
are simply unrealistic. Of course, the Soviet Union, in contrast to its
1960s position, now has the capabilities to engage in significant
counter-force trading with the United States. But although Soviet
responses to the revival by Schlesinger of overt counterforce proposals
were substantially less polemical than those which greeted the McNamara
'No Cities' doctrine, the basic message remained unchanged. Indeed,
Benjamin Lambeth, who is himself substantially in sympathy with the
Schlesinger approach, concludes that 'of all the conceptual and weapons
assymetries that currently obtain in the US-Soviet strategic confrontation,
the one which rests on the question of targeting limitation and intra-war
6 8"crisis management" seems to be the most dominant and irreconcilable'.
In the last decade, nonetheless, several Western analysts have 
suggested that the Soviet stance on limited options may be becoming less 
categorical. Such arguments tend to emphasize the basic Soviet concern 
with the political control of nuclear operations, the developments -
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in numbers, accuracy, and command and control - which have created a 
Soviet nuclear force clearly capable of selective counterforce strategies, 
and the ambiguous evidence of recent Soviet exercises, which, Schlesinger 
testified in 1974, were held to indicate 'far greater interest in the 
notions of controlled nuclear war and non-nuclear war than has ever before 
been reflected in Soviet doctrine'.69 The basic appeal in such arguments, 
therefore, is to the probability of a distinction between 'declaratory' 
and 'action' policy similar to that which prevails in the United 
States; and the reading of Soviet doctrine is much influenced by 
intuitive perceptions of what alternative courses the Soviets might wish 
to pursue with the arsenal now at their disposal. But even on this basis, 
the most substantial conclusions reached have been that the Soviets 
might be coming to acknowledge a 'potential ... escalation boundary'
7 Öbetween 'theater' (i.e. European) and intercontinental nuclear war; 
or else, more likely, that they might envisage a 'limited nuclear 
operation' in terms of a nuclear blitzkrieg against NATO coupled with
7 1simultaneous, massive counterforce attacks against the United States.
Whatever the plausibility of such inferences (and both have been 
persistently repudiated in recent statements by the political and 
military leadership), they can hardly be said to indicate a lowering of 
the Soviet nuclear threshold with the onset of parity. The first 
assumption has in fact been a staple of Western analysis since the late 
1950s, when the emergence of an intercontinental Soviet strike capability 
first raised fears of the 'de-coupling' of the U.S. deterrent from the 
defence of NATO. Yet it is a measure of the enormous risks involved in 
an invasion of Europe that Schlesinger could suggest - in his campaign 
in support of limited options - that the Soviets might elect to precede 
it with a counterforce attack on the United States.72 As regards the 
latter, there is simply no doctrinal evidence of a Soviet perception - 
of the kind hypothesized by Schlesinger and various hawk theorists - 
that an American president would be 'self deterred' in the face of an 
alleged choice between inaction and massive retaliation, and abundant 
evidence that massive retaliation is precisely the response that the 
Soviets would expect.
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Thus the charge of an instrumentalist Soviet approach to nuclear 
war devolves ultimately upon those aspects of Soviet doctrine which 
are held to suggest a coherent design for the survival of Soviet civil 
society even in the event of massive American retaliation. There are 
several issues involved here,73 but the discussion can perhaps be confined 
to the most prominent ones: preemption and civil defence. The logic of 
the general argument is exposed in the treatment of these issues, and 
may be seen to involve a gross insensitivity to the political context 
of Soviet doctrine.
The argument for a fixed Soviet attachment to preemption - advanced 
by many American analysts - has been stated with particular clarity by 
Kohler and Goure:
Nuclear weapons, in the Soviet view, have 
made the attack the 'decisive form of 
military action', and made it necessary to 
conduct defensive tasks by means of active 
defense, i.e. by means of nuclear strikes 
... Furthermore, to assure destruction of 
the enemy and the survival of the USSR, the 
doctrine calls for a first Soviet counter 
force strike.
74
However, two vital qualifications must be made to this simple picture. 
First, as almost all serious analysts have acknowledged, there is no 
doctrinal evidence of a Soviet commitment to 'preventive war', or to a 
first strike 'out of the blue' to exploit a favourable military balance. 
Second, the evidence for a doctrine of preemption in extreme crisis 
conditions has declined noticeably with the Soviet Union's acquisition 
of deterrent forces calculated to withstand a preemptive attack by the 
other side.
Indeed, the original 1954-55 debates on this issue - which introduced 
the 'frustrating', 'breaking up' and 'nipping in the bud' formulations 
which Western analysts have commonly taken as synonyms for preemption - 
took place in the context not merely of a continuing American monopoly 
of intercontinental delivery systems, but also of the declaratory 
exploitation of that monopoly by the Eisenhower administration's 
deliberately ambiguous doctrine of massive retaliation. Moreover, they 
represented the first major breach in the Stalinist orthodoxy of the 'five
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permanently operating factors', with its associated denigration of 
surprise, which was seriously inhibiting the adaptation of Soviet 
strategy to the implications of nuclear weapons. But even so, as
7 0Garthoff points out, 'the change in doctrine [was] far from revolutionary'. 
The highest priority was accorded to the problems (including preemption) 
involved in countering the threat of surprise from the opposing side.
But surprise was definitely not elevated into a self sufficient Soviet 
strategy, since, in the words of a leading participant, it 'cannot ... 
yield a conclusive result, cannot bring victory, in a war with a serious
7 7and strong enemy'.
The problem of the assymetrical vulnerability of Soviet forces to 
American surprise attack continued in one form or another till the late 
1960s, and hints about preemption continued to be prominent in this 
period. However, as C.C.Jacobsen points out, such indications as exist 
of Soviet approaches to the crucial question of nuclear command and 
control would seem to belie such an orientation. No major nuclear 
alert was called even during the Cuban missile crisis; and, 
according to the 1966 account of Marshal Krylov, the commander of the 
Strategic Rocket Forces, the Soviet ICBM force was not, in fact, 
characterized by 'instant readiness to take off' for most of the first 
half of the 1960s.78 Moreover, when faced with the alternatives of 
devoting scarce resources to programs for shortening ICBM alert times 
- an essential prerequisite of any serious preemption strategy - or to 
the addition of 'cumbersome extra control procedures' which cut down 
the risk of an unauthorized or accidental launch, but 'militated against 
fast reaction prospects', the Soviets evidently decided to accord priority 
to the latter. By 1966, Soviet sources were claiming with apparent
confidence that they had mastered both the command and control and 
survivability problems of their missile forces;80 and from this time,
ft 1there was also a sharp decline in references to preemption.
A further crucial factor which may have allowed the Soviets to 
revise their approach to preemption was the acquisition of effective 
early warning facilities in the late 1960s. The significance of these 
in disabusing an aggressor of illusions about the prospect of a successful 
first strike was emphasized in a number of articles in Military Thought; 
and Garthoff suggests that these discussions, together with several 
exchanges during the opening stages of SALT, indicate 'that the Soviet
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authorities, at least in 1969-70, were prepared to consider seriously 
a launch on warning concept' as a new response to the problem of surprise 
attack. While constituting a clear advance on preemption, this is 
also a disturbing approach, which the American delegation sought 
unsuccessfully to have both sides disavow during SALT. However, at least 
the hint of launch on warning is probably inevitable in the present 
context of developing ICBM vulnerability on both sides (being, indeed, 
recently invoked by the United States authorities in precisely this 
context); and, as Garthoff points out, the Soviets' basic recognition of 
the reality of mutual deterrence through the reciprocal threat of second 
strike retaliation was unequivocally expressed in a prepared statement, 
'cleared by the highest political and military leaders in Moscow', 
delivered at the outset of the SALT I negotiations:
Even in the event that one of the two sides 
were the first to be subjected to attack, it 
would undoubtedly retain the ability to inflict 
a retaliatory strike of crushing power. Thus, 
evidently, we all agree that war between our 
two countries would be disastrous for both 
sides. And it would be tantamount to suicide 
for the ones who decided to start such a war.
8 3
Moreover, there appears to be nothing in the contemporary military 
literature to contradict this view of Soviet perceptions. Kohler and 
Goure fail to produce a single post-1970 pronouncement which clearly 
supports their categorical assertion of a Soviet first-strike doctrine.84 
The same is true of the slightly more guarded claims about a Soviet 
preemption strategy advanced by Joseph Douglass and Amoretta Hoeber, in 
a recent study which heavily emphasizes the importance of the 
declassified volumes of M'iZ'itavy Thought. And Roger Barnett, in an 
exhaustive and hostile review of Soviet pronouncements for the years 
1972-75, can identify only a single 'isolated example' of the 'nipping 
in the bud' formulation (which could, of course, signify launch on 
warning as readily as preemption).85
In sum, the most reasonable interpretation of the doctrinal record 
is that preemption was never considered as anything more positive than 
'the least miserable option at the brink of a hopelessly unavoidable
o rnuclear catastrophe'; and that the significance of this theme has
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diminished in proportion as the Soviets' confidence in the credibility 
of their own second strike posture has grown.
By contrast with the preemption issue, there seems to be little 
doubt that the official Soviet emphasis on civil defence has, if anything, 
increased in the 1970s. According to the programme's chief, General 
A.Altunin (elevated to the rank of Deputy Defence Minister after the 
conclusion of SALT I):
The CPSU and the Soviet Government have set 
civil defense extraordinarily important and 
crucial tasks such as protecting the 
population from the enemy's weapons of mass 
destruction, insuring the steady work of 
projects and sectors of the national economy 
in wartime, and performing rescue and 
immediate emergency repair work . It must be 
stressed that the protection of the population 
is the main task.
8 7
Moreover, though the Soviet press responded aggressively to the 1976 
publication of two major American studies (by Goure, and by a team of 
Boeing Aerospace analysts under T.K.Jones) which sought to establish 
the civil defence programme as the centrepiece of much upgraded Soviet 
threat, no attempt whatever was made to downplay the Soviet commitment 
to war survival, which was merely treated as totally irrelevant to the 
issue of first strike intentions.88
In the light of this, and of the massive and increasingly sophisticated 
Soviet air defence network, it seems wholly reasonable to conclude that 
the Soviet change of direction on ABM during the SALT negotiations was 
motivated primarily by a pragmatic concern with the excessive costs of 
competition with the United States in this area, rather than by any 
conversion to a MAD philosophy of complete mutual vulnerability. But 
the arguments of Gourt;, Jones and Pipes go far beyond this judgement, and 
are characterized by assumptions, both about the technical effectiveness 
of the Soviet programme and about the motivation of the Soviet leadership, 
that are questionable in the extreme.
On the first issue, the Boeing Study claimed to establish, by a 
process of scientific testing, that the basic Soviet prescriptions for 
civil defence could achieve quite remarkable levels of protection for 
both population and industry. But the assumptions upon which the
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computations were based involve glossing over a striking range of 
contradictions, from such specific logistics problems as the provision 
of uncontaminated food and water for the rescue teams, to the vast
8 9and complex challenge posed for civil defence by the Russian climate; 
and American government studies have flatly contradicted the basic 
conclusions reached,90 above all as regards the prospects for protection 
of the Soviet Union's social and economic infrastructure. But even if 
these calculations were plausible in themselves, there remains the 
fundamental political question: on what grounds could the Soviets 
be expected to initiate, as a matter of conscious policy, a conflict 
calculated to produce civilian casualties which remained enormous by 
any normal reckoning, coupled with the wholesale destruction of the hard 
won infrastructure of modern urban life, and the most cherished 
monuments of an ancient and complex civilization?
Such answers as are offered to this question are totally inadequate.
It is simply asserted that the Soviet definition of victory would be 
couched in terms of relative destruction, and, in particular, of the 
relative time required for the post-attack recovery of each side. It 
is assumed that the rarified cost/gains calculus of American deterrence 
theory - so little in evidence even in superpower crisis behaviour and 
directly repudiated in all Soviet writings - will be applied by the Soviets 
to the evaluation of the costs and benefits of nuclear war fighting. 9 1 
And, most revealing of all, the Soviet leadership is portrayed as particularly 
indifferent to human suffering even on their own side, undeterred by the 
prospect of general population losses because their chief concern is 
with the political, military and industrial cadres 'who could re-establish 
the political and economic system once the war was over',92 and inured 
by the experiences of World War II and Brest-Litovsk to the need to accept
Q  Omassive losses in the interests of long term victory.
This handling of the civil defence issue provides a particularly clear 
insight into the special pleading that characterizes much of the hawk 
treatment of Soviet doctrine. There is the bland refusal to distinguish
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between temporary loss of territory and permanent loss of life and 
material accomplishments, or between piecemeal and involuntary losses 
in wars initiated by others and massive instanteneous losses consciously 
accepted as part of a conscious decision to initiate war oneself. There 
is the twisting of the most obvious link between past Soviet experience 
of war and present preoccupations with civil defence - that the extent 
of past suffering has made extensive preparation for future 'damage 
limitation' a political imperative however unpromising the likely results 
- into its virtual opposite. And behind everything, there is an 
assumption of 'moral asymmetry' in regard to American and Soviet 
intentions which is in practice as simplistic as that to be found in 
hard-line Soviet statements. As Gray succinctly puts it: 'U.S. political 
culture, unlike Soviet political culture, does not take an instrumental 
view of the lives, and quality of life, of its citizens'. 93(a)
More generally (to draw the overall discussion of nuclear issues 
to a close) the preoccupation with technical distinctions in the American 
debate produces some odd responses to the admittedly imprecise poZ'it'icat 
distinction suggested earlier between general categories and operational 
propositions in Soviet doctrine. On the one hand, the hawk analysts 
have dismissed the pragmatic Soviet acknowledgement of an indefinite 
military equilibrium in relations with the United States, because it has 
not been associated with the abandonment of the commitment to a long-term 
and indirect world order struggle. But, as I have attempted to argue, 
such a struggle is virtually a structural 'given' of contemporary world 
politics, and its modification by a mutual operational acceptance of 
military equilibrium would be a substantial advance on the approaches 
adopted by both sides in the first postwar generation. On the other 
hand, the civil defence issue has been treated as a wholly technical one 
in hawk discourse, whereas it involves fundamental philosophical questions 
which cut to the heart of the justification of the state in the nuclear 
era.
None of this is to deny that the civil defence issue has an 
operational aspect, or that the combination of Soviet civil defence and 
air defence programmes with the projected decline in the survivability 
of the fixed based ICBMs poses disturbing problems for American planners. 
Nor is it to fall back merely upon bureaucratic/institutional explanations 
of the current Soviet force structure - though these certainly cannot be
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disregarded.94 It seems undeniable that the Soviet literature manifests 
a deep-seated intellectual rejection of any notion of an abstract 
deterrence 'system', which is fully shared by those commentators who are 
most forthright in accepting mutual deterrence as an inescapable fact, 
and which provides a powerful rationale for the rejection of attempts to 
circumscribe unilateral damage limitation options in the interests of 
mutual vulnerability. There seems to be no early prospect for change in 
this basic orientation, despite the limited evidence that the Soviet 
leadership may be groping its way, under the impact of American criticism, 
towards its own conception of 'arms race stability', and towards a more 
detailed and less polemical consideration of precisely which technologies, 
and which weapons systems, may be regarded as particularly destabilizing.95
Soviet criticisms of 'the concept of deterrence' as a 'concept of
9 6peace built on terror', which will always be'an unstable and a bad peace', 
and insistence that 'maintaining the existing equilibrium is not an end 
it itself', but only the necessary prerequisite to the longer term 
elimination of the threat of nuclear war,97 may be seized on as evidence
Q  othat the Soviets reject the concept of deterrence stability, or, a good 
deal more plausibly, dismissed as high sounding propaganda. But such 
comments now occur very much in the context of calls for immediate 
attention to limited and concrete problems, and it could be argued 
that they accurately reflect the essence of the nuclear dilemma. There 
is no system of mutual deterrence: nor are there any unequivocal technical 
criteria for stability. There is a crude structure of reciprocal threat, 
whose momentous implications inspire prudence without real trust; and 
while the force of the threat does appear likely to remain 'grossly 
insensitive' to foreseeable technological developments, the recent 
upsurge of the great power debate would seem to suggest that the psychological 
stability of deterrence is highly susceptible to the uncertainties which 
these may generate.
Indeed, it seems increasingly clear that the phenomenon of 'moral 
asymmetry' in the motivations ascribed to the adversary is inherent in 
the dynamics of nuclear deterrence; and that, if the Soviet military 
has generally preserved an extremely hostile image of 'imperialism', into 
the detente era and beyond, its leading American critics - whether openly, 
or in the ostensibly neutral language of 'decision-logic' - present an 
almost identical view of the Soviet leadership. When each regime must
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justify to its citizenry - or at least to its 'p o l i t ic a l ly  relevant strata'
- the preservation of a military posture involving an irreducible risk 
of immediate total destruction, the development of a neutral, not to 
say benevolent image of the adversary seems highly improbable.
This would seem to be especially true of the vexed first strike 
issue. Under the existing and foreseeable strategic balance, a first 
strike by either great power would be fraught with enormous, and quite 
incalculable risks. But striking first must inevitably be more 'attractive' 
than being left to strike second, should the other side ever elect to 
accept those risks. Thus each side's apparent working hypothesis - that 
deterrence is preserved by the ascendancy of 'sober', 'realistic' or 
'sensible' decisionmakers in the councils of the adversary - must 
always be susceptible to the argument that his 'militarist circles' are 
fashioning new schemes to render nuclear war 'acceptable'. Moreover, 
since the Soviet obsession with strategic defence does not really 
'make sense' except in the context of an assumed intention to preempt, 
and the prevailing American scenarios for limited war are both inherently 
implausible and virtually indistinguishable from second wave strategies 
for coercive crisis bargaining, it is hardly surprising that each side's 
approach assumes a sinister aspect when viewed through the conceptual 
lenses of the other.
In sum, Soviet warfighting doctrine is most reasonably viewed as 
a genuine attempt to grapple with the 'worst possible case' of deterrence 
breakdown. It is, certainly, an inadequate response, but the problem 
does not admit of adequacy. There is no support in Soviet military 
doctrine for the strong thesis that the Soviet leadership is prepared 
to contemplate the initiation of nuclear war as a conscious act of policy. 
One is left, therefore, with the weak thesis that Soviet perceptions of 
a shifting correlation of forces will encourage a level of activism and 
risk-taking likely to result in escalation to nuclear war - an issue to 
which we must now turn.
The Role of Non-Nuclear Force
In this case, also, the question of the changed context of Soviet 
military capabilities naturally looms large in the evaluation of the
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significance of Soviet doctrine. However, two important caveats may 
be entered. First, it does not constitute a sufficient demonstration of 
Soviet insincerity about detente to point to the growth of a Soviet 
military establishment for which, in Pipes' words, 'no reasonable defense 
justification exists'.99 Observations of this sort have regularly been 
made both by civilian critics in the United States and by leading 
spokesmen of the Carter and Reagan administrations; but except in regard 
to the European theatre, they may be discounted as true but trivial.
In the European context, indeed, an already formidable Soviet threat 
has been substantially intensified - most notably by the deployment of 
the SS20, and by significant qualitative improvements to the Soviet 
capacity to conduct a theatre blitzkrieg - after the shift in the 
strategic balance and the Quadripartite Treaty had largely removed the 
two most cogent 'defensive' rationales for Soviet regional preponderance. 
However, with this important qualification, it can be said that the 
Soviet Union has followed the general logic of great powers - which 
characteristically define their security in terms not merely of defence, 
but also of the promotion and/or preservation of a favourable 
international milieu - and that it has, moreover, conformed to the 
particular requirements for contemporary great power status already 
established by the United States.
Second, it seems appropriate once again to emphasize the pattern of 
change at the operational level linked to continuity in broad political 
goals. Some Western commentators propose a clear distinction between 
the 'minimum deterrence' orientation - accompanied by strong military 
dissent - of the Khrushchev regime, and the militant, globalist consensus 
established by his successors on the foundation of a definitive party- 
military concordat in the early years of their rule; but a consideration 
of the probable lead times of major Soviet procurements would appear to 
suggest greater continuity, in Soviet policy as opposed to the external 
influences upon that policy, throughout this period. On this view, the 
constant Soviet problem has been to balance the need for improved 
performance in the consumer and agriculture sections with an abiding 
'determination to achieve the security and policy choice flexibility 
reserved to true superpowers'.100 Similarly, the crucial change in the 
equation has been an altered perception of the military requirements for 
this latter goal, which apparently emerged, in response to the Kennedy force
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expansions, in the late Khrushchev era.
As has already been suggested, it was evidently a central objective 
of Khrushchev's own detente policy to stabilize the military balance on 
terms which preserved, as far as possible, the fragile gains of the 
early Soviet successes in ICBM technology; and when this goal was 
undermined - in part through his own 'adventurist' diplomacy - he would 
seem to have drawn the relevant lesson on the need for softer language and 
a bigger stick. The most obvious Khrushchev legacies were the definitive 
nuclearization of the Soviet armed forces, and the quest for a 
controllable and survivable, if relatively small, retaliatory capability. 
But the readiness to concentrate immediate efforts on such obvious 
priorities does not necessarily signify a lack of interest in more 
expansive long term goals. As Edward Warner suggests:
A landmark decision appears to have been taken 
sometime in 1963 to commence a general expansion 
of Soviet strategic capability ... This decision 
has all the earmarks of an emulative reaction 
triggered by the over-reactive build-up of 
American strategic power that had begun three 
years earlier. Upheld and perhaps expanded by 
the collective leadership which succeeded 
Khrushchev in October 1964, it produced a 
steady expansion of the Soviet strategic missile 
capability throughout the decade. l o 1
Moreover, Jacobsen argues, the impressive, though 'not precipitate', 
expansion of Soviet 'non-strategic systems and interventionary-type forces' 
appears to have been facilitated by the fact that 'the necessary research 
allocations had already been enacted by Khrushchev'.102 And, as Wolfe 
points out, the basic 'combined arms' posture of the Soviet forces was 
clearly established by the late Khrushchev period:
In short, rather than reduce the theater forces 
to a small appendage of the Soviet military 
establishment, limited essentially to mopping 
up operations in the wake of nuclear blows 
delivered by the strategic striking forces, 
Khrushchev through his reforms in effect 
endowed the theater forces with dual capabilities 
for both conventional and nuclear warfare and 
left them to play a continuing role as a central
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element of Soviet military power. In so doing,
Khrushchev moved, at least part way, towards 
recognizing the arguments of those who feared 
his excessive emphasis upon strategic deterrence 
would prove harmful to the Soviet Union's war­
fighting preparedness and might even vitiate 
the country's deterrent posture itself.
l o 3
Conversely, there are indications that Khrushchev's successors may have 
been moving, in 1965, to implement his final projected troop cuts, but 
were dissuaded by the worsening international environment associated with 
the Vietnam crisis.104 The United States'role in Indochina, and the 
weapons systems deployed there, would also seem to have encouraged the 
efforts to improve Soviet conventional 'reach'.105 And more generally, 
Jacobsen suggests that the diversion of American resources there, together 
with the USSR's improving economic situation, enabled the Soviets to 
'catch up' without excessive economic burdens - the main U.S. achievement 
in Vietnam being 'the final destruction of her unchallengeable military 
superiority'. 1 0 6
Of course, such inferences from lead times are inevitably problematical, 
and some leading analysts have laid greater stress on the initiative of the 
present regime in accounting for the determined Soviet drive to catch up 
militarily.107 Moreover, to the extent that one accepts the retrospective 
increase in the CIA's estimates of the Soviet military 'burden', one's 
estimates of the ease of the catching up exercise must be correspondingly 
modified. Nonetheless, the above considerations, together with the 
recurrence of doctrinal 'debates' on superiority and nuclear victory, 
suggest that although the present leadership has given every indication 
of placing a high valuation upon military 'clout' as a bulwark of Soviet 
great power status, the actual dimensions of the arsenal at its disposal 
reflect a considerable more veccotive pattern of military decisionmaking 
than is often allowed. A corollary of this is that the strongly land 
power oriented, warfighting core of Soviet military doctrine provides 
little guidance on the flexible exploitation of non-nuclear capabilities. 
Indeed, as Robert Weinland comments, while 'the political leadership 
had already endorsed the expansion of the "internationalist functions" 
of the Soviet armed forces at least as early as the Twenty-Fourth Party 
Congress ... the military leadership in general, and Marshal Grechko in
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particular, appeared reluctant to even discuss, let alone embrace that 
issue1. Over the next three years, the general concept gradually
gained formal military support. But, with the notable exception of 
Gorshkov's important series, 'Navies in War and Peace', the most
• • 1 0 9substantial studies in this area have been primarily 'academic' in origin.
Of course, military doctrine remains highly relevant to the question 
of conventional war in Europe, and this question has lately attracted 
substantial Western commentary, which has focussed particularly on the 
inevitable ambiguity in regard to preemption involved in the strongly 
offensive orientation of Soviet prescriptions for 'theatre' warfare. 110 
But there is no substantial doctrinal evidence that the Soviets envisage 
a major European conflict remaining non-nuclear; and the Reagan 
administration's recent public flirtation with the notion of a limited 
nuclear exchange in Europe called forth a categorical rejection from 
Brezhnev and other spokesmen. 111 Thus the comments made earlier about 
nuclear preemption in general apply also in this case. Moreover the 'theatre 
offensive' Soviet strategy for Europe - as distinct from the widespread 
concern with it among Western civilian commentators - is far from novel, 
being rooted in a military tradition established in the Civil War, and 
confirmed both ly the Soviets' World War II experience and their lengthy 
period of enforced reliance upon a 'European hostage' deterrent against 
an invulnerable United States.
In addition, the 'side benefit ... of very significantly improved 
conventional capabilities'112 which the Soviets have derived from their 
combined arms approach to nuclear operations existed in embryo in the 
Khrushchev period. Yet they were at that time simultaneously increasing 
their nuclear threat to Europe, even as NATO moved towards a 'flexible 
response' strategy to counter the greater threat of Soviet conventional 
attack which was supposed to derive from the declining credibility of 
American 'extended deterrent' threats. The exercise of drawing
inferences about present Soviet intentions from present Soviet capabilities 
is, of course, an enormously complex one. But on the simpler question 
of the light cast by published Soviet doctrine on the prospects for a 
premeditated attack on Western Europe, there would seem to be no real 
shift from the 'high threshold' perspective implied in Sokolovskiy's 
comment on Western approaches to limited war :
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Various limitations are mostly forced and 
conditional. A limited war is fraught with 
a tremendous danger of escalating into 
general war, especially if tactical nuclear 
weapons are used. ... In spite of all these 
theories and concepts, one can state with 
assurance that [this] strategy ... will 
involve the dangers analogous to those connected 
with the strategy of 'massive retaliation'^^
The wider issue of the 'international' functions of Soviet power 
has been approached with particular vigour by the Chief of the Main 
Political Administration of the armed forces, General A. Yepishev:
Today the defense of the socialist fatherland 
is closely tied to giving comprehensive 
assistance to national liberation movements, 
progressive regimes, and new states which 
are fighting against imperialist domination .. . 
This activity of our army, directed to cutting 
off the export of imperialist counterevolution 
under current conditions may with full 
justification be regarded as one of the most 
important manifestations of its external 
functions^ l 5
However, the novelty of such pronouncements lies primarily in their 
expansiveness. As Garthoff points out, the 'counter deterrence' of 
American 'flexible response' strategies was one of the functions 
anticipated for the Soviet nuclear force under Khrushchev. However, this 
was then 'only an auxiliary instrument for constraining Western resort 
to military means to meet non-military moves'; 116 and its underlying 
rationale - that any substantial local conflict was extremely likely 
to escalate into central nuclear war - was in fact a prescription for 
Soviet impotence in conditions in which the United States enjoyed the 
advantage of 'escalation dominance' and appeared determined to employ 
it. By contrast, Grechko was pointing to a genuinely comprehensive 
'counterdeterrent' when he asserted in 1971 that 'the military might 
of the USSR ... is one of the most significant factors assuring favourable 
foreign conditions for the building of communism in our country and the
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development of all socialist countries, for the struggle for independence 
1 1 7of the peoples'. But, like Yepishev, he was speaking essentially
within a well established tradition.
Of course, recent Soviet 'internationalist' activity has gone 
well beyond mere counterdeterrence; and some Soviet writings on this 
subject, as the following comment on the significance of the major 
OKEAN exercises illustrates, have demonstrated a relative unconcern 
with the justificatory constraints of Marxist-Leninist ideology:
Facts are facts - the Soviet Union is truly 
a great air and sea power. This fact alone 
... clearly reveals that the Soviet Union not 
only can but already has begun to resolve the 
task of furnishing military-technical support 
for its military presence in rather remote 
regions of the world.
118
Moreover, this is merely a more specific expression of the general 
claim to great power rights noted in the early discussion of the 
correlation of forces. But to move from such generalized pronouncements 
to the identification of recent Soviet actions in Africa and West Asia 
as merely the first step in a coherently planned and officially 
articulated policy of expansion is to enter the realm of pure speculation. 
The most important single statement in this area - that of Gorshkov 
- places a great deal of emphasis on the peacetime importance of the 
assertion of naval 'presence', but gives very little indication of 
Gorshkov's own - let alone the Soviet leadership's - perceptions of the 
role of an established capacity for the 'projection of power ashore' in 
the pursuit of Soviet interests in the Third World. 119 In general, both 
Soviet naval doctrine and (to date) Soviet naval procurements suggest a 
concern with 'sea denial' rather than 'sea control', 120 which, despite 
its more activist orientation, still conforms to the basic objective 
of ensuring that regimes and movements favourable to the Soviet Union 
do not fail simply for lack of military support against the forces of 
'counter-revolution'. As Michael MccGwire comments:
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The Soviet Union is not challenging the United 
States for command of the sea. But it is 
challenging the command that the Western navies 
used formerly to exercise through default of 
any opposition. And she CsicD is posing this 
challenge partly by means of the forward 
deployment of her own forces and partly by 
providing third-world countries with navies 
whereby to defend themselves.
1 2 1
However, the paucity of indications for an imperialist strategy
in the Soviet literature has not deter-red -some Western analysts from
drawing their own far reaching inferences in this regard. A particularly
striking example of this activity is presented by Douglass as an
addendum to a study overwhelmingly concerned with Soviet doctrine on
theatre warfare in Europe. Among his 'major conclusions', Douglass
states that 'local wars Caway from Europe and the Soviet borders] appear
to be regarded as a principal mechanism to be exploited by the Soviet Union
in expanding its interests and hegemony'; and that, while 'these local
actions are generally seen as conventional actions ... the Soviets
also appear to have recognized explicitly the limited use of nuclear
weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in local wars'. He concedes
that 'the evidence supporting this possibility is thin ... CbutU the
worldwide implications of such a development are sufficiently important
1 2 2to warrant its consideration as a major conclusion'.
This is an undeniably important conclusion, which may already be 
finding its way into the general strategic literature.1 2 2 But, in fact, 
the evidence deployed by Douglass in support of it is not so much thin 
as non-existent. The sole example cited of 'certain recent statements 
which indicate an interest in the capability to employ nuclear weapons 
in limited localized actions', is a 1975 article by General I. Shavrov, 
Chief of the General Staff Academy, on 'Local wars and their place in 
the global strategy of imperialism'.124 But unless Shavrov's language 
is to be regarded as 'Aesopian' in the extreme, his subject would appear 
to be precisely that indicated by his title, and his principal theme 
encapsulated in the contention that, in conditions of detente, an 
upsurge in the national liberation movement, an altered correlation of 
forces and the rest, 'the imperialist strategy of local wars is going 
through a crisis'.
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Despite a number of tendentious claims about the scope of direct 
imperialist aggression against young sovereign states, Shavrov builds 
a not implausible argument that whereas Western strategists had 
formerly considered local wars an 'acceptable' means of containing 
unfavourable developments in the Third World - ' in conditions when 
... a direct armed clash with the countries of socialism threatens 
catastrophe for imperialism itself' - they are now finding the strategy 
increasingly counter-productive even in the latter arena. In the late 
1960s and 1970s, Shavrov asserts, there has been both a decline in the 
number of local wars, and an increase in the proportion of such conflicts 
resolved in favour of the national liberation movement: and it is in 
this sense, and only in this sense, that they are presented as 'profitable'
1 2 5from the progressive/Soviet viewpoint.
Not only does the Shavrov article explicitly emphasize the bankruptcy 
of a local war strategy. It also introduces the specific issue of 
nuclear weapons as evidence of the great dangers of escalation from local 
into general conflict - an argument which, far from being new, was a 
commonplace of the Khrushchev era. Shavrov attacks as imperialist 
ideology - which creates a 'wilfully falsified and distorted image of 
the experience of local wars' - the notion that they can be kept within 
strict limits, and need not endanger world peace. He notes that what is 
a limited war for one side may be anything but limited for the other.
With special emphasis on the Vietnam conflict - a 'partial task of 
global strategy' for the United States, but a matter of 'very existence' 
for the Vietnamese - he argues that imperialist powers have already 
demonstrated their readiness to use all modern forms of mass destruction 
short of nuclear weapons in local wars, and that for the national liberation 
forces, compelled to respond to this asymmetry of force with the very 
different strategies at their disposal, ' any form of limitation' would 
be 'unnatural' . 12 6
It is undeniable that Shavrov's picture of the socialist camp as 
merely a source of material and moral support to indigenous forces 
struggling against a vastly more powerful external adversary has been 
increasingly belied by the Soviet Union's own exploitation of massive 
military force to determine the course of local conflicts in Angola,
Ethiopia and Afghanistan. But Shavrov also points to important constraints 
upon large scale military intervention - such as the limitations imposed
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by terrain on the use of modern weapons systems, and the advantages 
accruing to the national liberation forces in a prolonged struggle - 
which would be as significant for a Soviet strategy of imperialism 
as for an 'imperialist' one. Moreover, this question should be considered 
in the wider context of political restraints on the use of military 
power. As Christopher Jones points out, Soviet military writing on this 
topic has 'increased considerably ... [in] breadth and depth' since I960, 
and one important concern of Soviet commentators has been to assess 
the implications of the American experience in Vietnam. Given the
widespread assumption among American critics of a Soviet desire to 
emulate the former 'imperial' pre-eminence of the United States, and 
the readiness of some analysts to manipulate Soviet pronouncements to 
demonstrate official articulation of such a desire,*it is especially 
significant that Soviet discussions of constraints in this area should,
i 2 9in Jones' words, have been 'virtually ignored' by Western observers.
Jones argues that the 'moral-political factor', and especially the 
central Stalinist concerns of 'the stability of the rear' and 'the 
morale of the Army', retain great importance in contemporary Soviet 
thinking on limited or local war. 'Implicit in Soviet writing', he 
suggests, 'is the recognition that it is extremely difficult to explain 
to one's soldiers and civilians that a war can be both just and limited 
at the same time'. Moreover, behind the obvious Marxist-Leninist equation 
of just = historically progressive, Soviet military theorists have also 
settled on a 'working definition of a just war as one that the population 
regards as just'; and to Schelling's four possible outcomes to the 'dice 
game' of limited war - win, lose, draw, and disaster (through nuclear 
escalation) - 'the Soviets add two other possible outcomes: a collapse of
13 0army morale and a domestic political crisis'.
Three aspects of Soviet commentary on this issue seem especially 
relevant here. Soviet writers effectively acknowledge that nationalism 
is a central element in any population's assessment of the 'justice' of 
a war, and may well overcome class divisions when a direct threat to 
the motherland is identified; that multi-national states are especially 
susceptible to the erosion of support for 'unjust' war aims among the 
population and army; and that the dangers of such a development are
1 3 1much increased by the phenomenon of long and inconclusive foreign wars.
* As in the arguments of Douglass cited above.
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These observations accord both with the general record of colonialist/ 
nationalist struggle, and the specific experience of Russia and the 
Soviet Union in this century. When combined with the recognition of 
the serious 'technical' constraints upon the ability of great powers 
to enforce their own 'ground rules' in limited conflicts, and such 
specific aspects of the Soviet strategic culture - discussed in Chapter 
4 - as a propensity to over-insure in military engagements and a relative 
lack of concern with 'face' in the specific sense of future 'bargaining' 
reputation, they suggest that the Soviet Union may be rather less prone 
than the United States to acquire its own 'Vietnams' and more disposed 
to cut its losses at an early stage should a commitment appear likely 
to assume this character.
The situation in Afghanistan obviously constitutes a crucial test 
case for these propositions, and the evidence to date remains ambiguous.
On the one hand, the Soviet armed forces remain directly embroiled, more 
than two years after the initial invasion, in an apparently open-ended 
conflict against a deeply fragmented but undeniably genuine 'national 
liberation movement'. On the other hand, there has been no major 
increase in the Soviet troop commitment since the invasion, and the 
Soviet campaign has so far remained very different in character to that 
of the United States in Vietnam - reminiscent of the actions against 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia in the early, massive display of force, and 
reminiscent of traditional British practices on the North-West frontier 
in the sharply limited military goals apparently being pursued. Thus
while the Soviet authorities have so far been prepared to accept an 
extended 'limited war' of dubious 'justice' with little obvious concern 
for the loyalty even of their Central Asian soldiers and citizens, they 
have avoided the scale of involvement which might weld the opposition 
groups together into a coherent liberation front. At the very least, the 
proposition about Soviet caution regarding the size of the military 
commitment necessary to secure a given objective remains unchallenged.
If the Soviets are prepared to do so relatively little with almost 100,000 
troops in Afghanistan - a virtually uncontested region directly on their 
borders - they seem unlikely to undertake a commitment of the scale which 
would presumably be regarded as appropriate to a major action in the 
highly volatile Persian Gulf region, except in the context of a major 
East-West confrontation with at least partially independent roots.
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More generally still, there is the basic Soviet doctrinal tenet
that 'the question of use of armed force' must be considered in relation
to the entire correlation of forces, and that an individual war may
both be 'just and legitimate', and offer 'promise of success at a given
time within a certain country', and yet be undesirable because it 'may
result in substantial negative consequences for the world revolutionary 
13 3process'. This argument has, of course, often been employed in a
clearly manipulative manner - especially against the Chinese in their 
militant phase - to justify the tailoring of the 'world revolutionary 
process' to the more obvious Soviet national interest. But the constraints 
which it indicates are none.the less real for this,especially in regard 
to actions, such as a clear military encroachment in the Gulf, which 
would be seen as directly threatening vital Western interests. There is 
thus a dual aspect to the claim that 'the weakening of the positions of 
imperialism and the doom of the capitalist system intensify the aggressiveness 
and adventurism of reactionary monopolistic circles'134 - providing on 
the one hand a military rationale for high preparedness against the 
eventuality of a trend towards 'fascism' and 'revanchism' in the West, and 
on the other an argument against pushing too hard lest this should 
actively promote such a development. As has been argued in earlier chapters, 
there are reasonable grounds for believing that the Soviet regime does 
regard detente as the most effective strategy for advancing both its 
internal and external interests, and that its rejection of 'linkage', 
while genuine, is far from a complete denial of the general constraints 
which a commitment to detente imposes.
Finally, if published Soviet statements will not, on the face of it, 
support the thesis of a settled commitment to military-based expansion 
in the Third World, their most obvious material context provides no 
warrant for twisting them till they do. Indeed, as regards the crucial 
Middle East/Persian Gulf region, the reverse would seem to be the case.
As was argued in Chapter 4, the 'internal' correlation of forces seems 
to promise a further deterioration of a still highly privileged American
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position in this region. And while the Soviet Union's physical 
proximity to the Gulf may do little to remove the perils involved in 
a major military initiative on its own part, it does greatly enhance 
the plausibility of Soviet counter-deterrence of American intervention 
to contain unwanted internal developments there. As Uwe Nerlich puts 
it, the Soviet 'strategic purpose in most conceivable contingencies 
is rather to deter American intervention, thereby protecting favourable 
political changes', and the Soviet Union is less reliant than the United 
States on nuclear threats because it 'has superior forces that would 
be in place first in contingencies where it would have to shoot second'.
Moreover, one does not have to delve very deeply in the work of 
leading American commentators (or in the rhetoric of the Reagan 
administration) for evidence that a good deal of the current American 
concern about the supposed threat to crisis stability from the Soviet 
military buildup is really a concern - analogous to that which first 
surfaced in the 1950s - with the dubious credibility of much of the 
extended deterrence objective of the American nuclear arsenal. Thus 
Gray states candidly that 'for reasons of extended deterrence duties, the 
United States cannot afford a crisis stability that precludes first use 
of nuclear weapons'. And Kissinger, in one of his recent attacks on
the 'geopolitical momentum' of current Soviet policy, adds the revealing 
judgement that the strategic balance early in the 1980s will give 'the 
Soviets a high degree of confidence in stability in a crisis [and] that 
confidence, in turn, may make crises more likely'. Such statements lie 
squarely within the mainstream tradition of American strategic theorizing, 
one strand of which has always been concerned with the exploitation of 
uncertainty regarding the range of contingencies for which a nuclear 
response is possible. There are, of course, identifiable historical and 
geopolitical reasons why a concern with the political exploitation of 
nuclear weapons should be more developed in the United States than in 
the Soviet Union; but the point here is that, at least on the published 
record, the relationship is this way around and not, as hawk arguments 
would imply, the reverse.
In conclusion, neither the strong nor the weak thesis that Soviet 
military doctrine indicates an adventurist approach to the risks of nuclear 
war would appear to be supported by the record. It is true that the 
earlier pattern of concentration on the extreme contingency of nuclear
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war has been modified by the increasing emergence of quasi-doctrinal 
studies on the prospects for the lower level exploitation of force.
But this is compatible with the activist conception of detente identified 
in this thesis; and moreover, it implies the leavening of purely 
military judgements by consideration of the political restraints 
involved in the management of a relatively stable modus vivendi with 
the leading capitalist powers. This is not to say that the risks
of nuclear war may not be increased by parity, by greater Soviet 
assertiveness, and by the uncertainties which the new 'correlation of 
forces' may create in the policies of both great powers; nor that 
'geopolitical' or other imperatives may not quite override doctrinal 
considerations in the determination of Soviet policies. But it is to 
say that the 'horse's mouth' argument for a settled campaign of Soviet 
expansionism will not stand. Soviet military doctrine is, in general, 
both internally consistent, and consistent with the wider body of Soviet 
doctrine on Peaceful Coexistence and detente; and insofar as doctrinal 
evidence provides the basis of arguments for a Soviet rejection of the 




1 Richard Pipes, 'Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and 
Win a Nuclear War', Commentary, July 1977, pp.21-34; see also 
Pipes' reply to letters on this article, Commentary, September 
1977, pp.22-25.
2 Ken Booth, 'Soviet Defence Policy', in Baylis (et. al.), Contemporary 
Strategy, p.219.
3 This argument is advanced in Gray, The Soviet-American Arms Race, 
pp.149-60.
4 Pipes, 'Why the Soviet Union ...', p.29. For similar arguments see 
Stanley Sienkewicz, 'SALT and Soviet Nuclear Doctrine',
International Security, Spring, 1978, p.91; William Van Cleave,
'Soviet Doctrine and Strategy', in Laurence L. Whetten, The Future 
of Soviet Military Power, Crane Russak, 1976, p.44; Ross,
'Rethinking Soviet Military Policy’, pp. 4-8.
5 This point is acknowledged even by Gray. See'Strategic Stability
Reconsidered', Daedalus, Vol 109, No 4, 1980, p.139.
6 Van Cleave, 'Soviet Doctrine and Strategy'; pp, 43-44.
/
7 Leon Goure, Foy Kohler, Mose Harvey, The Role of Nuclear Forces 
in Current Soviet Strategy, University of Miami, 1974, p.xx 
(introduction by Kohler).
8 Harriet Fast Scott (ed), Soviet Military Strategy, Macdonald & Jane's, 
London, 1976, p.38. (This work, hereafter referred to as Soviet 
Military Strategy, is a translation of the third edition of the 
authoritative Soviet text, Military Strategy, edited by Marshal 
Sokolovskiy, with annotations showing additions to, and deletions 
from, the two earlier editions.)
9 For a useful brief summary and evaluation of Soviet claims on 
this issue, see Benjamin Lambeth, 'The Sources of Soviet Military 
Doctrine', in Frank Horton, Anthony Rogerson, and Edward Warner 
(eds), Comparative Defence Policy, Johns Hopkins, Baltimore, 1974, 
pp.200-203. Lambeth comments that 'there unquestionably exists
in the Soviet Union a highly integrated and widely acception notion 
of what constitutes military doctrine, and the taxonomy of Soviet 
military theory is probably more elaborate and institutionalized 
than that of any other country'. But he rejects the view of 'some 
Western analysts' that 'the formulation of Soviet military policy 
is a sort of conspiratorial palace intrigue' directed with 
'relentless rationality' by a totally dominant party elite.
10 Pipes, 'Why the Soviet Union ...', p.27.
11 ibid., p.26. Pipes observes that the Marxist stress on class 
warfare 'has merely served to reinforce these ingrained convictions'. 
See also the very similar analysis advanced by Kohler in his 
testimony to the hearings on The Soviet Union: Internal Dynamics
592.
of Foreign Policy, Past and Future, u.S.House of Representatives 
Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Europe and 
the Middle East, Washington, 1978, 9-20.
12 See, for instance, Pipes' comments on the irrelevance of 'the 
public pronouncements of a Brezhnev, Arbatov, or some retired 
general working for Arbatov's institute', where these are at 
variance with his own interpretation of Soviet doctrine. Reply 
to readers' letters, Commentary, September 1977, p.24.
13 Lambeth, 'How to Think About Soviet Military Doctrine', RAND
Paper, p*- 5939, February, 1978, pp. 3-5. Lambeth is
describing this viewpoint, not endorsing it.
14 The most important statement of this argument is Roman Kolkowicz,
The Soviet Military and the Communist Party, Princeton University 
Press, 1967. The argument that no such inherent conflict exists, 
and that 'one is confusing appearances with reality if one believes 
that martial inclinations are limited to marshals', has recently 
been forcefully expounded by William E. Odom, in 'Who Controls 
Whom In Moscow", Foreign Policy, Summer, 1975, pp. 109-123'; 'The 
Party Connection', Problems of Communism, Sept-Oct, 1973, pp. 12-26; 
'The Militarization of Soviet Society', Problems of Communism, 
Sept-Oct, 1976, pp. 34-51.
15 Van Cleave, 'Soviet Doctrine and Strategy', p. 47.
16 Pipes, for instance, asserts that Soviet foreign policy is 
subordinated to domestic policy; but the only major domestic 
objective considered by him is the preservation of the existing 
centralized political structure, which, he argues, provides a 
positive incentive for the leadership not to shift more resources 
into the consumer sphere, since this would detract from the sj<ige 
mentality required for unchallenged party control. For the rest, 
he finds the well springs of the Soviet foreign policy outlook in 
deep seated aspects of national character: the 'patrimonial' 
tradition of government' 'the persistent tradition of Russian 
expansion' established in the 16th and 17th centuries; the peasant 
background of the Soviet elite; and the schooling of that elite
in the brutal traditions of Stalinist Machtpolitik. 'Detente/ 
Moscow's View', in Pipes (ed.) Soviet Strategy in Europe, Crane 
Russak, New York, 1976, pp. 7-12, 18-21. Similar arguments are 
advanced by Kohler, in, The Soviet Union: Internal Dynamics of 
Foreign Policy, pp. 9-25, and by other writers of this school.
As was noted in Chapter 1, the similarity of such arguments 
to the 'Riga Axioms', first formulated by American observers at 
the height of the Stalinist terror, is striking.
17 The term is Wolfe's; The Soviet Union: Internal Dynamics of
Foreign Policy, p.90. The argument it designates is expanded 
in Kenneth Myers and Dimitri Simes, Soviet Decision Making, 
Strategic Policy and SALT, Georgetown University Center for 
















For an exposition of this concept, see Odom, 'The Party 
Connection', pp. 20-26.
Wolfe, 'Military Power and Soviet Policy', in William E. Griffith 
(ed.) The Soviet Empire: Expansion and DetenteMIT Press,
Lexington, 1976, p.156.
Ibid., p.157.
See, for instance, Joseph Douglass and Amoretta Hoeber, Soviet 
Strategy for Nuclear War, Hoover Institute, Stanford, 1979.
This study appears with endorsements by Pipes, Nitze and Cline, 
and with an introduction by Eugene Rostow strongly praising it 
for demonstrating the Soviet doctrinal commitment to the use of 
military power 'as an instrument of imperial expansion'. On the 
preemption issue, the authors assert that public Soviet disavowals 
of first strike policies have 'nothing to do with Soviet views 
on striking first when the situation calls for war. The 
preponderant base of evidence in the Soviet literature designed 
for internal use calls for their-striking first against the West when 
the situation calls for war and when the factors are in the Soviet 
favour'. (p.106, emphasis in original).
Pipes, 'Detente: Moscow's View', p.34.
Ibid.
inHelmut Sonnenfeldt, cited^New York Times 3 April 6, 1976.
Thompson, 'The Projection of Soviet Power', p.35.
See Pipes' comment ('Detente: Moscow's View', p.28) that although 
the Soviet leadership seeks 'to create the impression of a 
relentless advance forward ... it in fact moves very cautiously 
and slowly Candi it can act decisively only when it has a near 
100 per cent assurance of success ...'.
For a striking example of the sterility of this approach, see 
Roger W. Barnett, 'Trans - SALT : Soviet Strategic Doctrine',
0rbis3 Summer, 1975, pp. 533-561.
Once again, Pipes provides the most striking examples of this 
approach.
For a similar, though rather more narrowly directed, argument 
for the existence of two 'quite separate debates' in Soviet 
doctrine, see Sienkiewicz, 'SALT and Soviet Nuclear Doctrine', p.85.
Garthoff, 'Mutual Deterrence and Strategic Arms Limitation in 
Soviet Policy', p.114.
31 Pipes, Reply to Readers' Letters, Commentary3 September, 1977,
p. 26.
32 Garthoff, 'Mutual Deterrence ...', pp. 114-5.
594.
33 'Marxism-Leninism asserts that the basic question in an analysis 
and evaluation of war must be the question as to what is the 
class character of a given war, what classes are waging it for 
the sake of what goals, by what classes it was prepared and 
directed ... war, being as it is the continuation of class 
politics, always has a class character. Any and every war is 
inextricably bound up with that political order out of which it 
flows'. Soviet Military Strategy, pp. 177-78. For an extended 
discussion of this issue, see P-H.Vigor, The Soviet View of War,
Peace and Neutrality, Routledge, London, 1976, pp. 14-177.
34 Soviet Military Strategy, pp. 201-211.
35 Van Cleave, 'Soviet Doctrine and Strategy', p. 49 (emphasis in original).
36 Editor's Introduction to Soviet Military Strategy, p. xxx.
37 General-Major A.S.Milovidov (ed.), The Philosophical Heritage of 
V. I.Lenin and Problems of Contemporary War, Moscow 1972.
(translated by US Air Force), p. 50.
38 See, for instance, Lieutenant Colonel Ye I. Rybkin, 'On the 
Nature of World Nuclear Rocket War', in William R. Kintner and 
Harriet Fast-Scott (ed.), The Nuclear Revolution in Soviet 
Military Affairs, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 1968, p. 115.
39 Soviet Military Strategy, p.197. This statement omits the reference 
in the earlier (Khrushchev era) editions to the existence of 
scientific calculations that such a war would cause 700-800 million 
deaths (p.432); but the basic message is unchanged.
40 Ogarkov, 'Guarding Peaceful Labour', p. 85.
41 Rybkin, 'On the Nature of World Nuclear Rocket War', p.114.
42 Maj-General K. Bochkarev, cited in Garthoff, 'Mutual Deterrence ...',
pp. 117-121. Garthoff discusses this and other contributions to
the late-1960s Military Thought debate on deterrence-related issues 
at considerable length in this article.
43 Ibid., p.120.
44 Wolfe, 'Military Power and Soviet Policy', p.168.
45 Sienkewicz, 'SALT and Soviet Nuclear Doctrine', p.85.
46 These developments are discussed in Chapter 5.
47 N .Talensky, 'The Late War: Some Reflections', International Affairs,
May, 1965, p.15. 'In our days, Talensky declared, 'there is no more
dangerous illusion than the idea that thermo-nuclear war can 
still serve as an instrument of politics, that it is possible to 
achieve political aims by using nuclear weapons and at the same 
time survive, that it is possible to find acceptable forms of 
nuclear war'. The leading response on the 'hawk' side was the
595.
Rybkin article cited earlier. The debate is discussed in Roman 
Kolkowicz, 'The Red "Hawks" on the Rationality of Nuclear War',
RAND Memorandum3 RM-4899-PR March, 1966.
48 See, on the military side: General-Major A.Milovidov 'A 
Philosophical Analysis of Military Thought', Krasnaya Zvezda3 
May, 19, 1973; Colonel T.R.Kondratkov, 'War as a Continuation
of Policy, Soviet Military Review3 February, 1974; Col. Ye. Rybkin,
'The Leninist Concept of War and the Present', Kommunist Vooruzhennykh 
Sil 3 October, 1973. (These articles are reproduced in Strategic 
Review3 Winter, 1974, Fall, 1974, and Spring, 1974 respectively.)
Leading civilian contributors were G.A.Arbatov, 'Strength - Strategy 
Stalemates', Peace3 Freedom and Socialism, February 1974; and A. Bovin, 
'Internationalism and Coexistence', New Times3 July, 1973.
49 See, for instance, Ogarkov, 'Guarding Peaceful Labour', 
pp. 85-7.
50 Garthoff claims that both 'Soviet military and political leaders 
have ceased to call for strategic superiority as an objective since 
the 24th Party Congress in April 1971, which also marked a turning 
point in SALT'; but in the military case, there would seem initially 
to have been a diminution rather than a cessation of such statements. 
'Mutual Deterrence . . . ' , p.14.
51 Leninskim Kursom3 Vol 6 , p. 294.
52 PravdOj February 23, 1978; CDSP, XXX, No 8, pp. 3-4.
53 Leninskim Kursom3 Vol 6. p. 596.
54 'Who Sets the Zone', Krasnaya Zvezda3 January 12, 1977; FB1S III3 
1977, No 13, p .4.
55 Colonel Ye. Rybkin, 'The Twenty-Fifth Congress of the CPSU and 
the problem of peaceful coexistence of Socialism and Capitalism',
Voyenno -  Istoricheskiy Zhumal3 January, 1977, pp. 5-9.
56 See, for instance, the recent claim of Frances Hoeber and Amoretta
Hoeber: 'the Soviets have over two decades both said they wanted
and in actuality pursued the goal of strategic superiority, 
treating parity only as a transition from inferiority'. 'The
Soviet View of Deterrence: Who Whom?', Survey3 Vol.25, No.3, 1980, p.19. 
(Emphasis in original.)
57 See the 1979 claims of a 'purely defensive' Soviet doctrine by 
Brezhnev and Ustinov, cited in Aspaturian, 'Soviet Global Power 
and the Correlation of Forces', p.6. More recently the American 
Vice-President George Bush claimed to be 'amused' by such claims, 
justifying the Trident submarine programme as a counter to the 
'aggressive and expansionist' policy of the USSR. The Age3
13 November, 1981.
596.
58 The phrase is 'yadernoye sderzhivanie', which, Vigor suggests 
is 'almost untranslatable', but would seem to convey the basic 
sense of 'nuclear restraining'. 'The Semantics of Deterrence 
and Defence', in Michael MccGwire (ed), Soviet Naval Policy: 
Ojectives and Constraints, Praeger, New York, 1975, pp. 471-478.
59 Garthoff, 'Mutual deterrence ...'. p. 122.
60 Barnett, in an extensive survey, found that it was not used 
by any writers below the rank of admiral or general.
'Trans - SALT . . . ' , p. 543.
61 See, for example, the following statement by Admiral Gorshkov:
missile-carrying submarines, owing to their great 
survivability in comparison with land-based launch 
installations, are an even more effective means of 
deterrence. They represent a constant threat to 
an aggressor who, by comprehending the inevitability 
of nuclear retaliation from the direction of the 
oceans, can be faced with the necessity of 
renouncing the unleashing of a nuclear war.
'Some Problems in Mastering the World Ocean!, . in Red Star 
Rising at Sea, USNIP, Anapolis, 1974, p. 130. This book is a 
United States Navy translation of the Gorshkov series of 
articles, 'Navies in War and Peace', published in Morskoi 
Sbomik in 1972-1973.
62 General V. Kulikov (then Chief of the General Staff), 'The 
Soviet Armed Forces and Military Science', Kommunist,1973,
No.3; reproduced in Strategic Review, Winter 1974, p. 82.
63 General V. Kulikov, Kommunist Vooruzhennyk Sil, March, 1973;
FBIS III, 1973, No. 72, pp. M - 3.
64 Barnett, for instance, cites the above passage as evidence 
of a Soviet approach 'that goes beyond direct linear 
deterrence', whatever that is supposed to be. 'Trans - SALT ..', 
p. 543.
65 Ross, 'Rethinking Soviet Strategic Policy', pp. 9-11.
66 Marshal A. Grechko (then Minister for Defence), On Guard 
for Peace and the Building of Communism; JPRS, No. 54602, 
December 2, 1971, p. 32.
67 Colonel A.A. Siderenko, The Offensive, Moscow, 1970, (United 
States Air Force Translation), p. 134.
68 Benjamin Lambeth, 'Selective Nuclear Options and Soviet 
Strategy', RAND Paper, P-5506, September, 1975, pp. 5-9.
Jack Snyder similarly observes that, in contrast to the 
evidence of divisions of the question of the winnability 
of nuclear war, 'on the limited nuclear options issue, at 
least, Soviet opinion does seem to be monolithic'. 'The 
Soviet Strategic Culture', p. 39. (emphasis in original)
597.
59 Testimony to 1974 Senate hearings on 'Nuclear Weapons and 
Foreign Policy’, cited in Joseph D. Douglass, The Soviet 
Theater Nuclear Offensive3 United States Air Force,
Washington, p. 1.
70 Ibid, j p.5.
71 Lambeth, ’Selective Nuclear Operations and Soviet Strategy', 
p. 21. An expanded version of Lambeth's analysis is to be 
found in 'Selective Nuclear Options in American and Soviet 
Strategic Policy'.
72 Ball, 'Deja Vu', p. 224.
73 'The implicit scenario for the Soviets', argues Sienkiewicz, 
'requires successful anticipation of an imminent United States
"surprise attack". Thus the strategic forces of the United 
States, assuming sufficient warning of the impending American 
attack, would be largely destroyed by a preemptive strike.
Those American forces which survived Soviet preemption and 
were actually launched would be met by Soviet air defense 
and greatly degraded. Those, finally, which succeeded in 
delivering their weapons to their targets would have attacked 
a population effectively organized and, to the degree feasible, 
protected by a vigorous civil defence program and an economy 
and political control structure also organized to cope with 
such an attack.' fSALT and Soviet Nuclear Doctrine', p. 95.
It should be pointed out that Sienkiewicz, who emphasizes the 
military character of the Soviet doctrinal position, does not 
himself appear very impressed with its feasibility.
74 Kohler, The Rote of Nuclear Forces in Current Soviet Strategy3 
p. 16. See also Pipes, 'Why the Soviet Union ...', p. 31; 
and Douglass and Hoeber, Soviet Strategy for Nuclear War3
pp.98-107.
75 For detailed discussion of these debates, see Garthoff,
Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age3 pp. 61-148, and Dinerstein, 
War and the Soviet Union3 passim.
76 Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age3 p.84.
77 Marshal Rotmistrov, cited ibid.
78 Cited in C.C. Jacobsen, Soviet Strategy - Soviet Foreign Folicy3 
Robert Maclehose 6 Co., Glasgow, 1972, p. 60.
79 Ibid. 3 pp. 73-75.
80 Ibid.
598.
81 ’Elaboration on the preemptive attack theme, while hardly 
dropped from the rhetoric of Soviet strategic discourse 
altogether, began to appear with sharply diminished insistence 
and frequency and came to be complemented by increasing Soviet 
commentary on the alternative theme of retaliation1.
Lambeth, ’Selective Nuclear Options and Soviet Strategy’,
pp. 9-10.
82 Garthoff, ’Mutual Deterrence pp. 127-133.
83 Cited ibid. 3 p. 124.
84 See Kohler, The Role of Nuclear Weapons in Soviet Foreign 
Policy3 especially pp. 77-78, 104-107; also Douglass and 
Hoeber, Soviet Strategy for Nuclear War3 pp. 98-107.
85 Barnett, ’Trans - SALT ...', p. 542.
86 Lambeth, 'How to Think About Soviet Military Doctrine’, p. 12.
87 General A. Altunin, Krasnaya Zvezda3 October 4, 1972; FBIS III3 
1972, No. 197, p. M-2.
88 Leon Goure, War Survival in Soviet Strategy3 University of 
Miami Press, Coral Gables, 1976; Industrial Survival and 
Recovery after Nuclear Attack. Report to the Joint Committee 
on Defence Production, United States Congress (CO 180-20236-1), 
1976.
For examples of the Soviet response, see ’Contrary to the Times: 
Campaign of Provocation’, (Interview with General A.I.
Radziyetsky), Literatumaya Gazeta3 January 19, 1977; CDSP3 
XXIX, No. 3, pp. 6-7. Also Colonel A. Korneev, ’Another 
Manoeuver by Opponents of Detente', Kraznaya Zvezda, August 12, 
1976 ; reproduced in Strategic Review3 Spring 1977 , pp. 111-112.
89 For an extensive critique along these lines, see the two part 
article by Fred Kaplan, ’The Soviet Civil Defense Myth’, in 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists3 March and April, 1978.
Kaplan argues that both the Jones and Goure studies are marked 
by ’unrealistic assumptions, leaps of faith, violations of 
logic and a superficial understanding of the dynamics of a 
national economy’.
90 The Boeing study claimed that with only three days* warning of 
an American retaliatory strike, Soviet civil defence could 
reduce population losses to 10-11 million, and Soviet industry 
would require ’little or no preattack hardening to survive 
and recover rapidly from nuclear war’, provided ’observed 
examples' of industry dispersion became the pattern for future 
industrial development. {Industrial Survival and Recovery . .  
p. 73). A CIA study, by contrast, argued that civilian deaths 
would exceed 100 million in a 'worst case’ situation for the 
USSR, possibly reducing to ’the low tens of millions' under 
the most favourable conditions, including 'a week or more’ to 
complete evacuation. But under any circumstances, it concluded, 
’the Soviets could not prevent massive damage to their economy 
and the destruction of many of their most valued material 
accomplishments'. International Herald Tribune3 21 July, 1978.
599.
91 For a particularly revealing instance of this approach see,
T.K. Jones and W. Scott Thompson, ’Central War and Civil 
Defense’, Orbis, Fall, 1978, pp. 681-712. This includes
a lengthy and portentous discussion of the relevance of ’the 
method of science’ (i.e. the abstraction and manipulation of 
such variables as can be put through a computer) to the 
clarification of the uncertainties inherent in decision-making 
at the brink of nuclear war. But the authors' justification 
for their approach hinges on a simple piece of sleight of 
hand, whereby the assumption that decision-makers will think 
in more complex terms than simply ’avoiding a "holocaust"' is 
made to justify the assumption that their decisions could 
seriously be guided by the kind of abstruse calculations 
regarding post-war 'strength' and ’recovery’ which litter 
their text.
92 Pipes, ’Why the Soviet Union ...’, p. 33.
93 For the Second World War analogy, see ibid. , pp. 29, 34;
for the Brest-Litovsk reference, see Barnett, ’Trans - SALT ...’ 
p. 559.
93a Colin Gray, ’Strategic Stability Reconsidered', p. 140.
94 See, especially, the discussion of the bureaucratic forces 
behind the Soviet air defence programme in Edward Warner,
'Soviet Strategic Force Posture', in Horton (et.al.), 
Comparative Defense Policy> pp. 322-323.
95 See, for example, 'The Task of Limiting Strategic Arms:
Problems and Prospects', Pravda editorial, 11 February, 1978; 
CDSP, Vol. XXX, No. 6, pp. 1-6.
96 Arbatov, 'Strength - Strategy Stalemates', p. 20.
97 Brezhnev, 'Great October and the Progress of Mankind',
Leninskim Kursom, Vol. 6, p. 596.
98 For examples of this approach, see Barnett, 'Trans - SALT ...', 
pp. 543-546; and Kohler, The Role of Nuclear Forces in Current 
Soviet Strategy, pp. 35-37.
99 Pipes, 'Detente: Moscow's View', p. 44.
100 Jacobsen, Soviet Strategy - Soviet Foreign Policy3 p. 24.
101 Warner, 'Soviet Strategic Force Posture', p. 314. Jacobsen, 
in particular, identifies a 'remarkably consistent pattern . . .
[in Soviet policy] Most Western inferences of conflict 
between the strategic concepts of Khrushchev and those of 
the post-Khrushchev Party leaders, or between those of the 
Party at any one time, and the military, have proved to be 
misleading'. Soviet Strategy - Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 21.
102 Ibid., p. 67.
103 Wolfe, Soviet Power in Europe3 p. 147.
600 .
104 Ibid., p. 165. For a contemporary interpretation of the 1965 
Rybkin-Talenski dispute in terms of military dissatisfaction 
with the continuation of Khrushchev’s 'detentist' military 
policies, see Kolkowicz, ’The Red ’’Hawks" on the Rationality 
of Nuclear War’.
105 See George Hudson, ’Soviet Naval Doctrine and Soviet Politics, 
1953-1975’, World Politics, 29, No. 1, 1976, pp. 108-111.
106 Jacobsen, Soviet Strategy - Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 67.
107 Wolfe, for instance, emphasizes the acceleration of Soviet 
ICBM deployment in mid-1966, which, he suggests, must be 
traced to a decision ’not long after the new regime came to 
power’. Soviet Power in E u r o p e pp. 452-433.
108 Robert Weinland, 'Analysis of Admiral Gorshkoy’s "Navies in 
War and Peace"’, in MccGwire (ed), Soviet Naval Policy, p. 569.
109 See, for example, V.M. Kulish, Military Force and International 
Relations, Moscow 1972 (Translated JPRS, 1973, No. 58947. 
Gorshkov's own position is further developed in Morskaya Moshch* 
Gosudarstva (Sea Power of the State), Ministry of Defence 
Publishing House, Moscow, 1976.
110 For recent Soviet discussions of 'theater' strategy see 
Sidorenko, The Offensive, passim; and Colonel General N.A.
Lomov (ed), Scientific-Technical Progress and the Revolution 
in Military Affairs, Moscow, 1973. (United States Air Force 
Translation), pp. 134-163.
111 Thus Brezhnev described talk of limited war as 'dangerous 
madness', claiming that any nuclear war would be 'suicide' 
for both sides, The Age, 22 October, 1981.
112 Douglass, The Soviet Theater Nuclear Offensive, p. 7. Douglass 
points out that Soviet nuclear and conventional integration is 
primarily at 'the higher command level'. But he concludes 
that Soviet doctrine does not provide any support for the idea 
of a major 'conventional war option'.
113 Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, pp. 151-156.
114 Soviet Military Strategy, p. 69.
115 Cited in Kohler, The Role of Nuclear Forces in Current Soviet 
Strategy, p. 33.
116 Raymond Garthoff, Soviet Military Policy: a Historical
Analysis, Faber and Faber, London,1966, pp. 110-113.
117 Grechko, On Guard for Peace and the Building of Communism, 
pp. 16-17.
60 1 .
118 A.M. Dudin and Yu.N. Listinov, in Kulish (ed), Militäry Force 
and International Relations3 p. 104.
119 See particularly ’Navies in War and Peace’ , ’Navies as 
Instruments of Peacetime Imperialism’, and 'Some Problems in 
Mastering the World Ocean', in Red Star Rising at Sea.
120 Hudson, ’Soviet Naval Doctrine and Soviet Politics'.
121 MccGwire, ’Command of the Sea in Soviet Naval Strategy’ , 
in Soviet Naval Policy3 p. 634.
122 The Soviet Theater Nuclear Offensive, pp. 7-8.
122a See, for instance, Roman Kolkowicz, ’On Limited War: Soviet 
Approaches', in Robert O'Neill and D.M. Horner (ed), New 
Directions in Strategic Thinking3 Allen 6 Unwin, London,
1981, p. 85.
123 Douglass, The Soviet Theater Nuclear Offensive, pp. 108-109.
124 General I. Shavrov, 'Local wars and their place in the global 
strategy of imnerialism’ , Voyermo-Jstoricheskiy Zhurnal3 March, 
1975, pp. 57-66, April, 1975, pp. 90-97.
125 Ibid. In fact, the claim that local wars are now presented 
'as a profitable course’ for the Soviets is one key point of 
Douglass’s interpretation (p. 109). The other is that Shavrov 
presents local wars as an ethically ’two sided process’, 
reactionary on the imperialist side, but ’progressive, just 
and liberating on the other’. However, this represents not a 
new approval of local wars as a political instrument, but 
rather a sensible simplification of Soviet taxonomies, which 
gained official sanction in the third (1968) edition of 
Sokolovskiy. Formerly, the Soviets had employed the Western 
term 'local war' solely as a term of an opprobrium, to 
designate imperialist conflicts. In the Brezhnev era however, 
they have recognised that, in a conflict between an imperialist 
power and a national liberation movement, both sides must be 
fighting in the same (local) war, save that one is pursuing 
unjust, and the other just, ends. See the useful discussion
of this general issue in Vigor, The Soviet View of War s pp. 42-45.
126 Shavrov, 'Local Wars’, Part II, pp. 94-96.
127 Christopher Jones, ’Just Wars and Limited Wars: Restraints
on the Use of Soviet Armed Forces’, World Politics, Vol. 28,
No. I, 1975, pp. 44-68. See also Zimmerman and Axelrod, ’The 
’’Lessons" of Vietnam and Soviet Foreign Policy’.
128 See Eugene Rostow’s comment that the Soviets 'have been impressed 
- nearly dazzled - by the recent history of the United States', 
in ’The Soviet Threat to Europe Through the Middle East', p. 51.
129 Jones, ’Just Wars and Limited Wars’, p. 45.
130 Ibid. 3 pp. 45-53.
602.
131 Ibid, 3 pp. 55-61.
132 I am indebted to Geoffrey Jukes for the latter comparison.
133 Milovidov (ed), The Philosophical Heritage of V.I. Lenin 
p. 36.
134 Marshal A. Grechko, The Armed Forces of the Soviet State, 
Moscow, 1975 (United States Air Force Translation), p. 346.
135 Nerlich, 'Change in Europe', p. 85.
136 Gray, 'Strategic Stability Reconsidered', p. 147.
137 'Kissinger's Critique', p. 21. (emphasis added).
603.
CONCLUSION
And don't forget, he wasn’t Lenin then.
Henry Carr, in Travesties3 by Tom Stoppard.
As noted in the Introduction, this thesis is addressed to the 
current American debate over the political significance of Soviet 
doctrine on Peaceful Coexistence and related issues; but it approaches 
these issues in terms substantially different from those which have 
predominated in the American context. Thus, the chief concern has not 
been to distinguish genuine from propagandistic elements of Soviet 
doctrine or to relate specific doctrinal positions to specific groups 
within the Soviet political elite, but rather to assess the internal 
coherence of the broad corpus of Soviet doctrine, the analytical 
credibility of its basic organizing categories, and the extent of the 
adaptation in the basic Soviet line to the crucial, and initially 
unforeseen, international realities of protracted coexistence with 
the capitalist powers. Similarly, the concern here has been with the 
realism or appropriateness of Soviet doctrine as a general perspective 
on the problems of contemporary great power coexistence, not with its 
specific implications for the full range of 'American values' and 
'American interests' (though, of course, one important criterion of 
realism in this argument is precisely a basic sensitivity to the core 
'legitimate' interests of the opposing great power).
Given this core definition of the problem, I have attempted to 
demonstrate both the broad realism of the basic categories of the 
Kbftfrchevian 'coexistence synthesis', and the continuing refinement 
of the theme of state-to-state relations in the handling of those 
categories under the present regime. However, even the attempt to 
identify a 'basic line' involves a high degree of selection; and there 
is no way to distinguish completely between the process of identifying 
'important' elements of Soviet doctrine and the process of identifying 
'important' structural realities against which the credibility of that 
doctrine is to be assessed. The claim is not that this thesis avoids 
outright the extreme selectiveness and circular argumentation which 
was identified as a hallmark of the hawk approach to Soviet doctrine,
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but that it attempts to discipline the selection process in accordance 
with coherent and publicly accessible criteria. Therefore, before 
developing more fully the implications of the above conclusions about 
the realism of Soviet doctrine, it may be best to recapitulate the 
broad principles upon which the argument as a whole has been predicated.
First, there is the emphasis upon the logic of 'real', historically 
specific, social structures. I have assumed that any assessment of 
the appropriateness of Soviet international doctrine must be grounded 
in judgements about basic 'rules' of coexistence which ought to be 
acknowledged by both great powers. However, the rules in question must 
be derived not from the definitional requirements of an abstract and 
reified 'international system', but from the structural properties of 
a specific historical 'episode' of interstate coexistence, and from the 
shared prudential logic confronting specific (great power) members of a 
specific 'international society' of sovereign states.
Of course, the basic proposal is still to delineate the inner 
necessity of a particular, and disputable, conceptual world; and the 
mere shift from a 'systemic' language to a language of structured 
political choice provides no inbuilt guarantee that the latter 
conceptual world has any greater correspondence to the 'reality-out- 
there' than the former. Thus it must be reiterated that the 'realist' 
stance of this thesis is not an ontological claim at all, but rather 
a methodological claim that counterfactual argument should he conducted 
in a holistic rather than a piecemeal fashion' for instance, that one 
cannot assess the general adequacy of a 'states-system' image of 
contemporary world politics without also assessing the adequacy of the 
more specific image of the 'hardshelled state', which is effectively 
taken as given in the classical states-system paradigm but which has 
become increasingly problematic in the contemporary era. It is 
precisely this practical problem of counterfactual analysis which lies 
behind the arguments about the disruptive domestic implications of 
transitional development advanced in Part II. The aim there is not 
to subsume this highly complex and controversial issue under the formal 
Soviet teleology of the 'world revolutionary process', but rather to 
demonstrate that the equally far-reaching teleology of 'stability' 
implied in mainstream American analyses is also untenable, and provides, 
on balance, a more misleading practical guide to the problems and 
prospects of strategically significant Third World regions than does 
the Soviet account.
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Second, there is the commitment to a mode of argument which is 
not merely 'realist' but 'materialist in the first instance'. As has 
been repeatedly emphasized, this too is not an ontological claim but 
a methodological judgement about the most economical mode of social 
explanation; and it certainly does not rule out a practical elevation 
of cultural over material determinants in accounting for particular 
social phenomena. However, the notion of an objective logic of the 
(material) situation is especially important in evaluating the 
legitimacy of Soviet (or American) perspectives on the coexistence 
relationship: first, in identifying the common core of mutual interests
which ought logically to be acknowledged by either side; and, second, 
where interest claims are in substantive conflict,in identifying those 
core claims on either side which might logically be expected from any 
great power in that specific geopolitical and developmental situation, 
and which should therefore be acknowledged as 'legitimate' by the 
opposing side.
Of course, to state the issue in such simple terms is to assume 
what has already been rejected as a practical impossibility: namely,
a purely strategic situation, in which the clash of opposing interests 
is mitigated only by purely prudential considerations grounded in the 
most immediate situational logic. In practice, as has been noted, the 
enduring international order of the modern states-system has been 
partly dependent upon the effective moral force which certain 
traditional rules of behaviour have acquired precisely by virtue of 
their increasingly traditional status; while traditional values have 
normally played a major role in determining how the great powers of 
a particular era defined their own core national interests. However, 
the primary reason for the force of traditional solutions in the 
primarily strategic international context has been the broad continuity 
of the international structures which generated those traditions in the 
first place. And to ignore the far-reaching implications of contemporary 
structural change, for issues ranging from the general pattern of great 
power intervention in the 'periphery' to specific great power 'spheres 
of influence' claims, would be to ignore the most pervasive 
international tradition of all: the tradition of flexible adjustment
to the changing realities of power.
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Third, there is the tautological definition of political 
rationality as the accurate perception of one's own real interests 
and of the most appropriate means to advance them - a definition which 
shifts the emphasis in practical arguments about rationality away from 
questions about style in analysis and decisionmaking and towards 
questions about the conformity of its results with the objective logic 
of the situation. I have attempted to show that this definition can 
provide for a fruitful approach even to situations, such as domestic 
revolution, where real interests are irretrievably in flux and 
meaningful distinctions between instrumental and substantive rationality 
are virtually impossible to sustain. However, the notion of 
instrumental rationality clearly remains crucially important for any 
attempt to identify a core of common interest in basic procedural norms 
between actors enmeshed in wide-ranging strategic conflict over 
substantive issues; and I have argued that the paradigm case of such a 
common instrumental interest is provided by the limited but enduring 
international order of the modern states-system.
Thus the question at issue here is not whether the substantive 
Soviet vision of a preferred world order is a 'rational' or 'irrational' 
one (a question which is in practice permeated by idiosyncratic value 
judgements on either side of the ideological divide) , but whether the 
ostensible Soviet programme for realizing that vision acknowledges the 
basic prudential constraints which any rational actor ought to acknowledge 
in the contemporary international environment. This latter question 
often receives an a priori answer in the mainstream American debate, 
on the ground that the monistic, 'ideological' Soviet vision of world 
socialism (or Russian manifest destiny) is inherently incompatible 
with the working acceptance of limited, predictable 'national interest' 
goals or of an indefinite coexistence relationship. However, this view 
reflects a general failure to grasp that objective historical tension 
between international and world order goals which has re-acquired, in 
the contemporary era, the importance it had in the first centuries of 
the European states-system; and also a particular failure to recognize 
the covertly monistic character of the 'pluralist' American vision of 
world order. To repeat, the most economical and accessible explanation 
for any particular aspect of Soviet doctrine (or conduct) is that it is 
a rational, realistic or appropriate response to objective environmental
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problems; and less accessible, more 1 essentialist' accounts should be 
entertained only insofar as this simpler premise fails to answer the 
problem.
These general principles provide the epistemological underpinning 
for the specific model of the structure and environment of the 
contemporary great power relationship developed in Part II. It must 
be emphasized that no claim is made here for an elaborate theoretical 
apparatus to make sense of contemporary world politics. The proposed 
model is an avowedly rudimentary one, as it must be if it is to 
combine a high level of abstraction with historical specificity. If 
an extended theoretical excursus is nonetheless necessary to clear 
the ground for this essentially simple approach, it is necessary to 
counter the elaborate methodological claims of behaviouralism, on the 
one hand, and to justify the partial acceptance of perspectives that 
are often dismissed en bloc as ideological, monistic or historicist, 
on the other. However, since the central theoretical propositions of 
Part II do run counter to much conventional wisdom in this field, and 
since they are pivotal to the argument of the thesis as a whole, it 
is important to recapitulate them at this point.
First, the analysis of the Soviet-American relationship has been 
grounded in a material 'reference grid' with four constituent elements: 
the abstract structure of military power, the structure of geopolitics, 
the abstract structure of economic power, and the structure of 
differential stages of development. I have attempted to show that this 
provides a more flexible analytical framework than either the overt 
monism of neo-Marxist world-systems theory or the covert monism of 
mainstream American pluralism: both because of its explicit emphasis
on discrete episodic 'boundaries' and because of its identification of 
two 'overall structures' - of military and economic power - which are 
not, in the contemporary era at least, reducible one to the other. 
Moreover, while the basic tension between military and economic 
determinants provides the bedrock of the analysis, the proposed 
reference grid is 'situated' both spatially and temporally, to reflect
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the specific logic of geographical position and developmental tempos, 
thus resulting in the four dimensions listed above. Only in regard 
to the first dimension - the locus of the abstract, great power 
'security dilemma' - is the situational logic of the Soviet-American 
relationship essentially the same for both parties; and this 
consideration must seriously limit the prospects for a genuinely 
'comprehensive detente', even given maximum goodwill on either side.
Second, the argument has emphasized the extremist, even 
revolutionary political pressures generated in transitional states 
by virtue of their location within this overall framework of 
contemporary world politics. The analysis here draws explicitly on the 
'schizophrenic' Soviet picture of the 'international system' and the 
'world historical process', and it further highlights the core of 
realism in the Soviet preference for a limited or 'compartmentalized' 
detente in contemporary conditions. But the analysis itself is not 
a compartmentalized one: rather it is precisely the attempt to provide
an integrated overview of the structure and environment of the great 
power relationship which dictates the emphasis here on radically 
different patterns of strategic interaction in the international and 
domestic realms.
At one level, the analysis is integrated through a sharp formal 
contrast between the basic strategic logic of international power 
politics and of revolutionary situations within transitional states.
In the international realm, the existence of an entrenched plurality 
of power centres, whose relations are characterized by great 
inequality but low functional interdependence and relatively stable 
hierarchies of wealth and power, creates a situation in which conflict - 
though often violent - is substantially institutionalized, and is 
normally directed towards limited 'reasons of state' and not towards 
a fundamental rearrangement of the internal organization of the major 
competing powers. In revolutionary situations, the emergence of an 
embryonic and probably transient plurality of power centres, against 
a background of continuing inequality but growing functional inter­
dependence and unstable hierarchies of wealth and power, generates 
powerful incentives for the competing collective actors to ignore 
institutionalized constraints in an all-out struggle to seize the state 
apparatus and lay down their own particular vision of fundamental 
arrangements for the society in question.
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Thus, in contrast to pluralist conceptions of orderly development - 
which tacitly assume the 'normality' of the highly specific Anglo- 
American developmental experience, this thesis argues from the 
example of the modern states-system - as a paradigm of political 
continuity - to establish the 'normality' of extreme, even revolutionary 
political responses to the structural problems of transitional 
development. But the analysis is also integrated in a more concrete 
sense, through a focus upon the ambivalent logic confronting established 
'state managers' in transitional situations - especially in those 
larger 'semi-periphery' states most directly exposed to the pressures 
of the great power relationship. The sources of structural instability 
in such contexts must be sought not merely in the 'spontaneous' 
development of domestic social contradictions, nor merely in the 
exacerbation of such contradictions by transnational pressures from 
the world-economy, but also in the direct initiatives towards political 
and economic 'modernization' undertaken by state-managers themselves - 
initiatives which in turn directly reflect the basic logic of 
competitive emulation (or 'power balancing') which has shaped the 
central institutional practices of the modern states-system.
Third, a crucial counterpoint in this argument to the material 
reference grid is provided by the culturally specific traditions of 
(European) international society and of the major national societies 
considered in the argument. The emphasis here upon the material 
generation of such traditions 'in the first instance' is certainly 
not meant to deny their effective autonomy as structuring agents in 
contemporary world politics. On the contrary, it highlights that 
autonomy: for it indicates that such traditions must always be
regarded, in principle, as standing in a contingent relationship to 
the current logic of the material situation, and as capable of 
obscuring or even totally over-riding that logic through their sway 
over the practical consciousness of the relevant human actors. This 
principle is just as applicable to the traditional practices of the 
states-system.as it is, say, to the traditional practices of the 
Russian/Soviet 'patrimonial' state. Admittedly the former practices - 
by virtue of their grounding in the anarchical structure of international 
power politics - approach much closer to effective neutrality between 
the interests of major contenders than do the latter; and their 
development has also been relatively free from that 'spot welding' 
together of diverse social forms which has been such a striking
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feature of the Soviet domestic experience. But the realism (or 
substantive rationality) of international, as of domestic, practices 
must ultimately be assessed by reference to their conformity or 
otherwise with current situational logic; and some key features of the 
European tradition of multiple balance, with its institutionalization 
of (limited) central war for reasons of state, must now be regarded 
as irrational in this sense.
If this is true even of the 'state-centric* pluralism of 
European international society, it is the more true of the mainstream 
American perspective, in which a very specialized interpretation of 
the European tradition of multiple balance has effectively been 
cobbled onto an indigenous vision of pluralist world order, grounded 
in an idealization of the American development experience. The result, 
as has been repeatedly emphasized, is a world-view which is just as 
'monistic' in its way as the official Soviet one, but which - because 
it lacks the 'historicist' Soviet distinctions between different 
'spheres' of development, and between long-term and short-term goals 
- is less conducive in practice to the isolation of minimum 
international order criteria from the clash of wider world order 
claims.
At this point we are brought back to a distinctive feature of 
the argument foreshadowed in the Introduction: that it attempts to
evaluate the rationality of Soviet and American world-views as 
perspectives on contemporary world politics, while simultaneously 
acknowledging them as fundamental realities of contemporary world 
politics. In this regard, it may be objected that - having defined 
an initial constellation of questions by reference to apparent 
anomalies in the Soviet account, I have then constructed a model of 
the great power relationship calculated to make that account rational 
come-what-may. There can be no definitive, formal refutation of such 
a criticism; for the issue must ultimately be determined on practical 
grounds, by reference to the scope and coherence of the argument as 
a whole. I can only restate the view that the argument is adequate 
in its scope to the complexity of the problem, that it seeks to 
accommodate contradictions in contemporary world politics which are 
merely finessed on definitional grounds in mainstream pluralist 
accounts, and that it works from as limited and explicit a core of 
epistemological principles as possible. It is not alone in the 
theory of interstate coexistence, nor in the theory of domestic social
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change, but in the inter-relation between these two elements and in 
their common grounding in recent developments in philosophy of history 
and philosophy of science, that the analytical claims of this 
argument reside.
It remains to summarize the judgements on Soviet doctrine as 
such developed on the basis of these more general epistemological and 
substantive arguments. I have suggested that the official Soviet 
account does indicate, on balance, a realistic appreciation of the 
major 'international order' problems of the Soviet-American 
relationship; and that where that account is manifestly inadequate, 
the problem lies primarily in the intractable contradictions of 
contemporary world politics, rather than in peculiar limitations of 
the Soviet conceptual framework. To begin with the central question 
of the nuclear relationship, there is no compelling evidence in 
Soviet doctrine of a refusal to recognize the practical reality of 
mutual deterrence and the major implications which flow from it, 
including the practical impossibility of a successful 'first strike' 
strategy under present and foreseeable technological conditions. It 
is certainly true that Soviet doctrine indicates a deep concern with 
the fragility of deterrence despite the irrationality of the 
alternatives, and a commitment to fighting a nuclear war if deterrence 
should break down. But this is most reasonably viewed as a traditional 
military response to an intractable new problem. It is clearly an 
inadequate response; but it is less disturbing overall than those 
American 'limited war' concepts which are much more obviously designed 
to retain an integral role for nuclear weapons in the flexible 
'spectrum of capabilities' underpinning American diplomacy.
This much said, the question of detailed and systematic strategies 
for nuclear warfighting is pervaded by a general sense of unreality, 
and the more tangible implications of warfighting goals on either side 
lie in the convenient rationale which they provide for openended 
competition in the strategic arms race. As has been noted, the 
pattern of this arms race is to some extent a 'natural' reflection 
of the structural logic of the contemporary 'bipolar' system, as both
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sides pursue a traditional great power concern with maintaining a 
favourable 'balance' on their own side, in conditions which place 
a premium on competitive improvements in capability as a means 
towards this goal. However, the traditional security dilemma has been 
given an unusually sinister twist by the anomalous character of nuclear 
weapons as essentially irrational instruments of diplomacy, in that 
the intense qualitative competition of the past decade must inevitably 
prompt suspicions on either side that the other is hankering after 
the Chimera of a 'usable' first strike advantage. Since this strategic 
competition has also been accompanied by the globalization of 
conventional capabilities on both sides - capabilities which do appear, 
at least superficially, to offer tangible diplomatic rewards~ but which 
also lock the two great powers more closely into the autonomous 
conflicts of an increasingly 'crowded' periphery - the preoccupation 
with the use of nuclear weapons 'in the last resort' is further 
intensified.
There is no doubt that the recent Soviet advance in both the 
nuclear and conventional areas constitutes a major extension in this 
general militarization of world politics. But this is substantially 
explicable as a drive to 'catch up' with already established American 
capabilities; and it is by no means clear, once account is taken of 
the inevitable lag between procurement and deployment of major weapons 
systems, that the chief initiative in this respect now lies on the 
Soviet side. And on the matter of declared policy (which, to repeat, 
is a crucial component of the hawk interpretation of the otherwise 
ambiguous pattern of Soviet procurement) such an assumption is 
particularly questionable. The Soviet leadership did indeed proclaim 
its commitment to superiority throughout the first post-war 
generation: but so, for the most part, did the American leadership,
which was much better placed, given the actual balance of forces, 
to contemplate meaningful initiatives in arms control and reduction.
And since the early 1970s, when the catching-up drive had achieved 
its most obvious goal, the Soviet leadership has shifted towards an 
increasingly unequivocal disavowal of aspirations towards superiority, 
and displayed a consistent, if narrowly focussed, declaratory commitment 
to the SALT process which is in substantial contrast to the ups and 
downs of official American pronouncements in this regard.
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To t u m  from these more narrowly military questions to the wider 
questions of the Soviet 'working theory of contemporary world history' 
is to encounter the area in which Soviet doctrine is most distinctive 
- and also, I would argue, the area in which its particular contribution 
to the understanding of international issues is most substantial.
There has been much dissension in the American debate over whether the 
'schizophrenic' Soviet picture of world politics reflects the genuine 
perceptions of the Soviet leadership, but relatively little challenge 
to the view that the picture itself is a disturbing one which, insofar 
as it does accurately reflect Soviet perceptions, suggests a basic 
inability to contemplate a truly comprehensive relationship of 
coexistence and detente. The argument here, by contrast, is that the 
contradictions in Soviet doctrine reflect contradictions in the world: 
in the general history of the modern states-system, whose central core 
of procedural norms and practices has survived so long because it has 
been largely 'insulated' from a continuous process of more or less 
intense change in the system's underlying socio-political fabric; and, 
more particularly, in the contemporary phase of the system, which is 
structurally closer to the disordered situation of early modern 
Europe than to the 'classic' periods of multiple balance and limited 
power politics of the 18th and 19th centuries. Similarly, the 
complexity of levels and tempos in contemporary world politics is more 
adequately represented by the crude, but historically oriented Soviet 
doctrine of the correlation of forces than by the synchronic image of 
the international (or world) system which evidently informs American 
criticisms of that doctrine. And given the persistent elongation of 
the official Soviet image of the transition to world socialism, its 
effective acknowledgement of a piecemeal, 'building block' approach 
to world revolution, and its markedly statist approach to the question 
of 'national liberation', the Soviets may in one sense be said to 
provide a positive rationale for a 'state-centric' pluralism in the 
transition period.
As has been noted, this image of long-term struggle for control 
of the world economy has a very respectable Leninist pedigree, and it 
has been constantly promulgated for almost thirty years by the post- 
Stalin leadership. There has been, for the most part, a striking 
consistency between the general 'coexistence synthesis' established
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by Khrushchev and the doctrinal position of the current regime; and 
the elongation of the 'transition period', in particular, has now 
been carried so far as to project the situation of capitalist-socialist 
coexistence well beyond the scope of any plausibly 'foreseeable future' 
But it is also true that the broad Khrushchevian appeal to the concept 
of 'peaceful economic competition' - admittedly in conditions of 
relative military weakness on the Soviet side - has given way to an 
increasing doctrinal emphasis - mirrored in Soviet practice - on the 
importance of socialist-bloc military assistance to the national 
liberation struggle. I have suggested that the Soviet attempt to 
reconcile this approach with support for an 'irreversible' but 
compartmentalized detente effectively resurrects a very traditional 
mode of great power conflict management: the insulation of conflicts
of interest 'beyond the line' from relations in the core of the 
system. This is at least an advance on the more exclusivist position 
on this score of the United States during the 1950s and 1960s. But, 
as has also been noted, the attempt to insulate conflicts in the 
periphery has in the past tended to evolve into a positive rationale 
for unrestricted great power intervention in that region; and in the 
'closed' global system of today, such a prospect would rapidly 
destabilize a great power relationship which, in most other respects, 
is more genuinely 'in balance' than at any previous point in this 
century.
This raises, finally, a paradox which has been encountered on 
several occasions, in regard to the hawk argument for the 'Russian' 
derivation of Soviet expansionism. Soviet international conduct, 
and increasingly Soviet international doctrine, have substantially 
'converged' in the post-war era on that traditional great power 
posture which was once widely regarded in the West as the sine qua non 
of a viable coexistence relationship with the Soviet bloc. But this 
development has, on balance, increased rather than diminished the 
Soviet contribution to world military tensions: not merely in the
obvious sense that the Soviets now have a greater capability to 
interfere in military conflicts away from their own borders, but also 
in the sense that, after a tentative exploration of less militarized 
forms of struggle in the Khrushchev era, they have increasingly 
conformed to a more traditional conception of great power management
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rights, and in particular to the standard established in this area by 
the United States in the first post-war generation. This paradox has 
been handled in the hawk literature by the assertion that the Russian 
historical experience has militated against a true great power 
perspective in Soviet policy, based upon relatively well-defined 
conceptions of national interest and a general sensitivity to 'how 
much is enough'. But the polemical deployment of this partial truth 
(which is also applicable to the United States) has obscured the 
larger truth that a traditional great power perspective is, in itself, 
inadequate to the contradictory realities of contemporary world politics.
This, I would argue, is the underlying reason for the 
resilience of the ideological perspectives of interdependence/ 
developmental pluralism, on the American side, and national liberation/ 
anti-imperialist struggle, on the Soviet. Each perspective is 
partial and often misleading; and each can be used to rationalize 
'geopolitical' and 'mercantilist' policies which are both self- 
serving in immediate impulse and also based upon anachronistic 
perceptions of the real long-term interest of either great power.
But each perspective, insofar as it implies that states-system and 
world-economy issues must be comprehended together or not at all, 
points to a crucial feature of contemporary world politics which 
cannot be exorcized merely by appeals for a turn back from 'ideological' 
to 'pragmatic' attitudes in this area. Indeed, given a choice between 
the broad declaratory stances of the American and Soviet leaderships 
at the outset of the detente era, one might reasonably prefer the 
latter. Not the declining viability of all "isms", to which Nixon 
and Kissinger looked forward with approval, but genu ine detente 
combined with genu ine ideological struggle (as opposed to a state- 
directed ritual rationalizing the suppression of domestic dissent), 
seems the most appropriate prescription for a healthy future 
relationship between the great powers themselves and between the 
great powers collectively and the rest of the world.
In conclusion, it is worth recalling Hinsley's 1962 observation 
that the Cold War might 'go down in history as another of those 
periods in which the majority of men have railed against the crisis
-]of their time when, in reality, the crisis had already passed away'.
Men are still railing against the crisis of Soviet-American coexistence, 
and at least partly for that reason the crisis itself has not yet
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passed away. But the other, more fundamental crisis emphasized by 
Hinsley - the crisis in the social, economic and political development 
of the Third World - has grown still more intense with the passage of 
time, and it carries with it growing possibilities for the catalytic 
extension of otherwise containable great power tensions into a 
general military conflagration.
It would be misleading to suggest that an end to ideological 
'misperception1 on both sides could remove the real and substantial 
conflicts of interest between the Soviet Union and the United States.
But it would be still more misleading to deny the common core of 
interest in basic conflict management procedures transcending these 
specific conflicts between the two powers; and I have attempted to 
show that these common interests are acknowledged with increasing 
clarity in the official Soviet account. Moreover, behind this 
doctrinal evidence of basic prudential realism, I have attempted to 
show that the Soviet account provides an important, if undeniably 
partial, insight into those problems of Third World development 
which will increasingly complicate the great power relationship over 
the remainder of the century. On balance, there are strong reasons 
for holding that exercises in 'taking Soviet doctrine seriously' 
should be directed less towards the search for improbable messages 
about Soviet intentions concealed behind its 'Aesopian' exterior 
and more towards a serious consideration of its potential contribution 
to the common enterprise of understanding the current transitional era 
in world politics. For it is a common enterprise, as it is an 
enterprise of the transition. Comprehensive philosophical afterthought 
will be available only when, and if, the more dangerous rapids have 
already been negotiated; and the recent history of 'transition - 
thought' on these questions provides no warrant for gratuitously 
narrowing on ideological grounds the range of historical experience 
'available' to theoretical reflection in the present crisis.
Twentieth century international theory has characteristically resembled 
Eliot's 'raid on the inarticulate, with shabby equipment always
deteriorating' and twentieth century international practice has all-
2too-often constituted 'a different kind of failure'. This is one 
kind of novelty that the world can no longer afford.
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